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Preface 
 
 
The world today is shaped by high dynamics. Multitude of processes evolves parallel and 
partly connected invisible. For example, the globalisation is such a process. Here one can ob-
serve the exponential growing of connections form the level of single humans to the level of 
cultures. Such connections guide as to the term complexity. Complexity is often understood as 
product of the number of elements and the amount of connections in the system. In other 
words, the world is going more complex, if the connections increase. Complexity itself is a 
term for a system, which is not fully understood, which is partly uncontrollable and indetermi-
nated: exactly as humans. Growing from a single cell, the humans will show latter a behaviour, 
which we can not predict in detail. After all, the human brain consists of 1011 elements (cells). 
If the social dynamical processes yield to more complexity, we have to accept more indetermi-
nation. Well, one has to hope, that such an indetermination does not affect the basic of human 
existence. If we look at the field of technology, we can detect, that here indetermination or 
uncertainty is often be dealt with explicitly. This is valid for natural risk management, for nu-
clear engineering, civil engineering or for the design of ships. And so different the fields are 
which contribute to this symposium for all is valid: People working in this field have realised, 
that a responsible usage of technology requires consideration of indetermination and uncer-
tainty. This level is not yet reached in the social sciences. It is the wish of the organisers of this 
symposium, that not only civil engineers, mechanical engineers, mathematicians, ship builders 
take part in this symposium, but also sociologists, managers and even politicians. Therefore 
there is still a great opportunity to grow for this symposium. Indetermination does not have to 
be negative: it can also be seen as chance.  
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Vorwort 
 
 
Die heutige Welt der Menschen wird durch große Dynamik geprägt. Eine Vielzahl verschie-
dener Prozesse entfaltet sich parallel und teilweise auf unsichtbare Weise miteinander verbun-
den. Nimmt man z.B. den Prozess der Globalisierung: Hier erleben wir ein exponentielles 
Wachstum der internationalen Verknüpfungen von der Ebene einzelner Menschen und bis zur 
Ebene der Kulturen. Solche Verknüpfungen führen uns zum Begriff der Komplexität. Diese 
wird oft als Produkt der Anzahl der Elemente eines Systems mal Umfang der Verknüpfungen 
im System verstanden. In anderen Worten, die Welt wird zunehmend komplexer, denn die 
Verknüpfungen nehmen zu. Komplexität wiederum ist ein Begriff für etwas unverstandenes, 
unkontrollierbares, etwas unbestimmtes. Genau wie bei einem Menschen: Aus einer Zelle 
wächst ein Mensch, dessen Verhalten wir im Detail nur schwer vorhersagen können. Immerhin 
besitzt sein Gehirn 1011 Elemente (Zellen). Wenn also diese dynamischen sozialen Prozesse zu 
höherer Komplexität führen, müssen wir auch mehr Unbestimmtheit erwarten. Es bleibt zu 
Hoffen, dass die Unbestimmtheit nicht existenzielle Grundlagen betrifft. Was die Komplexität 
der Technik angeht, so versucht man hier im Gegensatz zu den gesellschaftlichen Unsicherhei-
ten die Unsicherheiten zu erfassen und gezielt mit ihnen umzugehen. Das gilt für alle Berei-
che, ob nun Naturgefahrenmanagement, beim Bau und Betrieb von Kernkraftwerken, im 
Bauwesen oder in der Schifffahrt. Und so verschieden diese Fachgebiete auch scheinen mö-
gen, die an diesem Symposium teilnehmen: Sie haben erkannt, das verantwortungsvoller Um-
gang mit Technik einer Berücksichtigung der Unbestimmtheit bedarf. Soweit sind wir in ge-
sellschaftlichen Prozessen noch nicht. Wünschenswert wäre, dass in einigen Jahren nicht nur 
Bauingenieure, Maschinenbauer, Mathematiker oder Schiffsbauer an einem solchen Probabi-
listik-Symposium teilnehmen, sondern auch Soziologen, Politiker oder Manager. Es bleibt 
also noch viel Entwicklungspotential für dieses Symposium. Bleiben wir gespannt, Unbe-
stimmtheit kann auch positiv sein. 
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Modelling human behaviour in the assessment of naviga-
tional safety in restricted areas  
Zbigniew Pietrzykowski 
Institute of Marine Navigation, Maritime University of Szczecin 
Abstract: This article presents a problem of modeling processes of navigators' 
decision making during simulation research on ships' movement in a restricted 
area. The acquisition and representation of navigators' knowledge makes it 
possible to build a model of behaviour which takes into consideration decision 
making criteria used by the human being. The use of behaviour models in 
simulation research on ship movement in a restricted area allows to analyze 
and evaluate the navigational safety in these areas with the human factor taken 
into account. 
1 Introduction 
Increasing awareness of societies and economical factors make people draw more attention 
to problems of navigational safety. The safety of personnel, ships, cargo and environment 
has to be ensured both at sea and in inland navigation as the vessel traffic increases and so 
does vessel size, maximum speeds. The concern particularly refers to ships carrying haz-
ardous goods: tankers, gas carriers, chemical tankers. At the same time the human factor 
becomes of more importance due to the fact that human errors are most often causes of 
navigational accidents.  
The assessment of navigational safety is essential in both analyses and project works (off 
line) and in ship control and management (on line). These problems, or in more general 
terms, qualitative and quantitative description of vessel traffic in restricted areas are dealt 
with by the discipline called marine traffic engineering.  
Modelling human decision making processes – those referring to a navigator steering a 
ship in a restricted area is a detailed research problem of marine traffic engineering. Navi-
gators' behaviour models are used for designing systems of autonomous ship movement 
control and for simulation tests of ship movement. Such models can also be used for a cur-
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rent assessment of a navigational situation and safety analysis in project research as well as 
navigator training.  
One essential component of the models is navigators' knowledge acquired and properly 
represented. This knowledge refers to. e.g. criteria for navigational situation assessment. 
Besides, the knowledge can be used in the classical risk analysis, based on probabilistic 
methods in designing work, ship control and vessel traffic control. 
2 Decision making models 
The decision process can be divided into stages. Their correct execution is a prerequisite 
for the decision to be correct, which, consequently, affects the effectiveness of decision 
maker’s actions (Fig. 1).  
 
information 
acquisition 
sit. analysis 
and assessment 
making 
a decision
taking 
action 
 
Fig. 1. The stages of the decision making process 
The correctness of decisions made by a navigator depends, among others, on the scope and 
quality of available information, navigator’s knowledge, experience and skills and his 
knowledge of the problem being solved. It also refers to the assessment of a navigational 
situation and decisions made during sea-going ship movement control. In this case it is im-
portant which model of a situation is used, adopted methods of analysis and assessment 
and the type and scope of decisions considered by the navigator as admissible.  
Information describing a navigational situation may be of various character in the decision 
making process: 
• deterministic (the parameters and state vector values of own and target ships are 
known), 
• probabilistic (information describing the problem is expressed by appropriate prob-
ability distributions), 
• uncertainty (probability distributions are not known), 
• fuzziness (uncertainty relates to both an occurrence of an event and its signifi-
cance). 
In the classical approach the deterministic form of the mentioned elements is adopted. 
A number of classification criteria can be distinguished for decision making models, such 
as the character (form) of a model, type of controlled system, number of decision stages, 
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number of criteria and number of decision makers. In work [5] two main approaches are 
proposed for decision making modelling:  
• descriptive approach; it is not based on the knowledge of a model defining the out-
put (effect) as a function of input (cause), but on knowing what input values are to 
be selected in order to obtain desired output values; 
• prescriptive (normative) approach; this approach is based on the knowledge of a 
model defining the output (effect) as a function of input (cause), and it uses a rele-
vant conventional optimizing algorithm for gaining an optimal process control. 
Both descriptive and prescriptive approaches can be used for decision making modelling in 
various system optimization and control problems: 
• deterministic (transition from one state to another at a preset control input, de-
scribed by a deterministic relation), 
• statistical (transition from one state at a preset control input to next states at a de-
fined probability), 
• fuzzy (transition from one crisp or fuzzy state – at a preset control input, defined by 
a crisp or fuzzy relation). 
Deterministic, statistical and fuzzy models are created depending on the type of the system 
being controlled, decision variables and goals.  
There exists a class of problems in which the searched for decision has to account for more 
than one criterion. This necessitates finding a compromise as goals are often much differ-
ent. Another difficulty in the modeling decision processes executed by human beings is 
that the human often fails to maximize, preferring to reach a defined value of the goal 
function, called the aspiration level. 
The decision process can comprise one (e.g. one-stage optimization) or many stages (con-
trol). In the case of multi-stage control we can identify problems with various times of their 
completion: preset in advance, or set in a covert manner, fuzzy or indefinite. 
The number of decision makers is also significant. Problems of decision making where 
there are more than one decision makers are a subject of group decision, human teams and 
N-person game theories. This diversification results from taking into account decision 
makers’ preferences (identical or different) and access to information (identical or differ-
ent). 
The variety of decision making models is a consequence of diversity of systems, existing 
constraints, goals and criteria used. It also refers to models of navigators’ behaviour in the 
process sea-going ship movement control. 
4th International Probabilistic Symposium, 12th-13th October 2006 
4 
3 Navigators’ behaviour models 
The navigator, making a decision, to a greater or lesser degree relies on approximate val-
ues, uses approximate models of objects and approximate constraints and goals. Therefore, 
one should consider all possible combinations of „certainties” and „uncertainties” affecting 
ship control. In order to simplify thus formulated problem, the following assumptions were 
made [10]: 
• The navigator uses a simplified model of own ship. It is assumed that it is a deter-
ministic model, and refers to other objects as well. 
• The navigator, planning manoeuvre execution, assesses a given navigational situa-
tion and determines ship movement trajectory: ship’s positions and necessary 
courses at subsequent instants. This refers in particular to difficult and complicated 
situations. S/he optimizes ship’s trajectory looking for a series of control inputs 
such as courses that will assure performing a manoeuvre as s/he has planned. 
• In situations where neither difficult nor complex decisions have to be made the 
navigator applies simpler solutions. S/he replaces a prescriptive decision making 
model by a descriptive one, based on solutions found by a deterministic method or 
on fuzzy inference. 
• Depending on a situation, the navigator uses deterministic or fuzzy goals and con-
straints. 
• Deviations from the worked out trajectory at defined discrete instants are corrected 
by him/her on the basis of a descriptive model. 
In this way navigator’s behaviour models – decision process models – can be presented as 
these superimposed models: 
• prescriptive (decision making) and descriptive (ship movement control) (Fig. 2), 
• descriptive (decision making) and descriptive (ship movement control) (Fig. 3) 
Modelling navigators’ behaviour calls for the identification of goals and constraints used 
by them. These include the assurance of navigational safety, incorporation of good sea 
practice principles, economical aspect (loss of way, loss of time, fuel consumption). The 
navigator implements the goals by using corresponding criteria while making decisions.  
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Fig. 2. A prescriptive model of navigator’s behaviour 
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Fig. 3 A descriptive model of navigator’s behaviour. 
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4 Classical criteria of navigational situation assessment 
The assurance of navigational safety is strictly connected with continuous analysis and as-
sessment of a navigational situation based on adequate assessment criteria: 
• those resulting directly from regulations (general ones (Colreg [1], local and spe-
cific), and  
• those resulting from navigators’ knowledge and experience.  
It should be emphasized that even in the regulations that are references to navigators’ 
knowledge and experience. 
The use of criteria of navigational situation assessment requires that quantitative or qualita-
tive measures and indicators are introduced (distance, time, impact energy, safety level in-
dicators). These are, among others, distance to other objects, closest point of approach 
(CPA) and time to the closest point of approach (TCPA), indicators of safety/danger level, 
ship’s domain. If the relevant regulation do not state otherwise, it is the navigator who 
specifies the criteria.  
The criterion known as the closest point of approach (CPA) is commonly employed in the 
assessment of a navigational situation, and used in automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA). 
This criterion assumes that the navigator specifies a minimum (safe) distance for the pass-
ing of another object – minimum closest point of approach (CPAL). An additional criterion 
is the time to the closest point of approach (TCPA) – its minimum value TCPAL is defined 
by the navigator as well. There are also criteria taking into account the magnitudes CPAL 
and TCPAL at the same time. Examples of such criteria are the risk level indicators or the 
collision risk coefficients. In this case the navigator also defines its minimum admissible 
value. 
In the process of ship conduct the navigator tries to keep a certain area around the ship free 
from other navigational objects. The area is referred to as ship’s domain [3]. The presence 
of another vessel in the domain area is interpreted as a hazard to navigational safety. Ana-
lytical and statistical methods are mainly used for the determination of ship’s domain. 
Generally the determination of navigation safety level is connected with the determination 
of navigation safety indicator. The indicator can be written as the functional P [4]: 
),,,( MSRBF=Ρ   (1)
Where B  – area parameters, 
 R  – vessel parameters, 
 S  – position determination system parameters, 
 M  – hydro-meteorological parameters. 
 
The principal problem is that it is difficult to describe the functional in analytical terms. 
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5 Criteria of navigational situation assessment based of 
knowledge representation 
Each decision in ship movement control is based on the situation analysis and assessment. 
That is why more and more attention is drawn to the problems of acquisition, extraction 
and representation of navigators’ knowledge on the subject, so that it can be utilized in de-
cision support systems. These problems are dealt with by knowledge engineering. This dis-
cipline uses methods and tools for the acquisition of and structuring of experts’ knowledge 
as well as the matching and selection of proper methods of inference and clarification of 
problems being solved. This refers to both procedural knowledge – procedure formulated 
by the experts – and declarative i.e. descriptive knowledge, defined by sets of facts, state-
ments, rules. Declarative knowledge is particularly difficult to acquire and represent, as is 
typical of elements of uncertainty and fuzziness. These elements result from, among oth-
ers, inaccurate and imprecise parameters characterizing the analyzed phenomenon and 
from the fact the expert uses linguistic concepts in the description of parameters (e.g. dan-
gerous / (very) safe distance, etc.). 
The work [6] proposes a method of navigational safety level determination based on the 
representation of expert navigators’ knowledge, using artificial neural networks with the 
fuzzy logic. 
These networks, after the learning process, make it possible to assess navigational situa-
tions according to the criteria used by navigators. The learning data comprise facts col-
lected within expert research (simulation and questionnaire research): parameters charac-
terizing a navigational situation (such as ship’s state vector parameters) and the assessment 
of navigational safety level of the situations recorded. The network was supposed to im-
plement the development (Fig. 1) 
( )ωϕγ ,,∆∆= yf   (2)
where ∆y  – deviation from the fairway center line [m], 
  ∆φ  –  deviation from the preset course [°], 
  ω – the turn rate. 
 
Both the CPA criterion as well as ship’s domain (see Chapter 4) divide navigational situa-
tions into safe and dangerous ones. The concept of ship’s domain has been generalised and 
extended to the concept of ship’s fuzzy domain [7]: area around the ship which the naviga-
tor should maintain free from other vessels and objects; the shape and size of that area de-
pends on the assumed navigational safety level. 
The determination of ship’s fuzzy domain is based on the representation of navigators’ 
knowledge, making it possible to determine navigational safety level for any navigational 
situation that may occur. Using the method discussed in [8] and employing an artificial 
neural network with fuzzy logic we can determine areas of a preset navigational safety 
level. Fig. 4. presents fuzzy domains of ships of various sizes in an area 200 m wide.  
Similarly to the notion of ship’s fuzzy domain we can introduce and define the concept of 
fuzzy closest point of approach. The criterion of fuzzy closest point of approach is inter-
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preted as follows: the navigator, setting the value of the closest point of approach CPAL, 
determines a safe passing distance between ships. The passing at a ‘slightly’ larger distance 
will assure a higher level of safety. Besides, a ‘slightly lower’ value of CPA (CPA < CPAL) 
is allowed. When two ships pass each other at such a distance, there will be no collision 
and the situation is acceptable. Thus the tolerance interval 〈CPALmin, CPALmax〉 is assumed, 
described by the values of the navigational safety level, as is the case for the ship’s fuzzy 
domain. 
6 Restrictions in choosing the right track 
While steering a ship in a restricted area the navigator has to maintain a safe distance to 
other objects and at the same time s/he has to account for the regulations in force, specific 
character of the area and the current traffic situation. There is no choice of track, which 
results from the shape of the navigable restricted area, from increased vessel traffic and the 
necessity to execute such manoeuvres as passing, overtaking, crossing, following another 
ship, passing a berthing or anchoring ship and others.  
All this requires maximum caution, and to maintain it several criteria are used: 
• navigational safety of own ship, 
• safe distance of passing, overtaking, crossing courses of other ships or objects, 
• clear (noticeable) admissible course alteration, 
• steering (if applicable) along the defined fairway centre line, or recommended tra-
jectory, 
• economical: loss of way, loss of time, fuel consumption, etc. 
For instance, in the passing manoeuvre (ships on opposite courses) in the fairway safe dis-
tance to the other ship has to be maintained (goal) and to the fairway limit (constraint). The 
same applies to overtaking. When passing a berthed or anchored ship, the main goal is to 
maintain safe distance such that no damage will be done to the other ship, e.g. breaking of 
mooring lines or anchor chain, while a safe distance to the area limit has to be kept as well. 
Another constraint is a noticeable admissible alteration of ship’s course. 
These criteria can be determined on the basis of expert research. Tools of the fuzzy set the-
ory were used for their identification and representation. Some of them are as follows: 
• ship’s fuzzy domain DSF – criterion of own and other ship’s navigational safety, 
• fuzzy sets of trajectory shift relative to the recommended trajectory (fairway centre 
line) CRF, noticeable admissible course alteration CCF and, if they occur, safe dis-
tance from a berthed or anchored ship, respectively CMF and CAF , described by cor-
responding functions of membership µCRF, µCMF and µCAF. 
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b) ship 95 m in length, 18 m breadth and 5,5 m 
draft 
c) ship 156 m in length, 24 m breadth and 
9,3 m draft 
Fig. 4. Ship’s fuzzy domain on the waterway of 200 m wide. Navigational safety level γ: 
0 – safe; 1 – dangerous (collision) [12] 
These and not other methods and tools of fuzzy set theory have been used because they 
offer, among others, the following possibilities: 
• description of criteria for the choice of way (including the navigational safety crite-
rion) intuitively follows the human pattern, accounting for imprecision (fuzziness) 
of the criteria – gradual transition from elements belonging to the sets to those not 
belonging to the sets of such elements, 
• aggregation of criteria defined in various spaces (e.g. distance, course), 
• description of human decision making process as an optimization one-stage or 
multi-stage problem  with fuzzy goals and constraints. 
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• Use of classical optimization methods for solving thus formulated optimization 
problem. 
7 Assessment of navigational safety in the fairway 
The criterion of ship’s fuzzy domain can be used for the current assessment of a naviga-
tional situation (on line), as well as for an analysis of traffic processes (off line) in re-
stricted areas, which may comprise various parts of fairways, i.e. straight sections and 
bends. For instance, the above criterion was used for assessing navigational safety of a ship 
proceeding in a fairway bend 200 metres wide. Figures 5 and 6 present, respectively, an 
”ideal” and ”dangerous” passages of a ship 95 m in length, 18 m breadth, moving within a 
fairway bend, with recorded values of the safety level.  
 
(a) ship’s trajectory 
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(b) values of the navigational safety level γ 
Fig. 5.”Ideal”ship’s passage on a fairway bend [2]  
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8 Assessment of navigational safety of the manoeuvre of 
passing a mooring ship 
Ships moving in a restricted area are forced to manoeuvre by passing or overtaking other 
moving or stationary objects. While assessing navigational safety, the navigator has to take 
into account the safety of his/her own ship and that of other objects. Figure 7 shows an ex-
ample of passing a moored ship and the recorded values of navigational safety level: of 
own ship, (passing ship), mooring ship and overall assessment of navigational situation. 
This allows to make a more detailed analysis of manoeuvres executed. 
 
(a) ship’s trajectory 
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(b) values of the navigational situation assessment γ 
Fig. 6. “Dangerous” passage on a fairway bend [2] 
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(b) navigational situation assessment: 1- navigational safety level γ of the own ship; 2 - safety level of the mooring 
ship  
Fig. 7 Manoeuvre of passing a mooring ship  
9 The probabilistic-fuzzy method for manoeuvring risk as-
sessment 
Modelling human behaviour, particularly the acquisition and representation of human 
knowledge and experience, enables us to extend methods of manoeuvring risk assessment 
used so far. This will be useful in a current analysis of navigational safety and in designing 
work. The probabilistic-fuzzy method of manoeuvring assessment is one example of this 
approach [9]. The method was used in assessing the safety of a ship manoeuvring within a 
fairway bend being in the stage of designing. The presented approach makes it possible to 
assess navigational safety taking into account dangerous situations, i.e. situations when a 
ship comes too close to the fairway border, which may result in safety failure situation. 
The probability of such a situation can be determined on the basis of the density function in 
which the random variables are locations of extreme points of the ship in the fairway 
(separately for the straboard and port sides of fairway limits), as well as on the basis of the 
defined fuzzy set: dangerous situation – dangerous distance to the port (left) and starboard 
(right-hand) fairway limit.  
The relevant research was carried out in a fairway bend, 150m broad at the bottom, with 
the radius of 600m [9]. The fairway was divided into sections with limits running perpen-
dicular to its centre line. The ship used for research was a loaded tanker with 40000 DWT 
capacity, length overall L=196m, beam B=28m and draft T=11m. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate 
the determined values of a probability of a collision and of dangerous situation occurrence. 
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Fig. 8. Probability of an accident on the starboard (right) and port (left) side of the water-
way [9]. 
10 Models of navigators’ behaviour in the process of ship 
control 
The models of navigators’ behaviour introduced in Chapter 3 were implemented in the 
problem of the ship’s safe trajectory determination. Examples of the trajectories obtained 
by using an optimization algorithm – multi-stage control in a fuzzy environment – are 
shown in Figure 10.  
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Fig. 9. Probability of dangerous situation occurrence for the waterway starboard and port 
sides (Zadeh’s approach) [9]. 
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(a) overtaking manoeuvre 
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(b) passing manoeuvre 
Fig.10. Trajectories of ship movement in a restricted area; positions (x) on 60 [s] time in-
tervals [11] 
It is possible to implement the mentioned models in simulation research into ship move-
ment processes in restricted areas. The diversification of criteria of situation assessment 
and the choice of way will enable modelling movement of ships as autonomous objects, 
with consideration given to individual behaviour of navigators. In this way the possibility 
arises for a comprehensive analysis and assessment of navigational safety in restricted ar-
eas. 
11 Summary 
The analysis and assessment of navigational safety in restricted areas is essential in the 
process of ship movement control in order to prevent accidents as well as in designing new 
or modernizing existing waterways.  Such tasks have to account for the human factor – 
namely navigator’s behaviour. This article presents models of human behaviour which take 
into account criteria used by the navigator in the process of ship movement control in a re-
stricted area.  Examples are shown of the use of these models in navigational situation ana-
lysis and assessment. 
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Stochastic structural modelling 
Konrad Bergmeister& Simon Hoffmann 
BOKU, Department of Civil Engineering + Natural Hazards, Vienna, Austria 
Abstract: The Department of Civil Engineering & Natural Hazards has a more 
than 5 year long experience in stochastic modelling of complex structures. This 
contribution gives a brief introduction to the models generated during this pe-
riod. Several applications are demonstrated to show the capabilities of this soft-
ware system for structural analysis. Their specific characteristics regarding 
geometry, load cases and modelling is outlined. The sampling used for the sin-
gle applications is described. Basic results taken from each single analysis are 
discussed. The contributions extend allow no detailed presentation of all results 
obtained during the last 5 years, but a substantial list of references shall help 
for further investigations. 
1 Introduction  
During the last few decades practical methods for the reliability assessment of structural 
infrastructure have been developed to assist engineers in probabilistic analysis. These 
methods help to quantify reliability within the inspection and assessment, as well as imma-
nent uncertainties by sensitivity analysis. Eventually decision making about the structural 
resistance is eased. The considered structures can still be in the design phase, under con-
struction or already in use. Therefore it is essential to apply the basic principles and meth-
ods as a problem related reliability analysis including the posing of possible risks. The 
objective is to confirm the updating and decision making methods. 
1.1 Structural analysis SARA 
The procedures used for the applications is implemented in the integrated software system 
SARA (Safety Analysis and Reliability Analysis), which was developed in the course of a 
project called “Structure Analysis and Reliability Assessment”. Based on a deterministic 
nonlinear FEM model finally a Reliability index β is obtained by the calculation of multi-
ple models simulating the distribution of the input parameters. The concept of the reliabil-
ity assessment with its main steps is demonstrated in figure 1, taken from a more detailed 
description of the system in [8] and [9]. 
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Figure 1: Concept of reliability assessment 
2 Application Examples 
2.1 Segmental bridge in Vienna 
The single span bridge in Vienna over Highway A23 is 25 years old.  Due to an ongoing 
construction project the bridge was demolished in 2002. During the demolition a range of 
non-destructive tests as well as finally a full-scale destructive load test were performed. 
The presented reliability assessment was a part of the predictive numerical study [6] for 
planning and optimizing the test setup. 
2.1.1 Geometry 
The length of the bridge is 44.60 m, the width 6.40 m and the height 2.10 m (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Side elevation of the bridge from the west. 
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The fully post-tensioned box-girder bridge was made of 18 segments with lengths of 2.485 
m each. The segmental joints were filled with epoxy resin. The segments were cast from 
concrete B500 and are rein-forced with mild steel St 50. The post-tensioning tendons con-
sist of 20 strands St 160/180. 
2.1.2 Load cases 
The bridge was pre-stressed and then loaded with prescribed displacement in the middle of 
the span. The ultimate failure load and the descending branch were obtained. The bridge 
girder failed typically in the middle of the span. First the prestressing tendons yielded, ten-
sile cracks developed, and consequently the concrete in the compression flange of the box 
girder crushed and split. 
2.1.3 Modelling 
Mean values of the material properties for concrete B500 were generated using ATENA 
defaults (based on recommendations by CEB, fib, RILEM etc.). Tensile cracking model in 
ATENA is based on the smeared crack approach, which replaces the discrete cracks, oc-
curring in real concrete structures, by strain localization in a continuous displacement field. 
Concrete fracture is covered by nonlinear fracture mechanics based on fracture energy with 
an exponential softening law derived experimentally by Hordijk [2] demonstrated in Figure 
3 and equation 1. The objectivity of the finite element solution is assured by crack band 
approach - the descending branch of the stress-strain relationship is adjusted according to 
the finite element size and mesh orientation.  
 
Figure 3: Stress - crack-opening law according to Hordijk [2]. 
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A more detailed contribution to the material modelling within the software ATENA can be 
found in the contribution “Uncertainties of material properties in nonlinear computer simu-
lation” by R. Pukl, included in these proceedings. The used mean values, coefficients of 
variation and suitable pdfs of the concrete and steel properties are presented in Table 1. 
Statistical correlation among random variables was considered according to the prescribed 
correlation matrix as shown in the upper triangle of Table 2. 
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Tab. 1:  Basic variables used for the simulation. 
Variable Material Properties Units Distribution Mean CoV 
Ec 
ν 
ft 
fc 
Gf 
εc 
 
cRed 
 
wd  
 
ρ 
Es 
fyp 
Fp 
As 
Concrete 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-stressed steel 
 
Modulus of elasticity 
Poisson’ ratio 
Tensile strength 
Compressive strength 
Fracture energy 
uniaxial compressive strain 
at compressive strength 
reduction of compressive 
strength due to damage 
critical compressive dis-
placement 
specific material weight 
Modulus of elasticity 
Yield strength 
Prestressing force 
Area of strands 
Gpa 
- 
MPa 
MPa 
N/m 
- 
 
- 
 
m 
 
MN/m³
GPa 
MPa 
MN 
m² 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
 
Rectangular 
 
Lognormal 
 
Normal 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
Normal 
Normal 
36.95 
0.2 
3.275 
42.5 
81.43 
0.0023 
 
0.8 
 
0.0005 
 
0.023 
200 
630 
21.85 
0.0237 
0.15 
0.05 
0.18 
0.10 
0.20 
0.15 
 
0.06 
 
0.10 
 
0.1 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.001 
Tab. 2:  Correlation matrix for concrete properties. 
Parameter Ec ft fc Gf εc 
Ec 
ft 
fc 
Gf 
εc 
1 
0.7 
0.9 
0.5 
0.9 
0.7 
1 
0.8 
0.9 
0.6 
0.9 
0.8 
1 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
1 
 
2.1.4 Analysis 
For the estimation of the basic statistical parameters of the ultimate load different numbers 
of samples have been used by total numbers of 8 and 32 samples [6]. In both cases compa-
rable results were obtained. Furthermore the results have been used to estimate a reliability 
index for the structure considering different levels of the load (mean values) and two alter-
natives of variability (coefficient of variation 0.1 and 0.2). The analysis verified the feasi-
bility of the used complex stochastic nonlinear program system integrating nonlinear 
fracture finite element analysis wit probabilistic tools. 
2.2 Colle Isarco Viaduct 
The goal of the stochastic fracture analysis for the Colle Isarco Viaduct was to estimate the 
reliability of the structure and to show the efficiency of the procedures used by SARA ([8] 
and [9]). A detailed statistical failure simulation and reliability assessment of the existing 
bridge structure was performed. The Colle Isarco Viaduct is a cantilever beam bridge in 
Italy with a total length of 1,000 m. Built in 1969, it is a fully post-tensioned box-girder 
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bridge and is part of the Brenner Highway in Italy. Several objects of this type are found in 
the two separated lanes which form this bottleneck crossing the Alps.  
2.2.1 Geometry 
The northern cast-in-place balanced cantilever beams are the most sensitive elements of 
bridge systems. Therefore, these elements, with varying box girder depths, have been cho-
sen for the analyses. The total length of the beams is 167.5 m. They are subdivided by the 
mid-span with a length of 91 m and the cantilever beams with a length of 59 m and 17.5 m, 
see Figure 4. The lane slab has a width of 10.60 m and the lower girder slab a width of 
6.00 m. Both of them have a thickness of about 0.20 m. The height of the box girder varies 
from 10.80 m over the middle support to 2.85 m at the end of the cantilever beams. A 
summary of the geometric data used for the analysis is given in Table 3. 
91 m59 m 17.5 m
Pier 9
Pier 10 
North South
~1050 m
 
Figure 4: Side elevation of the bridge from the west. 
Tab. 3:  Deterministic geometric data used for the analysis. 
Component Location Magnitude (m) 
Cantilever north 
Middle-span 
Cantilever south 
Width of lane slab 
Box section width 
Box section height 
Box section height 
Box section height 
Total length 
North of pier 9 
Pier 9 to pier 10 
South of pier 10 
Entire slab 
Entire box 
Pier 10 
Pier 9 
Both ends 
- 
59.0 
91.0 
17.5 
10.6 
6.0 
4.5 
10.8 
2.85 
167.5 
 
2.2.2 Load cases 
A structure is exposed to numerous actions. The groups of load cases examined for this 
structure were dead loads, pre-stressing loads, traffic loads, and the boundary conditions. 
In addition to the dead load of the box girder, the dead loads of the neighbouring sus-
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pended spans were taken into account (pro rata). The traffic loads acting on the neighbour-
ing suspended span were treated in the same way as the dead loads. The traffic loads were 
modelled as regularly distributed loads with a magnitude of 70kN/m. These loads acting 
downwards on the pavement of the box girder were incrementally increased until failure. 
To find the smallest load capacity, this procedure was performed for differently located 
line loads along the longitudinal axis of the bridge. The uniform load along the entire 
girder was identified as relevant load case for the smallest load capacity. For the probabil-
istic assessment coefficients of variation of 15%, 30% and 45% for the traffic load were 
analyzed. The load case pre-stressing is given by 211 bar cable elements each with a di-
ameter of 32 mm of type 850/970. The configuration of the bearing ensured a statically 
determined support of the girder. 
2.2.3 Modelling 
The finite element model was built in ATENA by using the previously mentioned geomet-
ric data. A detailed description of the non linear material models and discretisation of the 
structure can be found in [8]. The uncertainties of the materials caused by natural influ-
ences were included using for the specification their complete distribution function. The 
used mean values, coefficients of variation and suitable pdfs of the concrete and steel 
properties are presented in Table 4. The reinforcement was modelled multilinearly with a 
yield strength fys = 500 MPa to capture the break down by exceeding the yield strength. 
For the pre-stressed steel a similar model was used with a yield strength fyp = 630 MPa 
which equals 75% of the nominal yield strength to allow for wedge slip, shrinkage and 
creep. The coefficients of correlation between the different concrete material properties, 
which have been considered during sampling by simulated annealing, can be found in Ta-
ble 5. 
Tab. 4:  Basic variables used for the simulation. 
Variable* Material Properties Units Distribution Mean CoV 
Ec 
ft 
fc 
Gf 
fys 
fyp 
rV 
rM 
Concrete 
 
 
 
Reinforcement 
Pre-stressed Steel 
Reinforcement 
Reinforcement 
Modulus of elasticity 
Tensile strength 
Compressive strength 
Fracture energy 
Yield strength 
Yield strength 
Ratio vertical As/Ac 
Ratio horizontal As/Ac 
GPa 
MPa 
MPa 
N/m 
MPa 
MPa 
- 
- 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
Normal 
Normal 
37 
3.26 
42.5 
120 
500 
630 
0.003 
0.003 
0.15 
0.18 
0.10 
0.20 
0.05 
0.03 
0.10 
0.10 
Tab. 5:  Basic variables used for the simulation. 
Parameter Ec ft fc Gf 
Ec 
ft 
fc 
Gf 
1 
0.7 
0.9 
0.5 
0.7 
1 
0.8 
0.9 
0.9 
0.8 
1 
0.6 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1 
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2.2.4 Analysis 
Based on probability simulations of the structure with a total number of 30 samples de-
tailed analysis regarding the reliability index of the structure has been performed [8]. 
Monitoring data taken from a permanent measurement system [7] was considered for this 
analysis. Present and future reliability indices for the ultimate and service limit state have 
been estimated based on different load levels and scenarios for the structure’s degradation. 
A sensitivity analysis for the single basic variables identified already major parameters for 
the structural response. Based on this analysis a specific strengthening concept for the 
bridge was developed. Recent works [8] have a closer look on the structure’s behaviour on 
degradation and discussed different degradation functions characterisation of the time de-
pendent reliability performance of the structure like the one introduced by Mori [3], (2). 
btatg ⋅−=1)(   (2)
Within these studies different damage scenarios as global or local degradation of the pre-
stressed steel are discussed. Furthermore different failure scenarios are identified by a 
more detailed sensitivity analysis of the basic variables. 
2.3 Footbridge 
The pre-stressing system used for the Colle Isarco Viaduct with massive bars is generally 
not applied any more for modern pre-stressed bridges. For many years already tendons 
made of single wires typically app. 5 mm in diameter are applied. These wires are designed 
for much higher stresses and degree of utilization. Furthermore these tendons allow higher 
curvature and are much more likely to show single wire ruptures caused by degradation. 
All these differences to the analysed structure of the Colle Isarco Viaduct encouraged the 
additional analysis [8] of a structure more typical for the majority of pre-stressed bridge 
structures built since the 1970’s. Based on [11] a theoretical sample of a pre-stressed 
bridge, not realized as an existing structure, was chosen. 
2.3.1 Geometry 
The 3 span continuous tee-beam with a total length of 65 m consists of a middle span of 26 
m and 2 side spans of 19.5 m. The width for the bridge deck was chosen to be 2.8 m with a 
thickness of 0.18 m. The detailed dimensions of the tee-beams 0.86 m high cross section 
can be taken from Figure 5. The detailed characteristic of the tendons run described by (3) 
is shown in Figure 6. The geometric data used for the analysis is summarized in Table 6. 
 
Figure 5: Cross section of tee-beam.  
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Figure 6: Characteristic of tendons run (10x enlarged in height).  
( ) ( )24 ξξ −= fxz  with 
pl
x=ξ   (3)
Tab. 6:  Deterministic geometric data used for the analysis. 
Component Magnitude (m) 
Middle-span 
Side-spans 
Width of deck 
Thickness of deck 
Cross section height 
Web height 
Total length 
26.0 
19.5 
2.8 
0.18 
0.86 
0.65 
65.0 
 
2.3.2 Load cases 
The groups of load cases examined for this structure were dead loads, pre-stressing loads, 
traffic loads, and the boundary conditions. In addition to the dead load of the tee-beam 
itself the dead loads of the surfacing and rails were taken into account. The traffic loads 
were modelled as regularly distributed loads with a magnitude of 11.76 kN/m. These loads 
acting downwards on the pavement of the tee-beam were incrementally increased until 
failure. The uniform load along the entire 3 spans was identified as relevant load case for 
the smallest load capacity. The load case pre-stressing is given by 4 tendons consisting of 7 
tension wires with a diameter of app. 5 mm each of type 1570/1770. The configuration of 
the bearing ensured an almost statically determined support of the entire structure. 
2.3.3 Modelling 
The finite element model was built in ATENA 2D using the previously mentioned geomet-
ric data. The cross section of the tee-beam acc. figure 7 was idealised using 3 rectangles 
with constant thickness. For the discretisation of the structure 2D-Quadrileterals CCIso-
QQuad Elements have been selected. The element size of the finite element mesh was cho-
sen to be 0.20 m and 0.10 m for the deck respectively, which led to a total number of 3,155 
elements and 12,107 nodes. The elements could be grouped into 7 macro elements, consid-
ering material and geometrical qualities. Similar to the assessment for the Colle Isarco 
Viaduct the nonlinear concrete behaviour was specified using the SBETA material model 
[1]. Horizontal und vertical smeared reinforcement, modelled using a multilinear stress-
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strain law with yield strength of fys = 500 MPa, was used in the web. The bending rein-
forcement in the web was realized as discrete reinforcement bars with yield strength of fys 
= 500 MPa. The tendons were modelled as polyline acc. to figure 8. For the pre-stressed 
steel a multilinear law with yield strength fyp = 1170 MPa was used too, again allowing for 
wedge slip, shrinkage and creep. The materials uncertainties caused by natural influences 
were included using their complete distribution function for the specification. The used 
mean values, coefficients of variation and suitable pdfs of the concrete and steel properties 
are presented in Table 7. The coefficients of correlation of the concrete material properties, 
which have been considered during sampling by simulated annealing, are the same as the 
ones choosen for the Colle Isarco according Table 5. 
Tab. 7:  Basic variables used for the simulation. 
Variable* Material Properties Units Distribution Mean CoV 
Ec 
ft 
fc 
Gf 
fys 
fyp 
Concrete 
 
 
 
Reinforcement 
Pre-stressed Steel 
Modulus of elasticity 
Tensile strength 
Compressive strength 
Fracture energy 
Yield strength 
Yield strength 
GPa 
MPa 
MPa 
N/m 
MPa 
MPa 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
Weibull 
Lognormal 
Lognormal 
35.57 
3.04 
38.3 
120 
500 
1170 
0.15 
0.18 
0.10 
0.20 
0.05 
0.03 
 
2.3.4 Analysis 
A study based on 45 samples at a time demonstrated several differences to the results for 
the Colle Isarco [9]. The free cantilever construction of the Colle Isarco created a signifi-
cant spare of performance for the final state of the bridge, which is missing for the ana-
lysed footway bridge. The different type of pre-stressing allowed to study in addition the 
rupture of single wires in the tendons including the local drop out of the pre-stress, rebuild 
by the bond to the concrete. The importance of changes of failure modes for different 
grades of degradation to the reliability index of the structure is demonstrated. 
2.4 Gantry sign 
Gantry signs are simple steel structures with wind as significant dominant load case. Their 
high level of standardisation makes them an ideal object for a detailed and sophisticated 
optimisation process based on probabilistic methods. In contradiction to bridge structures 
shown before, wind as the main load component orthogonal to the main axes of the struc-
ture makes the use of a 3dimensional model inescapable. 
2.4.1 Geometry 
For the analysis a most typical geometry was chosen. Shafts and bar are build of 8 mm 
plates bended to half shells and welded together to almost rectangular profiles. The main 
dimensions including the size of the sign exposed to the wind load can be found in Figure 
7.  
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Figure 7: Side elevation of the analysed gantry sign.  
2.4.2 Load cases 
As only body force and wind load had to be considered for the analysis a specific non de-
terministic description could have been extended to the load side. Primal variances of the 
loading to the structure are caused by different wind speeds. Therefore its scattering have 
been directly included while generating the samples for the probabilistic analysis. In this 
case a mean value of 32.88 m/s and standard derivation of 5.31 m/s describing a Rayleight 
pdf (4) was chosen, corresponding to a mean wind load of 1.275 kN/m² on the sign.  
( )
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2.4.3 Modelling 
The finite element model was built in ATENA 3D using the previously mentioned geomet-
ric data. All bended plates of the shafts and bar were modelled by quadratic Ahmad shell 
elements with a minimum of 9 integrational points and a number of 4 layers of similar 
height in its thickness were chosen. Only the head plates had to be modelled as linear brick 
elements and the connection of shafts and bar with linear tetra elements. A simple linear 
elastic material model could have been chosen because for the service limit state, as a 
maximum deflection, no non linearity had to be considered and the ultimate limit state was 
defined as the yielding of the steel plates of the shafts and the bar. This allowed estimating 
the reliability index for the service limit state only by a variation of the young’s modulus of 
all elements and for the ultimate limit state by a comparison of the computed maximum 
stress to the yield stress of the used material. Detailed studies on steel probes of plates pro-
duced in Austria were used for the non deterministic description of the yield stress [10]. By 
the use of the multipurpose probability-based software for statistical sensitivity and reli-
ability analysis of engineering problems FREET ([4] and [5]) the best description of the 
yield stress distribution of all 444 probes was identified as Gumble max. pdf with a mean 
value of 286.27 N/mm² and standard derivation of 17.88 N/mm² as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Yield stress distribution for a material S235JRG2 with a plate thickness of 8 mm.  
 
2.4.4 Analysis 
Based on 30 samples at a time an analysis for the service limit state and ultimate limit state 
was conducted within a diploma thesis. It could have been proved, that the actual design of 
the structure shows sufficient reliability for the service limit state and exceeds by far the 
demands for the ultimate limit state. Studies using differing plate thicknesses, dimensions 
and connections of the shafts and the bar showed possibilities for an optimized design of 
the structure and have to be discussed regarding their technical feasibility. 
3 Conclusion and Outlook 
The paper gives a wide overview of practical applications of the state of the art stochastic 
modelling tool SARA. The first three applications are reliability assessments of prestressed 
concrete bridge structures. The nonlinearities of their structural behaviour produce in most 
cases additional potential of the structure for its ultimate limit state and therefore lower 
failure probabilities than those calculated by neglecting these effects. Though for the ser-
vice limit state these changes in stiffness might cause more deflection and consequently a 
lower reliability for its service limit state. Thus it appears that nonlinearities of the struc-
tures behaviour have to be considered for a reliability assessment of the entire structures in 
most cases. The non linear FEM software ATENA implemented in SARA allows to con-
sider these effects. Especially the studies regarding the Colle Isarco and the Footbridge 
showed the necessity to include as well specific damage scenarios and types of degradation 
to gain a realistic description of the structures reliability. The implementation of monitor-
ing data and sophisticate degradation functions into the reliability assessment is still a wide 
scope of research. Future progress in this field will help us to have not only current as-
sessment of structures reliability, but a forecast of its probable development. Therefore 
SARA can build a powerful tool for maintenance planning of structures of different kinds, 
not only bridges. Supported by identification methods, which use for several approaches 
already some of the resources given by ATENA and FREET, the assistance in cost plan-
ning will not be limited to the maintenance. The last application showed the potential of 
stochastic modelling for the optimization of structural design. The extension of the system 
by supporting the modelling of 3D structures opens a wide range too of complete structures 
and details for a design based on more specific and sophisticated stochastic proof of its 
reliability as it is given by level II and III methods in Eurocode 0. 
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Analysis and modelling of autocorrelation in concrete 
strength series 
Luc Taerwe 
Ghent University, Department of Structural Engineering,  
Magnel Laboratory for Concrete Research 
 
Abstract : Consecutive concrete strength values are often considered to be in-
dependent. However, analysis of extensive concrete strength records reveals 
that generally a significant autocorrelation is present, which can be explained 
on the basis of the concrete production process. The following aspects will be 
addressed in the paper :  
- analysis of the autocorrelation structure in concrete strength records (total 
number of observations varying between 500 and 1800) 
- influence of autocorrelation on the common sample statistics (mean, stan-
dard deviation, ...) 
- physical background of the autocorrelation structure 
- modelling of the autocorrelation structure  
1 Introduction 
Concrete strength is a random variable which is usually modelled by means of a normal or 
lognormal distribution function. Generally it is assumed that consecutive strength values 
are independent. However, the detailed investigation of strength records that is presented 
below reveals that significant autocorrelation exists between consecutive values. Informa-
tion concerning the correlation structure which is present in concrete strength records is 
only scarcely available in the literature. The time-dependent variation of consecutive 
strength values was mentioned by SOROKA [1] who investigated the evolution of the stan-
dard deviation as a function of the number of specimens that gradually became available as 
the length of the production period became longer. This variable increased with time and 
approached a constant value. The phenomenon was explained by RACKWITZ on the basis of 
an autoregressive model of order 1 [2]. Some empirical serial correlation functions were 
reported by DEGERMAN [3] who made use of strength values from the Swedish concrete 
industry. A thorough analysis of the problem based on the analysis of empirical concrete 
strength records can be found in [4, 5, 6]. 
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2 General characteristics of the analyzed series 
A general survey of the five concrete strength series that will be analyzed in the following 
is given in Tab. 1. The compressive strength of the specimens is determined at 28 days and 
expressed in MPa. The series are subdivided into subseries each covering a maximum of 
200 results. This subdivision was found useful because this number of observations is suf-
ficiently large to characterize the concrete production process during a certain period, whi-
le on the other hand, the corresponding period is not too long with respect to the inclusion 
of possible long-term changes in the basic variables influencing concrete strength. 
The complete series are designated as A, B, C, D and E whereas the subseries notation 
contains an additional figure. The time period between the days that the first and the last 
specimens were tested, is mentioned in the fourth column of Tab. 1. For series A, B and C 
the number of specimens per casting day is variable and for series D and E, the daily sam-
ple rate equals 4 or 2. The first three series were obtained at building sites in Belgium whe-
reas the two other series came from precasting plants all having their own concrete mixing 
equipment. 
Tab. 1 : General survey of the concrete strength series 
Series n (*) Division in sub-
series 
Observation 
period (days) 
Type of 
specimen 
Mean daily 
sample rate 
A 
 
B 
C 
D 
 
 
E 
 
 
1786 
 
945 
534 
1468 
 
 
1158 
A1...A9 
 
B1...B5 
C1...C3 
D1...D8 
 
 
E1...E6 
1158 
 
1044 
1233 
303 (D1...D4) 
 
422 (D5...D8) 
267 (E1...E3) 
 
526 (E4...E6) 
cubes 
(200 mm) 
cylinders 
cylinders 
cubes 
(158 mm) 
 
cubes 
(158 mm) 
3.26 
 
2.59 
2.32 
4 
 
4 
4 
 
2 
(*) Total number of test results 
In Tab. 2 and 3, the mean nx , the standard deviation sn and the coefficient of variation 
nn / xs=δ  are given for the complete series and the subseries respectively. The consecuti-
ve values of subseries A4 and B4 are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 in chronological order. 
Tab. 2 : General characteristics of the concrete strength series 
Series N nx  
(MPa) 
sn 
(MPa) 
δ 
(%) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
1786 
945 
534 
1468 
1158 
46.5 
36.8 
42.1 
59.9 
72.3 
6.56 
5.30 
6.62 
3.68 
5.94 
14.1 
14.4 
15.7 
6.1 
8.2 
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Tab. 3 : General characteristics of the subseries 
Subseries n nx  
(MPa) 
sn 
(MPa) 
δ 
(%) 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
A7 
A8 
A9 
 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
 
C1 
C2 
C3 
 
D1 
D2 
D3 
D4 
D5 
D6 
D7 
D8 
 
E1 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
E6 
200 
199 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
187 
 
200 
200 
200 
200 
145 
 
200 
200 
134 
 
200 
196 
200 
200 
200 
200 
200 
72 
 
200 
199 
200 
200 
200 
158 
45.8 
48.8 
50.2 
48.3 
44.5 
44.8 
46.3 
43.2 
46.8 
 
39.0 
34.9 
36.5 
37.0 
36.4 
 
46.1 
40.9 
37.9 
 
59.8 
59.6 
61.7 
59.0 
59.3 
59.8 
60.5 
58.1 
 
68.0 
69.0 
69.3 
76.7 
75.6 
75.7 
5.47 
6.35 
6.78 
5.73 
5.74 
5.89 
6.33 
6.08 
7.13 
 
5.40 
4.83 
5.33 
4.69 
5.52 
 
6.67 
5.17 
5.01 
 
3.64 
3.17 
3.52 
4.25 
3.96 
3.44 
3.05 
2.95 
 
4.06 
4.05 
4.91 
4.61 
4.95 
5.53 
11.9 
13.0 
13.5 
11.9 
12.9 
13.1 
13.7 
14.1 
15.2 
 
13.9 
13.8 
14.6 
12.7 
15.2 
 
14.5 
13.6 
13.2 
 
6.1 
5.3 
5.7 
7.2 
6.7 
5.8 
5.0 
5.1 
 
6.0 
5.9 
7.1 
6.0 
6.5 
7.3 
3 Serial correlation 
For series which are not random there will be dependencies of one kind or another between 
successive terms. One very useful measure of this effect is the correlation coefficient bet-
ween pairs of strength values, where the components of each pair are k units apart in the 
sequential sampling process. Given n values x1, ..., xn the so-called serial correlation of lag 
k is defined [5] by 
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where  - n,  the total number of observations 
  - nx , the mean of the series 
 
Fig. 1: Representation of subseries A4 
 
Fig. 2: Representation of subseries B4 
If the series is regarded as a parent form which is infinitely long, we refer to the autocorre-
lations, instead of the serial correlations, and denote them by ρk where 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]{ } 2/1kii
kii
k VarVar
,Cov
+
+=
XX
XXρ  (2) 
This accords with the usual convention in statistics of denoting parent values by Greek 
letters and sample values by roman type. The serial correlation of lag 0 equals 1. In the 
case of independent observations, rk = 0 for k ≥ 1. It is important to note that the strength 
results must be available in chronological order, otherwises the calculation of rk does not 
make sense. 
In the following, the structure of equation (1) is briefly discussed. The numerator is part of 
the sample covariance which is a sum of products, the factors of which are related to ob-
servations k units apart. In the case of a perfectly random series, the possibility that both xi 
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and xi+k are at the same side of the mean level nx is as likely as the event that both are at a 
different side. This means that in the long run both positive and negative contributions to 
the numerator compensate each other and that rk is zero. However, in the case of a correla-
ted series, positive contributions will be dominating for a series with slow fluctuations 
whereas negative contributions will predominantly occur for a series with rapid fluctuati-
ons. The resulting values or rk will be either positive or negative and significantly different 
from zero. As the dependency between observations, sufficiently far apart, tends to become 
negligible, rk will approach zero for high k values. The denominator may be considered as 
a standardization factor and is equal to the sum appearing in the  sample variance. 
The consecutive values of rk yield an instructive picture of the internal structure of a series 
consisting of correlated observations. The graphical representation of rk as a function of k 
is called a correlogram. The correlograms of subseries A4 and B4 are represented in Figs. 
3 and 4. The main difference between these two typical examples is that the first corre-
logram (subseries A4) decays rather rapidly, whereas in the second case (subseries B4) the 
values of rk decrease very slowly. The reason for this is that the mean level of subseries A4 
remains almost constant whereas in subseries B4 a significant downward trend is present 
(Figs. 1 and 2). 
 
Fig. 3: Correlogram of subseries A4 
 
Fig. 4: Correlogram of subseries B4 
In Tab. 4 the values of rk, with k = 1, ..., 5 are given for the 31 series. It may be concluded 
that, on the mean, r1 ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 whereas r2 varies between 0.1 and 0.5. 
The same order of magnitude is mentioned in [4] for strength series of Swedish origin. 
In order to test whether the serial correlation of lag k is significantly different from zero, 
use is made of the property that if rk = 0 then [7, 8] 
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In case that  
 [ ]kk Var2 rr <  (4) 
it is concluded that rk is not significantly different from zero [6]. The highest lag for which 
rk is significantly different from zero is also shown in Tab. 4. Obviously, these values vary 
rather widely depending of the correlation structure of the subseries concerned. 
Tab. 4: Serial correlations r1 to r5 of the 31 subseries 
Subseries r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 Highest lag of 
significant rk 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
A7 
A8 
A9 
 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
 
C1 
C2 
C3 
 
D1 
D2 
D3 
D4 
D5 
D6 
D7 
D8 
 
E1 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
E6 
0.425 
0.258 
0.226 
0.302 
0.196 
0.286 
0.277 
0.227 
0.462 
 
0.323 
0.493 
0.536 
0.600 
0.199 
 
0.451 
0.437 
0.384 
 
0.432 
0.488 
0.461 
0.586 
0.561 
0.366 
0.389 
0.341 
 
0.369 
0.255 
0.575 
0.358 
0.252 
0.360 
0.386 
0.128 
0.084 
0.173 
0.115 
0.090 
0.213 
0.089 
0.375 
 
0.287 
0.412 
0.535 
0.511 
0.145 
 
0.401 
0.319 
0.194 
 
0.326 
0.385 
0.412 
0.513 
0.341 
0.201 
0.211 
0.211 
 
0.144 
0.030 
0.412 
0.278 
0.148 
0.168 
0.276 
0.113 
0.091 
0.169 
0.044 
0.177 
0.185 
0.145 
0.337 
 
0.077 
0.409 
0.449 
0.509 
-0.039 
 
0.372 
0.300 
0.210 
 
0.306 
0.242 
0.246 
0.431 
0.272 
0.053 
0.180 
0.133 
 
0.227 
-0.018 
0.388 
0.263 
0.089 
0.095 
0.263 
-0.011 
0.072 
0.060 
0.011 
0.033 
0.174 
0.143 
0.300 
 
0.149 
0.202 
0.393 
0.464 
0.015 
 
0.362 
0.328 
0.183 
 
0.237 
0.132 
0.269 
0.402 
0.198 
0.037 
0.221 
0.023 
 
0.146 
0.107 
0.396 
0.179 
0.125 
0.028 
0.286 
0.028 
0.083 
0.006 
0.096 
-0.023 
0.121 
0.120 
0.343 
 
0.076 
0.134 
0.358 
0.351 
-0.097 
 
0.325 
0.244 
0.223 
 
0.080 
0.185 
0.217 
0.416 
0.103 
0.064 
0.241 
0.009 
 
0.116 
0.104 
0.330 
0.104 
-0.037 
-0.010 
8 
1 
1 
3 
1 
3 
4 
7 
5 
 
2 
6 
12 
14 
1 
 
7 
6 
5 
 
4 
11 
5 
10 
3 
2 
5 
1 
 
3 
1 
9 
6 
1 
1 
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4 Physical background of the correlation structure 
A possible explanation for the existence of the correlation structure may be found in the 
nature of the concrete production process. A given strength value is to a certain extent de-
pendent on the previous values due to the fact that the basic factors which contribute to the 
variation of concrete strength, namely cement strength, and moisture content and grading 
of the sand, maintain a certain value during a more or less long time interval. On this basic 
process, random variations proper to each concrete mix are superimposed. The processes 
that describe the fluctuations of the basic variables, may also present a correlation structu-
re. This complex input function is transformed, during the production process, into the out-
put variable namely concrete strength. Further, a certain number of control activities are 
performed resulting in slight modifications of the cement or water content of the mix. The 
efficiency of this procedure strongly depends on the magnitude of the time lag between the 
observation of a significant change of a variable and the appropriate adjustment of a para-
meter. The general interaction scheme is represented in Fig. 5 [2]. 
 
Fig. 5: Schematic representation of concrete production; adapted from [2] 
In [5] and [6] the correlation structure of some input variables was also investigated. In 4 
cement strength series, each consisting of 400 observations, also a significant serial corre-
lation was found. 
Values of the fineness modulus and moisture content of 378 consecutive deliveries of sand 
at a certain concrete plant were recorded. These data cover a period of about four and a 
half years. The main statistical characteristics of both series are shown in Tab. 5, whereas 
the five first serial correlations are given in Tab. 6. 
Tab. 5: Properties of sand data (378 observations) 
Mean value Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
 
 
Fineness modulus 
Moisture content (%) 
2.991 
6.09 
0.154 
1.92 
5.1% 
31.5% 
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Tab. 6: Serial correlations of sand data (378 observations) 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5  
Fineness modulus 
Moisture content (%) 
0.380 
-0.026 
0.243 
0.100 
0.283 
0.083 
0.199 
0.013 
0.154 
0.056 
 
For the fineness modulus, the highest lag for which rk is significantly different from zero is 
7. On the other hand, the moisture content data present no significant serial correlation. 
In the concrete production process, the moisture content of sand is generally compensated 
by adjusting the amount of mixing water, so the initial variations are only partly reflected 
in the concrete properties. However, it is difficult in practice to take into account variations 
in the grading of the sand by adjusting the mix proportions. Hence, variations of this vari-
able are, to a great deal, transmitted to the concrete properties and probably this also holds 
for the correlation which appears to be present between consecutive values of the fineness 
modulus. 
5 Practical consequences of the correlation structure 
The presence of serial correlation has important consequences on the distribution of the 
usual sample statistics. The distribution of nX  remains normal but its variance increases 
compared to the case of independent observations. Both the expectation and the variance of 
Sn are influenced. Moreover, 22n /)1( σSn −  has no longer a χ2-distribution, and nX  and Sn 
are no longer independent [5]. 
These particularities have to be duly considered for the calculation of OC-lines of compli-
ance criteria [9] because otherwises the calculated probabilities of acceptance will not ac-
curately reflect reality. 
It can be shown [8] that 
[ ]
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+= ∑−
=
j
n
j
X jn
nn
X ρσ .)(21Var
1
1
2
n  (5) 
and 
[ ]
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−= ∑
−
=
j
n
j
Xn jnnn
S ρσ .)(
)1(
21E
1
1
22  (6) 
where 2Xσ  represents the variance of the strength variable X. In the case of independent 
observations ρj = 0 for j ≥ 1 which yields the classical results [ ] nX n /Var 2Xσ= and [ ] 22nE σ=S . 
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In the boundary case of equicorrelation (ρk = ρ for k = 1, ..., n) the previous expressions 
reduce to 
[ ] [ ]ρσ )1(1Var 2n −+= nnX X  (7) 
[ ] )1(E 2X2 ρσ −=nS  (8) 
In case the correlation structure can be modelled by means of an autoregressive model of 
order 1 (see section 6.1) and for n = 3 )( k1k ρ=ρ=ρ one finds respectively 
[ ] [ ]22X3 2439Var ρρσ ++=X  (9) 
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−= )2(311E 22X23 ρρσS  (10) 
In Tab. 7, some values of [ ]( ) X2/1n /Var σX are mentioned for the case of an AR(1) model 
and for the case of equicorrelation. It appears for example that for n = 10, the fact that ρ = 
0.7 makes the reduction of the variance due to averaging half as efficient compared to the 
case of independent observations. 
Tab. 7: Values of [ ]( ) X2/1n /Var σX  
AR(1) model Equicorrelation ρ 
n = 3 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 20 n = 3 n = 20 
0 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
0.5774 
0.6976 
0.7817 
0.8680 
0.4472 
0.5680 
0.6671 
0.8747 
0.3162 
0.4165 
0.5099 
0.6446 
0.2582 
0.3441 
0.4269 
0.5559 
0.2236 
0.2997 
0.3742 
0.4944 
0.5774 
0.7303 
0.8165 
0.8944 
0.2236 
0.5788 
0.7247 
0.8456 
Some values of [ ]( ) X2/12n /E σS  are mentioned in Tab. 8.  
Tab. 8: Values of [ ]( ) X2/12n /E σS  
AR(1) model Equicorrelationρ 
n = 3 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 20  
0 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
1 
0.8775 
0.7638 
0.6083 
1 
0.9202 
0.8329 
0.6931 
1 
0.9583 
0.9067 
0.8059 
1 
0.9719 
0.9361 
0.8605 
1 
0.9788 
0.9515 
0.8918 
1 
0.8366 
0.7071 
0.5477 
 
From the foregoing results it is clear that autocorrelation has important consequences on 
the distribution of the usual sample statistics. 
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6 Development of stochastic models 
6.1 Time-series models [4, 7] 
Time-series are ordered observations of a random variable, which are typically obtained at 
different points in time. Time-series models are widely used in economics, also with the 
purpose of forecasting. 
A first class of time-series models are the so-called autoregressive processes, abbreviated 
as AR(p) where p is the order of the model. The general equation of the AR(p)-model is 
∑
=
−−−− +=++++=
p
j
ijijipipiiii uuuuu
1
221 ... εφεφφφ  (11) 
Where E[u] = 0 and εi is N(0,σε). It appears that a particular value ui is a weighed sum of p 
previous values, to which a random fluctuation is added. In case X is distributed according 
to N(µ,σ) and ε according to N(0,1) then (11) can be written as 
∑ ∑∑
= ==
− −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
p
j
i
p
j
jj
p
j
jjiji µxx
1 11
..11 εσφρφφ  (12) 
The most simple model is the AR(1) process or Markov series : 
iii uu ερ += −1   (13) 
where φ1 = ρ has been introduced. It can easily be shown that 
2
2
2
1 ρ
σσ ε−=u   (14) 
The autocorrelation decays according to ρk = ρk. 
The AR(2)-model, also called the Yule series, is given by 
iiii uuu εφφ ++= −− 211  (15) 
It can be shown that 
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1 11
φφ
φρφ
φρ +−=−=  (16) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )21212
2
22
111
1
φφφφφ
σφσ ε −+−−+
−=u  (17) 
The stationarity conditions are 
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1111 21212 <+−<++<<− φφφφφ  
In order to find out which order is significant to maintain in the model, one can make use 
of the so-called Box-Jenkins approach in combination with the Ljung-Box test statistic 
which is based on the serial correlations of the residual series εi. 
For subseries A4 and B4, depicted in Fig. 4, one finds the following AR-models. 
A4 : AR(1) with φ1 = 0.302 
B4 : AR(3) with φ1 = 0.406 ; φ2 = 0.135 ; φ3 = 0.220 
However, for most of the subseries mentioned in Tab. 3, an AR-model of order 1 or 2 is 
sufficient. Typical values of the parameters are  
AR(1)-model : - mean : φ1 = 0.3 
 - upper limit : φ1 = 0.5 
AR(2)-model : - mean : φ1 = 0.4 ; φ2 = 0.2 
 - upper limit : φ1 = 0.56 ; φ2 = 0.13 
Hence the following AR(2)-model was deemed to be rather representative for the concrete 
strength series considered : 
iiii uuu ε++= −− 21 2.04.0  (18) 
This model is used in [9] to analyse the influence of autocorrelation on OC-lines for con-
formity criteria for concrete strength. 
The long-term effect which is present in several series can be related to the Hurst-effect 
(long-memory property) and the so-called stable distribution functions [11]. 
6.2 Renewal pulse process 
6.2.1 General 
We consider the following test statistic 
∑−
=
+ −−=
1
1
2
1
2 )(
)1(2
1 n
i
ii xxn
q  (19) 
which is an unbiased estimate of σ2 with efficiency equal to 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+= 43
11
3
2
][Var
][Var
2
2
nq
s  (20) 
4th International Probabilistic Symposium, 12th-13th October 2006 
12 
The latter ratio equals 1 for n = 2 and approaches 2/3 for n → ∞. The statistic 2 q2 is called 
the mean square successive difference. 
The use of q2 is particularly useful when the mean of the population, from which the ob-
servations are successively drawn, exhibits gradual or stepwise changes, the variance re-
maining constant. In that case the estimate s2 of σ2 will tend to be too large because s2 also 
includes the variation of the population mean. If, during the observation period, a change 
in population mean takes place, the effect of this change on the estimate q2 will be relative-
ly small since q2 includes only the differences between successive values, and generally 
only one difference will be rather high. Therefore, the estimate s2 is much more sensitive to 
changes in the population mean than is the estimate q2. 
If we take as null hypothesis that the population mean µ remains constant during the ob-
servation period, and as an alternative that µ changes in one way or another, we can make 
use of the test statistic 
2
2
s
qr =   (21) 
small values of r being significant. Note that E[r] = 1.  
When r is calculated for the subseries mentioned in Tab. 3, one always finds a significantly 
low value. This also holds for the cement strength series mentioned in [6]. 
The foregoing investigation suggests that the processes which produce the concrete 
strength results can hardly be considered as being "under control" in the classical statistical 
sense. However, this remark mainly holds for short-term variations and not for the long-
term behavior. This statement is not meant as criticism on the current production methods, 
but shows that in practice it is very difficult to obtain a production process with perfectly 
homogeneous output properties. This comment is also applicable to other types of produc-
tion processes and for many time-dependent phenomena that are influenced by random 
disturbances. 
6.2.2 Model 
Once it is found that the population mean doesn't remain stable at short term, it is attractive 
to find out what part of the total variation is due to these changes. In fact, we want to 
dispose of a rational procedure to divide the strength records into subgroups such that the 
conditions are essentially the same within each subgroup. However, in this case we have 
no prior knowledge of the occurrence of assignable causes of variation in the mean level. A 
possible way to proceed is to divide a record into subgroups of equal size n. However, the 
choice of n is quite arbitrary and the estimated values of the variances within and between 
subgroups depend on the chosen length of the subgroups. Hence it is necessary to develop 
an appropriate stochastic model and an associated practical estimation procedure. 
To elaborate the model, we premise that the mean strength level does not vary in a conti-
nuous way but rather in a discontinuous one and that it presents jumps at certain points in 
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time. In between these jumps, the mean level remains constant. Whether these jumps are 
caused by the production process itself, or follow from a similar behaviour of the input 
variables, is not investigated here. Thus, a series of successive observations consists of 
consecutive subgroups, each group corresponding to a certain mean strength level that re-
mains constant in between the mentioned jumps. Each subgroup, which may be considered 
as a sub-population, is called a "segment". The number of test results in segment j is deno-
ted Tj, the mean value of the Tj results is denoted mj, and the standard deviation of the Tj-
values with respect to mj is denoted sj (Fig. 6). The distinction between consecutive seg-
ments is made on the basis of jumps in the mean strength level, although the standard devi-
ation, too, may show a similar piecewise constant evolution (Fig. 6). In the theory of 
stochastic processes this type of behaviour is called a "renewal pulse process". The indivi-
dual values of the random variable X (here cement strength) arise from random variations 
which are superimposed on a step-function. The complete model is fully determined by the 
distribution functions of the random variables m, s and T. 
In [4,6] a statistical procedure was developed to devide the observed series according to 
the previous scheme, based on a likelihood ratio test. 
 
Fig. 6 : General representation of the stochastic model 
7 Conclusions 
- From the analysis presented in this paper it follows that successive concrete 
strength values are not indepedent as is usually assumed. Significant serial corre-
lation is present in empirical concrete strength records. 
- Five extensive series of concrete strength values, arranged in chronological order, 
are available. The total number of observations ranges between 534 and 1786.  
4th International Probabilistic Symposium, 12th-13th October 2006 
14 
- The analysis of 31 subseries, each consisting of almost 200 observations, reveals 
that r1, the serial correlation of order 1, ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 whereas r2 
may vary between 0.1 and 0.5. 
- The existence of serial correlation influences the distribution of the usual sample 
statistics used in quality control procedures. The variance of the sample mean nx  
is higher compared to the case of independent observations whereas the mean va-
lue of 2ns  is reduced by serial correlation. 
- The origin of serial correlation in concrete strength records may be related to the 
nature of the production process and more particularly to the characteristics of 
the input variables. It was found that cement strength records from several ce-
ment plants also present significant serial correlation. The same conclusion holds 
for the fineness modulus of sand used at one concrete plant. 
- The observed autocorrelation structure is modelled by means of an AR(2) time 
series model and a particular renewal pulse process. 
- The conclusions raised in this paper are not only relevant to a better understan-
ding of the random nature of concrete strength but also have practical consequen-
ces with respect to production control techniques and the calculation of OC-lines 
for compliance criteria. 
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Abstract: Intervention strategies for cost optimized maintenance of concrete 
structures become in recent years important matters under bridge owners as 
well as persons immediately concerned with the preservation. Intervention 
strategies should support the preservation of national wealth and should allow 
in consequence a structured maintenance planning. The intervention strategies 
are closely connected to optimization algorithm. The optimization algorithm 
has to include several structural qualities, like the geometrical design, the 
material properties, the results of the visual inspection, the results of 
monitoring programs, the numerical reliability assessment (BERGMEISTER et al. 
[1]) etc. Most of these qualities are time dependent and are afflicted with 
uncertainties. The time-dependent structural qualities can usually clearly be 
torn up by means of condition profiles and reliability profiles. Costs can be 
assigned to the elements determining these profiles. Cost models for the 
elements of the reliability profiles have already been developed by KONG et al. 
[2] & FRANGOPOL et al. [3]. Since the visual inspection is the most frequent 
used methodology in bridge maintenance, it is necessary to develop also cost 
models for the associated condition profile and to combine both of them for a 
global optimization process. A global realistic optimization process must have 
the ability to capture the uncertainties of the material qualities and their 
temporal variability-degradation. The aim therefore is to transfer and to deduce 
the cost models for the elements of the reliability profiles to the elements of the 
condition profiles to combine the cost models and to include adequate the 
uncertainties of the material qualities.  
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1 Introduction 
Management systems have to support decision-makers as to when and how to repair, 
rehabilitate, replace, and/or shut down deteriorating facilities. Therefore effective cost 
evaluation methods have to include; construction costs, inspection costs, maintenance 
costs, user costs, and failure costs, which are essential factors for life-cycle cost analysis of 
deteriorating structures (CHANG & SHINOZUKA [4]); (ANG & DE LEON [5]); (FRANGOPOL et 
al. [6], [7]). Inspection and maintenance measures, also called interventions, are the most 
easily influence able quantities during the structural preservation. The kind of interventions 
and their duration are based on various parameters, e.g. material properties, degradation 
ratio of material properties, the reliability level of a structure etc.. Intervention strategies 
are closely connected to cost optimization algorithms. They also have to include several 
structural qualities, like the geometrical design, the material properties, the results of the 
visual inspection, the results of monitoring programs, the results from numerical reliability 
assessment methods (BERGMEISTER et al. [1]) etc.. Most of these qualities are time 
dependent and are afflicted with uncertainties. The time-dependent structural qualities can 
usually clearly be torn up by means of condition profiles and reliability profiles. Costs can 
be assigned to the elements determining these profiles. Cost models for the elements of the 
reliability profiles already are developed by KONG et al. [2] & FRANGOPOL et al. [3]. Since 
the visual inspection is the most frequent used methodology in bridge maintenance, it is 
necessary to develop also cost models for the associated condition profile and to combine it 
with the cost models of the reliability profile to allow a global optimization process. In this 
contribution a method will be shown, which permits the combination of the two cost 
models to a global cost optimization model considering also the uncertainties in the time 
dependent material qualities. The combination can be carried out heuristically based on 
engineering experience, by means of multiobjective optimization (NEVES et al. 2006), or 
by means of a Cost Optimized Reliability – Condition Profile function CRCP. The CRCP 
is less computationally costly than the multiobjective generic algorithm optimization. The 
time-saving CRCP function can be extended for the inclusion of uncertainties in the 
material qualities but also the uncertainties of the profiles defining elements to a 
probabilistic basis (STRAUSS et al. [8]).  
2 Condition – Reliability Profiles 
The reliability profile, the condition profile and their cost models mainly characterize the 
cost optimization process for structures. Its course is essential influenced by the definition 
of the objective function or analytical formulation, respectively. The objective function has 
to meet the demands of the profiles, cost models and their boundary conditions. Since the 
descriptive elements of the profiles and the objective function itself are afflicted by 
uncertainties, it is necessary to perform the cost optimization considerations on a 
probabilistic level. A probabilistic concept concerning cost optimization strategies requires 
the inclusion of the following considerations: 
• Conventional optimization processes are time expensive calculation processes 
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• Mostly, it is a target at the optimized cost considerations to carry them out as a 
function of a property of the reliability profile or the condition profile. The 
necessary calculation processes therefore increase according to the bounds and the 
step width of the variables property. 
• Cost combined reliability profile as well as the condition profile consists of nearby 
24 elements to be expressed as random variables. 
These facts require the inclusion of an efficient statistical tool in the cost optimization 
model, which has to permit a simple definition of random variables and has to include an 
advanced Monte Carlo (MC) technique that allow a small number of realizations for 
random variables. FREeT is one of those statistical software packages that include an easy 
user-friendly definition of the stochastic models and an advanced MC technique the Latin 
Hypercube Sampling (LHS) technique [9]. FREeT was therefore in the following selected 
to support the probabilistic treatment of the objective function and the analytical model, 
respectively.  
The condition profile can be defined as the variation of the condition index with time. This 
approach is deviated from a proposal for the reliability profile already suggested by THOFT 
CHRISTENSEN [10]; ESTES and FRANGOPOL [11]; NOWAK et al. [12]. The main elements 
describing the condition profile are (i) the initial condition index C0I, (ii) the time of 
condition change initiation tCI, (iii) the condition index deterioration rate αC without 
lifetime extension, (iv) the time of first application of preventive lifetime-extending 
maintenance tPI, (v) the time of reapplication of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance 
tP, (vi) the duration of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance effect on condition tPDC, 
(vii) the deterioration rate change of the condition index during preventive lifetime-
extending maintenance effect δc, (viii) the improvement in the condition index (if any) 
immediately after the application of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance ∆γ, see Fig. 
1.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Characteristic Elements of the Condition profile 
 
In a first approach, the elements of the condition profile can be considered deterministic. 
Elements as shown in Table 1 are in general predefined and, as shown in Table 2, are 
variables. These two sets of elements are the descriptive ones for the condition index 
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profile optimization. The optimization can be performed with regard to several aspects: 
e.g. (1) to minimize the number of interventions for a specified life time tH and a demanded 
index; (2) to minimize the overall costs of maintaining the condition or/and reliability over 
the demanded index during the specified lifetime. 
 
Table 1: Predefined elements for the optimization strategy 
 
Condition 
Profile 
Reliability 
Profile Name Unit 
Symbol Symbol 
Time of condition change initiation / damage initiation*): lower 
bound Year tCI,lower tRI,lower 
Time of condition change initiation / damage initiation*): upper 
bound Year tCI,upper tRI,upper 
Time of first application of preventive lifetime-extending 
maintenance: upper bound Year tPI,upper tPI,upper 
Specified lifetime Year tH tH 
Initial condition index / initial reliability index*) - C0I β0I 
Condition index at tH / reliability index at tH*) - CH βH 
Condition index deterioration rate / reliability index deterioration 
rate*) without lifetime extension - αC αR 
Improvement in the condition index / reliability index*) - ∆γ ∆β 
Initial duration of preventive lifetime extending Year tCD tRD 
Deterioration rate change of the condition index / reliability index*) 
during preventive lifetime-extending maintenance effect - δc ∆α 
 
*) reliability profile 
 
Table 2: Variable elements for the optimization strategy 
 
Condition 
Profile 
Reliability 
Profile Parameter Vari-able Symbol Symbol 
First application of preventive lifetime-extending 
maintenance X(1) tPI tPI 
Time of condition change initiation / damage initiation*) X(2) tCI tRI 
Duration of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance X(3) tPDC tPDR 
Unprotected period X(4) tA tA 
Number of interventions X(5) n N 
 
*) reliability profile 
 
The optimization by minimization of the overall costs needs the definition of cost functions 
that can be assigned to the interventions. Suitable formulations of cost functions already 
proposed for interventions regarding the reliability profile can be found in Kong and 
Frangopol [2], see Table 3. 
Since the measures of improvement in the condition index γ are not independent of the 
level of CI, the level of the condition index at the measure of γ has to be included in the 
cost formulation. The polynomial formulation, also shown in Table 3, yields an increasing 
factor λ for the improvement in the condition index γ.  
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Table 3: Intervention-related cost functions 
 
 Condition Profile Reliability Profile 
Parameter Unit Intervention / Cost Eq. Symbol Intervention / Cost Eq. Symbol 
Fixed cost $ Cγ0, Cβ0, 
Var. cost factor - p P 
Var. cost factor  - 
∆γ 
Cγ=Cγ0+p × (∆γ)q q 
∆β 
Cβ=Cβ0+p*(∆β)q Q 
Fixed cost $ Cδ0, Cα0, 
Var. cost factor - g G 
Var. cost factor  - 
δc 
Cδ=Cδ0+g × (δc)h h 
∆α 
Cα=Cα0+p*(∆α)q H 
Var. cost factor - P1 Cγ0, 
Var. cost factor - P2 P 
Var. cost factor  - 
λCi=p1 × Ci²+p2 × Ci+p3 
P3 
λßi=p1*ßi²+p2*ßi+p3 
Q 
3 Objective Function 
3.1 Condition Profile 
The analytical model of the above mentioned condition profile could be expressed as 
shown in Eq. (1). The equation consists of three main parts: (1) the initial time described 
by the C0I index and the time without deterioration x(2); (2) the period of deterioration 
without interventions, described by x(1), x(2) and αC; (3) the time of interventions and 
reapplication of measures dominated by tP and the value of x(5). 
[ ] [ ] )5(x(4))-(x(3))2()1( c0 xxxCCI cccI ⋅⋅−⋅−+⋅−+= αδαγα ∆                                            (1) 
Based on this classification, Eq. (1) can further be divided into four parts, C0, C1, C2, and 
C3, see Eqs. (2) to (5). C0 is the more or less constant part that is not influenced by the 
number of interventions. The remaining parts are directly related to the interventions. 
[ ] cI xxCC α⋅−+= )2()1(00                                                                                                     (2) 
γ∆=1C                                                                                                                                (3) 
)]-(x(3)[ c2 δα cC ⋅−=                                                                                                            (4) 
]x(4)[3 cC α⋅−=                                                                                                                    (5) 
Since C1 to C3 are in a linearly relation to x(5), they can be combined in ∆C, which results 
in Eq. (6). 
)5()5()( 03210 xCCxCCCCCI ⋅+=⋅+++= ∆                                                                      (6) 
This aggregation has the advantage that the cost-increasing factor λ can be handled as a 
global coefficient, as shown in Eq. (7). 
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Applying the global coefficient λCI,ges to the cost function as shown in Table 3 yields Cγ 
and Cδ respectively. 
( ) gesCIqpCC ,0 λγγγ ⋅⋅+= ∆                                                                                                      (8) 
( ) )5(0 xgCC hc ⋅⋅+= δδδ                                                                                                         (9) 
The cost due to the δc interventions, see Eq. (9), is not correlated with the level of CI. The 
cost terms thus associated result in the overall cost for maintaining a condition profile: 
δγ CCCCI +=                                                                                                                       (10) 
The aim is to minimize the overall cost for maintaining a condition profile by means of an 
optimization method. The optimization will rely mainly on the parameters as shown in Eq. 
(11). 
)(),,,,( xfnttttfC APDCCIPICI ==                                                                                          (11) 
Eq. (11) represents the objective function, a constrained nonlinear multivariable function, 
which has to be minimized. The optimization of the objective function is performed in this 
study by a line search medium-scale method. To ensure a reasonable course of the 
condition profile, the nonlinear multivariable function must be subjected to inequalities 
c(x), equalities ceq(x), and the lower (lb) and upper (ub) boundary conditions as shown in 
Eq. (13) 
bbeq ulcc ≤≤=≤ xxx ;0)(;0)(                                                                                        (13) 
where x, lb, and ub are vectors, c(x) and ceq(x) are functions that return vectors, and f(x) is 
the function that returns the minimum of the cost as a scalar. f(x) and c(x) are (or can be) 
nonlinear functions.  
3.2 Reliability Profile 
The reliability profile can also be created based on the variation of the reliability index, 
similar to the above performed remarks. The main elements describing the reliability 
profile are (i) the initial reliability index β0I, (ii) the time of damage initiation tRI, (iii) the 
reliability index deterioration rate αR without lifetime extension, (iv) the time of first 
application of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance tPI, (v) the time of reapplication 
of preventive lifetime-extending maintenance tp, (vi) the duration of preventive lifetime-
extending maintenance effect on reliability tRD, (vii) the deterioration rate change of the 
reliability index during preventive lifetime-extending maintenance effect ∆α, (viii) the 
improvement in the reliability index (if any) immediately after the application of 
preventive lifetime-extending maintenance ∆β. Similar to the condition profile, there are 
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predefined and variable elements describing the reliability profile optimization process (see 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively). The set up of the associated objective function can be 
performed analogously the previous explanations, which yields to. 
( ) gesqpCC ,0 βββ λβ ⋅⋅+= ∆                                                                                                   (14) 
( ) )5(0 xgCC h ⋅⋅+= ααα ∆                                                                                                    (15) 
and in consequence to: 
αββ CCC H +=                                                                                                                     (16) 
There are therefore two objective functions, see Eq. (10) and Eq. (16): 
a) which are used for the cost optimization,  
b) which ones have to be combined with each other to get a global cost optimization, 
c) for whom the specification factors have to be formulated by random variables to 
capture their uncertainties, 
d) for whom one or more specification factors should be selectable as variables to 
allow a scope examination of cost influence quantities. 
4 Objective Function – Probabilistic Treatment 
The independent deterministic cost optimization of the objective functions regarding the 
condition profile and the reliability profile do not meet all the maintenance requirements. It 
is necessary to combine both objective functions and to include the uncertainties of the 
describing elements of the profiles. The uncertainties intrinsic in the profiles can be treated 
by random variables and an advanced Monte Carlo simulation technique. The high scores 
of simulations, necessary for a Monte Carlo Simulation, can be reduced by the Latin 
Hypercube Sampling (LHS) technique by a factor 1000 [9]. A special subdivision concept 
applied to each of the random variables within the LHS technique allows the reduction to a 
small number of necessary realizations and simulations, respectively. Consequently, each 
of the objective functions has to be evaluated n times according to the number of the 
necessary realizations for one specified initial set of random variables. The scattering input 
parameters, together with the simulated scattering output parameters, can be used for 
sensitivity analyses. These analyses give already essential insights into the mutual relation 
under the profiles parameter. 
The main aim of the probabilistic consideration is to deliver the variables of Table 2 as 
scattering sizes under the claim of the minimal costs. The minimal costs are also due to the 
n simulations scattering quantities. These results permit the decision maker a more realistic 
assessment of the costs to be expected and the assessment of the sensitivity of the elements 
of the profiles regarding the costs. A more extensive assessment of cost developments 
enables the consideration of one or several variables of Table 1 and Table 2 as variable 
quantities within a defined range. 
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For the necessary requirements, mentioned above, Strauss et al. [8] developed a MATLAB 
routine for cost optimization strategies. It contains the LHS technique, FREeT as statistical 
software and allows the flexible choice of one or more quantities of the Table 1 and Table 
2 as variables. 
Fig. 2 shows the results of a probabilistic cost optimization for which ßH and CH are 
selected as variables, for more details see [8]. This kind of investigation gives insight into 
the development of the costs and its spread as a function of the variables. Since a cost 
optimized profile is assigned to each of the presented points, – simulation results – the 
main elements describing the profiles are also available in a statistical/ spreading manner. 
These statistical results can be consulted to demonstrate the significance of each single 
main element in the cost optimization. Nevertheless there are two independent optimized 
courses – condition and reliability profile, respectively – which have to be entangled for a 
global cost optimization.  
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Fig. 2: Optimized cost CostRE and CostCI vs. ßH and CH, respectively. 
A strategy proposed by [8] to combine the two optimized courses is to assign the 
minimized costs, reliability and condition cost, respectively, to a normalized expression 
and sum them, see Eqs.(17). 
min
min,max,min,max,
=+++ CIRE
CI
CIRE
RE
CostCost
Cost
CostCost
Cost
                                                               (17) 
This kind of combining the Cost-Optimized Reliability Profile ß with the Cost-Optimized 
Condition Profile CI, results in a structure’s characteristic health profile CRCP, see Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3: Optimized cost profile regarding CH and ßH [8] 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 3, the ßH/CH Cost Index Profile (CRCP) is more or less a derived 
numerical result that is different for every structure or structural component and that can be 
captured in a more general form as shown in Eq. (18): 
[ ]wHHHH CCv minmin −⋅+= ββ                                                                                          (18) 
The parameters v and w can be obtained by the boundary conditions and a curve-fitting 
operation, respectively, see Fig. 3. This function can be understood as a characteristic size 
of the structure or the component looked at. The above considerations were carried out 
under the acceptance of a constant deterioration rate α. The deterioration rate is determined 
mainly by the changes in the material in the cross section or the structure itself. Therefore 
the demand is given to design the deterioration rate more flexible e.g.:  
• in form of a linear function 
• in form of a nonlinear function 
• combined with a monitoring program. 
The last approach captures the actual structural qualities best. It allows the realistic 
indication of material, cross section and structural properties. However, the approach 
requires the inclusion of an identification algorithm (STRAUSS et al. [13]) and of a 
prognosis model by TEPLY et al [15], MAORI [14] etc. 
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Fig. 4: Development of failure ratio factors αi 
 
How obviously from  
Fig. 4 the identification algorithm has the following tasks at different times  
• Identifying critical elements of the structure 
• Due to the changes in the monitoring to identify the changes in the structure 
(reliability index ß) or the changes in the cross sections (e.g. resistances and in 
consequence the material properties based on cross section or sensitivity analyses, see  
Fig.3 on the right) 
The changes of the reliability level or the changes of the material properties serve for the 
determination of the current degradation rate.  Prognoses models like the Weibul functions, 
MAORI [14] approaches and TEPLY [15] degradations models can be used in consequence 
to derive the future development of the deterioration rate α. Since the monitoring systems 
and the identification methods are based on scattering date the prognoses models are too 
characterized by scattering. These prognoses models, expressible in most cases inform of 
functions, has to be included in Eqs. (18) which leads to: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ))((min)((min)(( tfwHHHH CCtfvtf ααβαβ −⋅+=                                                         (19) 
5 Conclusion 
The aim of this contribution was to present a cost optimization concept for the maintenance 
planning of engineering structures. In the concept both the reliability considerations and 
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the condition consideration (visual inspections) are included. How it is obviously from the 
above explanations both considerations can be led to a structure characteristic property, the 
„structure’s characteristic health profile CRCP”. The active inclusion of time variable 
material qualities requires, however, an extension of this approach. The extension 
comprehends the description of the degradation rate α by the use of inverse identification 
algorithms and prognoses models. This concept allows a permanent updating of the CRCP 
profiles. 
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Conformity control of concrete: some basic aspects 
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Abstract : Conformity control is an important step in the quality control of 
manufactured items. This also holds for concrete where an additional problem 
arises by the fact that the main mechanical characteristics can only be determi-
ned at a certain age, typically 28 days. In the European Standard EN 206-1, 
specific rules for conformity control of concrete strength are given. In the pa-
per the following aspects will be covered : 
- current types of conformity criteria for concrete strength 
- derivation of the probability of acceptance of current conformity criteria 
and discussion of OC-lines 
- dependency in the case of compound conformity criteria 
- influence of autocorrelation on OC-lines 
- basic criteria for the parameter selection in conformity criteria 
- discussion of the conformity criteria in EN 206-1. 
1 Introduction 
When concrete is produced, one or more properties are specified depending on the field of 
application and the environmental conditions. It has to be verified whether the produced 
concrete complies with the specified properties. This verification is called conformity con-
trol. In the case of concrete with product certification or production control certification, a 
more or less continuous production process takes place. Identity testing may be performed 
on a particular volume of concrete and shall be agreed between the supplier and the pur-
chaser. 
The most commonly specified property of concrete is compressive strength and most con-
trol plans have been derived for this property. However, also conformity criteria for other 
properties than strength are mentioned in EN 206-1 “Concrete – Part 1: Specification, per-
formance, production and conformity” as e.g. consistence, density, W/C-ratio, cement con-
tent, air content and chloride content. The latter properties are related to durability 
requirements. 
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Conformity control is always based on a sample of limited size, from which inferences are 
made for the whole population. Hence, there is always a risk of taking the wrong decision. 
This means that in some cases “good” concrete will be rejected and “bad” concrete will be 
accepted. The associated risks are called respectively the producer’s risk and the con-
sumer’s or client’s risk. It is not straightforward to elaborate a control plan which satisfies 
all parties involved and to fix the mentioned risks for which no absolute criteria are avail-
able. Traditionally, a large variety of conformity criteria have been proposed in national 
design guidelines. This paper gives a review of several aspects which have to be consid-
ered when deriving conformity criteria. It also reviews the first author’s earlier proposals 
for a general approach for conformity control [1]. 
2 Basic concepts 
In the sequel we shall focus on the compressive strength as the quantity to be tested. For 
design and production purposes the specified characteristic strength fck corresponds to the 
5%-fractile of the theoretical strength distribution of the concrete class considered (Fig. 1). 
In practice, the fraction below the specified fck will be smaller or higher than 5%. We shall 
call θ the fraction of test results below fck in the offered strength distribution (Fig. 1), hence 
[ ] θ=≤ ckfXP  (1) 
with X the compressive strength, considered as a random variable. 
 
Fig. 1 : Theoretical and offered strength distributions 
For an assumed strength distribution function and for a given conformity criterion, one can 
calculate the probability that a concrete lot, characterized by a value of θ, is accepted. This 
probability is called the probability of acceptance and denoted as Pa. The function Pa(θ) is 
called the operating characteristic of the criterion and is commonly abbreviated as OC-line. 
The OC-line has a typical shape as shown in Fig. 2. The ideal OC-line would be the line 
ABCD, which is described as Pa = 1 for θ < 0.05 and Pa = 0 for θ > 0.05. This OC-line, 
corresponding to a hypothetical sample of infinite size, has the greatest discriminating   
capacity i.e. the related conformity criterion allows to make a perfect distinction between 
good and bad productions. Practical OC-lines like AED show no specific variation at θ2 = 
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0.05. A production with θ2 > 0.05 still has a significant probability of acceptance and a 
producer realizing θ1 < 0.05, will find out that his production is not always accepted.     
 
Fig. 2 : General shape of an OC-line 
3 Types of conformity criteria 
Common conformity criteria are of the following types 
σλ ⋅+≥ ckn fx  (2) 
nckn sfx ⋅+≥ λ  (3) 
1kfx ckn +≥   (4) 
2min kfx ck −≥  (5) 
where nx  is the sample mean, σ the known standard deviation of the strength population, 
sn the sample standard deviation, xmin the smallest strength value in the sample and λ, k1 
and k2 parameters. 
Consider criterion (2). Assuming a normal strength distribution, it can be shown that  
])([ λθ +−Φ= unPa  (6) 
where Φ(.) is the standardized cumulative normal distribution function and uθ is the stan-
dardized normal variable corresponding to θ for which holds θ = Φ(uθ). It is quite common 
to represent the corresponding OC-line in a diagram with transformed scales according to 
the inverse of the function Φ(.). In this case, the OC-line becomes a straight line as can be 
seen in Fig. 3. In this figure line A is the OC-line for λ = 1.64 and n = 10. The slope of the 
OC-line is proportional to n0.5. This is in agreement with the fact that the larger the sample, 
the better the discriminating capacity of the conformity criterion. If λ increases (decreases) 
for constant n, then the OC-line shifts to the left (right). For uθ = -λ, Pa = 50%. The        
corresponding value of θ is called the indifference quality level. As there are two parame-
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ters in the criterion i.e. λ and n, it is possible to derive a conformity criterion for which the 
OC-line passes through two fixed points in the (θ, Pa) diagram. 
For criterion (3) the exact probability of acceptance is given by the non-central t-
distribution. However, generally good approximations are obtained by making use of the 
normal distribution. A possible approximation is given by 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+
+
−Φ= )(
2
1
2a λλ θu
nP  (7) 
which means that, by the fact that σ is not known but replaced by the sample estimate sn, 
the slope of the OC-line is reduced by a factor (1 + λ2/2). In case λ = 1.4, then 1 + λ2/2 = 
1.98 which means that the sample size needs to be doubled in order to obtain the same OC-
line as for the case that σ is known. 
 
Fig. 3 : OC-lines for σ⋅+≥ 64.110 ckfx  (A: independent observations ; B: correlated ob-
servations) 
Criteria of the type (4) can be rewritten as 
σλσσ ⋅′+≥⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+≥ ckn1ckn or fxkfx  (8) 
which is the same structure as (2) with λ’ = k1/σ. A value of σ needs to be adopted for the 
evaluation of λ’ and the calculation of the OC-line. Generally criteria of the type (4) are 
only applied to small samples (n = 3 to 10). OC-lines for criteria of the type (5) can be cal-
culated by making use of the binomial distribution. Generally these criteria are used in 
combination with criteria of the type (3) and (4) which results in the following compound 
criteria 
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⎩⎨
⎧
−≥
⋅+≥
2ckmin
nckn
kfx
sfx λ
 (9) 
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥
+≥
2ckmin
1ckn
kfx
kfx
 (10) 
The usual interpretation is that both criteria must be satisfied in order to accept the con-
crete production in case of product certification or the lot in case of identity testing. The 
calculation of the probability of acceptance of compound criteria is complicated by the fact 
that both criteria are not independent. This means that the global probability of acceptance 
Pa is not equal to the product of the probabilities of acceptance of the separate criteria i.e. 
Pa1 × Pa2 . This is due to the fact that the events expressed by both inequalities are depend-
ent. In case xmin is very small, it is likely that also nx will tend to be small. This trend 
should not be accounted for twice as would be the case by the application of the product 
rule. Hence Pa > Pa1 × Pa2. The exact calculation of Pa is quite complicated [5]. Generally, 
one has to make use of Monte-Carlo simulation or numerical integration of integral expres-
sions. It is interesting to point out that, especially for high n-values, the major contribution 
of the minimum value criterion to rejection takes place in the region with low θ values 
where it is not necessary to reduce Pa1 of the mean value criterion. 
OC-lines corresponding to criteria of the type nckn sfx ⋅+≥ λ are independent of the stan-
dard deviation σ of the strength distribution (Fig. 4, case A). OC lines for criteria: 
1ckn kfx +≥ shift to the right with increasing σ (case B), whereas the opposite effect is 
found for criteria of the type 2ckmin kfx +≥  (case C). In the case of compound criteria, the 
first effect is generally predominant and a shift to the right results with increasing σ (case 
D). This different behaviour has some particular consequences with respect to the concrete 
producer’s strategy. 
In cases B and D (Fig. 4) it follows that, for a given θ, a production with low σ values has 
a lower probability of acceptance compared to a production with higher σ, which can give 
rise to the following situation. Consider the two basic types of behaviour that are depicted 
in the left hand side of Fig. 5, and premise that a target of Pa is available. In order that two 
producers (with different values σ1 and σ2), have the same probability of acceptance, it is 
necessary that they realize different fraction defectives (θ2 > θ1) in the first case of Fig. 5, 
whereas in the second case θ1 = θ2 (lower part of figure). For the rather extreme case de-
picted in the upper part of Fig. 5 it is possible that both producers can realize the same 
mean value. In other words, to obtain the same target Pa value, the influence of the mean 
value is predominant whereas the standard deviation is of less importance. However, the 
situation represented in the lower part of Fig. 5 is completely in accordance with the notion 
of characteristic strength and clearly reflects the fact that in the case of high σ values, it is 
necessary to strive for a higher µ value in order to reach the target probability of accep-
tance. The situation represented in the upper part of Fig. 5 is rather extreme because the 
equality of the means only occurs for a target Pa equal to 50%. Nevertheless, the effect is 
still important for realistic target values. 
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Fig. 4 : Influence of σ on the location of OC-lines for different criteria 
 
Fig. 5 : Comparison of offered distributions which yield the same probability of acceptance 
In the case of correlated observations the variance of nx is larger than in the case of inde-
pendent observations, for which it equals σ2/n. The result is that the slope of an OC-line 
also decreases as shown in Fig. 3 for the criterion σ⋅+≥ 64.1ck10 fx (line B). Hence, there 
is a significant influence of the correlation structure on OC-lines. More details can be 
found in [6]. 
4 Derivation of conformity criteria 
4.1 Traditional approach 
Traditionally, the parameters appearing in conformity criteria are derived on the basis of an 
Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) or Limiting Quality (LQ) (Fig. 6). The AQL is a numeri-
cal definition of "good" quality. It is the maximum percent below the specified characteris-
tic strength that can be considered satisfactory over a production period. The producer's 
risk α is the probability that a good lot will be rejected by the sampling plan (Fig. 6). A 
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sampling plan should have a low producer's risk for quality which is equal to or better than 
the AQL. In some plans α is fixed at 5%, in other plans it varies from about 1% to 10%. 
The consumer's risk β is the probability that a "non-conforming" lot will be accepted by 
the sampling plan (Fig. 6). The risk is stated in conjunction with a numerical definition of 
"bad" quality such as the Limiting Quality (LQ). The LQ is the level of results below the 
specified characteristic strength that is unsatisfactory and therefore should be rejected by 
the sampling plan. A consumer's risk of 10% is common. The criteria presented in ISO 
3951 "Sampling procedures and charts for inspection by variables for percent nonconform-
ing" are of the type given in equation (3) and based on the AQL concept. 
 
Fig. 6 : AQL (Acceptable Quality Limit), LQ (Limiting Quality) and associated risks 
4.2 General remarks 
Before the introduction of unified design guidelines at the European level, quite different 
conformity criteria for concrete strength were used in the various European countries, al-
though the procedures for the design of structural elements were nearly the same. An at-
tempt to arrive at a more unified approach can be found in the 1978 Edition of the CEB-
FIP Model Code for Concrete Structures (MC 78) [8] where compound criteria of the type 
(9) and (10) were introduced. These types of criteria are also mentioned in ENV 206 
(1989) and EN 206-1 (2000) [9]. 
Once the type of criterion is fixed, the next stage is to derive numerical values for the pa-
rameters. In principle, two points in the θ-Pa diagram could be fixed (see e.g. Fig. 6) and 
the corresponding parameter values calculated. This yields one value for λ and one value 
for n. 
However, 2 problems occur. Primarily it is not easy to find representative values for AQL, 
LQ, α and β which satisfy the needs of both producers and purchasers. Choices of these 
parameters are to a large degree arbitrary. Secondly conformity control is often performed 
on the basis of samples with different sizes. 
An obvious choice could be λ = 1.64. The corresponding OC-line for the criterion 
σ⋅+≥ 64.1ckn fx  gives Pa = 50% for θ = 5%, which means that a producer who produces 
the target 5%-fractile, can expect a rejection of his production in one out of two cases. In 
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Fig. 3 the OC-line for n = 10 is shown. For lower values of θ, the probability of rejection 
remains fairly high, unless n would be increased. Hence, an approach is needed which 
yields sufficiently safe and economic solutions. A first attempt in this sense can be found 
in MC78 where so-called “unsafe” and “uneconomic” regions were indicated in the θ-Pa 
diagram. However, the origin of these regions is unclear. 
4.3 The average outgoing quality limit 
Another index which is used for sampling plans is the Average Outgoing Quality Limit 
(AOQL). The AOQL is the worst, or "limit", of average quality of outgoing product in-
cluding accepted lots and rejected lots which have been screened. The AOQL concept 
stems from the relationship between the fraction defective before inspection (incoming 
quality) and the fraction defective after inspection (outgoing quality) when inspection is 
nondestructive and rejected lots are screened. 
If θ is the incoming quality, Pr = 1 – Pa the probability of lot rejection and if all rejected 
lots are screened and made free of defects (i.e. θ = 0), then 
ara 0AOQ PPP ⋅=⋅+⋅= θθ  (11) 
The calculation assumes that all defective units in the accepted lots are retained in the lots 
while all defective units in rejected lots are identified and either repaired or replaced by 
nondefective units. As θ increases with θ and Pa decreases with increasing θ, the function 
θ⋅Pa goes through a maximum which is the AOQL (Fig. 7). The AOQL is most frequently 
used for inspection by attributes. However, there is no principle objection in using it for 
inspection by variables too [7]. The fact that all rejected lots have to be made free of de-
fects is no major problem for concrete since rejected lots are subjected to more detailed 
inspection. In case of low strength, upgrading measures will be taken in order to assure 
adequate structural safety. From this point of view we can state that a rectification of re-
jected lots will take place such that θ ≈ 0 is a reasonable assumption. 
 
Fig. 7 : General evolution of AOQ as a function of θ 
The OC-lines derived by Taerwe [1] are based on the AOQL concept, whereby AOQL = 
5%, or from (11) AOQL = (θ.Pa)max = 0.05. As in the commonly applied semi-probabilistic 
safety format fck is defined as the 5 %-fractile, it results that the curve 
05.0=⋅ aPθ   (12) 
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is a boundary for the unsafe region. This boundary line is plotted in Fig. 8, in the region θ 
> 5%. It is located in the same region as the former CEB-boundary, which proves the     
operational suitability. Values of λ for criteria corresponding to AOQL = 5% or (θ⋅Pa)max ≤ 
0.05 are given in Tab. 1 for the case of independent observations and for the case of corre-
lated observations according to a particular AR(2)-model [2,3,6]. OC-lines tangent to the 
unsafe region for the case of independent observations are shown in Fig. 8. 
Tab. 1 : Values of λ of the type nckn sfx ⋅+≥ λ with OC-line tangent to (12) 
n Independent observations AR(2)-model 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1.76 
1.52 
1.43 
1.38 
1.36 
1.34 
1.33 
1.33 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
1.32 
2.67 
2.20 
1.99 
1.87 
1.77 
172 
1.67 
1.62 
1.58 
1.55 
1.52 
1.50 
1.48 
 
Fig. 8 : OC-lines for independent observations and n = 5, 10, 15 
When the AOQL concept is used, its value is fixed at 5%, corresponding to the definition 
of fck. This choice is quite fundamental since for safety reasons we are interested in the 
average fraction defective of the outgoing lots. No arbitrary assumptions had to be intro-
duced for determining the parameter λ, and no discussion about balancing risks between 
different parties is necessary. When n decreases, the slope of the OC-line decreases as well 
as its discriminating capacity. In that case, both the producer's and consumer's risk in-
crease. Hence the consequences of changes in sample size are balanced between the two 
parties involved. 
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5 OC-curves for conformity criteria in EN 206-1 
In the current standard EN 206-1 the following two conformity criteria are mentioned for 
concrete strength: 
1. A compound criterion of the type (13) in the case of initial production with 3=n  
and 421 == kk  
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥
+≥
2ckmin
1ckn
kfx
kfx
 (13) 
2. A compound criterion of the type (14) in the case of continuous production with 
15≥n  and 48.1=λ  
 
⎩⎨
⎧
−≥
⋅+≥
2ckmin
ckn
kfx
fx σλ
 (14) 
Although it was indicated in this paper that a criterion of the type nckn sfx ⋅+≥ λ  is more 
appropriate according to the notion of characteristic strength (cf. Fig. 5), the European 
standard makes use of a criterion of the type (14). In this case σ has to be estimated on the 
basis of at least 35 consecutive strength values taken over a period exceeding three months 
and which is immediately prior to the production period during which conformity is to be 
checked. This σ value may be introduced in (14) on condition that the standard deviation 
of the latest 15 results (s15) does not deviate significantly from σ. This is considered to be 
the case if 
σσ ⋅≤≤⋅ 37.163.0 15s  (15) 
which is the 95% acceptance interval. If condition (15) is not satisfied a new estimate of σ 
has to be calculated from the last available 35 test results. 
Let us first investigate the case of independent observations. For different values of σ , Fig. 
9 illustrates the probability of acceptance in the case of initial production. Except for the 
case MPa 3=σ , the OC-curves cross the unsafe region given by (12).  
Fig. 10 illustrates the probability of acceptance in the case of continuous production (with-
out autocorrelation) and 15=n . For all σ  values the curves remain in the acceptable     
region, but the OC-line is far from optimal, because it doesn’t reach the unsafe region. 
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Fig. 9: Compound criterion for initial production (EN 206-1) and independent observations 
 
Fig. 10 : Compound criterion for continuous production (EN 206-1) and independent      
observations 
Let us now consider the fact that realistic concrete strength records present an undeniable 
autocorrelation between consecutive values [2, 6]. This autocorrelation can easily be ap-
plied in the Monte Carlo simulations by using an AR(2)-model as selected in [3, 6]. Appli-
cation of this model on the compound criteria in EN 206-1 yields Figs. 11 and 12, for the 
case of initial production and continuous production respectively. The same conclusions as 
the independent observations can be indicated. The slope of the OC-curves decreases sig-
nificantly. Hence, autocorrelation needs to be incorporated in the derivation of the parame-
ters in conformity criteria. 
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Fig. 11 : Compound criterion for initial production (EN 206-1) and correlated observations 
 
Fig. 12 : Compound criterion for continuous production (EN 206-1) and correlated obser-
vations 
6 Conclusions 
1. The calculation of OC-lines is briefly explained. The influencing factors and the 
particular aspects of the different types of criteria are indicated. 
2. It is proposed to derive conformity criteria on the basis of the AOQL concept    
(Average Outgoing Quality Limit). In this way OC-curves that are tangent to the 
AOQL-boundary can be derived, which leads to balanced producer's and con-
sumer's risks.  
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3. The OC-lines corresponding to the conformity criteria for concrete strength in EN 
206-1 fall within the zone on the OC-plot that is both safe and economic. The OC-
curves could however be optimized using the approaches mentioned in this paper. 
4. Autocorrelation of subsequent strength records can be modelled by means of auto-
regressive time-series. Incorporation of this aspect significantly decreases the      
descriminating capacity of the conformity criteria. 
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Tragfähigkeitsbewertung aus Versuchen-  
Probenanzahl versus Aussagesicherheit 
Dr.-Ing. Milad Mehdianpour 
Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung, Berlin  
 
Zusammenfassung: Der Einfluss der Probenanzahl auf die erreichbare Aussa-
gesicherheit bei der experimentellen Tragfähigkeitsbewertung wird anhand von 
zwei statistischen Methoden, der variablen und der attributiven Methode, vor-
gestellt. Der mathematische Hintergrund der attributiven Methode wird kurz 
beleuchtet. Bei der attributiven Methode zeigt sich insbesondere der Vorteil, in 
vielen Fällen ohne Zerstörung der Prüflinge, Aussagen hinsichtlich der Tragsi-
cherheit im Gebrauchszustand machen zu können. Es wird eine Möglichkeit 
gezeigt, bei unveränderten Anforderungen an Aussagesicherheit die Prüflast 
und den Stichprobenumfang zu variieren und gegeneinander aufzurechnen. Der 
Einsatz der attributiven Methode wird an zwei Fallbeispielen vorgeführt.  
1 Einleitung 
Die Bewertung der Tragfähigkeit von Bauteilen erfolgt in der Regel rechnerisch, experi-
mentell oder kombiniert aus beiden Methoden. Bei der rechnerischen Modellierung stellt 
die realitätsnahe Annahme der Materialeigenschaft bzw. -verhalten häufig ein größeres 
Problem dar als die Erfassung der realen Bauteilgeometrie. In vielen Fällen eröffnet die 
experimentelle Untersuchung die einzige Möglichkeit einer realistischen Bewertung der 
Tragfähigkeit, wenn präzise Eingangsinformationen für ein Rechenmodell oder gar ein 
geeignetes Rechenmodell fehlt. Die richtige Anwendung experimenteller Methoden setzt 
ein fundiertes Know How über die Versuchstechnik, über die mechanischen Zusammen-
hänge und oft die Beachtung der Probabilistik voraus. Bei falscher Anwendung kann die 
experimentelle Methode die Realität verfälscht widerspiegeln. Neben einer sorgfältigen 
Planung der Belastungskonfiguration, der Lagerungsbedingungen und der Versuchsdurch-
führung spielt die Auswertung bzw. die Bewertung der Versuchsergebnisse eine sehr wich-
tige Rolle. Jeder Bauteilwiderstand ist infolge vieler Einflussparameter in Wirklichkeit 
eine Zufallsgröße, weshalb zur Auswertung statistische Verfahren angewandt werden müs-
sen, wenn Ergebnisse aus mehreren Prüfungen vorliegen. Die durchgeführten Prüfungen 
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stellen im Sinne der Statistik eine Stichprobe dar. Der Umfang der Stichprobe stellt einen 
wichtigen Parameter dar, von der die Sicherheit der Aussage über die Grundgesamtheit 
entscheidend abhängt. Es ist einleuchtend, dass diese Aussagesicherheit mit sinkender Pro-
benanzahl schwindet.   
Aus Kostengründen bzw. auch aus Gründen des Denkmalschutzes besteht häufig die Auf-
gabe darin, anhand von Untersuchungen an einer repräsentativen Stichprobe möglichst 
geringen Umfangs, zuverlässige Aussagen für die Grundgesamtheit abzuleiten.  
2 Theoretische Grundlagen 
2.1 Allgemein 
Zur Auswertung von Versuchsergebnissen wird ausgehend von einer statistischen Vertei-
lung der Tragfähigkeitswerte ein Grenzwert geschätzt, welcher von einem Mindestprozent-
satz aller Bauteile erreicht wird. Häufig beeinflusst die Materialeigenschaft die 
Tragfähigkeit eines Bauteils dominierend bzw. in vielen Fällen ist es möglich, andere Un-
sicherheiten des Systems vor dem Versuch zu erfassen, zu eliminieren und gesondert zu 
berücksichtigen. Im Bauwesen wird hinsichtlich der Materialeigenschaft i. d. R. die 5%-
Fraktile als Grenzwert festgelegt. Ein Sicherheitsfaktor γM =γm·γm,sys deckt noch weitere 
Unsicherheiten bei der Ermittlung der Beanspruchbarkeit eines Bauteils ab. 
Die Aussage über den 5%-Fraktilwert, basierend auf der Untersuchung einer Stichprobe 
begrenzten Umfangs, ist nur als Schätzung möglich, d. h. sie trifft nur mit einer gewissen 
Wahrscheinlichkeit zu, welche als Aussagewahrscheinlichkeit bzw. Konfidenz bezeichnet 
wird. Sie wird in verschiedenen Bereichen des Bauwesens unterschiedlich festgelegt (Bsp. 
Stahlbau DIN 18800: 5%-Fraktile bei 75% Aussagewahrscheinlichkeit oder Betonstahl 
DIN 488: 5%-Fraktile bei 90% Aussagewahrscheinlichkeit). Das Fraktil bei einer geforder-
ten Aussagesicherheit lässt sich in Abhängigkeit des Umfangs der getesteten Stichprobe 
ermitteln. Es gibt verschiedene Methoden, eine Stichprobe zu prüfen und den Fraktilwert 
zu schätzen. Man unterscheidet zwischen der „variablen“ und der „attributiven“ Prüfme-
thode, wobei die attributive Methode die strengere Prüfmethode ist und konservativere 
Ergebnisse liefert. Während bei der variablen Methode aus dem Mittelwert und Standard-
abweichung einer Versuchsreihe die konkrete Größe der Beanspruchbarkeit als 5%-Fraktil 
ermittelt wird, wird bei der attributiven Methode lediglich bewertet, wie viele Proben eine 
gewisse Eigenschaft z. B. die Mindestfestigkeit als 5%-Fraktil besitzen.  
2.2 Variable Methode 
Bei der variablen Methode wird bei jedem Versuch der Zahlenwert für eine Messgröße 
bestimmt und aus den vorliegenden Zahlenwerten unter Beachtung des begrenzten Stich-
probenumfangs n eine statistisch abgesicherte „Größe“ entwickelt. Wie bereits oben er-
wähnt, handelt es sich bei der statistisch abgesicherten Größe hier um den 5%-Fraktilwert 
bei einer bestimmten Konfidenz. Unter Zugrundelegung einer Normalverteilung der Ver-
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suchswerte liefert die mathematische Statistik aufbereitete Gleichungen, woraus der im 
Bauwesen geforderte statistisch abgesicherte Schätzwert der pxˆ ermittelt werden kann: 
x1p skxxˆ ⋅−=   (1) 
mit )1,p,n(kk1 α−=    k1-werte der nicht-zentralen t-Verteilung 
n    Umfang der Stichprobe 
p     p-Fraktil 
1-α    Vertrauensniveau bzw. Aussagesicherheit 
∑
=
=
n
1i
ixn
1x    Mittelwert der Stichprobe  (2) 
∑
=
−−=
n
1i
2
ix )xx(n1
1s  Standardabweichung   (3) 
und  xi i-te Realisation der Stichprobe (Nummer des 
Einzelversuchs). 
Die k1-Werte sind in den einschlägigen Statistikbüchern tabelliert. Abbildung 1 zeigt ex-
emplarisch den Verlauf der k1-Werte zur Ermittlung des 5%-Fraktilwertes einer Versuchs-
reihe in Abhängigkeit der Probenanzahl für 90% bzw. 75% Aussagesicherheit. Aus dem 
steil abfallenden Verlauf der Kurven ist zu erkennen, dass insbesondere bei geringen Pro-
Abb. 1: Verlauf der k1-Werte der nicht-zentralen t-Verteilung für die 5%-Fraktile in Ab-
hängigkeit der Probenanzahl für 90% bzw. 75% Aussagesicherheit   
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benzahlen etwa unter 5 jeder zusätzlicher Versuch erheblich zu Steigerung der Aussagesi-
cherheit beitragen kann. Da für n→∞ die t-Verteilung in die Normalverteilung übergeht, 
konvergieren die Kurven gegen den Wert 1,645. Der Betrag 1,645 entspricht dem z-Wert 
der Standardnormalverteilung für die 95%- bzw. 5%-Fläche unter der Verteilungskurve. 
Zur Ermittlung des p-Fraktils pxˆ  wird nach (1) das Produkt aus dem k1-Wert und der Stan-
dardabweichung Sx von dem Mittelwert x der Versuchsreihe subtrahiert. Die Subtraktion 
kann insbesondere bei großer Streuung der Versuchswerte - worauf man als Prüfer keinen 
Einfluss hat- sehr kleine bzw. gar negative Werte liefern, die physikalisch nicht sinnvoll 
sind. Dies liegt unter anderem an der zugrunde gelegten Normalverteilung der Versuchs-
werte. Ab einem Variationskoeffizienten von etwa 0,2 empfiehlt es sich daher eine andere 
Verteilung wie z. B. die Log-Normalverteilung anzunehmen [1]. Das p-Fraktil ergibt sich 
dann aus der Multiplikation des Mittelwertes x mit einem anderen Beiwert k2, der ähnlich 
wie der k1-Wert der einschlägigen Literatur entnommen werden kann.  
2.3 Attributive Methode 
Die attributive Methode wird häufig zum Zwecke der Qualitätsprüfung von Serienproduk-
ten eingesetzt. Bei der attributiven Methode wird aus einem Los eine Stichprobe des Um-
fangs n entnommen und durchgeprüft. Das Los soll einen gewissen Maximalanteil an 
„schlechten“ Proben (Schlechtanteil p) besitzen. Diese Hypothese ist auf Wahrheit zu prü-
fen.  Es sind entsprechend viele Proben im Los vorhanden, sodass die Stichprobenentnah-
me den Schlechtanteil kaum beeinflusst. Bei jedem Test der n Proben wird lediglich 
kontrolliert, ob die Probe die erwartete Eigenschaft hat und damit „gut“ ist oder nicht (sog. 
„ ja-nein-Prüfung“). Das Prüfergebnis entscheidet darüber, ob die Hypothese über den ma-
ximalen Schlechtanteil p im Los zutrifft und das gesamte Los anzunehmen oder abzuleh-
nen ist. Ist dabei die Anzahl i der „schlechten“ Stücke größer als eine festgelegte 
Annahmezahl Ac, so wird das gesamte Los abgelehnt. Im Sinne von Bauteilprüfungen zei-
gen beispielsweise gute Bauteile eine Mindesttragfähigkeit, schlechte nicht. Nach bestan-
dener Prüfung einer Stichprobe des Umfangs n, kann auf die Tragsicherheit aller ähnlichen 
Bauteile des Bauwerks geschlossen werden.  
Zur mathematischen Erläuterung der attributiven Methode werden zunächst die wichtigs-
ten Parameter nochmals zusammengefasst: 
• n der Stichprobenumfang = Anzahl der Prüfungen 
• p Schlechtanteil im Los in % 
• Ac  Annahmezahl (die maximal akzeptierbare Anzahl der schlechten Proben, 
wenn n Stück getestet werden) 
• Pa Annahmewahrscheinlichkeit (Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Prüfung positiv 
ausfällt und das Los angenommen wird) 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit Pa, das Los nach der Prüfung anzunehmen, hängt ab von p, n und 
vor allem von Ac. Sie ergibt sich nach Überlegungen, welche auf dem Gesetz des 
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BERNOULLI-Experiments basieren. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit bei einem Schlechtanteil von 
p, nach n Tests genau i schlechte Stücke zu erhalten ergibt sich zu 
   ( ) ini p1p
i
n
)"Trefferigenau("P −−⋅⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=      (4) 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, höchstens Ac schlechte Stücke zu erhalten (also i=0 oder i=1 oder 
... i=Ac) ergibt sich aus der Summe der Einzelwahrscheinlichkeiten (Unabhängigkeit der 
Proben vorausgesetzt) zu 
( )∑
=
−−⋅⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=≤ c
A
0i
ini
c p1pi
n
)Ai(P       (5) 
Mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von P(i ≤ Ac) treten höchstens Ac schlechte Stücke auf, was 
gleichzeitig die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür ist, dass die Stichprobe die Prüfung besteht und 
damit das gesamte Los angenommen wird. Die Annahmewahrscheinlichkeit P(i ≤ Ac) ist 
bei „strengen“ Testbedingungen oder durch Festlegung einer kleinen Annahmezahl Ac ent-
sprechend gering. Je kleiner Ac ist, umso kleiner ist P(i ≤ Ac) und umso geringer ist das 
„Risiko“, ein evtl. schlechtes Los zu akzeptieren. Wird in einer Hypothese behauptet, dass 
es im Los maximal den p-Anteil an schlechten Proben gibt und es wird auf maximal Ac in n 
geprüft, so stellt P(i ≤ Ac) die Unsicherheit α der Hypothese dar. Das Einserkomplement 
W= 1- P(i ≤ Ac) ist demnach dann Testsicherheit bzw. Aussagesicherheit [2]. 
α−= 1W            (6) 
Anders als bei der Qualitätskontrolle einer laufenden Produktion ist bei Bauwerksprüfun-
gen häufig die vorliegende Stichprobenzahl gering und man ist folglich bestrebt, auch die 
Annahmezahl möglichst gering zu halten und setzt von vornherein Ac=0. Solche Prüfungen 
werden in der Literatur als „Success-Run“ bzw. „Erfolgslauf“ bezeichnet [3]. Dadurch 
vereinfacht sich die Gleichung (5) zu:  
( )
( )
n
n
n0
)p1()0i(
.bzw
p1)0i(P
p1p
0
n
)0i(P
−==
−==
−⋅⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛==
α
       (7) 
Durch Umstellung von (7) kann dann festgestellt werden, wie viele Prüfungen erforderlich 
sind, um auf ein bestimmtes Sicherheitsniveau schließen zu können. Werden beispielswei-
se Stahlbauteile untersucht, deren Tragfähigkeit vorwiegend von der Materialeigenschaft 
bestimmt wird, ist es sinnvoll, die Kombination des 5%-Fraktils bei einer Aussagesicher-
heit von 75% zugrunde zulegen [4]. Geprüft wird dann gegen ein aus dem Fraktilwert der 
Beanspruchbarkeit abgeleitetes Mindestmaß an Tragfähigkeit minx, das ggf. weitere Sys-
temunsicherheiten in Form von höherer Prüfkraft berücksichtigen könnte. Löst man die 
Gleichung (7) nach n auf, erhält man die Gleichung (8), nach der dann 27 Success-Run-
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Tests erforderlich wären. Da es sich hier um Success-Run-Tests handelt, wurde α(i=0) 
durch α abgekürzt. 
)p1ln(
lnn)p1( n −=⇒−=
αα        
27
95,0ln
25,0lnn95,025,0 n ==⇒=       (8) 
In der Regel ist die Entnahme bzw. die Prüfung von 27 Bauteilen nicht erwünscht und wä-
re, abgesehen von dem Aufwand, häufig aus der Sicht des Bestandschutzes nicht vertret-
bar. Um dennoch mit einer praxisgerechten Anzahl von Proben die gewünschten 
Zuverlässigkeitsaussagen zu erhalten, können die Prüflasten über den geforderten Min-
destmaß an Tragfähigkeit minx, angehoben werden. Dabei ist natürlich darauf zu achten, 
dass die technischen Grenzen nicht verletzt werden. Im Folgenden soll gezeigt werden, wie 
bei unveränderten Anforderungen an Zuverlässigkeit bzw. Konfidenz die Prüflast und der 
Stichprobenumfang variiert und gegeneinander aufgerechnet werden können. 
Abbildung 2 zeigt beispielhaft die angenommene Dichte- und die Wahrscheinlichkeitsver-
teilung der Tragfähigkeit aller Bauteile eines Loses (Grundgesamtheit) unter Zugrundele-
gung einer Normalverteilung (σ und µ nicht genau bekannt). Die Annahme einer 
normalverteilten Grundgesamtheit wird hier als gut zutreffend postuliert. In der Praxis soll-
te dies immer mit Hilfe von statistischen Tests gesondert geprüft werden, da das Ergebnis 
durch die zugrunde gelegte Verteilung entscheidend beeinflusst werden kann. 
Das Los soll auf einen Schlechtanteil von maximal 5% geprüft werden, entsprechend wur-
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de minx (inklusive evtl. Sicherheitsbeiwert fürs System) festgelegt. Mit einer Wahrschein-
lichkeit von 95% erreicht oder überschreitet jedes beliebig aus dem Los herausgegriffene 
Stück die Mindestbeanspruchbarkeit minx. Würden 27 Bauteile geprüft werden, wobei alle 
minx erreichen, liegt die Annahmewahrscheinlichkeit bzw. die statistische Unsicherheit 
nach der Gleichung (7) bei 
   25,0)05,01( 27 =−=α        (9) 
und damit die Aussagesicherheit bei 0,75. Verschärfte man bei n = 27 die Prüfbedingun-
gen, indem minx auf minxLab anhebt, sinkt naturgemäß die Annahmewahrscheinlichkeit. Soll-
ten alle 27 Prüflinge den verschärften Test bestehen, hätte man hinsichtlich der Aussage 
„maximal 5% Schlechtanteil im Los“ eine viel größere Aussagesicherheit als zuvor gefor-
dert. In dem Beispiel der Abbildung 2 bewirkt die erhöhte Prüflast, dass nur 84% aller 
Bauteile minxLab überschreiten könnten bzw. entsprechend evtl. 16% Schlechtanteil gibt. Die 
überhöhte Aussagesicherheit, wenn alle 27 Prüflinge  minxLab überschreiten, liegt bei  
991,0009,01W
009,0)16,01( 27
=−=
=−=α         (10) 
Um bei der verschärften Prüfbedingung mit minxLab wie zuvor die gleiche Aussagesicherheit 
von 75% zu erhalten, müsste die Anzahl der Prüfungen reduziert werden.  
8
84,0ln
25,0lnn84,025,0 n ==⇒=       (11) 
Mit anderen Worten: Das Los wird nicht auf dem Niveau der 5%-Fraktile untersucht, son-
dern wie in dem Beispiel gezeigt auf dem Niveau der 16%-Fraktile, wodurch viele Proben 
eingespart werden können, falls der Success-Run-Test bestanden wird. Wegen des steilen 
Verlaufs der Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungskurve in dem Bereich, in dem üblich operiert 
wird und wegen der ln-Funktion bewirkt eine geringfügige Verschärfung der Prüfbedin-
gung eine große Ersparnis an erforderlichen Proben.   
Im Folgenden wird für das Beispiel eine Beziehung für die Festlegung der verschärften 
Prüfbedingung minxLab abgeleitet. Die Vorgehensweise lässt sich analog für andere Vertei-
lungsformen und Fraktilwerte anwenden.  
Um die Tabellen der standardisierten Normalverteilung verwenden zu können, werden die 
z-Transformierten nach Gleichung (12) betrachtet. 
   σ
µ−= xz          (12) 
Die z-Variablen der Standardnormalverteilung betragen jeweils  
   
00,1z%84für
64,1z%95für
%16
%5
=
=
       (13) 
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Aus dem Verhältnis der z-Variablen 
  64,1
z
z
%16
%5 =          (14) 
wird durch die Anwendung von (12) für minx und minxLab folgende Beziehung aufgestellt   
  µ
µ
σ
µ
σ
µ
−
−=−
−
= Lab
min
min
Lab
min
min
x
x
x
x
64,1       (15) 
 Nach der Umstellung erhält man für die verschärfte Prüfbedingung im Labor  
 
64,1
64,0xx minLabmin
µ⋅+=        (16) 
Da es sich um die ein und dieselbe Grundgesamtheit handelt, ist ein Success-Run-Test mit 
8 Proben auf dem Niveau von  minxLab  hinsichtlich der Zuverlässigkeitsaussage gleichwer-
tig mit einem Success-Run-Test mit 27 Proben auf dem Niveau von minx. Während sich minx 
aus dem charakteristischen Wert der Beanspruchbarkeit ableiten lässt, ist für Gleichung 
(16) µ als Mittelwert der Grundgesamtheit zu schätzen oder der einschlägigen Literatur zu 
entnehmen.  
3 Fallbeispiele 
3.1 Deutschlandhalle Berlin 
Der mittlere Bereich der Deutschlandhalle (sog. Laterne) wird auf einer rechteckigen Flä-
che von 95 m x 58 m von einer stützenfreien Dachkonstruktion überspannt, bestehend aus 
58 m langen Spannbetonbindern, verlegt im Abstand von 11 Metern. Zwischen den Spann-
betonbindern liegen Stahlbetonpfetten im Abstand von 2 m. Den Raumabschluss bilden ca. 
Abb. 3: Deutschlandhalle in Berlin  
Bildquelle: http://www.berlin-china.net/zonglan/lueyou/berlin360/images/messe_deutschlandhalle.jpg 
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5200 Porenbetonplatten (Ytong) von 2,00 m x 0,50 m mit einer Dicke von 7,5 cm. Über 
den Porenbetonplatten befindet sich eine bituminöse Ausgleichsschicht von einigen Zenti-
metern und eine mehrlagige Dachpappenabdichtung. Die mit statisch anrechenbaren punkt-
geschweißten Bewehrungsmatten (glatte Stäbe) versehenen Porenbetonplatten tragen die 
Dachlasten und dienen gleichzeitig als Wärmeisolierung. Das Dach ist für Revisionsarbei-
ten begehbar. In den vergangenen Jahren wurde das Dach regelmäßig inspiziert und teilsa-
niert. Es wurden trotzdem immer wieder kleinere Stücke Porenbeton auf dem Hallenboden 
und im Tribünenbereich gefunden. Gegen herabfallende Bruchstücke wurden schließlich 
Abfangnetze unterhalb der Decke angebracht. Durch zahlreiche Untersuchungen und Gut-
achten wurden die Gefahrenpotentiale der Dachkonstruktion hinreichend dokumentiert. 
Ein großer Teil der Schadensaufnahmen (Sichtprüfung) konnte von einer Zwischentribüne 
aus, 8 m unterhalb der Deckenplatten erfolgen, vgl. Abbildung 4 links. Insbesondere in 
einer der letzten BAM-Gutachten wurde auf die Problematik von schadhaften Porenbeton-
platten, deren Anzahl damals unbekannt war, eingegangen, vgl. Abbildung 4 rechts. Da die 
Bewehrung nicht gerippt ist, spielt die Betondeckung für die Tragfähigkeit der Porenbe-
tonplatte eine große Rolle.  
Im Rahmen einer umfangreichen Prüfmaßnahme wurde zunächst eine komplette Scha-
denskartierung durchgeführt. Alle 5200 Platten wurden zunächst einer Sichtprüfung aus 
nächster Nähe unterzogen. Ein direkter Zugang zu der Dachunterseite besteht nicht. Daher 
musste die Schadensaufnahme durch Industriekletterer durchgeführt werden. Da die Ursa-
che für die in Abbildung 4 rechts dargestellten Schäden nicht feststand, war es umso wich-
tiger, möglichst alle betroffenen Platten ausfindig zu machen. Hierzu gehörte auch der 
Anteil derjenigen Platten, bei denen eine schalenartige Ablösung der Betondeckung bzw. 
eine horizontale Trennung im Material auf der Höhe der Bewehrung (bzw. Hohlstellen), 
welche jedoch durch die Rissverzahnung gerade noch am Bauteil hängt, vermutet wurde. 
Ein solcher Schaden bleibt bei einer Sichtprüfung unerkannt und kann nur durch mechani-
sche Prüfung der Plattenunterseite z. B. durch Klopfen entdeckt werden. Eine Abklopfprü-
fung stellte aber einen viel höheren Prüfaufwand dar als die Sichtprüfung, da der 
Industriekletterer hierzu die Platte mit der Hand erreichen mussten. Da hierbei auch der 
Klang beim Klopfen zu beurteilen ist, ist die unmittelbare Nähe zwingend erforderlich. 
Die Abklopfprüfung der Platten stellt eine ja-nein-Prüfung dar, d. h. entweder weist die 
schalenartige Abplatzungen  
Pfette 
Porenbetonplatten 
Spannbetonbinder 
Abb. 4: links: Untersicht der Decke von der Zwischenbühne aus; rechts: schadhafte 
Porenbetonplatte mit schalenartiger Abplatzung der Betondeckung  
Pfette 
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Platte einen (für die einfache Sichtprüfung versteckten) Mangel auf oder nicht. Wenn ja, ist 
sie im Sinne der Ausführungen unter Kapitel 2.3 als „schlecht“ zu bezeichnen. Mit Hilfe 
der attributiven Methode wurde ein Prüfplan aufgestellt, mit dem der Maximalanteil an 
schlechten Platten mit vertretbarem Aufwand abgeschätzt werden konnte. Der Prüfplan ist 
in Abbildung 5 im linken Diagramm dargestellt. Die einzelnen Wertepaare lassen sich mit 
Hilfe der Gleichung (5) berechnen oder aus dem rechts abgebildeten Nomogramm ablesen. 
Dort ist beispielhaft das Ablesen des ersten Wertepaares des Prüfplans rot eingezeichnet.  
Ein Beispiel soll die Anwendung des Prüfplans verdeutlichen: wenn 59 (optisch unauffäl-
lige) Platten einer Abklopfprüfung unterzogen werden (vgl. Ordinate in Abbildung 5 links) 
und dabei keine fehlerhafte Platte (vgl. Abszisse in Abbildung 5 links) entdeckt wurde, 
dann liegt der Anteil der "schlechten" Platten bei maximal 5 %. Diese Aussage hat eine 
Sicherheit von 95%. Wurde aber bei der Prüfung eine "schlechte" Platte entdeckt, so muss 
der Prüfumfang auf 93 Platten erweitert werden, um eine gleichwertige Aussage machen 
zu können. Dabei darf keine weitere "schlechte" Platte entdeckt werden, sonst ist der Um-
fang wieder gemäß Prüfplan zu erhöhen. 
Die Festlegung der Eingangsparameter für den Prüfplan, maximal 5% Schlechtanteil bei 
95% Aussagesicherheit, erfolgte in diesem Sonderfall durch eingehende Abwägung der 
Gefahrensituation und die Abschätzung des Risikos eines versteckten Mangels und Be-
rücksichtigung der Ergebnisse einer Ausfallrechnung für eine einzelne Platte. Zur Erhö-
hung der Sicherheit wurden die 5200 Platten bereichsweise nach Lage und früheren 
Beanspruchung (wie etwa Durchfeuchtung) in mehreren Grundgesamtheiten aufgeteilt und 
gesondert geprüft. Die Prüfung war lediglich für die optisch unauffälligen Platten vorgese-
hen. Platten mit offensichtlichem Schaden waren generell auszutauschen, oder abzufangen. 
Die zu prüfenden Platten wurden zuvor auf einem Plan festgelegt. Häufig konnte der Prü-
fer aus seiner Kletterposition heraus ebenso die benachbarten Platten abklopfen. Diese 
Maßnahme erhöhte naturgemäß den Stichprobenumfang und trug erheblich zur Aussagesi-
cherheit bei bzw. es konnte bei gleich bleibender Aussagesicherheit von 95% auf einen 
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Abb. 5: Links: Prüfplan für die Abklopfprüfung; statistische Rahmenbedingungen bei 
maximal 5% schadhaften Platten aus einer Grundgesamtheit bei 95% Aussage-
sicherheit. Rechts: Nomogramm für die cumulative Binominalverteilung nach 
H. R. LARSON [5] 
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geringeren Schlechtanteil von ca. 2% geschlossen werden. Erfreulicherweise gelangen die 
Prüfungen als Success-Run-Tests.       
3.2 Ritterschaftsbank Berlin Mitte 
Das vor 1900 gebaute vierstöckige Gebäude der ehemaligen Ritterschaftsbank in der Moh-
renstr. 66 in Berlin Mitte sollte saniert und teilweise umgebaut werden. Für die Sanierung 
des Gebäudes sollte der Bestand weitgehend erhalten bleiben. Es wurde insbesondere an-
gestrebt, die vorhandenen Decken weiter zu nutzen. Das Deckensystem besteht, gemäß den 
damaligen Bauweisen, aus Stahlträgern mit zwischenliegenden preußischen Kappen. Ers-
ten Materialuntersuchungen zur Folge weisen viele der Altstahlträger die Merkmale eines 
Puddelstahls auf, einige auch die eines Flußstahls. Von Altstahl sind einige ungünstige 
Eigenschaften bekannt, wie z. B. geringe Bruchdehnung, große Streuung der Materialei-
genschaften, Inhomogenität innerhalb des Querschnitts sowie Anisotropie. Daher sollte vor 
der Sanierungsmaßnahme die Tragfähigkeit der Altstahlträger für den Bau- und den End-
zustand untersucht und hinsichtlich der zu erwartenden Beanspruchungen beurteilt werden. 
Zum Einen waren für den Endzustand Deckenbelastungen bis zu 5,0 kN/m² geplant, zum 
Anderen wurden für den Bauzustand stoßartige Beanspruchungen durch herabfallende 
Trümmer erwartet. Insgesamt befinden sich an die 400 Altstahlträger im Bauwerk. Für 
Untersuchungen wurden 8 Träger (Walzprofile) aus dem Bestand entfernt und der BAM 
zur Verfügung gestellt. Die Trägerentnahme erfolgte aus verschiedenen Bereichen des Ge-
bäudes. Es wurden statische sowie dynamische Tragfähigkeitstests an Bauteilen durchge-
führt. Dem Planer sollte für den Gebrauchszustand ein Grenzwert der Beanspruchbarkeit 
als „zulässige Spannung“ basierend auf einem globalen Sicherheitsbeiwert im Sinne des 
alten Bemessungskonzepts geliefert werden. Außerdem sollte neben der Beurteilung der 
Beanspruchbarkeit gegenüber stoßartiger Belastung noch das Tragverhalten von Altstahl-
bauteilen unter kombinierter Beanspruchung durch Moment und Querkraft untersucht wer-
den. In diesem Beitrag wird nur auf die Abschätzung des Grenzwertes der 
Beanspruchbarkeit als „zulässige Spannung“ eingegangen. Da die Anzahl der Proben ge-
ring war und eine Reihe von Untersuchungen unterschiedlicher Art anstand, war es wich-
Abb. 6: Ritterschaftsbankgebäude. Links: Zeichnung von 1896: " Berlin und seine Bauten " 
hg. vom Architektenverein zu Berlin 1896, II. und III. Hochbau S. 372 Abb. 395. 
Rechts: Berlin Mohrenstr.66, Bild mit freundlicher Genehmigung von: Pitz&Hoh Werkstatt 
für Architektur und Denkmalpflege, September 2003   
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tig, den Grenzwert der Beanspruchbarkeit im Gebrauchszustand abzuschätzen, ohne die 
Träger zu beschädigen. Die Gewissheit, hierzu im Anschluss an alle anderen Untersuchun-
gen abschließende Traglastversuche durchführen zu können, war vor allem wegen der an-
stehenden Stoßversuche nicht gegeben. Mit Hilfe der attributiven Methode war es möglich, 
Ergebnisse von Gebrauchslastversuchen, bei denen keine Beschädigung der Bauteile be-
fürchtet wurde, auszuwerten und Aussagen zur Tragsicherheit im Gebrauchszustand zu 
treffen. Die geringe Probenanzahl wurde durch schärfere Prüfbedingungen ausgeglichen. 
In Gebrauchslastversuchen wurden die Träger im Dreipunktbiegeversuch bis zu einer 
Grenzlast minx mehrmals be- und entlastet und die Tragfähigkeit anhand der Linearität der 
Kraft-Verformungskurve beurteilt. Dabei wurde kontrolliert, ob das Tragverhalten linear 
bleibt. Das vom Planer vorgegebene Gebrauchslastniveau entsprach einer Randfaserspan-
nung von 10 kN/cm². Berücksichtigt man noch in Anlehnung an die alte Stahlbaunorm 
DIN 18800 Teil 1 (3.81) einen globalen Sicherheitsfaktor von 1,5 , so ergibt sich der gefor-
derte Mindestwert der 5%-Fraktile für die Tragfähigkeit der Träger im Versuch zu 
15 kN/cm². Träger, deren Tragfähigkeit auch nur geringfügig unterhalb minx liegt, sollten im 
Sinne der attributiven Methode als „schlecht“ bezeichnet werden. 
Unter Kapitel 2.3 wurde mit Hilfe der Gleichung (8) die Zahl 27 als die Mindestanzahl an 
Success-Run-Tests ermittelt, welche erforderlich wären, um bei 75% Aussagewahrschein-
lichkeit nicht mehr als 5% Schlechtanteil in einer Grundgesamtheit anzunehmen. Hier 
standen aber nur 8 Träger, also höchstens nur 8 Success-Run-Tests zur Verfügung. Wie bei 
8 Proben die gleiche Zuverlässigkeitsaussage erreicht werden kann, wenn die Tests mit 
einer höheren Laborbelastung minxLab durchgeführt werden, wurde als Beispiel in Gleichung 
(16) ermittelt. Für die Gleichung (16) ist die Abschätzung des Mittelwertes der Grundge-
samtheit µ erforderlich. Der Mittelwert der Grundgesamtheit µ wurde unter Berücksichti-
gung der hauseigenen Datenbank auf der sicheren Seite liegend möglichst hoch 
abgeschätzt. Die statistische Berechnung der oberen Schranke für µmax erfolgte mit Hilfe 
der Student-t-Verteilung unter Zulassung einer Irrtumswahrscheinlichkeit von maximal 
5%. Das Ergebnis beträgt µmax=28,04 kN/cm². 
Nach Einsetzen erhält man für die Gleichung (16)  
 
2
Lab
min cm
kN1,20
64,1
2864,015x =⋅+= ,     (17) 
Alle 8 Bauteile konnten jeweils ihren Test auf dem mit (17) ermittelten erhöhten Bean-
spruchungsniveau von 20,1 kN/cm² unbeschadet bzw. ohne Nichtlinearitäten in der Kraft-
Verformungskurve bestehen. Daher wurde mit ausreichender Sicherheit auf einen Grenz-
wert der Beanspruchbarkeit von 10 kN/cm² geschlossen. 
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Deflection of Concrete Members Considering Random 
Behaviour of Loading and Material Properties  
Guido Hausmann 
Institute of Concrete and Masonry Structures, University of Technology Darmstadt 
Summary: Within the present paper deflection computations concerning ran-
dom behaviour of loading and system parameters for a prestressed and a rein-
forced concrete member were accomplished. Since the load history is of 
particular importance for the actual stiffness distribution, computations on ba-
sis of simulated load histories were carried out. This method requires the com-
putation of the deflection at a lot of points in time, which does not lead to 
acceptable time and effort of computation for complex systems. Therefore a 
simplified modelling of the live loads was developed, which considers the ef-
fects of load history and resulting stiffness distribution implicitly.  
1 Introduction 
In modern structural engineering wide span slabs and the minimization of dead load to 
optimize the dimensions of columns and foundation are required. These needs can be done 
by the use of pre-stressed concrete slabs. Due to serviceability requirements of the con-
struction the allowable deflection becomes the main design criterion in many cases. Be-
sides loading conditions, reinforcement ratio and compressive strength of concrete or time-
dependent behaviour like creep and shrinkage, the deflection of concrete slabs is influ-
enced by the effects of pre-stressing, i.e. the induction of bending moments and normal 
forces. To approach the complex system of a pre-stressed concrete slab, initially investiga-
tions of a pre-stressed and a conventional reinforced single span concrete member are car-
ried out. For this reason a MATLAB procedure was developed, which is based on the 
determination of deflection at a given time using the moment-curvature relationship. Con-
sideration of the random behaviour of the material properties is offered using Latin Hyper-
cube Sampling. Additionally the calculation is based on a realistic differentiation between 
cracked and uncracked regions to obtain the realistic stiffness at a given time. Furthermore 
effects of unloading and repeated loading should be taken into account. For this purpose 
the consideration of the load history is essential. Usually the load history is unknown, 
therefore the calculation is based on load history simulations. Basis of these simulations 
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are the user category dependent live load parameters taken from JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
STRUCTURAL SAFETY [1]. The results of the investigations of the relatively simple single 
span member can be used to model more complex structural systems, e.g. pre-stressed con-
crete slabs. Especially simplifications of the live load history are necessary regarding the 
computing time.  
2 Mechanical Model for Calculation of Deflection  
2.1 Material Models 
For the description of material behaviour of concrete under compression the stress-strain-
relationship according to JOINT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURAL SAFETY [1] is used. In com-
parison to the material laws according to DIN 1045-1 [2] used for deformation analysis, 
this material law differs especially for high strains. For a deflection analysis the occurring 
concrete stresses are normally below maximum concrete stress, so this difference can be 
neglected. 
The concrete tensile strength can be calculated in relation of the compression strength ac-
cording to DIN 1045-1 [2]. For the present examinations a linear stress strain relation for 
concrete in tension was assumed, limited by tensile strength. Modelling of complex tension 
softening behaviour was disregarded. To regard long term effects concerning the tensile 
strength, the centric tensile strength is reduced by a factor of 0.85 according to 
MERTSCH [3]. For the determination of cracking moment the flexural tensile strength was 
assumed. 
The time dependent material properties of concrete include compression strength, tensile 
strength, young’s modulus and of course creep and shrinkage. Within the scope of the pre-
sent investigations time variant material properties were neglected except for creep and 
shrinkage effects. Creep and shrinkage coefficients were calculated according to DAFSTB-
HEFT 525 [4], whereby only linear creeping behaviour was implied. 
 
2.2 Moment-Curvature Relationship 
The carrying behaviour of reinforced concrete or pre-stressed concrete sections can be 
modelled by the moment-curvature-relationship in good approximation. For the present 
examinations the calculation model of moment-curvature-relationship according to 
CEB FIB MODEL CODE 1990 [5] was used. Therein the tension stiffening effect is regarded 
relatively simple expressed by the parameter βb. 
Time dependent effects due to creep can be considered directly by modification of the 
stress strain relation of concrete in dependence of the current creep coefficient. Based on 
this modified moment-curvature-relationship and creep inducing loading this part of de-
flection can be calculated. 
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Deformations due to shrinkage are considered by applying a centric shortening of the sys-
tem, which leads under consideration of the compatibility conditions with asymmetrical 
reinforced cross sections to a cross section curvature, which is considered in the moment-
curvature-relationship as an imposed deformation. It is of particular importance whether 
the regarded cross section is in state I or state II. In the cracked condition (state II) the cur-
vatures due to shrinkage increase clearly. Therefore the effects of load history have to be 
considered also for the deformations due to shrinkage, which are actually independent of 
loading conditions. 
The effect of prestressing without bond for the determination of moment-curvature-
relationship can be considered by an appropriate normal force. The bending moment due to 
prestressing is treated like an external loading. 
Depending on the kind of loading different moment-curvature-relations are used for calcu-
lation. If a load arises for the first time, the relationship for instantaneous loading is used. 
For the deformation due to creeping the moment-curvature-relationship with modified 
stress strain relation of concrete and the parameters for long-term load is used. 
Repeated unloading/reloading is considered according to KRELLER [6], which provides a 
constant stiffness for the un- and reload procedure after exceeding the cracking moment for 
the first time. Reloading beyond the maximum value again the relationship for monotonous 
load applies. 
 
2.3 Calculation of Deflection 
From the moment-curvature-relationship for each bending moment the corresponding cur-
vatures with consideration of the non-linearity of reinforced concrete can be easily deter-
mined. The integration of these curvatures over the system leads in good approximation to 
the deflection. In addition the distribution of the internal forces of the examined system 
must be known. In statically determinate systems the distribution of the internal forces is 
independent of the stiffness distribution and does not have to be determined by iteration.  
For the present examinations the deflection is determined separately for the three compo-
nents: for instantaneous loading, creep-inducing loadings and deformation due to shrink-
age. The reasons for this procedure is that depending on the deflection component both 
different moment-curvature-relationship and different kinds of loading (e.g. only sustained 
loads for deformations due to creep) have to be considered. 
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3 Stochastic Modelling 
3.1 Stochastic Modelling of Material and System Properties 
The stochastic parameters of material and system properties were derived from JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURAL SAFETY [1], STRAUSS [7] and FLEDERER [8] and are assorted 
in Tab. 1. Among the dimensions (h, d1, b) the material strength (fc, Ec, fct, fy) are regarded 
as stochastic values as well. The model used to determine the moment-curvature-
relationship according to CEB FIB MODEL CODE 1990 [5] considers the tension-stiffening-
effect by model parameter βb. Uncertainties of βb are regarded by model uncertainty θβb 
For determination of creep- and shrinkage coefficients according to DAFSTB-HEFT 525 [4] 
the stochastic input variables relative humidity (RH), geometry, compressive strength of 
concrete) are considered. Additionally model uncertainties θshr and θcr for the prediction of 
creep- and shrinkage coefficients are implied. 
For the investigation of prestressed concrete members the uncertainties of the prestressing 
force and location of the tendon (eccentricity) are mentioned by model uncertainties θP and 
θe1. 
The scatter of the dead loads is composed by both scatter of specific weight and spatial 
scatter. Concerning both components the coefficient of variation is assumed as 5 % accord-
ing to GRAUBNER & GLOWIENKA [9] 
Tab. 1:  Stochastic parameters of material and system properties 
Variable X Type of  
distribution 
Mean COV 
h Normal hm 3 % 
d1 Normal d1m 17 % 
b Normal bm 10 % 
fc Lognormal 38 N/mm² 13 % 
Ec Lognormal 35000 N/mm² 15 % 
fct Lognormal 2.6 N/mm² 30 % 
fy Lognormal 560 N/mm² 6 % 
θβb Lognormal 0.8 20 % 
RH Normal 70 % 10 % 
θshr Lognormal 1 15 % 
θcr Lognormal 1 15 % 
θP Normal 1 5 % 
θe1 Normal 1 5 % 
g Normal ²m/kNhb mm 25⋅⋅  5 % 
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3.2 Live Load Modelling 
The live load on floors in buildings can be divided into sustained and intermittent load. 
Both components are characterised by intensity, duration and the time between two loading 
periods. The intensity of sustained loads can be approximated by a gamma distribution, 
intermittent loads by an exponential distribution. The required stochastic parameters are 
given in Tab. 2, which is taken from JOINT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURAL SAFETY [1]. 
Therein σu regards scatter of spatial distribution and σv variation between storeys respec-
tively different buildings. Note that these parameters are point in time loads. 
Tab. 2: parameters for live loads depending on the user category [1]  
User category Reference 
Area 
Sustained Load Intermittent Load 
 A0  
[m²] 
mst 
[kN/m²] 
σv 
[kN/m²] 
σu 
[kN/m²] 
1/λ 
[a] 
min 
[kN/m²] 
σu 
[kN/m²] 
1/λ 
[a] 
Office 20 0.5 0.3 0.6 5 0.2 0.4 0.3 
Residence 20 0.3 0.15 0.3 7 0.3 0.4 1 
 
By means of this information the standard deviation of both components are given as fol-
lowing: 
κσσσ ⋅⋅+=
A
A
uvst
022   (1)
κσσ ⋅⋅=
A
A
uin
02   (2)
10 ≤⋅= κκ
A
A
red   (3)
Therein κ regards the shape of the influence line used to determine the equivalent uni-
formly distributed load. The present examinations are based on κred = 1. With arising val-
ues of influence area A the scatter of spatial distribution (σu) becomes less important. 
By means of the present input parameters a live load simulation is carried out. The princi-
ples of this live load simulation applied here were developed by SCHMIDT [10], whereas 
the present analysis is based on input parameters according to Tab. 2. Result of each simu-
lation is a random live load history (Fig. 1 a), which provides the basis for the determina-
tion of deflection at each point in time of load change. Furthermore such a live load history 
simulation is used for determination of extreme value distributions (Fig. 1 b) supposing 
sufficient number of simulations.  
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Fig. 1: Live loads for user category office 
The discrete extreme value distribution based on simulation can now be fitted by an ana-
lytical extreme value distribution. GLOWIENKA & HAUSMANN [11] carried out such an 
analysis of extreme value distribution for extreme live loads based on simulations for dif-
ferent user categories, reference time periods and influence areas respectively influence 
line shape factors. For reference time periods longer than average occurrence rate of load 
changes the fitting to a Gumbel distribution is quite good. The parameters for total live 
loads approximated by a Gumbel distribution for reference time periods of 50 years respec-
tively 10 years are given in Tab. 3. They are valid for the user categories office and resi-
dence which will be analysed in the following. 
Tab. 3:  parameters of fitted Gumbel distribution for live loads [3]  
User category T [a] Mean SD COV 
Office 50 2.50 0.925 37 % 
 10 1.60 0.730 46 % 
Residence 50 1.85 0.520 28 % 
 10 1.26 0.515 41 % 
 
4 Analysis of Selected Examples 
4.1 General 
Based on the input variables for material and system properties respectively load history 
simulations explained in chapter 3 both a prestressed concrete (example a) and a reinforced 
concrete member (example b) were investigated. Calculations were carried out using Latin 
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Hypercube sampling, an advancement of Monte Carlo method, in order to reduce the num-
ber of samples required. The main dimensions are displayed in Tab. 4. 
Tab. 4:  dimensions of calculated examples 
Example L [m] h/b [cm] As1 [cm²] As2 [cm²] Ap 
a) 10 20 / 100 11.3 3.77 3 * 150 mm² 
b) 6 30 / 100 9.24 --- --- 
 
 
4.2 Sequence of Computation 
In the following section the principles of computation sequence of the deflection is repre-
sented briefly. The computations were carried out for a reference time period of 50 years. 
In the first step load history in dependence of the user category is simulated. At each time 
of a load change the deflection is computed separately due to instantaneous loading, due to 
creeping and due to shrinking. For the computation of the creep deformation only the sus-
tained load portion is set as creep inducing load. The separate deformation components are 
summed up to get the total deformation. As result of a single computation one receives a 
time response of deflection. A simulated load history with associated time response of de-
flection is represented in Fig. 2 exemplarily for example b). 
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Fig. 2: Results of a single calculation of deflection based on a simulated load history 
 
This sequence of computation is repeated n times under random variation of the input pa-
rameters using Latin Hypercube Sampling. For the present investigations n = 500 simula-
tions were performed. The results can be subjected to a statistic evaluation. In Fig. 3 is 
represented the time response of the average values, standard deviations (SD) and coeffi-
cient of variation (COV). Both examples were applied for user category office. 
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Fig. 3: statistical evaluation of deflection computation based on simulated load history 
The results show that for the reinforced concrete beam a decreasing coefficient of variation 
of deflection with increasing service life. In contrast to this the coefficient of variation re-
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mains almost constant for the prestressed concrete member. The proportional component 
of the creeping and shrinking deformation increases for prestressed concrete member in 
comparison to the reinforced concrete member, however the higher dispersion of the total 
deformation comes off mainly by the deformation component from instantaneous loading. 
Differences exist likewise in the kind of the distribution function. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present 
the extreme value distributions of the maximum deflection and the distribution functions at 
certain points in time (1 a, 5 a and 50 a). While for the reinforced concrete member all dis-
tribution functions can be approximated by a normal distribution, a Gumbel distribution 
fits well to the results of the prestressed concrete member. These differences are important 
for the computation of probabilities of exceeding of a defined limit value. 
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Fig. 4: distribution functions of deflection of prestressed concrete member (example a) 
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Fig. 5: distribution functions of deflection of a reinforced concrete member (example b) 
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4.3 Simplified Modelling of Live Loads 
The investigations on basis of a simulated load history, as shown in section 4.2, are feasi-
ble for the relatively simple single span member still with an acceptable time and effort of 
computation. If more complex systems are examined e.g. prestressed concrete slabs the 
time and effort of computation increases substantially. Therefore a simplified modelling of 
live loads is suggested here, which considers the effects of load history implicitly and leads 
to the same results. On the one hand equivalent creep inducing loads are to be determined, 
on the other hand the effects of the extreme values arising in load history must be consid-
ered as well.  
From comparative calculations has been obtained that the average value and the scatter of 
the creep deformations in good approximation a creep inducing load can be assumed which 
is constant in time. The value of the equivalent load corresponds to the sustained load indi-
cated in tab. 2. Only during the first 5 years the deviations are larger in individual cases, 
since the value of the creep deformation depends strongly on the load amplitude at the 
early concrete age. 
For the size of the deformations due to shrinking and direct load the extreme values occur-
ring up to a given time is of importance. Subsequently two problems have to be solved. To 
obtain an extreme value distribution of the deflections for a certain reference time period 
(e.g. 50 a), it is sufficient to carry out the computation on basis of the appropriate extreme 
value distribution of the live loads. For other reference time periods T then the extreme 
value distribution of live loads has to be adapted accordingly. A comparison of the results 
of both procedures is represented in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6: comparison of extreme value distribution based on simulated load history (user 
category office) and simplified load model 
For the determination of the distribution function at a certain point in time t the simulated 
load history can be replaced by the computation of two different points in time. At the time 
t-1 the extreme value distribution of the live loads for the reference time period T = t-1 is 
used. Thus the maximum preloading of the system is included. At the point in time t the 
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point in time loads for the sustained load component according to Tab. 2 are applied. Thus 
all unloading procedures actually occurring during load history are replaced by only one 
unloading procedure. In Fig. 7 the distribution functions for the deflections for the points in 
time after 50 years for user category office are compared. 
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Fig. 7: comparison of distribution functions of deflection and its components for 50 a  
A good accordance of the results can be ascertained, so that the represented proceeding 
appears suitable to replace the extensive computation based on simulated load history. An 
examination of the validity for other user categories, which consist exclusively of sustained 
load (e.g. libraries) is still upcoming. 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
In the present paper computations concerning random behaviour of loading and system 
parameters for a prestressed and a reinforced concrete member were conducted. Since the 
load history is of particular importance for the actual stiffness distribution, the computa-
tions on basis of simulated load histories were carried out. This method requires the com-
putation of the deflection at a lot of certain points in time, which does not lead to 
acceptable time and effort of computation for complex systems. Therefore a simplified 
modelling of the live loads was developed, which considers the effects of load history and 
resulting stiffness distribution implicitly. Based on this load model reliability analyses can 
be accomplished for serviceability states of more complex structures without extensive 
consideration of load history and can consequently be used for the development of a design 
concept for limiting deflections based on a probabilistic approach. 
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Structural Reliability of Sheet Pile Walls 
Using Finite Element Analysis 
Timo Schweckendiek & Wim Courage 
TNO Built Environment and Geosciences, Delft, The Netherlands 
 
Abstract: In geotechnical design nowadays partial safety concepts like Load 
and Resistance Factor Design are applied in order to account for the uncertain-
ties in the model and design parameters and to guarantee a minimum required 
level of reliability. It is, however, advantageous to determine the reliability le-
vel directly for many applications. It will be shown how reliability analysis for 
retaining structures can be carried out in a fully probabilistic manner within 
reasonable time effort. A case study of a deep excavation will be used to il-
lustrate the presented concepts. Basically the approach follows the philosophy 
that all uncertain quantities in a design should be treated as stochastic variables 
instead of making conservative estimates. TNO Built Environment and Geos-
ciences has developed the probabilistic toolbox ProBox that includes methods 
for reliability analysis and local sensitivity analysis. ProBox can be coupled 
with external models (e.g. FEM-codes) for the evaluation of the limit state 
function. Analytical models can be formulated in Probox directly as well. For 
the present example the Finite Element Code Plaxis was applied and coupled 
with ProBox. Level II as well as level III methods will be applied and the the-
ory of Hohenbichler is applied to combine the failure probabilities of singular 
mechanisms to a system failure probability respectively reliability. 
Keywords: Reliability, Retaining Structures, ProBox, Plaxis, Finite Element 
Method, Directional Sampling, Geotechnics, System Reliability 
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1 Introduction 
There is a large variety of reliability methods available. However, these techniques are 
almost exclusively used by the scientific community and not in engineering practice. Our 
proposition is that this fact is not due to lack of suitable methods, but lack of user-
friendliness and experience with applications. 
Therefore we intend to demonstrate in this paper that reliability analysis can be carried out 
with reasonable time effort for specific structures whose system behavior is known. Level 
II as well as level III methods will be used in combination with finite element analysis. As 
specific example an excavation with a retaining structure consisting of a sheet pile wall and 
an anchor layer in layered soil is analyzed.  
A significant advantage of determining the reliability of structures is that it supports the 
use of risk-based or probabilistic design concepts. The failure probabilities that are calcu-
lated by means of the reliability analysis are, of course, crucial elements in these ap-
proaches. 
Furthermore, reliability analysis usually gives insight into the sensitivity with respect to the 
input variables. This information is especially useful as decision support for optimization 
or to know where the reduction of uncertainty or design changes have the largest effects. 
The current example was chosen from the field of geotechnical engineering. The subsoil 
contains large uncertainties compared to other materials applied in civil engineering. The 
principal sources of uncertainties in soil properties are imprecise measurements and inher-
ent spatial variability. 
There are several possibilities for modeling these uncertainties. Spatial variability can for 
example be modeled be means of random fields. In this paper the random average ap-
proach is followed, where a soil deposit is modeled as a homogeneous material with ran-
dom average properties. In fact, when following this approach, averaging effects can only 
be accounted for by adapting the input statistics. Since the calculation example is fictitious 
anyway, we do not pay attention to this detail here and assume the input parameters statis-
tics to include the averaging effects already. 
2 Proposed Methodology 
For determining the reliability respectively the failure probability of a system the relevant 
failure modes and mechanisms are to be detected. In general we consider unacceptable 
states of the structural system as failure, like e.g. excessive deformations or plastic yielding 
of materials. Some of these mechanisms do not directly lead to a collapse of the system 
and the system exhibits some residual strength, even though it is already considered as 
failed. Considerations about residual strength are especially of interest for systems that 
might still fulfill their major essential function after reaching failure according to this defi-
nition, which is the case for water retaining structures like dikes (A dike might still retain 
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the water after partial failure of the inner slope.). In the present example, however, we con-
sider residual strength to be irrelevant. The functional requirements of the structure are 
expressed by the limit states and omission of their fulfillments is considered failure. 
For the presented approach the reliability analysis package ProBox (developed by TNO, 
The Netherlands) was coupled with the Finite Element code Plaxis, which is a program 
that is specifically suited for the analysis of geotechnical problems. The coupling of the 
programs consists essentially of two basic interfaces. On the one hand ProBox was enabled 
to amend the input data of each Plaxis calculation before its execution. Secondly the calcu-
lation output is to be accessed by ProBox in order to use it for the limit state function 
evaluation (see fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1: Coupled Reliability Analysis and Interfaces ProBox-Plaxis 
In this approach the finite element analysis (FEA) is used as sort of a black box for ele-
ments of the limit state formulation. Due to the implicit nature of the limit state function, of 
course, all the available reliability methods in ProBox use numerical procedures, e.g. for 
the determination of partial derivatives. ProBox includes techniques like FORM/SORM, 
Crude Monte Carlo, Directional Sampling, Directional Adaptive Response Surface Sam-
pling (DARS), Numerical Integration or combinations of these methods. 
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3 Example Description 
The calculation example is presented before introducing the proposed method in order to 
give the reader a clear picture of the type of system that will be analyzed. The presented 
example is a simple retaining wall in sand. It consists of a sheet pile wall and one anchor 
layer with a whaling realized by means of two connected U-beams.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Retaining System Geometry 
The sequence of execution is: 
• 1. Installation sheet pile wall 
• 2. Excavation phase 1 (-1.0 m) 
• 3. Installation of anchors and whaling, prestressing of the anchors 
• 4. Excavation phase 2 to final depth (-5.0 m) 
The properties of the involved materials are given in table 1. For the characterization of the 
parameter statistics the first two central moments are used. These are based on back-
calculation from typical 95%-characteristic values in the NEN6740 – table 1 (Dutch Stan-
dard for Geotechnical Design). 
For stability of the calculations, avoiding ill-posed problems and physically impossible 
realizations of the parameters, the following distribution types are applied in the reliability 
analysis: 
• Normal distribution: γsat 
• Lognormal distribution (2-parametric): c, φ’, ψ, E  
• Beta distribution: ν (0≤ν≤0.5), Rinter (0≤Rinter ≤1) 
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A deterministic design was carried out on this example, which resulted in the following 
structural dimensions: 
• Sheet pile: AZ17, length: 12.0 m 
• Anchors:  440 kN capacity (S235) at mutual distance a = 2.0 m, inclination: 45°, 
embedment app. 1.0 m in the sand layer 
• Whaling: 2xUPE220 
The design was made according to the CUR 166 (Dutch Technical recommendation for 
Sheet Pile Structures). It was considered to belong to safety class two, which is based on a 
system reliability of β = 3.4.  
Table 1: Soil Properties of the Calculation Example 
 
4 Failure Mechanisms 
The following failure modes are the essential potential causes to set the system to the un-
wanted state – failure. Their definitions are applied for the formulation of the limit states of 
singular failure mechanisms. 
4.1 Yielding of the Sheet Pile 
The sheet pile is subject to bending and the bending moments lead to 
compressive and tensile stresses. If these stresses exceed the yield stress 
σy of the applied steel, the structure can exhibit plastic behavior. As men-
tioned before, we consider plasticity in the sheet pile as failure, even 
though there is residual strength. There is a contribution of a normal force 
component, which can be accounted for via the limit state formulation. 
Figure 3: Bending and Normal Loading of a Retaining Wall 
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If the normal force contribution is neglected, we can determine a maximum moment resis-
tance of the sheet pile: Madm = Wel*σy, where Wel is the elastic section modulus and σy is 
the steel yield strength. In this case the limit state can simply be formulated as: 
Z = Madm – Mmax 
where Mmax is the maximum calculated bending moment. 
This limit state formulation would be restricted to account for the uncertainties in the soil 
properties and the external loads. A more general formulation gives us the flexibility to 
include also the uncertainties on the resistance side and the earlier mentioned normal force 
contribution: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
)(
)(
)(
)(
zA
zN
zW
zMZ
el
yσ  
, where M(z) is the bending moment N(z) is the normal force and A(z) is the cross section 
area of the sheet pile. 
As can be seen from the limit state formulation, some of the involved quantities are depth 
dependent. This distinction might is necessary, because 
1. The maximum moment Mmax and the maximum normal force Nmax might not coin-
cide in depth z. 
2. The geometrical properties Wel and A might not be constant over depth, e.g. when 
they are effected by corrosion and this corrosion is estimated by a depth-dependent 
corrosion model. 
Of course, all these quantities can be treated as stochastic variables, also the steel yield 
strength. 
4.2 Failure of the Support 
The principal function of an anchor in a retaining structure is its contribution to horizontal 
equilibrium. Basically this is composed of the active and passive soil pressure and the an-
chor force itself. Anchors consist of a grout body that serves as connection with the soil, a 
tensile element (e.g. a steel rod or steel cables) that connects the grout body with the retain-
ing structure and connective elements that connect sheet pile and 
tensile element. We neglect the uncertainties in the connective 
elements, since the tensile element is considered to have a signifi-
cantly higher failure probability. The grout body is treated in the 
next section. The tensile element itself has a certain cross section 
Aa and, in combination with a given anchor force Fa , the tensile 
stresses in the anchor can be determined by σa = Fa / Aa . As for 
Figure 4: Anchor Loading 
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the sheet pile, reaching plasticity is considered as failure despite residual strength. Using 
design values in the above relation leads to a maximum anchor normal force capacity 
Fa,adm  and a simple version of the limit state would be: 
Z = Fa,adm  - Fa 
, where Fa is the calculated normal force in the anchor. 
The calculated normal force is constant over the anchor length, because no interaction be-
tween the anchor strands and the soil is accounted for. Another more flexible limit state 
function, formulated directly in terms of maximum stresses in the material, could be: 
),( zxA
F
Z
a
a
y −= σ  
As for the earlier described yielding of the sheet pile, this formulation has the advantage 
that the uncertainties can be accounted for on a more detailed level and that spatial influ-
ences (e.g. variations of the cross section area Aa due to corrosion etc.) can be examined as 
well. 
The reliability of the waling can be determined based on the calculated anchor force Fa and 
the mutual anchor distance a: 
8
2aFMZ aadm
⋅−=  
4.3 ‘Failure in the Soil’ 
In the following sections a few failure mechanisms are presented whose strength and load 
are determined either by the soil properties, by soil-structure interaction or both. For most 
of these mechanisms there are analytical approximations to determine a factor of safety or 
a margin of safety. However, the starting point of this research was the application of finite 
element analysis for the evaluation of the limit state function, because ideally it gives bet-
ter approximations of the structural behavior taking interaction aspects automatically into 
account.  
On the other hand this implies that we can usually not refer to these analytical methods in 
the limit state function. The limit state has to be formed based on information that is avail-
able in the results (or input) of the finite element analysis or in additional relations or mate-
rial parameters. 
Subsequently a number of those mechanisms are explained and possible approaches of 
limit state formulations are introduced, also highlighting potential problems. Finally a 
more crude, but robust approach is presented that would be sufficient to determine the sys-
tem reliability as explained in section 5. 
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Figure 5: Failure Mechanisms in the Soil 
4.3.1 Mobilized Shear Resistance in the Soil 
In figure 5 we have summarized the most likely failure mechanisms for the contemplated 
system. The first three mechanisms are basically based on the idea that the soil shear resis-
tance is insufficient for horizontal equilibrium (for active and passive failure a soil body is 
triggered to displace over a failure plane) or moment equilibrium (overall failure is compa-
rable to a slope failure in e.g. a dike body) of the system. Therefore the available analytical 
methods for the handling of these mechanisms are usually based on the maximum shear 
resistance of the soil. The Mohr-Coulomb criterion can be used for this purpose. 
 
Figure 6: Mohr-Coulomb Yield Criterion (Plane-Strain) 
On the one hand it is difficult to obtain the relevant quantities from the results of a finite 
element analysis that would be needed to directly use the earlier mentioned equilibrium 
approaches (active/passive soil resistance, Bishop slip circle analysis etc.). On the other 
hand the finite element method delivers us data that even refer more directly to the ideas 
where the analytical methods are based on, namely stresses and strains. As can be seen 
from figure 6, the stress state in a Gauss point in combination with the strength properties 
of the soil allow us to define a ratio between shear stress and shear resistance, which is 
commonly called the mobilized shear resistance: 
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This ratio is a handy measure to define failure in an integration point. It is continuous in 
the ‘safe’ domain and therefore very useful for optimization or search algorithms, such as 
FORM or in parts also Directional Sampling. The question, however, arises where in the 
stress field we have to apply this measure. The fact that plasticity occurs in some integra-
tion points does certainly not imply structural failure directly. Ideally we would observe all 
the integration points along the expected failure surface(s). The problem is that it is not 
known beforehand where this surface will be situated.  
One possible solution for this problem is the definition of areas around the expected failure 
planes. The average mobilized shear resistance mobτ can be calculated after each finite 
element analysis which can be used as a measure for the margin or factor of safety in the 
limit state function. The challenge with this approach is to define the failure criterion, i.e. 
how much mobilized shear resistance is equivalent to failure (unwanted state)?. 
mobmobZ ττ −= max,  
Some tests with this criterion have shown that there are possibilities, e.g. using iterative 
procedures (stepwise increase of the failure criterion max,moxτ ) in combination with FORM, 
to calculate a reasonable estimate for an upper bound of the failure probability. It has to be 
stated that this method requires a considerable effort in adjustments and also a priori 
knowledge which makes it not generic and in a certain sense even subjective. 
4.3.2 Displacement-Based Failure Criteria 
From the previous section it becomes obvious that the definition of failure itself can be a 
difficult question for a whole structural system. The presented approach using information 
about the stress state was not robust enough to lead to answers in a generic manner. There-
fore it was tried to use excessive displacements as definition of failure. 
The arrows in figure 7 indicate locations where excessive 
displacements would be the result of the occurrence of one of the 
failure mechanisms. Therefore the limit state could theoretically 
be formulated as: 
)min( max, ii uuZ −=  
where iumax,  are admissible and iu  are calculated displacements. 
There are, however, again several difficulties with the use of these criteria in combination 
with the reliability methods: 
• Relatively large displacements are only reached in case of structural collapse. Often 
collapse means that the FEA does not find equilibrium and no results are available. 
Figure 7: Possible Displacement Criteria 
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• If we apply algorithms like FORM, partial derivatives in a design point estimate are 
used for the subsequent estimate. For many of the deformation problems, these de-
rivatives are larger with respect to stiffness parameters around the origin in parame-
ter space, but the failure might be influenced more by strength parameters. This 
leads to convergence problems for algorithms including search or optimization rou-
tines. 
• At some of the proposed points, like e.g. the sheet pile tip, significant displace-
ments will not even be observed at all before failure is initiated. Again, methods 
like FORM have difficulties with convergence. 
• If the displacements results are available and the other problems can be solved, the 
question arises what amount of displacements is considered as failure. As for the 
mobilized shear resistance a certain subjectivity is involved. 
• FORM can only give a lower limit for the system failure probability which can be a 
bad estimate. 
4.3.3 Equilibrium in the Finite Element Calculations 
A more robust, generic and objective criterion for the failure of the structure respectively 
the soil surrounding it might be the information if the finite element analysis reached equi-
librium in all calculation phases or not. In fact, this criterion is also used in the Dutch tech-
nical recommendations for retaining structures – the CUR 166. In its recommendations 
about the determination of the sheet pile length it is stated that, equilibrium is reached in 
all construction phases using design parameters, the length is sufficient. This implies at 
least the considerations about active and passive failure. 
In this research this criterion was used in a broader sense including all the mentioned fail-
ure mechanisms in the soil. A disadvantage is that only the common failure probability of 
all the mechanisms is determined and not each one, which would give more insight into the 
system behavior: 
( )0...01, ≤∪∪≤= nsoilf ZZPP  
However, if the aim is to determine the system failure probability, this is sufficient, as ex-
plained in section 5. The limit state function simply becomes: 
 1=Z  , if equilibrium is reached in all construction phases 
 1−=Z  , if equilibrium is not reached in one or more construction phases 
In fact, most of the commonly used reliability methods do not perform well on this kind of 
discrete or even binary functions. In order to deal with this problem, the basic idea of  
Directional Sampling was adopted and a few modifications on the iterative procedures for 
the determination of the λi (vector length in parameter space for direction i for which Z=0) 
were necessary. 
Due to its generic and robust properties this approach was considered to perform best and 
the presented results in the example calculation are also obtained with it. 
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5 System Failure 
The singular failure mechanisms can either themselves lead to failure of the entire system, 
or in combination with others. The fault tree in figure 5 illustrates the singular failure 
mechanisms in their context of the system. 
 
Figure 8: Fault Tree Retaining Structure With Support 
The green limit states can be calculated directly from the results of the finite element 
analysis, whilst the yellow ones can be obtained by combining the green ones. In fact the 
top event is not a combination of the underlying failure probabilities, but both, the SLS 
(Serviceability Limit State) and the ULS (Ultimate Limit State) have to fulfill their re-
quirements. 
In the subsequent discussion of the calculation results it will be shown how the failure 
probabilities can be combined using the approach of Hohenbichler [5] to the system reli-
ability. 
Note: The probability of pull-out of the anchor is considered to be negligible in this con-
figuration compared to the other failure mechanisms in the soil. Otherwise the probability 
of soil failure would have to be used as lower bound for the probability of anchor failure. 
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6 Calculation Results 
The system that was defined in section 3 was modeled with the finite element package 
Plaxis. For the soil elements an elasto-plastic model with Mohr-Coulomb yield criterion 
was applied. The one- or two-dimensional structural elements (plates, anchors, grout body) 
were modeled as linear elastic. The Plaxis model was coupled with ProBox as explained in 
section 2. The results of the calculations using this coupled reliability-FEM analysis are 
presented in the following sections. 12 random variables were used whilst others with ob-
viously negligible influence were taken deterministic with their mean value. 
6.1 Reliability Analysis Results for Singular Failure Mechanisms 
There are, of course, plenty of reliability techniques available in the literature. The appli-
cability of a large number of them to reliability analysis of geotechnical structures has been 
investigated by one of the authors during his MSc-thesis [3]. The following sections sum-
marize some results for the Ultimate Limit State terms of the failure probability and the 
most important influence coefficients αi that are direct outcomes of a FORM analysis or 
approximations of these in case of other methods. 
6.1.1 Yielding of the Sheet Pile 
In this calculation example we consider only the uncertainties in the soil. Therefore it is 
sufficient to use the simplified limit state formulation from section 4.1 with Madm = 391.3 
[kNm/m] (corresponding to the deterministic design sheet pile). Thus: 
Z = 391.3 – Mmax  [kNm/m] 
Table 2: Reliability Analysis Results for Yielding of Sheet Pile 
Number of Calculations (FORM): 66 
Reliability Index β: 3.73 
Probability of Failure: Pf 3.72 E-04 
Influence Coefficients:  
Parameter alpha ;  |α|>0.1 
E (clay) 0.94 
E (peat) 0.14 
ν (clay) -0.23 
Rinter (clay) 0.13 
γ’ (clay) -0.12 
The failure mechanism is clearly dominated by the stiffness of the two soft top layers. 
6.1.2 Yielding of the Anchor 
Again we use the simple formulation for the limit state function from section 4.2 with 
Fa,adm=220 [kN/m], thus: 
Z = 220  - Fa [kN/m] 
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Table 3: Reliability Analysis Results Yielding of the Anchor 
Number of Calculations (FORM): 66 
Reliability Index β: 4.49 
Probability of Failure: Pf 3.55 E-06 
Influence Coefficients:  
Parameter alpha ;  |α|>0.1 
E (clay) 0.97 
ν (clay) -0.16 
γ’ (peat) -0.12 
Again the shear modulus (
)1(2 ν+=
EG ) of the clay layer dominates the failure mechanism. 
6.1.3 Yielding of the Waling 
The limit state for the yielding of the waling can be formulated as (see also 4.2): 
( )
][
8
0.2
7.114
2
kNm
F
Z a
⋅−=  
Table 4: Reliability Analysis Results for Yielding of Waling 
Number of Calculations (FORM): 66 
Reliability Index β: 4.61 
Probability of Failure: Pf 2.00 E-06 
The influence coefficients are the same as for the previous limit state, since both limit state 
functions are linear combinations of Fa. 
6.1.4 Failure in the Soil 
The limit state used for the calculations is defined according to section 4.3.3.  
Table 5: Reliability Analysis Results for Soil Failure 
Number of Calculations (DS): 2929 
Reliability Index β: 2.62 
Probability of Failure: Pf 4.32 E-03 
Influence Coefficients:  
Parameter alpha ;  |α|>0.1 
E (clay) 0.48 
ν (peat) -0.26 
φ’ (peat) -0.23 
Rinter (clay) 0.12 
γ’ (clay) 0.69 
γ’ (peat) 0.16 
c (clay) 0.11 
c (peat) -0.15 
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6.2 Combination To System Failure Probability 
The method explained by Hohenbichler [5] enables us to obtain estimates for the system 
reliability, given the reliability indices of the singular mechanisms βi, the influence coeffi-
cients αij and their mutual correlation coefficients ρijk (which can be assumed as fully cor-
related, thus ρijk = 1) in this case. Then the correlation between the mechanisms can be 
determined by: 
jjZZ 2121 ),( ααρ =  
If two mechanisms show a high degree of correlation, it is not worthwhile to carry out the 
calculations, because the common failure probability will be very close to the upper bound: 
 ( ) ( ){ }0;0max 21 ≤≤= ZPZPPf  
Following this reasoning, we can conclude that the probability of the support failure can be 
approximated by the probability of yielding of the anchor: 49.4support ≈β . The same ap-
proach for the combination of the yielding of the sheet pile and the support failure leads 
to 73.3pilesheet  yieldingsupport ≈∪β . 
In the following we will consider for the correlation between this combination of mecha-
nisms and the remaining ‘failure in the soil’ only the contribution of E (clay), since the 
contribution of the rest is small and the assumption is conservative. Thus 
65.048.094.0),( =⋅=failuresoilcombined ZZρ  
Using this information we obtain using Hohenbichler the following results for the system 
reliability: 
Table 6: System Reliability Results 
Number of Calculations (FORM / DS): 3127 
Reliability Index β: 2.61 
Probability of Failure: Pf 4.33 E-03 
It can be observed that the approximated system failure probability does not significantly 
differ from the upper bound approach. This is due to the dominance of the large failure 
probability Pf,soil failure. It should be mentioned at this point that the equilibrium approach 
that was followed for determining this probability is still being refined and may have con-
sidered numerical problems in some cases as ‘failure’ and therefore increased the failure 
probability. This subject is being examined at the moment and the improved results will 
probably be presented on the symposium. We insist that this paper presents a methodology 
that in our opinion is suitable for reliability analysis of retaining structures in terms of its 
general framework, whereas the details are still undergoing developments. For the same 
reason the presented results should not yet be used to judge the reliability level of the de-
terministic design based on the CUR 166 or whatsoever. 
The total calculation time for the 3127 FEM evaluations amounted about 52 hours. 
Schweckendiek & Courage: Structural Reliability of Sheet Pile Walls Using Finite Element Analysis 
15 
7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The proposed methodology enables us to determine the system reliability of a retaining 
structure with reasonable effort. The total calculation time to obtain the results might 
amount about 3 days, but the calculations are carried out automatically, once the model and 
the reliability analysis parameters are defined. The following list includes some points of 
attention and recommendations for further improvements: 
• The influence factors α are a result of the linearization of the limit state in methods 
like FORM. For other methods, as in this paper for Directional Sampling, these 
values are approximations and they are calculated in a way, as if linearization was 
implied. Therefore the quality and the significance of these α are questionable. 
• The FEM analysis includes some conservatism at several points. The elasto-plastic 
model with Mohr-Coulomb yield criterion certainly overestimates the deflections 
of the retaining wall and the bending moments and anchor forces. Also the use of a 
plane-strain model (using e.g. friction angles determined by triaxial tests) implies 
un under-estimation of the strength. More realistic constitutive models and 3D 
analysis would lead to more realistic results. 
• The pore pressures are supposed to represent a large contribution in the overall un-
certainties. These should therefore also be modeled in a stochastic way. 
• After the necessary calibrations (see section 6.2) of the reliability analysis for fail-
ure in soil the reliability analysis results might be compared with the requirements 
on which the deterministic design was based. We insist that the necessary refine-
ments are not finished yet. 
• Alternative to using level II influence coefficients for combining the failure mecha-
nisms, one could think about a single Directional Sampling Calculation including 
all the limit state functions with an OR combination (serial system) and scaled in 
such a way that all the limit states are of similar importance respectively weight.  
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Bewertung der Tragfähigkeit bestehender  
Stahlbetonbrücken mit Hilfe der Messungen von  
Betonstahldehnungen 
Kerstin Bierbrauer & Manfred Keuser 
Institut für Konstruktiven Ingenieurbau, Universität der Bundeswehr München 
Zusammenfassung: Die Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit bestehender Brücken 
aus Stahlbeton stellt eine Herausforderung dar, im Besonderen wenn über das 
Tragwerk keine Informationen in Form von statischen Berechnungen oder 
Zeichnungen zur Verfügung stehen. Die für die Tragfähigkeit relevanten Para-
meter müssen somit am Bauwerk selbst bestimmt werden. Da diese Parameter 
nur zum Teil gemessen werden können, müssen die fehlenden Werte zunächst 
abgeschätzt und die Schätzwerte anschließend verifiziert werden. Im Rahmen 
der Entwicklung einer Methode zur Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit bestehender 
Brücken wurden Verfahren entwickelt, die es ermöglichen, die für die Tragfä-
higkeit relevanten Parameter - wie die Bewehrungsmenge - abzuschätzen und 
zu verifizieren. Mit Hilfe des Vergleichs von gemessenen und berechneten Be-
tonstahldehnungen können die Eingangswerte für die Nachberechnung des 
Brückenüberbaus bewertet und der Berechnung der Tragfähigkeit zugrunde ge-
legt werden.  
1 Motivation 
An der Universität der Bundeswehr München wurde im Jahr 2000 ein Projekt initiiert mit 
der Aufgabenstellung die Tragfähigkeit bestehender Brücken zu ermitteln. Da bei Aus-
landseinsätzen der Bundeswehr für Brückenbauwerke oftmals keine Informationen in 
Form von Berechnungen oder Zeichnungen zur Verfügung stehen, muss deren Tragfähig-
keit vor Ort untersucht werden. 
Für die Ermittlung der Eigenschaften von Brückenüberbauwerken stehen zerstörende und 
zerstörungsfreie bzw. zerstörungsarme Messverfahren zur Verfügung. Diese ermöglichen – 
unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Anwendungsgrenzen – eine zuverlässige Ermittlung der Ab-
messungen des Brückenüberbaus und der Materialdaten. Bei Brücken in Massivbauweise 
ist jedoch besonders die Bestimmung der Bewehrung problematisch, auch unter Verwen-
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dung moderner Messverfahren. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden Verfahren entwickelt, die 
die Abschätzung der Bewehrungsmengen für bestehende Brückenüberbauten erlauben. Auf 
die Beschreibung dieser Verfahren wird in diesem Beitrag verzichtet. Detaillierte Informa-
tionen können entsprechender Literatur entnommen werden [1], [2], [3]. 
 
Abb. 1: Vorgehensweise bei der Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit bestehender Brücken 
Da die Bewehrungsmenge aus den Schätzverfahren von der im Tragwerk tatsächlich vor-
handenen Bewehrung abweicht, unterscheiden sich die daraus resultierenden Bauwerksre-
aktionen von den tatsächlichen, am Brückenüberbau messbaren Reaktionen. Diese Ab-
weichung muss mittels des Vergleichs der berechneten Bauwerksreaktionen mit den 
gemessenen verifiziert werden. Ergibt sich aus der Verifikation eine Diskrepanz, die einen 
vorgegebenen Toleranzwert überschreitet, muss die Bewehrungsmenge modifiziert wer-
den. Auf der Basis der modifizierten Bewehrung kann ein neuer Wert für die Bauwerksre-
aktion berechnet werden. Wird der Toleranzwert eingehalten, wird die Bewehrungsmenge 
der Nachberechnung der Tragfähigkeit des Brückenüberbaus zugrunde gelegt. Die graphi-
sche Darstellung der Vorgehensweise zur Verifizierung der Bewehrungsmenge und der 
anschließenden Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit zeigt Abbildung 1. 
2 Lösungsansatz 
Brückenüberbauten in Stahlbetonbauweise befinden sich in der Regel bereits unter 
Gebrauchslasten im gerissenen Zustand, d.h. in Zustand II. In der Zugzone treten infolge 
der Überschreitung der Zugfestigkeit des Betons Risse auf und führen an diesen Stellen zu 
deutlich erhöhten Spannungen und Dehnungen im Betonstahl. Im ungerissenen Bereich 
übernimmt der Beton weiterhin Zugspannungen (Tension - Stiffening - Effekt). Die Größe 
der in den Beton eingeleiteten Zugkraft hängt von der Verbundwirkung ab, die maßgeblich 
Bierbrauer & Keuser: Bewertung der Tragfähigkeit bestehender Stahlbetonbrücken 
3 
durch die Lastgeschichte des Bauwerks beeinflusst wird [7]. Dabei spielen die durch ver-
änderliche Lasten wie Verkehr erzeugten, dynamischen Beanspruchungen eine wesentliche 
Rolle. 
Um die abgeschätzte Bewehrungsmenge am Bauwerk zu verifizieren, werden lokal mess-
bare Größen benötigt, die die Verifizierung der Eigenschaften des Bauwerks auf der 
Grundlage einer lokalen Aussage erlauben. Hierfür werden in den Rissen gemessene Be-
tonstahldehnungen unter definierten Einwirkungen im Gebrauchslastniveau verwendet.  
Um den beschriebenen Lösungsansatz zu belegen, wurden im Labor für Konstruktiven 
Ingenieurbau der Universität der Bundeswehr München Versuche durchgeführt. Dabei ist 
der Versuchsablauf, dem die Versuchskörper ausgesetzt wurden, derart konzipiert, dass die 
Versuchskörper für die Versuchsdurchführung in gerissenem Zustand vorliegen. Als Bean-
spruchungen werden sowohl statische als auch zyklische Belastungen auf die Versuchs-
körper aufgebracht.  
3 Ziel 
Ziel dieser Untersuchungen ist es ein Verfahren zu entwickeln, das es ermöglicht, die ab-
geschätzte Bewehrungsmenge auf Gebrauchslastniveau zu verifizieren und zu validieren, 
um diesen Wert der Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit des Brückenüberbaus zugrunde zu legen.  
Als Parameter für die Verifizierung der Bewehrungsmengen auf Gebrauchslastniveau wer-
den die Betonstahldehnungen in den Zugzonen des Bauwerks verwendet (vgl. Ab-
schnitt 2). Die Verifizierung selbst geht einher mit der Gegenüberstellung der am Bauwerk 
gemessenen Betonstahldehnungen εs,meas. und den Betonstahldehnungen, die in der Nach-
berechnung des Brückenüberbaus ermittelt werden, εs,calc.. Der Vergleich der Betonstahl-
dehnungen erfolgt unter Berücksichtigung eines Toleranzwertes ∆εs entsprechend 
Gleichung (1).  
)1(.,., scalcsmeass εεε ∆±⋅=  (1) 
Sowohl die am Bauwerk bestimmten Eingangsdaten und die abgeschätzten Bewehrungs-
mengen als auch die berechneten Betonstahldehnungen enthalten Ungenauigkeiten. Diese 
sind z.B. auf Streuungen in den Materialeigenschaften und –mengen bzw. auf Idealisierun-
gen in den mechanischen Modellen zurückzuführen. Dabei fließen zufällige und systemati-
sche Fehler in den Vergleich der Betonstahldehnungen ein. In dem Zahlenwert des 
Toleranzwerts, der die Abweichungen der gemessenen und berechneten Betonstahldeh-
nungen abdeckt, müssen somit die Unsicherheiten von Messung und Berechnung berück-
sichtigt werden.  
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4 Berücksichtigung von Abweichungen der Eingangsdaten 
Die Ergebnisse aus Versuchen bzw. die Ergebnisse der Berechnungen werden im Wesent-
lichen durch zwei Arten von Abweichungen beeinflusst: 
• die systematischen Fehler und 
• die zufälligen Fehler. 
Unter einem systematischen Fehler versteht man z.B. einen instrumentellen Fehler wie die 
Messungenauigkeit eines Messgeräts. Der systematische Fehler ist unabhängig von der 
Anzahl der Stichproben und kann nur über alternative Vorgehensweisen minimiert bzw. 
ausgeschaltet werden [4], [5], [6]. In dem hier beschriebenen Fall erzeugen die Verfahren 
zur Messung der Betonstahldehnungen sowie die für die Berechnung verwendeten, ideali-
sierten Werkstoffmodelle systematische Fehler. 
Zufällige Fehler entstehen z.B. durch die Beschreibung von Parametern bei einer nicht 
ausreichenden Anzahl von Stichproben. Durch die Verwendung einer ausreichenden An-
zahl von Stichproben können diese minimiert bzw. eliminiert werden. Im Fall der Ver-
suchskörper erzeugen z.B. die Eigenschaften der Werkstoffe wie die Elastizitätmoduli, die 
Abmessungen der Versuchskörper sowie die Querschnittsfläche und die Betondeckung der 
Bewehrung zufällige Fehler.  
Wurden aus einer Messreihe n Stichproben xn ermittelt, so streuen die Messwerte um den 
Mittelwert x  der Messreihe. Das Maß für die Streuung eines Messwerts um den Mittelwert 
ist die Standardabweichung s. Zur Beschreibung von Abweichungen der Messwerte vom 
Mittelwert ist die Standardabweichung nur bedingt geeignet, da sie nicht berücksichtigt, 
dass mit zunehmender Anzahl der Stichproben der berechnete arithmetische Mittelwert den 
wahren Mittelwert genauer beschreibt. Daher wird zur Beschreibung der Streuung einer 
Messreihe um den Mittelwert der mittlere quadratische Fehler ∆x eingeführt. Für Zufalls-
größen, die der GAUSSschen Normalverteilung folgen, gilt Gleichung (2): 
2
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1 ∑
=
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i xxnnn
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(2) 
In die Nachberechnung der Betonstahldehnungen fließen – wie bereits voran erläutert – 
Parameter ein, die zufällige und systematische Fehler enthalten. Daher enthalten die be-
rechneten Betonstahldehnungen die Ungenauigkeiten der Eingangswerte der Berechnung.  
Die Ermittlung der Abweichung der Betonstahldehnungen. aufgrund der zufälligen Fehler 
der Eingangsgrößen ∆εs,calc.,zuf. kann mit Hilfe der Fehlerfortpflanzung ermittelt werden. 
Zur Ermittlung der Abweichung des Ergebnisses wird die Funktion f(xi) in eine Taylorrei-
he entwickelt. Sind die Abweichungen im Verhältnis zu den Werten der Bezugsgrößen 
klein, darf die Taylorreihe nach dem linearen Glied abgebrochen werden. Gemäß 
BRONSTEIN et al. [4] gilt für die Ermittlung der Abweichung des Ergebnisses die Formulie-
rung entsprechend Gleichung (3). Die Abweichung ∆εs,calc.,zuf. entspricht dabei dem größten 
zu erwartenden Fehler [6].  
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Zur Ermittlung der Abweichung infolge systematischer Fehler ∆εs,calc.,sys. wird Glei-
chung (4) verwendet: 
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Die Abweichungen ∆εs,calc.,zuf. und ∆εs,calc.,sys. erfassen nur die Ungenauigkeiten der berech-
neten Betonstahldehnungen. Im Zahlenwert des Toleranzwerts ∆εs sind darüber hinaus die 
Ungenauigkeiten der Messung zu berücksichtigen.  
5 Versuche 
5.1 Versuchskonzept 
Für die Versuchsreihe wurden zehn Stahlbetonbalken mit einer Länge von 3,0m herge-
stellt. Die Querschnittsabmessungen betragen b/h = 0,20m/0,40m (siehe Abbildung 2). 
Alle Versuchsbalken wurden mit Beton der Festigkeitsklasse C30/37 hergestellt, die Aus-
härtedauer betrug 28 Tage. Die Probekörper unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Beweh-
rungsgrades ρ, des Stabdurchmessers ds und der Betonüberdeckung cnom entsprechend 
Tabelle 1. 
 
Abb. 2: Ansicht und Querschnitt sowie Bewehrungsmenge der Versuchskörper 
Der Versuchsaufbau wurde als Vier-Punkt-Biegeversuch konzipiert. Für die Versuchs-
durchführung wurden die Versuchsbalken auf Rollenlagern gelagert. Beidseitig kragten die 
Versuchsbalken jeweils 0,18m über die Rollenlager aus. Die Belastung der Balken erfolgte 
durch zwei Lasteinleitungsstellen in den Drittelspunkten zwischen den Rollenlagern (vgl. 
Abbildung 3).  
Die Stahlbetonbalken wurden statischen und zyklischen Einwirkungen unterworfen. Zuvor 
wurden die Versuchskörper mit einer Initiallast vorbelastet. Diese erzeugt für jeden Ver-
suchskörper ein Biegemoment, das oberhalb des Rissmoments Mcr liegt. Durch das Auf-
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bringen der Initiallast wird sichergestellt, dass sich die Versuchskörper für die Versuchs-
durchführung im Zustand II befinden.  
Nach Aufbringen der Initiallast wurde die Bewehrung auf der Zugseite in Feldmitte und 
unter einem der Lasteinleitungspunkte auf einem etwa 5cm breiten Streifen vorsichtig frei-
gelegt. An zwei Bewehrungsstäben jeder geöffneten Stelle wurden Dehnmessstreifen be-
festigt. 
Tab. 1: Modifikation der Versuchskörper 
Bezeichnung 
der  
Versuchs-
körper 
Betongüte 
fck/ 
Betonstahl-
güte fyk 
[N/mm²] 
Bewehrungs-
grad ρ 
 
 
[%] 
Beton-
über-
deckung
cnom 
[cm] 
Anzahl der 
Stäbe /  
Anzahl der 
Bewehrungs-
lagen 
Stabstahl-
durch-
messer 
ds 
[mm] 
Vorh. 
Bewehrungs-
querschnitt 
Asl 
[cm²] 
R05 30 / 500 0,42 2 3 / 1 12 3,39 
R08 30 / 500 0,70 2 5 / 1 12 5,65 
R1 30 / 500 0,99 2 7 / 2 12 7,92 
R16 30 / 500 1,40 2 10 / 2 12 11,30 
St10 30 / 500 1,00 2 10 / 2 10 7,85 
St14 30 / 500 1,00 2 5 / 1 14 7,69 
St16 30 / 500 1,00 2 4 / 1 16 8,04 
cnom3 30 / 500 0,57 3 4 / 1 12 4,52 
cnom5 30 / 500 0,57 5 4 / 1 12 4,52 
cnom7 30 / 500 0,57 7 4 / 1 12 4,52 
 
g
2,6418 18
M = 0,855 q   
Q = -0,18 q   
eigen
M = -0,016 q   
Q = 1,32 q   
3,00
 
Q/2 Q/2
88 88 8818 18
0 0
3,00
M = 0,88 Q/2   
0 0
Q =    Q/2   
0
 
(a) Belastung des Versuchskörpers infolge Eigenge-
wicht (oben), resultierender Biegemomenten-
verlauf (mittig) und Querkraftverlauf (unten) 
(b) Belastung des Versuchskörpers infolge Auflast 
(oben), resultierender Biegemomentenverlauf 
(mittig) und Querkraftverlauf (unten) 
Abb. 3: Belastung und Reaktion der Versuchskörper unter Eigengewicht und Auflast 
In den statischen Tests wurden stufenweise gesteigerte, statische Beanspruchungen gemäß 
Tabelle 2(a) auf die Versuchskörper aufgebracht. Zusätzlich zu den statischen Tests wur-
den die Versuchskörper zyklischen Belastungen ausgesetzt. Nach Durchführung der zykli-
schen Belastung, d.h. nach 20.000 und nach 40.000 Lastwechseln, wurden die 
Versuchskörper nochmals mit der höchsten Laststufe der statischen Versuche beansprucht. 
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Die Lasten für die statischen Tests sowie die Mittellasten und Amplituden für die zyklische 
Belastung wurden entsprechend des Gebrauchslastbereichs der Träger festgelegt (vgl. hier-
zu Tabelle 2(b)). Die zeitliche Abfolge ist in Abbildung 4 qualitativ dargestellt. 
Tab. 2: Übersicht über die Auflasten für die statischen und zyklischen Versuchsabläufe 
(a) Laststufen für die stu-
fenweise gesteigerte, sta-
tische Belastung 
(b) Laststufen und Beanspruchungen der Versuchskörper für die stati-
schen und zyklischen Versuchsabläufe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abb. 4: Chronologischer Ablauf der Versuchsdurchführung 
Mit Hilfe der Dehnmessstreifen wurden die Betonstahldehnungen während der stufenweise 
gesteigerten, statischen Belastung sowie in den statischen Belastungen nach der zyklischen 
Beanspruchung aufgezeichnet.  
5.2 Versuchsergebnisse 
Sowohl die Ergebnisse der Versuche mit stufenweise gesteigerter, statischer Last als auch 
die der Versuche mit zyklischer Beanspruchung zeigen - wie erwartet - deutlich den Ein-
fluss des Bewehrungsgrades (Abbildung 5(a)). Der Einfluss der statischen Höhe, berück-
sichtigt über die veränderte Betonüberdeckung cnom, zeichnet sich ebenfalls deutlich in den 
Betonstahldehnungen ab. Der Einfluss des Stabdurchmessers auf den Zusammenhang zwi-
Laststufe Auflast 
[kN] 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
45,45 
68,18 
90,91 
113,60 
136,41 
159,10 
181,80 
204,50 
 Lastbild: 
Statische Belastung 
 
Lastbild: 
Zyklische Belastung 
 
Versuchs-
körper 
Minimale 
Laststufe 
Maximale 
Laststufe 
Mittellast 
[kN] 
Amplitude
[kN] 
R05 
R08 
R1 
R16 
St10 
St14 
St16 
cnom3 
cnom5 
cnom7 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q2 
Q3 
Q5 
Q6 
Q8 
Q6 
Q7 
Q7 
Q4 
Q4 
Q4 
50 
75 
90 
120 
90 
90 
95 
55 
50 
50 
± 20 
± 25 
± 40 
± 60 
± 40 
± 40 
± 45 
± 15 
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schen Betonstahldehnung und Biegemoment ist vergleichsweise gering und somit vernach-
lässigbar. Dies bestätigen die Ergebnisse nach aufgebrachter zyklischer Belastung.  
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(a) Einfluss des Bewehrungsgrades (b) Einfluss der Anzahl der Lastwechsel am Beispiel 
des Versuchskörpers R05 
Abb. 5: Einfluss des Bewehrungsgrades und der Lastwechsel auf die Betonstahldehnungen  
Die Gegenüberstellung der Betonstahldehnungen vor und nach aufgebrachter zyklischer 
Belastung ergab, dass es näherungsweise zu keiner Veränderung der Betonstahldehnungen 
kommt, wie die Abbildungen 5(b) und 6 zeigen. Dies ist in Hinblick auf die Messung der 
Betonstahldehnung im Riss zu erwarten. Im Riss wird die gesamte Zugkraft infolge der 
Auflast auf den Versuchskörper durch den Betonstahl übernommen. Da die Kraft im Be-
tonstahl für gleiche Laststufen vor und nach zyklischer Beanspruchung im Riss unverän-
dert bleibt, ergibt sich für die Betonstahldehnung εs keine Änderung zwischen statischer 
und zyklischer Belastung. Die Mitwirkung des Betons zwischen den Rissen hat keinen 
Einfluss auf die Messwerte.  
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Abb. 6: Gegenüberstellung der Betonstahldehnungen vor und nach zyklischer Beanspru- 
 chung am Beispiel der Versuchskörper mit variierendem Bewehrungsgrad 
Aus der Messung über einen gerissenen Bereich resultiert eine Betonstahldehnung, die 
den Anteil aus der Mitwirkung des Betons zwischen den Rissen enthält. Es ergibt sich ein 
mittlerer Wert für die Dehnungen im Betonstahl. Dieser wird durch zyklische Beanspru-
chung beeinflusst. In Versuchen wurde durch SEIBEL [7] der Einfluss der Anzahl der Last-
wechsel auf die mittleren Betonstahldehnungen untersucht. Der Dehnungszuwachs im 
‰ ‰
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Betonstahl beträgt nach 20.000 Lastwechseln etwa 5%. Die Veränderung des Verbundes 
resultiert aus der Schädigung des Betons der Kontaktzone in Rissnähe [8]. Für eine stati-
sche Belastung wird der Bereich, in dem der Verbund zwischen Beton und Betonstahl ge-
stört ist, mit einer Länge des 2fachen bis 5fachen Stabdurchmessers angegeben (vgl. 
Abbildung 7). Durch die zyklische Belastung wird dieser gestörte Bereich vergrößert. Es 
verbleibt ein Resttraganteil des Betons auf Zug zwischen den Rissen. 
 
Abb. 7: Ausbruchkegel des Betons infolge statischer Belastung nach [8] 
Für die Auswertung der Versuche wurde die Einwirkung infolge Eigengewichts nicht be-
rücksichtigt, da durch die Kalibrierung der Dehnmessstreifen vor Versuchsdurchführung 
nur die Dehnungsänderungen in den Betonstählen infolge der Auflast gemessen werden.  
5.3 Berechnung der Betonstahldehnungen 
Für die Nachberechnung der Betonstahldehnungen wird ein vereinfachtes Berechnungs-
modell verwendet (vgl. Abbildung 8). Das Berechnungsmodell setzt das Ebenbleiben der 
Querschnitte voraus. Des Weiteren findet die Mitwirkung des Betons zwischen den Rissen 
keine Berücksichtigung. Für die Berechnungen wurden die Versuchsträger als Stabmodell 
idealisiert, bei denen nichtlineares Materialverhalten berücksichtigt wurde.  
 
Abb. 8: Berechnungsmodell zur Ermittlung der Betonstahldehnungen 
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Das Werkstoffmodell für Beton wird gemäß DIN 1045-1 als Parabel angesetzt, der Beton-
stahl mittels des bilinearen Spannungs-Dehnungs-Verhalten abgebildet. Die geometrischen 
Daten und die Materialeigenschaften der Versuchskörper werden entsprechend der Ver-
suchsplanung (vgl. Tabelle 1) angesetzt. 
Wie bereits erläutert, werden die auf Gebrauchslastniveau verifizierten Bewehrungsmen-
gen der Berechnung der Tragfähigkeit zugrunde gelegt. Zur Berechnung der Bewehrungs-
menge können die gemessenen Betonstahldehnungen verwendet werden. Die gemessenen 
Betonstahldehnungen sind hierzu in die resultierende Lage der Bewehrung zu transformie-
ren. Es ergibt sich eine resultierende Betonstahldehnung ∆εs,res. Unter der Voraussetzung 
des Ebenbleibens der Querschnitte kann aus dem Biegemoment infolge der Änderung der 
Auflast ∆Q (vgl. hierzu Abschnitt 5.1) mittels der Abschätzung des Hebelarms des inneren 
Kräfte z=0,85d (d: statische Höhe) die Kraft im Betonstahl berechnet werden. Unter der 
Annahme, dass für den Betonstahl linear elastisches Materialverhalten gilt, kann die Be-
wehrungsmenge gemäß Gleichung (5) ermittelt werden.  
resss
s Ez
eQAerf
,
2/
ε∆⋅⋅
⋅∆=  (5) 
5.4 Bewertung der Versuchsergebnisse 
Um die in den Versuchen gemessenen Betonstahldehnungen zu bewerten, werden sie Be-
tonstahldehnungen gegenübergestellt, die - wie in Abschnitt 5.3 beschrieben - rechnerisch 
ermittelt wurden (vgl. Abbildung 8).  
Die berechneten Betonstahldehnungen zeigen eine recht gute Übereinstimmung mit den 
gemessenen Betonstahldehnungen nach stufenweise gesteigerter statischer Last entspre-
chend Abbildung 9(a) und nach zyklischer Beanspruchung gemäß Abbildung 9(b) (vgl. 
hierzu auch Abschnitt 5.2). 
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(a) Ergebnisse nach aufgebrachter stufenweise gestei-
gerter, statischer Last 
(b)  Ergebnisse nach aufgebrachter zyklischer Last 
Abb. 9: Vergleich der gemessenen mit den berechneten Betonstahldehnungen in Feldmitte 
und im Bereich der Lasteinleitung 
‰
 
‰
‰
 
‰
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Um den Vergleich der berechneten Betonstahldehnungen mit den gemessenen zu bewer-
ten, ist der Einfluss der Abweichungen infolge zufälliger und systematischer Fehler in den 
Einflussparametern der Berechnung und Messung zu berücksichtigen. Diese bilden die 
Grundlage für die Festlegung des Toleranzwerts ∆εs (vgl. hierzu auch Abschnitt 3). 
Als Einflussparameter auf die Größe des Toleranzwerts ∆εs finden auf der Seite der ge-
messenen Betonstahldehnungen folgende Faktoren Berücksichtigung: 
• die Messabweichung der Dehnmessstreifen, 
• die Genauigkeit der Messapparatur,  
• die Sorgfalt bei der Anbringung der Dehnmessstreifen auf den Betonstählen, 
• die Einflüsse der Lasteinleitung und der Lagerung. 
Auf der Seite der Berechnung wird das Ergebnis durch folgende Parameter beeinflusst: 
• die Nennwerten zur Beschreibung der Eigenschaften der Versuchskörper und 
• die vereinfachten, mechanischen Modelle zur Nachberechnung der Betonstahldeh-
nungen.  
Die Einflussgrößen auf der Seite der Messung sind mit systematischen Fehlern behaftet. 
Sie werden im Wesentlichen durch die Sorgfalt bei der Versuchsdurchführung beeinflusst. 
Das fehlerhafte Anbringen der Dehnmessstreifen an den Betonstählen wird im Weiteren 
nicht beachtet, da zur Festlegung der Betonstahldehnungen mehrere Messwerte entnom-
men und Ausreißer eliminiert werden.  
Die Eingangsgrößen in die Berechnung der Betonstahldehnungen werden sowohl durch 
systematische (mechanische Formulierung) als auch durch zufällige Fehler (Geometrie und 
Material der Versuchskörper) beeinflusst. So beinhalten die mechanischen Modelle Ideali-
sierungen, die nur durch die Verwendung anderer Modelle minimiert werden können. Zur 
Beschreibung der Abweichungen der Eigenschaften der Versuchskörper finden deren sta-
tistische Eigenschaften Berücksichtigung. 
Bei der Anwendung dieses Verfahrens bei Brückenüberbauten ist es unbedingt erforderlich 
mehrere Messwerte für die Betonstahldehnungen am Bauwerk aufzunehmen. Somit kann 
zum einen der Auswertung der Betonstahldehnungen eine ausreichende Anzahl an Stich-
proben (vgl. hierzu auch Abschnitt 4) zugrunde gelegt werden, zum anderen können Sys-
temreaktionen bestimmter Brückenquerschnitte, wie die Querverteilung bei Plattenbalken 
infolge exzentrisch angreifender Lasten, verifiziert werden. 
6 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 
In diesem Beitrag wurde ein Verfahren vorgestellt, das es erlaubt Bewehrungsmengen von 
Stahlbetonbauteilen mit Hilfe gemessener Betonstahldehnungen auf Gebrauchslastniveau 
zu verifizieren. Die Verifizierung erfolgt mittels des Vergleichs von am Bauwerk gemes-
senen mit berechneten Betonstahldehnungen unter Berücksichtigung eines Toleranzwerts 
∆εs. Dieser Toleranzwert dient der Entscheidung, ob die abgeschätzte Bewehrungsmenge 
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akzeptiert und für die Berechnung der Tragfähigkeit verwendet wird oder modifiziert wer-
den muss. Die Vorgehensweise zur Verifizierung abgeschätzter Bewehrungsmengen wurde 
mit Hilfe von Versuchen an Stahlbetonbalken verifiziert. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass 
gemessene Betonstahldehnungen zur Verifizierung von Betonstahlmengen gut geeignet 
sind. 
Die Grundlagen zur Festlegung des Toleranzwerts ∆εs wurden auf der Basis der Fehlergrö-
ßen in den berechneten und den gemessenen Betonstahldehnungen gelegt. Im nächsten 
Schritt ist ein Verfahren zur Festlegung des Toleranzwerts ∆εs zu entwickeln. Seine Quan-
tifizierung geht einher mit der Bewertung der Eigenschaften der für die Ermittlung der 
Tragfähigkeit zu berücksichtigenden Größen.  
Die Verifikation der am Bauwerk ermittelten Eingangsgrößen bildet die Basis für die Be-
rechnung einer aktuellen Tragfähigkeit eines bestehenden Brückenüberbaus. Diese basiert 
auf der statistischen Auswertung der Messwerte zur Ableitung von Rechenwerten und die 
Modifikation der Teilsicherheitsbeiwerte der DIN 1055-100. 
Ausdrücklicher Dank gilt dem Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung in Koblenz 
als finanziellem Träger des Projekts „Ermittlung der Tragfähigkeit von Brücken“. 
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Ein systematischer Ansatz für eine Strategie 
zur Gewährleistung der Sicherheit von Gebäuden 
Burkhard Switaiski 
TÜV Rheinland Industrie Service GmbH 
1 Einleitung 
Infolge des gehäuften Auftretens von Hallendacheinstürzen im Januar und Februar 2006 
gelangte die Frage nach einer generellen Prüfpflicht für Ingenieurbauten in den Mittel-
punkt des öffentlichen Interesses. Die Befürworter sehen den Staat in der Pflicht, zum 
Schutz von Personen und Sachgütern entsprechende Vorschriften zu erlassen, die Gegner 
argumentieren mit der ohnehin bestehenden Verkehrssicherungspflicht des Besitzers oder 
Betreibers und lehnen jeden staatlichen Eingriff mit Hinweis auf Verstoß gegen die Grund-
sätze der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung ab. 
Dieser Beitrag soll zur Versachlichung der Diskussion beitragen, indem er ausgehend von 
bereits bestehenden Regelungen und den Grundlagen der Risikobetrachtung das Modell 
einer Prüfsystematik entwickelt, das sowohl die Eigenverantwortung des Betreibers im 
Rahmen einer Eigenüberwachung als auch die Fremdüberwachung so kombiniert, dass 
eine Risikominderung mit vertretbarem Aufwand erreicht wird. 
Die Diskussion wird hier auf die bauliche Substanz beschränkt. Betrachtungen der techni-
schen Ausrüstung von Gebäuden sind somit ausgeschlossen. 
2 Gesetzliche Regelungen 
2.1 Die Verkehrssicherungspflicht nach BGB 
Aus § 836 bis 838 BGB [1] ergibt sich die Verpflichtung zum sicheren Erhalt von Bau-
werken und baulichen Anlagen (Verkehrssicherungspflicht genannt): 
BGB § 836 Haftung des Grundstücksbesitzers. 
(1) Wird durch den Einsturz eines Gebäudes oder eines anderen mit einem Grundstück 
verbundenen Werkes oder durch die Ablösung von Teilen des Gebäudes oder Werkes ein 
Mensch getötet, der Körper oder die Gesundheit eines Menschen verletzt oder eine Sache 
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beschädigt, so ist der Besitzer des Grundstücks, sofern der Einsturz oder die Ablösung die 
Folge fehlerhafter Errichtung oder mangelhafter Unterhaltung ist, verpflichtet, dem Ver-
letzten den daraus entstehenden Schaden zu ersetzen. Die Ersatzpflicht tritt nicht ein, wenn 
der Besitzer zum Zwecke der Abwendung der Gefahr die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt 
beobachtet hat. 
(2) Ein früherer Besitzer des Grundstücks ist für den Schaden verantwortlich, wenn der 
Einsturz oder die Ablösung innerhalb eines Jahres nach der Beendigung des Besitzes ein-
tritt, es sei denn, dass er während seines Besitzes die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt 
beobachtet hat oder ein späterer Besitzer durch Beobachtung dieser Sorgfalt die Gefahr 
hätte abwenden können. 
(3) Besitzer im Sinne dieser Vorschriften ist der Eigenbesitzer. 
BGB § 837 Haftung des Gebäudebesitzers. Besitzt jemand auf einem fremden Grund-
stück in Ausübung eines Rechts ein Gebäude oder ein anderes Werk, so trifft ihn an Stelle 
des Besitzers des Grundstücks die im § 836 bestimmte Verantwortlichkeit.  
BGB § 838 Haftung des Gebäudeunterhaltungspflichtigen. Wer die Unterhaltung eines 
Gebäudes oder eines mit einem Grundstück verbundenen Werkes für den Besitzer über-
nimmt oder das Gebäude oder das Werk vermöge eines ihm zustehenden Nutzungsrechts zu 
unterhalten hat, ist für den durch den Einsturz oder die Ablösung von Teilen verursachten 
Schaden in gleicher Weise verantwortlich wie der Besitzer. 
Festzuhalten ist, dass eine Ersatzpflicht immer dann eintritt, wenn die erforderliche Sorg-
falt zur Abwendung der Gefahr nicht beobachtet wurde. Dabei kann die Erfordernis nicht 
vom subjektiven Empfinden des Verantwortlichen abhängen; vielmehr ergibt sie sich aus 
demjenigen Verhalten, das zur Vermeidung des Schadens notwendig gewesen wäre. Nicht 
relevant sind hier übrigens Güterabwägungen im Sinne einer wirtschaftlichen Optimierung. 
Wie aus einem höchstrichterlichen Urteil hervorgeht (BGH, Urteil vom 27. 4. 1999 - VI 
ZR 174/ 98), ist die Haftung auch dann gegeben, wenn Naturereignisse wie starke Sturm-
böen zum Schaden führen. Lediglich der Eintritt außergewöhnlicher Naturereignisse kann 
bei Nachweis der fehlerfreien Errichtung und der mit erforderlicher Sorgfalt vorgenomme-
nen Unterhaltung des Bauwerks zu einem Haftungsausschluss führen (siehe auch BGHZ 
58, 149, 153 f.; Senatsurteil vom 7. Oktober 1975 - VI ZR 103/ 74 - VersR 1976, 66; vom 
23. März 1993 -). 
2.2 Körperverletzung im Strafrecht 
Der Straftatbestand der Körperverletzung ist im Strafgesetzbuch [2] geregelt: 
StGB § 223 Körperverletzung. 
(1) Wer eine andere Person körperlich misshandelt oder an der Gesundheit schädigt, wird 
mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.  
(2) Der Versuch ist strafbar. 
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StGB § 226 Schwere Körperverletzung 
(1) Hat die Körperverletzung zur Folge, dass die verletzte Person 1. das Sehvermögen auf 
einem Auge oder beiden Augen, das Gehör, das Sprechvermögen oder die Fortpflanzungs-
fähigkeit verliert, 2. ein wichtiges Glied des Körpers verliert oder dauernd nicht mehr 
gebrauchen kann oder 3. in erheblicher Weise dauernd entstellt wird oder in Siechtum, 
Lähmung oder geistige Krankheit oder Behinderung verfällt, so ist die Strafe Freiheitsstra-
fe von einem Jahr bis zu zehn Jahren. 
(2) Verursacht der Täter eine der in Absatz 1 bezeichneten Folgen absichtlich oder wis-
sentlich, so ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter drei Jahren. 
(3) In minder schweren Fällen des Absatzes 1 ist auf Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis 
zu fünf Jahren, in minder schweren Fällen des Absatzes 2 auf Freiheitsstrafe von einem 
Jahr bis zu zehn Jahren zu erkennen. 
StGB § 227 Körperverletzung mit Todesfolge 
(1) Verursacht der Täter durch die Körperverletzung (§§ 223 bis 226) den Tod der verletz-
ten Person, so ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter drei Jahren. 
(2) In minder schweren Fällen ist auf Freiheitsstrafe von einem Jahr bis zu zehn Jahren zu 
erkennen. 
Da in der Regel bei Verstößen gegen die Verkehrssicherungspflicht nicht von Vorsatz aus-
zugehen ist, liegt bei der aus Mängeln und Schäden an Bauwerken resultierenden körperli-
chen Schädigung von Personen Fahrlässigkeit vor: Hinsichtlich der Strafbarkeit fahr-
lässigen Handelns legt das StGB fest: 
StGB § 15 Vorsätzliches und fahrlässiges Handeln  
Strafbar ist nur vorsätzliches Handeln, wenn nicht das Gesetz fahrlässiges Handeln aus-
drücklich mit Strafe bedroht. 
Bei fahrlässiger Körperverletzung ist die Strafbarkeit gegeben durch  
StGB § 229 Fahrlässige Körperverletzung.  
Wer durch Fahrlässigkeit die Körperverletzung einer anderen Person verursacht, wird mit 
Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
Kennzeichnend für die Fahrlässigkeitstat ist die ungewollte Verwirklichung des gesetzli-
chen Tatbestandes durch eine pflichtwidrige Vernachlässigung der im Verkehr erforderli-
chen Sorgfalt. 
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3 Normen und Richtlinien 
3.1 DIN 1076 
DIN 1076 „Ingenieurbauwerke im Zuge von Straßen und Wegen, Überwachung und Prü-
fung“ (November 1999) [3] regelt Durchführung und Fristen für Untersuchungen sowie die 
Qualifikation der Prüfer u.a. an Straßenbrücken. Sie ist durch Allgemeine Rundschreiben 
des Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen verbindlich eingeführt 
(Allg. Rundschreiben Straßenbau Nr. 25/199 v. 22.11.1999). 
3.2 Richtlinie 804.8xxx 
Die Richtlinie 804.8001 bis 804.8004 der Deutsche Bahn AG Netz „Ingenieurbauwerke 
planen, bauen u. Instand halten / Inspektion von Bauwerken“ [4] gilt für alle Ingenieur-
bauwerke, die Konzernunternehmen der DB AG nutzen bzw. für die eine Verkehrssiche-
rungspflicht besteht. 
RiL 804.8001 „Allgemeine Grundsätze“ legt die Inspektionsarten, den Umfang, die Quali-
fikation der Inspizierenden sowie die Inspektionsfristen fest. Neben Eisenbahnüberführun-
gen (Brücken) (RiL 804.8002) und Überbauungen (RiL 804.8003) werden ausdrücklich 
sonstige Ingenieurbauwerke erfasst, zu denen auch Dächer und Hallen zählen (RiL 
804.8004). 
3.3 Vergleich 
Die Begrifflichkeiten von DIN 1076 und RiL 804 können wie folgt zugeordnet werden: 
DIN 1076 RiL 804 
Laufende Beobachtung Überwachung 
Besichtigung ------------------- 
Einfache Prüfung Untersuchung 
Hauptprüfung Begutachtung 
Prüfung aus besonderem Anlass Sonderinspektion 
Eine gewisse Unschärfe ist lediglich bei den Bauwerksüberwachungen nach DIN 1076 und 
der Inspektionsart „Überwachung“ nach RiL 804 festzustellen. 
Die Prüffristen sind wie folgt festgelegt: 
 DIN 1076 RiL 804 
Lfde. Beobachtung/Überwachung Laufend/halbjährl. Halbjährlich 
Besichtigung Jährlich ------------------ 
Einfache Prüfung/Untersuchung Drei Jahre Drei (Sechs) Jahre 
Hauptprüfung/Begutachtung Sechs Jahre Sechs Jahre 
Demnach ist die Besichtigung entsprechend DIN 1076 in der Ril 804 nicht vorgesehen. 
Weiter gibt RiL 804 die Möglichkeit, die Fristen für die Untersuchung bei einfachen Ver-
hältnissen auf sechs Jahre auszudehnen. Für sehr risikoarme Bauwerke wird die Anwen-
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dung der Richtlinie nicht gefordert. Die Einstufung erfolgt nach Anhang 1 zu RiL 
804.8004. 
Die geforderten Qualifikationen der Prüfer sind: 
 DIN 1076 RiL 804 
Lfde. Beobachtung/Überwachung Sachkundige Fachl. Qualifizierte Personen 
Besichtigung Sachkundige  
Einfache Prüfung/Untersuchung Sachkundige Ingenieure Ingenieure Bauwesen, Hochbau 
oder sonst. Befähigung 
Hauptprüfung/Begutachtung Sachkundige Ingenieure Ingenieure Bauwesen, Hochbau, 
Architektur mit Berufserfahrung 
und speziellen Kenntnissen 
Im Bereich der DB Netz wird insbesondere für die Durchführung der Begutachtungen ex-
plizit erheblich höhere Anforderungen angegeben als in DIN 1076, obwohl die dortige 
Formulierung, dass der sachkundige Ingenieur in der Lage sein muss, die statischen und 
konstruktiven Verhältnisse des Bauwerks zu beurteilen, bei entsprechend schwierigen Ver-
hältnissen zu ähnlichen Qualifikationsmerkmalen führen muss. 
Insgesamt ist also festzustellen, dass zwischen DIN 1076 und RiL 804 nur graduelle Unter-
schiede bestehen. Mit Bezug auf die Inspektion von sonstigen Ingenieurbauwerken wie 
Hallen und Dächern ist allerdings wesentlich, dass RiL 804 die Unterscheidung in Heft- 
und Buchbauwerke vornimmt, womit auch die Notwendigkeit von Begutachtungen ent-
schieden wird. Zudem sieht RiL 804 die Verlängerung der Fristen für Untersuchungen auf 
sechs Jahre bei einfachen Verhältnissen bzw. in risikoarmen Fällen den Entfall der Ver-
pflichtung zur Anwendung der Richtlinie vor. 
4 Inspektionsmodell 
4.1 Grundlegende Anforderungen 
Die Inspektion eines Ingenieurbauwerks soll gewährleisten, dass innerhalb des gesamten 
Nutzungszyklus – beginnend mit der Abnahme und endend mit der Außerbetriebstellung – 
die Gefährdung von Personen und Sachen minimiert wird und die zur Erfüllung des defi-
nierten Zwecks des Bauwerks erforderlichen Eigenschaften erhalten bleiben. Sie ergänzt 
somit die Planung, Berechnung und Ausführung durch eine Komponente, die sich über die 
gesamte Nutzungsdauer bis hin zum Abriss erstreckt und Hinweise für die notwendigen 
Wartungs- und Reparaturmaßnahmen geben. 
In einem Inspektionsmodell sind insbesondere folgende Parameter festzulegen: 
• Umfang der Inspektion 
• Zeitplan (Inspektionsintervalle) 
• Qualifikation des Prüfpersonals 
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Diese sind so zu definieren, dass mit einem vertretbaren Aufwand Mängel und Schäden, 
• die die Stand- und/oder Funktionssicherheit des Bauwerks beeinträchtigen, frühzei-
tig genug erkannt werden, um eine Gefährdung zu vermeiden; 
• deren Nichtbeseitigung zu erhöhtem Sanierungsaufwand führt, erkannt und in War-
tungs- und Reparaturanweisungen umgesetzt werden können. 
Das Inspektionsmodell hat somit 
• die Sicherheit des Bauwerks unter Beachtung der geltenden Gesetze und Richtli-
nien im Betrieb unter Beachtung des Sicherheitsbedürfnisses der Öffentlichkeit zu 
gewährleisten; 
• zum wirtschaftlichen Betrieb und zum Werterhalt des Bauwerks durch rechtzeitige 
Initiierung geeigneter Wartungs-, und Reparaturarbeiten beizutragen. 
Bei alledem ist festzuhalten, dass Sicherheit nicht in ein Bauwerk „hineingeprüft“ werden 
kann. Die mit dem Betrieb einer Anlage verbundenen Risiken sind in ihrer Größe durch die 
Planung, Ausführung und Nutzung vorgegeben, wobei Wartung und Instandhaltung eine 
bedeutsame Rolle spielen. Inspektionen dienen dazu, Abweichungen vom Sollzustand fest-
zustellen und dadurch Hinweise auf notwendige Instandsetzungsarbeiten zu erhalten, die 
sowohl der Wiederherstellung des ursprünglichen Sicherheitsgrades als auch der vorbeu-
genden Instandhaltung dienen. 
Insofern sind durch regelmäßige Prüfungen durchaus Kosten zu sparen und die Werthal-
tigkeit des Bauwerks über lange Zeiträume zu erreichen. 
4.2 Begriffe 
4.2.1 Sicherheit 
4.2.1.1 Umgangssprachliche Bedeutung 
Sicherheit ist umgangssprachlich definiert als Bedürfnis des Menschen, vor Gefahren für 
Leib und Leben sowie Hab und Gut geschützt zu sein. Die menschliche Psyche ist geneigt, 
Gefahren, die durch persönliches Verhalten – wenn auch nur vermeintlich – beeinflussbar 
sind, geringer einzuschätzen als solche, die von Naturereignissen oder nicht technischen 
Anlagen ausgehen, auch wenn dies objektiv nicht zutrifft. Beispielsweise werden die Ge-
fahren bei der Teilnahme am öffentlichen Straßenverkehr in der Regel unterschätzt, dieje-
nigen aus dem Betrieb technischer Großanlagen dagegen stark überschätzt. Zudem ist 
festzustellen, dass äußerst selten eintretende Schadensereignisse mit insbesondere hohen 
Opferzahlen sehr medienwirksam sind, häufig eintretende Fälle mit geringeren Schäden 
dagegen als normal angesehen werden, obwohl beispielsweise eine Risikobetrachtung letz-
teren ein um Größenordnung höheres Risiko zuordnen würde. 
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Das subjektive Sicherheitsempfinden muss dennoch beachtet werden, da die Akzeptanz 
einer Anlage oder der darin angebotenen Dienstleistung maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die 
Wirtschaftlichkeit hat. Bleiben etwa in einer Verkaufshalle die Käufer wegen tatsächlicher 
oder vermeintlicher sicherheitsrelevanter Mängel aus, so wird auf Dauer ein wirtschaftlich 
sinnvoller Betrieb nicht möglich sein. Meist ist es auch nur langfristig möglich, den einmal 
entstandenen negativen Eindruck durch Sanierungsmaßnahmen zu neutralisieren. 
Das Sicherheitsbedürfnis ist somit ein „weicher“ Faktor, der trotz seines schwer als Zah-
lenwert erfassbaren Charakters nicht vernachlässigt werden darf. 
4.2.1.2 Der Sicherheitsbegriff in der Technik 
In der Technik wird mit Sicherheit der Abstand einer vorhandenen oder der Planung zu 
Grunde gelegten Zustandes zu dem theoretischen Wert der Unbrauchbarkeit bezeichnet. 
Die Unbrauchbarkeit muss nicht zwangsläufig erst durch den Kollaps des Systems erreicht 
werden, vielmehr kann eine geometrische Lageänderung von Teilen oder das Überschrei-
ten bestimmter Werkstoffkennwerte (z.B. der Fließgrenze) diese bereits bestimmen. 
Für Bauwerke sind nach Eurocode [5] [6] folgende Nachweise zu führen: 
• Nachweis der Tragsicherheit 
• Nachweis der Lagesicherheit 
• Nachweis der Gebrauchstauglichkeit. 
Die Tragsicherheit ist gegeben, wenn die Beanspruchungen aus den Einwirkungen (Lasten) 
kleiner oder gleich den Beanspruchbarkeiten aus den Widerstandsgrößen (Steifigkeiten) 
sind. 
Die Lagesicherheit ist gegeben, wenn unter Ansatz der zu erwartenden Beanspruchungen 
kein Gleiten, Abheben oder Umkippen des Bauwerks oder von Bauteilen eintritt. 
Die Gebrauchstauglichkeit wird durch den Vergleich der Größe von Verformungen mit 
zulässigen Verformungen nachgewiesen. 
Neben diesen Begriffen der genannten Normen treten auch die Begriffe 
• Standsicherheit (in [3] und [4] 
• Verkehrssicherheit (in [3] und [4]) 
• Dauerhaftigkeit (in [3]) 
• Betriebssicherheit (in [4]) 
• Funktionssicherheit (in [4]) 
auf. 
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Die Standsicherheit ist überraschenderweise in beiden Regelwerken nicht näher definiert. 
Aus dem Inhalt der Prüfungen kann aber darauf geschlossen werden, dass es sich hierbei 
um die Kombination der Begriffe der Tragsicherheit und der Lagesicherheit handelt.  
Die Verkehrssicherheit erfasst nicht unmittelbar mit der baulichen Struktur zusammenhän-
gende Aspekte der sicheren Nutzung des Bauwerks. Bei Brücken fallen hierunter bei-
spielsweise Anfahrschutz (Leitplanken), Beleuchtungen, Geländer und Beschilderungen. 
Auch der Begriff der Dauerhaftigkeit ist in den Vorschriften ohne weitere Erläuterung ent-
halten. Dem Sinn der Regelwerke entsprechend soll er hier definiert werden als die Fähig-
keit einer Struktur, ihre Eigenschaften über einen längeren Zeitraum mit nur unwe-
sentlichen negativen Veränderungen beizubehalten. 
Die Betriebssicherheit betrachtet den Aspekt, dass ein Bauwerk einen Zweck zu erfüllen 
hat und diese Zweckerfüllung erhalten bleiben muss. So kann etwa eine Halle der Lage-
rung von Gütern dienen, die dort vor fremdem Zugriff und Witterungseinflüssen geschützt 
werden sollen. Übergeordneter Zweck ist hier das Betreiben und Aufrechterhalten eines 
logistischen Systems mit den Vorgängen der Ein- und Auslagerung. 
Die Funktionssicherheit ist lediglich in der Ril 804.8004.01 „Dokumentationsblatt für 
sonstige Ingenieurbauwerke“ auf dem Titelblatt erwähnt. Da in der vorzunehmenden Ein-
schätzung des Sicherheitsrisikos ausschließlich das Stand-, Betriebs- und Verkehrs-
sicherheitsrisiko erwähnt werden und die Beurteilung der Standsicherheit auf dem Titel-
blatt gesondert ausgewiesen wird, ist zu vermuten, dass die Funktionssicherheit die 
Zusammenfassung von Betriebs- und Verkehrssicherheitsrisiko ist. 
Insgesamt ist die Definition außerhalb der auf Eurocode basierenden Begrifflichkeiten 
Tragsicherheit, Lagesicherheit und Gebrauchstauglichkeit verwirrend und in sich nicht 
konsistent. 
Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, folgende Gliederung vorzunehmen: 
• • Standsicherheit 
• Tragsicherheit 
• Lagesicherheit 
• Gebrauchstauglichkeit 
• Funktionssicherheit 
• Betriebssicherheit 
• Verkehrssicherheit 
vorzunehmen. 
Der Aspekt der Dauerhaftigkeit ist auf alle Begriffe anzuwenden, da eine Beurteilung über 
den Zeitpunkt der Prüfung hinaus zumindest bis zur nächsten Prüfung gelten soll, wobei 
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besondere Ereignisse wie Unfälle, Gewalteinwirkung oder außer-gewöhnliche Unwetter 
die Gültigkeit der Prüfaussage beenden können. 
Der Begriff der Verkehrssicherheit ist hier dahingehend zu erweitern, dass der Schutz von 
Menschen und Gütern nicht durch Schäden und Mängel beeinträchtigt werden darf, die die 
Standsicherheit nicht berühren (z.B. Herabfallen von Einbauteilen). 
4.2.2 Risiko und Chance 
4.2.2.1 Versicherungsmathematische Definition des Risikos 
Das Risiko ist definiert als 
Risiko = Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit × Schadenseinheit 
SR E S= ⋅           (1) 
Die Schadenseinheit S wird dabei auf eine vorgegebene Schadensart beschränkt. Sie ent-
steht aus der statistischen Betrachtung von i Einzelereignissen mit dem zugeordneten 
Schadensumfang Ui. Aus der Gesamtheit der Einzelereignisse kann eine Verteilungsfunk-
tion des Schadensumfangs F(U) gewonnen werden [7] [8]. 
Diese Definition des Risikobegriffs wird allgemein im Versicherungswesen verwendet. Sie 
dient dazu, die Höhe von Versicherungsprämien festzulegen und den Umfang von Rück-
versicherungen sowie Rückstellungen zu bestimmen. 
Als Schadenseinheit wird in der Regel die Leistung der Versicherung im Schadensfall an-
gesetzt, die unter Einbeziehung etwaiger Selbstbeteiligungen des Versicherten nicht mit 
der Schadenshöhe identisch sein muss. 
Die Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit eines Schadensereignisses ergibt sich aus statistischen Da-
ten für die jeweiligen Objekt- und Ereignisklassen. Die Angabe ist nur dann vergleichbar, 
wenn ein Bezug auf einen Zeitraum vorgenommen wird (z.B. Ereignisse pro Jahr). 
Als Beispiel sei hier vereinfachend das Risiko dargestellt, das durch den Tod von Personen 
im Straßenverkehr entsteht. Wird von 7.000 Verkehrstoten pro Jahr ausgegangen, so ist die 
Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit bei 70 Mio. Einwohnern 1 × 10-4. Die Schadenseinheit soll mit 
100.000 € festgelegt sein.  
Damit wird das Risiko 
410  Person/Jahr 100000 Euro 10 Euro/(Person Jahr)R −= ⋅ = ⋅  
Dieser Ansatz würde aber nur dann gelten, wenn alle Einwohner in eine Versicherung auf 
Tod durch Verkehrsunfall einzahlen würden. Bei einer Betrachtung bezüglich der Verursa-
cher (z.B. Fahrzeuge) ist diese Berechnung anders aufzubauen: 
Wird angenommen, dass die Objektklasse der Versicherten 35 Mio. Fahrzeuge umfasst, so 
kommen auf jedes Fahrzeug 2 × 10-4 Verkehrstote. Damit ist das Risiko 
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42 10  (Person/(Fahrzeuge Jahr) 100000 (Euro/Person) 20 Euro/(Fahrzeug Jahr)R −= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅  
Aus diesem einfachen Beispiel wird klar, dass die saubere Definition von Objektklassen 
von entscheidender Bedeutung ist. 
4.2.2.2 Die Chance 
Komplementär zum Risiko ist die Chance definiert als 
Chance = Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit × Nutzen 
NR E N= ⋅           (2) 
Als Beispiel für eine Chance im technischen Bereich sei hier die Auslegung einer Stahl-
struktur angenommen, die gegenüber einer den Vorschriften genügenden Beschichtung 
einen Korrosionsschutz besitzt, der erheblich längere Standzeiten erwarten lässt, wenn die 
Umweltparameter konstant bleiben. Die Chance besteht nun darin, dass der Mehrpreis 
(dieser geht in das Risiko ein) durch geringere Instandhaltungskosten (die Kostendifferenz 
ist der Nutzen) zumindest kompensiert wird. 
Zur Optimierung technischer Systeme genügt es nicht, Risiken zu minimieren; vielmehr 
sind gleichzeitig die Chancen zu betrachten. Dies geschieht vorteilhaft durch die Minimie-
rung des Quotienten 
S
N
R E Sk
C E N
⋅= = ⋅  
Bereits an einfachen Beispielen kann gezeigt werden, dass die Minima von k nicht not-
wendigerweise mit dem Minimum von R und dem Maximum von C zusammenfallen müs-
sen (Bild 1). 
4.3 Übergreifende Konzepte 
4.3.1 Lebenszyklus eines Bauwerks 
Bauwerke unterliegen wie alle natürlichen und künstlichen Systeme einem Alterungspro 
zess, der die Fähigkeit, den erwünschten Zweck zu erfüllen, mit der Zeit abnehmen lässt. 
Zur Darstellung dieses Vorgangs lassen sich vorteilhaft verzerrte cos²-Funktionen einset-
zen, die die Eigenschaft besitzen, ausschließlich Werte zwischen 0 und 1 anzunehmen. 
Wird eine unverzerrte Funktion angenommen, so ist der 50 %-Wert nach p/4, der Nullwert 
bei p/2 erreicht. Wird p/2 mit der Gesamtlebensdauer gleichgesetzt, so bedeutet dies, dass 
bereits nach der halben Lebensdauer nur noch 50 % der Funktionalität (im folgenden als 
„Wert“ bezeichnet) erhalten sind. Tatsächlich wird der Wert aber in der Anfangszeit lang-
samer abnehmen und erst zum Ende der Lebensdauer stark abnehmen.  
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Bild 1: Minimum des Quotienten R/C (schematisch) 
 
Dieser Effekt lässt sich durch eine Verzerrung der Zeitachse erreichen: 
2cos
2 (1 ) e
W
t
s t s t
ξ
πξ
=
= ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
        (3) 
Darin ist 
te Lebensdauer 
s Streckung bei t = 0 
Die Streckung s in obiger Formel bewirkt, dass die Funktion längs x so verzerrt wird, dass 
bei t = 0 eine Streckung um s und bei t = te keine Streckung erfolgt. 
Bild 2 zeigt einen so erhaltenen Wertverlauf über die Zeit für zwei Varianten mit der Ge-
samtlebensdauer von 30 bzw. 50 Jahren. 
Tatsächlich wird sich der Wertverlauf für jedes Objekt individuell ergeben, eine Verallge-
meinerung ist somit auf statistischen Methoden zu basieren. Infolge der verhältnismäßig 
langen Betrachtungszeiträume ergibt sich dabei aber das Dilemma, dass unvorhersehbare 
Ereignisse (z.B. geänderte Nutzung, Kriege) einen nicht vorher abschätzbaren Einfluss 
ausüben. Damit ist die Stationarität als Grundlage der Anwendbarkeit stochastischer Me-
thoden nicht mehr gegeben. 
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Bild 2: Lebensdauerzyklen zweier Varianten mit Darstellung der Wertdifferenz 
Wird angenommen, dass es sich bei Variante den Verlauf ohne Instandhaltungsaufwand 
darstellt und Variante 2 ein entsprechendes Bauwerk mit Instandhaltung abbildet, so ist die 
Wertdifferenz bis zur Lebensdauer der Variante 1 (Annahme 30 Jahre) durch die Differenz 
Delta 1 und den restlichen Verlauf der Kurve für Variante 2 gegeben. Würde die Instand-
haltung der Variante 2 nach 30 Jahren eingestellt, so würde der Wert sich entsprechend der 
gestrichelten Kurve ändern und die Restlebensdauer nur noch 12 Jahre statt 20 Jahre betra-
gen. Wird weiter instandgehalten, ist eine Wertdifferenz entsprechend der Kurve Delta 2 
zu erreichen. Diese Betrachtung kann weiter fortgesetzt werden, wobei die Wertdifferenz 
stets geringer wird, je näher man der Lebensdauer der Variante 2 kommt. 
Die Wertdifferenz-Kurven stellen zugleich den maximalen wirtschaftlich vertretbaren In-
standhaltungsaufwand dar. Um den tatsächlichen Mehrwert zu erhalten, müssen von diesen 
selbstverständlich die Bewertungen des Instandhaltungsaufwandes abgezogen werden. 
Der Begriff des Wertes ist hier nicht ausschließlich monetär zu sehen, vielmehr kann dieser 
auch die Funktionalität abbilden, etwa dergestalt, dass die Tragfähigkeit einer Konstruktion 
bewertet wird. 
Wird beispielsweise angenommen, dass die Funktionalität eines Bauwerks bis zu einer 
Tragfähigkeitsminderung von 10 % des zugrunde gelegten Wertes erhalten ist, so wäre 
diese Grenze bei Variante 1 nach 16 Jahren, bei Variante 2 nach 28 Jahren erreicht. Nach 
Ablauf dieser Zeit ist dann eine Sanierung erforderlich, um den ursprüngliche Tragfähig-
keit wieder herzustellen. Modellhaft ist der Aufwand in Bild 3 dargestellt, wobei die ku-
mulierten Kosten betrachtet werden (bei Variante 2 fallen im Unterschied zu Variante 1 
auch Instandhaltungskosten an). 
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Bild 3: Kumulierter Aufwand für Instandhaltung und Sanierung (Modell) 
Alle hier getroffenen Feststellungen setzen voraus, dass der Zustand des Bauwerks wäh-
rend des Zeitablaufs auch tatsächlich bekannt ist. Nur dann lassen sich Instandhaltungs-
maßnahmen auf ihre Wirksamkeit hin überprüfen und Sanierungen zum notwendigen 
Zeitpunkt einleiten. 
4.3.2 Risikomanagement 
Als Basis der Betrachtung soll hier die Darstellung eines immobilienspezifischen Risiko-
managements für Kommunen dienen, das von BRADLER ausführlich in [9] dargestellt wur-
de. 
Dabei beschränkt sich die Ausführung auf die Nutzungs- bzw. Betriebsphase des Bauwerks 
beginnend mit dessen Fertigstellung. 
Die Bausteine des Modells für das Risikomanagement sind in Bild 4 dargestellt. 
Grundsätzlich sind die folgenden Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten: 
• Welche Risiken entstehen durch den Betrieb der baulichen Anlage? 
• Welche Auswirkungen haben diese Risiken und wie hoch ist deren Eintrittswahr-
scheinlichkeit? 
• Welche Risikofaktoren können durch geeignete Maßnahmen verändert werden? 
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Bild 4: Modell des Risikomanagements 
 
Unter Ansatz der zur Verfügung stehenden Finanzmittel – Einsparungspotentiale durch zu 
ergreifende Maßnahmen sind hier zu berücksichtigen – wird dann eine Strategie zur Steue-
rung des Risikos in dem Sinne entwickelt, dass das Verhältnis Risiko/Chance minimiert 
wird. 
Aus der Strategie leiten sich Aktionen wie beispielsweise die Aufstellung von Wartungs- 
und Inspektionsplänen, Instandhaltungsarbeiten und bauliche Veränderungen ab. Alle Ak-
tionen werden dokumentiert und ausgewertet, um so eine Anpassung der Aktionen, im 
weiteren Schritt möglicherweise der Strategie zu erreichen. 
Dieser Regelkreis ist in bestimmten Zeitabständen auf die erneute Betrachtung der Risiken 
zu erweitern, da anfänglich lediglich mit Abschätzungen gearbeitet werden kann, die durch 
die gesammelten Erfahrungen zu korrigieren sind. 
Als Risiken sind zu unterscheiden: 
• Betriebsrisiken 
• Marktrisiken 
• Umfeldrisiken. 
Markt- und Umfeldrisiken sollen hier nicht näher betrachtet werden, da sie nur in geringem 
Maße durch technische Eigenschaften des Bauwerks bestimmt werden. 
Die Betriebsrisiken können weiter untergliedert werden in: 
• Objektschäden 
• Haftungsschäden 
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• Schäden infolge krimineller Handlungen 
• Schäden durch Betriebsunterbrechung 
Oft wird argumentiert, diese Schäden seien durch entsprechende Versicherungen gedeckt. 
Nicht beachtet wird dabei häufig der tatsächliche Umfang des Versicherungsschutzes, ins 
besondere im Hinblick auf unterlassene Handlungen zur Minderung des Risikos (unterlas-
sene Wartung und Instandhaltung, grobe Fahrlässigkeit u.a.). Auch sind typische Betriebs-
risiken wie Nutzungsausfall und Funktionsstörungen in der Regel nicht versicherbar. 
Unverzichtbar sind somit im Rahmen der Gesamtstrategie die Teilstrategien 
• Präventivstrategie 
• Inspektionsstrategie 
• Korrektivstrategie 
Die Präventivstrategie umfasst alle Maßnahmen, die dem Erhalt der Funktionalität dienen. 
Dies sind vor allem Wartungs- und Instandhaltungsaktivitäten, die nach einem definierten 
Plan vorzunehmen sind. 
Die Inspektionsstrategie hat alle Prüfungen der Anlage zum Inhalt, die Aufschluss über 
deren Fähigkeit geben, den festgelegten Zweck zu erfüllen. Dabei ist eine Vorausschau 
über das Verhalten in der Zeit bis zur nächsten Prüfung notwendig. Aus der zu erwarten-
den Veränderung der Anlage ergibt sich der Inspektionsplan sowohl in Form eines Fristen-
plans als auch des Prüfumfangs. Die Inspektionen sind die Grundlage zur Anpassung der 
Wartungs- und Instandhaltungspläne und geben vorzunehmende Reparaturen, den Aus-
tausch von Bauteilen bis hin zu größeren Sanierungen oder der Außerbetriebnahme des 
Bauwerks vor. 
Die Korrektivstrategie ist bei Anwendung der Präventiv- und Inspektionsstrategie in der 
Regel überflüssig. Sie kommt nur dann zum Tragen, wenn außergewöhnliche Ereignisse 
wie etwa die Kollision eines LKW mit einer Gebäudewand eintreten und Sofortmaßnah-
men nötig werden, die die Sicherheit und den Wert des Bauwerks wieder herstellen. 
Der heute im Immobilienmanagement beschrittene Weg führt eindeutig aus Gründen der 
Kostenminimierung zu einer Abkehr von der Korrektivstrategie auch bei vorhersehbaren 
und regulären Betriebsrisiken hin zur Anwendung der Präventiv- und Inspektionsstrategie.  
4.3.3 Risikoklassen 
Zur Definition einer Präventiv- und Inspektionsstrategie ist es erforderlich, einen verlässli-
chen Beurteilungsmaßstab für das dem Bauwerk zuzuordnende Risiko zu entwickeln. 
Im Zusammenhang mit der Risikoabschätzung eines Bauwerks sind folgende Gesichts-
punkte zu betrachten und zu bewerten: 
• Vulnerabilität 
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• äußere Einwirkungen 
• Nutzung 
Die Vulnerabilität ist der Maßstab für die Anfälligkeit eines Bauwerks, d.h. für das Maß 
der möglichen Änderungen der hinsichtlich der Stand- und Funktionssicherheit charakte-
ristischer Eigenschaften. Hier gehen beispielsweise die Bauweise, die verwendeten Werk-
stoffe sowie die Eigenschaft der Fehlertoleranz (Redundanzen, Sicherheitsreserven) in die 
Bewertung ein. 
Die Vulnerabilität ist stets in Zusammenhang mit den zu erwartenden und bereits erfolgten 
äußeren Einwirkungen auf das Bauwerk zu betrachten, da erst diese zu einer Veränderung 
der Eigenschaften führen. Hier sind nicht nur die Lasten (z.B. als Lastkollektive oder Ma-
ximallasten), sondern auch Einflüsse aus Feuchtigkeit, Temperatur und chemischer Sub-
stanzen (z.B. Chlor in Schwimmbädern) zu erfassen. 
Die Nutzung entscheidet über die möglichen Personen- und Sachschäden sowie die Folgen 
eines Betriebsausfalls. 
Obwohl die angesprochenen Problemkreise seit langem bekannt sind, fehlen für Bauwerke 
im Allgemeinen verlässliche Zahlenangaben. Lediglich für Brückenbauwerke lassen sich 
aus den Berichten der Brückenprüfungen nach DIN 1076 entsprechende Statistiken gewin-
nen, die für sonstige Ingenieurbauwerke aber keine Rückschlüsse zulassen. Für den Be-
reich des Stahlbaus lassen sich Erkenntnisse der Betriebsfestigkeitsrechnung heranziehen. 
Die einfachste Klassierung wäre hier im Sinne einer Abgrenzung nach der Anzahl der sich 
in dem Gebäude aufhaltenden Personen möglich, die auch mittelbar über die Geschossflä-
che angegeben sein kann. Diesem Weg folgen viele Verordnungen der Bundesländer wie 
beispielsweise die Versammlungsstättenverordnung oder die Verkaufsstättenverordnung. 
Im Vergleich zu den oben aufgeführten Kriterien ist hier aber ausschließlich der Faktor der 
Nutzung berücksichtigt. 
Seitens der LGA wurde eine Klassierung entsprechend Bild 5 vorgeschlagen [10]. Die 
grundsätzlichen Gesichtspunkte scheinen hier zwar implizit zumindest ansatzweise berück-
sichtigt zu sein, jedoch ist eine nachvollziehbare Risikoeinstufung nicht gegeben. Insbe-
sondere ist hier der Aspekt der Vulnerabilität hinsichtlich Bauweise und verwendeter 
Werkstoffe nicht erfasst. 
Ein umfassender Ansatz für eine Klassierung ist in RiL 804.8004 [4} gegeben, der die Ein-
stufung eines Bauwerks nach obigen Kriterien zumindest teilweise vornimmt und danach 
entscheidet, ob es sich um ein Buch- oder Heftbauwerk handelt oder ob die dort vorgese-
henen Prüfungen entfallen können. Es werden dabei folgende Merkmale berücksichtigt: 
• Belastung des Bauwerks oder des Bauwerksteils 
• statische Verhältnisse 
• Konstruktive Ausbildung 
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• Zugänglichkeit zu den zu untersuchenden Bauwerksteilen bzw. Verbindungen 
• Möglichkeit, einen Schaden zu erkennen 
• Schadensfolge 
Die Bewertung der Zugänglichkeit und des Schwierigkeitsgrades der Schadenserkennung 
hat hier nur eine mittelbaren Einfluss auf das Risiko, etwa dergestalt, dass durch das Nicht-
erkennen von Schäden das Risiko für das Bauwerk zunimmt. Somit handelt es sich hierbei 
nicht um Gefährdungen des Gebäudes an sich, sondern um Erschwernisse bei der Scha-
densaufnahme, die aber durch erhöhten Prüfaufwand kompensiert werden können (z.B. 
Öffnen von Bauteilen, Vorrichtungen zur Überwachung). 
Gefährdungspotential/ 
Schadensfolgen 
Gebäudetypen Beispielhafte, nicht  
abschließende Aufzählung 
Kategorie 1 Versammlungsstätten mit mehr 
als 5000 Personen, bauliche 
Anlagen mit über 60 m Höhe 
Stadion, Fernsehturm, Hoch-
haus 
Kategorie 2a Gebäude und Gebäudeteile mit 
Stützweiten *) > 12 m sowie 
großflächige Überdachungen 
Schwimmbäder, Mehrzweck-, 
Sport-, Reit-, Tennis-, Passa-
gier- abfertigungs-, Pausen-, 
Produktionshallen, Kinos, The-
ater 
Kategorie 2b Exponierte Bauteile von Ge-
bäuden 
große Vordächer, angehängte 
Balkone, vorgehängte Fassa-
den, Kuppeln 
Kategorie 3 Sonstige Gebäude, ausgenom-
men Wohn- und Bürogebäude 
in herkömmlicher Bauweise 
 
Bild 5: Risikoklassierung nach einem Vorschlag der LGA [10] 
 
4.4 Entwurf einer Inspektionsstrategie für Ingenieurbauwerke 
4.4.1 Voraussetzungen und Randbedingungen 
4.4.1.1 Planung des Bauwerks 
Bei der Planung des Bauwerks werden auch alle die Vulnerabilität bestimmenden Größen 
festgelegt. Zusammen mit der vorgegebenen Nutzung und den anzusetzenden äußeren 
Einwirkungen ist damit das Betriebsrisiko bestimmt, aus dem sich als Konsequenz auch 
die erforderlichen Wartungs- und Instandhaltungsmaßnahmen ergeben, die in die Präven-
tivstrategie eingehen. Die Dauerhaftigkeit der Teilkonstruktionen bestimmt sowohl die 
Gesamtlebensdauer als auch den Aufwand für Reparaturen und Sanierungen. 
Aus wirtschaftlichem Gesichtspunkt sind demnach die Gesamtkosten über den Lebenszyk-
lus des Gebäudes zu betrachten und nicht ausschließlich die Herstellkosten: 
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Gesamtkosten = Herstellkosten + Betriebskosten + Sanierungskosten + Beseitigungs-
kosten 
Da die Präventivstrategie durch die Inspektionsstrategie gestützt und ständig angepasst und 
verbessert wird, ist bereits bei Entwurf und Planung die Möglichkeit der Prüfung hinsicht-
lich der zeitlichen Veränderungen der maßgeblichen Parameter des Bauwerks sicherzustel-
len. 
Dies kann durch Planung der Zugänglichkeit und/oder das Vorsehen von geeigneten Mess-
vorrichtungen erfolgen. Nur so ist zu erreichen, dass Abweichungen frühzeitig erkannt und 
entsprechende korrektive Maßnahmen ergriffen werden können. 
Dieser Aspekt ist im Bauwesen im Gegensatz beispielsweise zur Anlagentechnik und zum 
Fahrzeugbau zur Zeit noch stark unterentwickelt. So ist es auch heute noch weitgehend 
üblich, Spannglieder im Spannbetonbau (z.B. bei Brücken) so einzubauen, dass eine Ü-
berwachung der Spannkräfte praktisch nicht möglich ist. Deren Veränderung wird dann 
erst durch Folgeschäden sichtbar, was zu erheblichen Sanierungskosten führt. In Einzelfäl-
len ist hier auch schon plötzliches Versagen mit der Folge des Systemkollapses eingetre-
ten. 
Forderung I: Wartungs- und inspektionsfreundliche Planung 
4.4.1.2 Errichtung des Bauwerks 
In der Realisierungsphase entsteht das Bauwerk auf der Basis der Planung durch das Zu-
sammenwirken einer Vielzahl von Gewerken, wobei industrielle Verfahren der Massen- 
oder Serienfertigung in der Regel lediglich bei Komponenten Anwendung finden. Bei der 
überwiegenden Zahl von Bauten handelt es sich um im Prinzip handwerklich erstellte Uni-
kate. Dies führt dazu, dass die in der industriellen Fertigung angewandten Verfahren der 
Qualitätssicherung nicht unmittelbar übertragbar sind. Unverzichtbar ist als Teil des Pro-
jektmanagements hier ein Qualitätsmanagement, das die Übereinstimmung der Ausführung 
mit der Planung sicherstellt. 
Insbesondere größere Bauvorhaben sind durch Planungsänderungen während der Bauphase 
gekennzeichnet, die oft unter erheblichem Zeitdruck zustande kommen. Jedoch sind auch 
hier die oben für die Planungsphase aufgeführten Grundsätze in jedem Falle einzuhalten. 
Dies wird nur dann gelingen, wenn das Projektmanagement bereits in der Planungsphase 
zumindest informativ beteiligt wurde und die Planungsgrundsätze verstanden hat. 
Forderung II: Qualitätsmanagement als Teil des Projektmanagements 
4.4.1.3 Prüfung vor Inbetriebnahme 
Neben den bereits durch Verordnungen vorgeschriebnen Prüfungen an Bauwerken vor der 
Inbetriebnahme ist eine generelle Prüfung des baulichen Substanz auf Übereinstimmung 
mit der Baugenehmigung und der Planung sinnvoll, um eine verlässliche Basis für spätere 
Inspektionen zu erhalten. Auch kann hier die Beseitigung von Abweichungen im Rahmen 
der Gewährleistung eingefordert werden. 
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Eine sogenannte Endabnahme gibt jedoch letztlich nur einen Augenblickszustand wieder. 
Ein Großteil der Eigenschaften des Bauwerks ist zu diesem Zeitpunkt verdeckt und nicht 
mehr oder nur mit unvertretbarem Aufwand prüfbar. Aus diesem Grunde kann die Prüfung 
vor Inbetriebnahme letztlich nur den Abschluss einer baubegleitenden Qualitätssicherung 
sein, die entsprechend dokumentiert sein muss. 
Forderung III: Durchführung einer Prüfung vor Inbetriebnahme 
4.4.1.4 Erarbeiten einer Präventivstrategie 
Der Erhalt der integralen Sicherheit und des Wertes des Bauwerks erfordert die Festlegung 
von Plänen für die Wartung und Instandhaltung sowohl des baulichen Teils als auch der 
technischen Gebäudeausrüstung. Für letztere sind hier die Vorschriften der Hersteller 
maßgeblich, für das Bauwerk an sich sind diese anhand von Erfahrungswerten festzulegen. 
Forderung IV: Erstellen von Wartungs- und Inspektionsplänen 
4.4.1.5 Dokumentation 
Auch heute ist die Dokumentation für die meisten Bauwerke äußerst lückenhaft. Eine Aus-
nahme bilden hier eigentlich nur die Brücken, für die verpflichtend Brückenbücher zu füh-
ren sind. 
Sowohl im Sinne der Qualitätssicherung bei der Errichtung als auch für den Betrieb des 
Bauwerks und der damit verbundenen Wartungen, Instandhaltungen, Reparaturen und Prü-
fungen ist die Einführung eines Bauwerkbuches unabdingbar. 
Der Inhalt des Bauwerkbuches soll umfassen: 
• Übersichtsplan, Lageplan 
• Baugenehmigung 
• Geprüfte Statik 
• Ausführungspläne und Spezifikationen, jeweils auch für einzelne Gewerke 
• Unterlagen zur technischen Gebäudeausrüstung mit Bedienungs- und Wartungsan-
leitungen, ggf. Prüfbücher und zugehörige Prüfberichte 
• Abnahmeprotokolle 
• Verzeichnis der am Bau Beteiligten 
• Auflistung der Termine des Ablaufs der Gewährleistung 
• Wartungs- und Instandhaltungspläne mit Bestätigung der Durchführung 
• Inspektionspläne und Protokolle der Inspektionen 
• Verzeichnis der baulichen Veränderungen (ggf. mit Zeichnungen) 
• Liste vorgenommener Reparaturen und Sanierungen (mit Spezifikationen, Zeich-
nungen und Abnahmeprotokollen) 
4th International Probabilistic Symposium, 12th-13th October 2006 
20 
Bei größerem Umfang kann das Bauwerksbuch aus mehreren sinnvoll zu gliedernde Teilen 
bestehen. 
Forderung IV: Erstellen und Führen eines Bauwerkbuches 
4.4.2 Festlegung der Risikoklasse 
Die Risikoklasse ist maßgeblich für Umfang, Prüftiefe und Fristen der anzusetzenden In-
spektionen. Unabhängig von einem erwünschten Resultat kann eine Bewertungssystematik 
erstellt werden, die die Charakteristika des Bauwerks, die wirkenden Lasten und die Nut-
zungsparameter mit Einzelbewertungen versieht nach Gewichtung zu einer Gesamteinstu-
fung führt. Ähnliche Verfahren werden üblicherweise bei populären Tests von Waren (z.B. 
durch die Stiftung Warentest) angewandt. 
Das Gesamtergebnis hängt hier maßgeblich von der Gewichtung der Teilergebnisse ab und 
wird je nach individuellem Bedürfnis und Kenntnisstand höchst unterschiedlich ausfallen. 
Um hier einen breiten Konsens zu erzielen, ist die Anwendung der Delphi-Methode zu 
empfehlen, die auf der These beruht, dass eine Vielzahl subjektiver Expertenmeinungen zu 
einem objektiven Gesamtergebnis führt (PATZAK [11]). HERTZ [12] hat hierauf basierend 
ein Verfahren zur finanziellen Risikoanalyse durch stochastische Simulation entwickelt, 
das durchaus auf das hier vorliegende Problem einer Risikoklassierung hin angepasst wer-
den kann. Allerdings wird empfohlen, das Verfahren um die Bestimmung des Vertrauens-
bereichs (z.B. unter Anwendung der t-Verteilung [13]) und die Berechnung der Varianz zu 
erweitern, um einerseits stark abweichende Meinungen einzelner Experten identifizieren zu 
können und andererseits die Bandbreite der Aussagen darzustellen. 
Dabei sollte vorerst die Bewertungsskala der Einzelergebnisse und deren Gewichtung 
durch die Experten vorgeschlagen werden. Anhand festzulegender Musterobjekte wird 
dann unabhängig von den Experten eine Bewertung und Gewichtung mit den Mittelwerten 
und den oberen und unteren Quartilen vorgenommen. Die Gesamtergebnisse werden dann 
den Experten zusammen mit den Angaben zu den Musterobjekten mit der Frage vorgelegt, 
ob sie der Rangfolge der Objekte zustimmen. Gegebenenfalls sind darauf hin Adaptionen 
vorzunehmen, um zu einem breit anerkannten Verfahren zu gelangen. 
Ein Vorschlag des Verfassers ist in Bild 6 wiedergegeben. 
4.4.3 Inspektionen 
4.4.3.1 Inspektionsarten 
In Anlehnung an bereits vorhandene und bewährte Inspektionsschemata wird die Stufung 
in 
• Eigenüberwachung 
• Untersuchungen 
• Begutachtungen 
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Vorgeschlagen, die sich sowohl hinsichtlich ihrer Intensität als auch in der vorauszuset-
zenden Qualifikation des Durchführenden unterscheiden. Neben diesen turnusmäßig zu 
planenden Inspektionen werden in besonderen Fällen (z.B. Havarie, unerwartet auftretende 
größere Schäden) Sonderinspektionen notwendig.  
Die Eigenüberwachung ist eine Kontrolle des Bauwerks durch entsprechend eingewiesenes 
Personal des Betreibers, die in kurzen Zeitabständen im Rahmen des Wartungs- und In-
standhaltungskonzepts durchgeführt wird. Hierbei werden Erkenntnisse über Veränderun-
gen am Bauwerk anhand einer Checkliste dokumentiert und einer sachkundigen Person zur 
Beurteilung und Veranlassung entsprechender Maßnahmen zur Beseitigung von Schäden 
oder Veranlassung einer Sonderinspektion vorgelegt. 
Untersuchungen erstrecken sich auf die Kontrolle der zugänglichen Teile der Konstruktion 
auf Mängel und Schäden, deren Vorhandensein die Eignung hinsichtlich der Sicherheit, der 
Dauerhaftigkeit, der Tragfähigkeit und der Funktionssicherheit beeinträchtigen kann. Die 
zerstörende Öffnung von Bauteilen ist grundsätzlich nicht vorgesehen, kann aber auf Grund 
der Erkenntnisse als Sonderinspektion empfohlen werden. Diese Prüfungen können nur von 
Personen vorgenommen werden, die gemäß ihrer Berufsausbildung und der fachlichen Qua-
lifikation in der Lage sind, die statischen Verhältnisse des Bauwerks zu beurteilen. 
Begutachtungen erstrecken sich auf alle die Stand- und Funktionssicherheit des Bauwerks 
betreffenden Teile, soweit diese nicht bereits bei andere vorgeschriebenen Prüfungen inspi-
ziert wurden (z.B. Brandschutz, E-Technik, Aufzüge, HLK). Auch nur mit Hilfsmitteln zu-
gängliche Bauteile sind in den Inspektionsumfang einzubeziehen, die optische Prüfung ist 
ggf. durch zerstörungsfreie Prüfverfahren und Messungen zu ergänzen. Auch hier können 
weitergehende Sonderinspektionen (z.B. Öffnung, Ausbau von Bauteilen, Entnahme von 
Werkstoffproben, Laboruntersuchungen) erforderlich werden. Die Art der Inspektion setzt 
voraus, dass über die Anforderungen für Untersuchungen Personen mit langjähriger Erfah-
rung in der Prüfung von Bauwerken eingesetzt werden, die mit den üblichen Schadensbil-
dern vertraut sind und den Einfluss von Mängeln auf die Sicherheit beurteilen können. 
Alle Inspektionen sind so zu dokumentieren, dass dem Betreiber Hinweise für einzuleiten-
de Maßnahmen und eventuelle Nutzungseinschränkungen eindeutig mitgeteilt werden. 
4.4.3.2 Prüffristen 
Anhand der Risikoklasse des Bauwerks sind die Fristen für die einzelnen Inspektionsarten 
so festzulegen, dass eine Veränderung am Bauwerk, die die Stand- und/oder Funktionssi-
cherheit gefährdet, frühzeitig genug erkannt wird, um durch geeignete Reparatur- und Sa-
nierungsmaßnahmen oder die Außerbetriebnahme Schaden von Personen und Gütern 
abzuwenden. 
Als Anhaltswert sollen hier die Prüffristen für Brücken nach DIN 1076 herangezogen wer-
den. Unter Verwendung des Bewertungsschemas in Bild 6 würden Stahlbetonbrücken in 
der Regel eine Gesamtbewertung von etwa 4,0 erreichen. Solche Bauwerke sind alle drei 
Jahre einer Untersuchung und alle sechs Jahre einer Begutachtung (bei Brücken Hauptprü-
fung genannt) zu unterziehen. 
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Bild 6: Vorschlag Bewertungsschema zur Ermittlung der Risikoklasse 
Als unterer Grenzfall werde ein kleineres Bürogebäude mit geringem Publikumsverkehr in 
herkömmlicher Bauweise betrachtet. Die Gesamtbewertung nach dem Vorschlag in Bild 6 
würde etwa den Wert 2,0 ergeben. Für solche Bauwerke dürfte eine Eigenüberwachung in 
der Regel hinreichend sein.  
Hieraus ergibt sich auf der Grundlage der Bewertungsziffern und Gewichtungen des Vor-
schlags etwa die in Bild 7 zusammengefasste Festlegung von Prüffristen.  
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Gesamtbewertung Eigenüberwachung Untersuchung Begutachtung 
< 2,5 6 Monate Keine Keine 
2,5 bis 3,5 6 Monate 5 Jahre Keine 
> 3,5 6 Monate 3 Jahre 6 Jahre 
Bild 7: Vorschlag für Inspektionsfristen an Bauwerken (bautechnischer Teil) 
5 Zusammenfassung 
Auf der Grundlage der haftungs- und strafrechtlichen Bedingungen und bereits bestehender 
deutscher Normen und Regelwerke wurde eine Inspektionssystematik für Bauwerke entwi-
ckelt, die die bereits heute vorgeschriebenen Prüfungen um den Aspekt der Stand und 
Funktionssicherheit der baulichen Substanz erweitert. Dabei wurde auch die Tatsache be-
rücksichtigt, dass in neuerer Zeit im Immobilienmanagement eingeführte Präventions- und 
Inspektionsstrategien die Gesamtkosten mindern und zu einem wirtschaftlichen Betrieb 
maßgeblich beitragen. 
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Abstract: Nonlinear finite element method and advanced stochastic package 
were coupled in order to account uncertainties, randomness and spatial vari-
ability of material properties in computer simulation of structural behaviour 
and failure. The nonlinear FE program ATENA contains advanced constitutive 
models for concrete based on damage mechanics, fracture mechanics and plas-
ticity theories with smeared crack approach. The advanced stochastic simula-
tion software FREET is employed for the stochastic treatment. New and 
updated (significantly improved) methods were developed and verified in the 
simulation of uncertainties, e.g. small-sample simulation of Monte Carlo type 
Latin hypercube sampling for both random variables and random fields with 
focus on correlation control among variables, accurate representation of ran-
dom fields based on spectral decomposition of covariance matrix and employ-
ing very small number of underlying random variables, hierarchical nonlinear 
material models etc. The complex simulation tool SARA which efficiently 
combines both above mentioned packages has been introduced at the 3rd Inter-
national Probabilistic Symposium 2005 for the level of random variables. It can 
evaluate statistical properties of response variables (stresses, deflections, crack 
widths etc.) and consequently reliability analysis of the structure can be per-
formed. Here the upgrade to the level of random fields is described. An effi-
cient method encapsulating the existing material models has been developed 
and implemented in the nonlinear finite element framework to account the spa-
tial variability of material properties generated by the random fields technology 
or measured in-situ. Several illustrative examples of the stochastic fracture me-
chanics simulation accounting the spatial variability of material properties are 
presented. 
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1 Introduction 
Computer simulation based on nonlinear finite element analysis is a well established and 
widely used methodology for investigation of structural behaviour under severe conditions. 
Input parameters like material properties for such a simulation are usually considered as 
deterministic values. In reality, these values are uncertain and random, which can consid-
erably affect structural behavior, response and damage processes. It has been shown (Pukl 
& Bergmeister 2005, Novák 2005) that this subject can be satisfactorily solved in a rational 
and mathematically precise way and the random characteristics of nature can be addressed 
by computational models based on stratified sampling of random variables. A higher level 
and also very natural (physical) technique of uncertainties modeling is their representation 
by random fields. The stochastic numerical results from both random variables and random 
fields analyses can be statistically evaluated and used for assessment of structural safety 
and reliability. 
2 Nonlinear Computer Simulation of Building Structures 
The nonlinear finite element program ATENA employs advanced constitutive models for 
concrete based on damage mechanics, nonlinear fracture mechanics (as illustrated in Fig. 
1) and plasticity theories with smeared crack approach. It is a proven tool for computer 
simulation of reinforced structures including failure mechanism and post-peak behaviour 
(Červenka & Bergmeister 1999, Červenka 2000, Bergmeister 2005). The program consists 
of solution core and user-friendly graphical environment. The graphical user interface 
serves for creating of structural model and evaluation of results, even already during the 
analysis. The solution core includes finite element modelling, numerical equation solver, 
nonlinear solution methods and nonlinear material models. 
For computer simulation of concrete and reinforced concrete structures including its inter-
action with neighbourhood the program offers variety of nonlinear material models for 
concrete (plain, reinforced, pre-stressed, fibre reinforced concrete), quasi-brittle materials 
like masonry, rock, soils and metals, namely: 
• damage-based material model  
• fracture-plastic cementitious material  
• microplane material model  
• Drucker-Prager plasticity model 
• Von Mises plasticity model 
• plasticity with hardening for reinforcement 
• etc. 
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All these material models contain number of parameters, which define the numerical 
model and describe the nonlinear behaviour. Typical parameters for concrete are Young’s 
modulus of elasticity, compressive and tensile strength, fracture energy, Poisson’s ratio etc. 
In the standard (deterministic) solution these parameters are treated as deterministic values, 
constant within the structure or its parts. This assumption allows calculating a response to 
given actions in terms of mean values. Safety issues at the deterministic level should be 
addressed by means of global safety factors (Červenka 2006). 
 
Fig. 1: Nonlinear fracture mechanics approach for concrete in tension: exponential stress – 
crack-opening law 
3 Uncertainty and randomness of input parameters  
Solution to the variety of complex engineering problems, involving randomness in the me-
chanical properties and in the excitations they are subjected to, can be found by means of 
simulation. The Monte Carlo type of simulation is usually used for this purpose. However, 
a requirement of large number of samples can be time consuming and thus can be a serious 
limiting obstacle in practical cases. An efficient solution of this problem is offered in soft-
ware SARA, which couples the nonlinear finite element analysis with appropriate stochas-
tic methods (Pukl et al. 2003, Pukl and Bergmeister 2005, Bergmeister 2006). Part of the 
SARA package is the software FREET for stochastic functions (Novák et al. 2003). It is 
used in two stages of analysis: 
(i) Generation of random samples, which are passed to the deterministic solver. 
(ii) Statistical assessment of random response together with information on dominating 
and non-dominating variables (sensitivity analysis) and estimation of reliability using reli-
ability index and/or theoretical failure probability. 
For time-intensive calculations like nonlinear fracture mechanics of concrete, the small-
sample simulation techniques based on stratified sampling of Monte Carlo type represent a 
rational compromise between feasibility and accuracy. Therefore Latin hypercube sam-
pling (LHS) was selected in FREET as a key fundamental technique. The method belongs 
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to the category of stratified simulation methods. It is a special type of the Monte Carlo 
simulation, which uses the stratification of the theoretical probability distribution function 
of input random variables. It requires a relatively small number of simulations to estimate 
statistics of response – repetitive calculations of the structural response (tens or hundreds).  
The basic feature of LHS is that the probability distribution functions for all random vari-
ables are divided into NSim equiprobable intervals (where NSim is number of simulations); 
the values from the intervals are then used in the simulation process (random selection, 
median of interval or the probabilistic mean value of an interval). This means that the 
range of the probability distribution function of each random variable is divided into inter-
vals of equal probability (McKay et al. 1979, Iman & Conover 1980). The samples are 
chosen directly from the distribution function based on an inverse transformation of distri-
bution function, as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2: Scheme of the Latin hypercube sampling 
The order of representative parameters of variables are selected randomly, being based on 
random permutations of integers 1, 2, ..., j, NSim. Every interval of each variable must be 
used only once during the simulation. Being based on this precondition, a table of random 
permutations can be used conveniently, each row of such a table belongs to a specific 
simulation and the column corresponds to one of the input random variables. Once the 
samples of each input random variable alone are generated, the correlation structure ac-
cording to the target correlation matrix must be taken into account. There are generally two 
problems related to the statistical correlation: First, during sampling an undesired correla-
tion can occur between the random variables. For example, instead of the correlation coef-
ficient zero for the uncorrelated random variables an undesired correlation can be 
generated. It can happen especially in the case of a very small number of simulations 
(tens), where the number of interval combination is rather limited. Another task is to intro-
duce the prescribed statistical correlation between the random variables defined by the cor-
relation matrix. The columns in LHS simulation plan should be rearranged in such a way 
that they may fulfil the following two requirements: to diminish the undesired random cor-
relation and to introduce the prescribed correlation. A robust technique to impose statistical 
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correlation based on the stochastic method of optimization called simulated annealing has 
been proposed recently by Vořechovský & Novák (2003). The imposition of the prescribed 
correlation matrix into the sampling scheme can be understood as an optimization problem: 
The difference between the prescribed and the generated correlation matrices should be as 
small as possible. In such a way, the optimal sets of input parameters are generated and 
passed to the solver. 
The nonlinear finite element solver, represented in SARA by program ATENA, performs 
analyses of the structure with generated sets of input variables in order to obtain more real-
istic structural response. The results are evaluated by stochastic methods according to 
paragraph (ii). Safety of the structure is assessed directly by built-in reliability methods. 
The basic level of introducing randomness into the nonlinear finite element analysis by 
SARA system is treatment of the input parameters as random variables. Selected parame-
ters are randomized as described above, and their values differ from sample to sample, but 
inside of a single sample they are constants over the structure or structural part respec-
tively. Thus, the spatial variability of the structural properties is neglected at the level of 
random variables. 
4 Spatial variability of material properties 
Spatial variability of structural properties, in particular of material properties, is an impor-
tant phenomenon, which can have substantial influence on the structural damage and fail-
ure – e.g. crack initiation and localization in homogeneous stress state region as it occurs in 
four point bending tests. Therefore, it should be properly accounted in the computer simu-
lation of structures if realistic results are desired. The ATENA program has been extended 
in order to be able to account for the spatial variability of material properties. General pa-
rameters for the material models are updated according to the predefined values over the 
structure.  
The parameters of material models in the nonlinear finite element analysis are created and 
stored individually for each integration (material) point, since they can have individual 
settings and can locally change during the solution (e.g. due to damage processes or stress 
redistribution). Standard treatment of the local material models can be itemized as follows: 
• input of general parameters 
• adjustment of local parameters in integration (material) point (e.g. scaling to the fi-
nite element size) 
• changes of local parameters during nonlinear solution (e.g. reduction of lateral 
strength and shear stiffness in cracks, increase of compressive strength due to lat-
eral compression etc.) 
If the spatial variability should be reflected, the above scheme will change as follows: 
• input of general parameters 
• substitution of general parameters with predefined local parameters 
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• adjustment of local parameters in integration points (here comes the association 
with a random field realization) 
• changes of local parameters during solution. 
Since the number of material models in ATENA is rather high, and the spatial variability 
should be enabled for all of them, an efficient methodology has been developed for substi-
tution of the general parameters with the local ones by encapsulating the existing material 
models into an envelope. This envelope provides transfer of the local material parameters 
from the predefined geometrical matrix to the influenced material model. The value from 
the nearest geometrical point is adopted for the material point. If the parameter values are 
defined in the material points (Gaussian integration points), they are directly used for sub-
stitution of the general parameters. 
The geometrical matrix describing the spatial distribution of the material parameters is 
stored in an ASCII file with coordinates and corresponding parameter values. It can be 
created in several ways: 
•  it can contain the values from (in situ) measurements 
•  it can be written arbitrary by user – e.g. for introducing of (a local) inhomogeneity  
•  it can be generated in a scientific and mathematically precise way – by random 
fields methodology 
5 Random fields approach 
The term stochastic or probabilistic finite element method (SFEM or PFEM) is used to 
refer to a methodology, which accounts for uncertainties in the geometry or material prop-
erties of a structure, as well as the applied loads. The representation of spatial variability of 
structural properties by random fields is a high level of their modelling with a scientific 
background. Random fields describe the spatial distribution of a structural (material) prop-
erty over the region representing the structure. The spatial correlation of the generated ran-
dom fields, defined by correlation length (and the autocorrelation function), is of crucial 
importance. Randomly selected examples of realizations of 2D random fields over a rec-
tangular support for different correlation lengths are shown in Fig. 3 for illustration. 
Because of the discrete nature of the finite element formulation, the random field must also 
be discretized into random variables. This process is commonly known as random field 
discretization. The computational effort in reliability problem generally increases with the 
number of random variables. Therefore it is desirable to use small number of random vari-
ables to represent a random field. To achieve this goal, the transformation of the original 
random variables into a set of uncorrelated random variables can be performed through a 
well-known eigenvalue orthogonalization procedure. It has been demonstrated that a few 
of these uncorrelated variables with largest eigenvalues are sufficient for the accurate rep-
resentation of the random field.  
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The utilization of the above described LHS method for simulation of Gaussian uncorre-
lated variables is a new simple idea for improvement of random field simulation using or-
thogonal transformation of covariance matrix suggested by Novák et al. (2000). The 
superiority of this stratified technique remains here also for accurate representation of ran-
dom field, thus leading to the decrease of number of simulations needed (Vořechovský & 
Novák 2005). The approach is based on utilization of stratified sampling technique LHS 
for simulation of dominating uncorrelated random variables. The result is that only a few 
random variables and quite small number of simulations is necessary for accurate represen-
tation of a random field.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Realizations of 2D random fields with increasing spatial correlation 
This methodology is implemented in FREET as a level of random fields, which can repre-
sent the spatial variability of material properties for the structural analysis in ATENA. The 
above described technology of encapsulating existing nonlinear material models and spa-
tial distribution matrix are utilized in SARA system at this level. It enables to model the 
spatial variability and material inhomogenities in the nonlinear finite element solution in a 
highly scientific and systematic way. The results can be therefore directly statistically eva-
luated and used for statistical assessment of response variables, sensitivity analysis and 
estimation of structural reliability and failure probability, as recommended by Červenka 
(2006). 
6 Selected application examples 
The use of the SARA system at level of random fields is illustrated on several selected 
examples. Another example of utilizing the SARA system is described in a separate paper 
submitted to this Symposium (Strauss 2006).  
Random crack initiation and localization in numerical simulation of four-point bending 
tests is shown in Fig. 4. The first (uniformly grey) beam was analyzed with the determinis-
tic strength value, which was constant over the whole structure. Two major symmetrical 
cracks and symmetrically distributed microcracks appear in this case. In the next four 
beams the strength is randomly distributed over the structure. The regions with lower con-
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crete strength are red (dark) coloured. The localized cracks are depicted by short black 
lines in the damaged material points; the thicker line the larger crack width. Random ap-
pearance of cracks in the beam and various crack patterns are obvious. 
 
Fig. 4: Four-point bending tests - random fields of strength and crack patterns 
 
A bundle of normalized load-deflection curves from the extensive random-fields simula-
tion of those four-point bending beams is presented in Fig. 5. Due to spatial randomness 
the mean of the peak load decreases comparing to the deterministic capacity. Note that also 
the average plus one sample standard deviation does not reach the peak deterministic 
nominal stress. This is an important fact with serious consequences in rational design and 
assessment of structures. 
A complex example based on the random field’s methodology was published by Voře-
chovský and Matesová (2006). It presents numerical simulation of experimentally obtained 
size effect in dog-bone shaped concrete specimens under uniaxial tension (illustrative Fig. 
6). In the cited paper it is shown how the statistical size effect can be computationally cap-
tured. Since the deterministic model automatically models the energetic size effects caused 
by stress redistribution, the complex statistical-energetic size effect gets truly modelled by 
the presented software tools. 
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Fig. 5: Random stress–deflection curves (the thick red curve represents deterministic calcu-
lation) 
 
 
Fig. 6: Random crack initiation and size effect curves – experiment vs. simulation 
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Fig. 7: Random field of soil property (Drucker-Prager parameter α) around a concrete tun-
nel tube 
 
The application of random fields is also very suitable for solution of soil-structure interac-
tion tasks. The influence of spatial variation of Young’s modulus and material constants of 
Drucker-Prager failure criterion (based on cohesion and angle of internal friction) was stu-
died. The stability of concrete tunnel tube in complicated geological conditions has been 
analyzed. The thickness of geological layers was between 10 and 25 m, the diameter of the 
tunnel tube was 11 m, the typical wall thickness 0.5 m. The whole analyzed part of the soil 
with tunnel had the dimensions of 50  × 60 m. It was solved in plane strain state and discre-
tized in 5000 finite elements. Drucker-Prager plasticity was used for modelling of soil be-
haviour. The spatial variability was simulated using Gaussian random fields with 
correlation length of 2 m. A model sample is shown in Fig. 7. 
7 Conclusion 
The random nature and variability of structural features are widely recognized by both in-
dustry and researchers. The object of uncertainty can be solved in a scientific and mathe-
matically precise way and the random characteristics of nature can be addressed by 
computational models. A high level technique of uncertainties modelling is its representa-
tion by auto-correlated random fields. An efficient method encapsulating the existing mate-
rial models has been developed and implemented in order to account for spatial variability 
of material properties in the nonlinear finite element framework. The variable structural 
properties used for calculation can be measured in-situ or generated by random fields tech-
nology. 
The presented technology enables to model material inhomogenities in the nonlinear finite 
element solution, which can simulate random occurrence of structural damage (crack) even 
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in a homogeneous stress state (four-point bending beams), capture complex statistical-
energetic size effect etc. These features are in particular important in materials with high 
variability and uncertainty of their properties like fibre reinforced concrete, masonry or 
soil. 
The numerical results can be directly statistically evaluated and used for structural reliabil-
ity assessment. 
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Reliability of RC Members 
Strengthened with Externally Bonded Reinforcement 
Stefan Daus, Carl-Alexander Graubner  
Institute of Concrete and Masonry Structures, University of Technology Darmstadt  
Summary: Bonding additional reinforcement on the surface of concrete mem-
bers is a common technique for strengthening nowadays. For those strengthen-
ings the proof of the bond strength, is an essential part of the design. To adapt a 
new proof concept for the bond strength to the German design codes, the par-
tial safety factors are presently calibrated such that the required safety level is 
reached of all strengthened members as equally as possible. This includes the 
determination of the important basic variables as well as the size of the safety 
factors by means of a reliability analysis using Adaptive Importance Sampling. 
At first some characteristic of the bond between concrete and external rein-
forcement and of the considered proof concept are described briefly. Subse-
quently the reliability analysis is addressed paying special attention to the kind 
of safety factor, the stochastic model and the model uncertainties. 
1 Introduction 
Strengthening of concrete members by gluing additional reinforcement on its surface is a 
common technique nowadays, that has proved to be superior compared to other techniques 
in many cases. While in the beginning only steel plates were used as external reinforce-
ment, fiber reinforced polymers (FRP) became more and more established over the past 15 
years. FRP are used in the form of fabrics or lamellas and strips respectively. For the latter 
the fibers are embedded in a matrix of resin ex work, whereas fabrics are worked into the 
resin while gluing them onto the surface of the concrete.  
Concerning the effectiveness of those strengthenings the force-fit connection of the addi-
tional reinforcement and the concrete member is essential. Thus the proof of the bond 
strength is an important part of the structural analysis of strengthened concrete members, 
which is – when FRP is used as external reinforcement – decisive in most cases.  
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However the most codes or technical approvals respectively concerning those strengthen-
ings use design concepts for the bond strength, which are treating the bond of the exter-
nally glued reinforcement insufficiently. In the meantime however newer and more 
appropriate proof procedures are available. As one of these new concepts shall be included 
in the German technical approvals, a reliability-based calibration of the partial safety fac-
tors of that concept is conducted, to assure, that using the new concepts results in reaching 
the required safety level.  
2 Structural Strengthening with Externally Bonded Rein-
forcement 
2.1 Bond Between Concrete and Externally Glued Reinforcement  
In contrast to the bond between concrete and reinforcement bars the bond between con-
crete and external reinforcement glued on the surface behaves very brittle and fails already 
at very small relative displacements and shear stresses respectively. Therefore – in contrast 
to reinforcement bars – only forces can be transferred at the plate end or end of laminate 
respectively, which are considerably smaller than the ultimate load of the element (s. e. g. 
NEUBAUER [8] or NIEDERMEIER [9]). For steel plates with common thickness only about 
20 % to 40 % of the yield stress can be transferred and for lamellas of FRP the bond 
strength corresponds to only about 15 % of the ultimate load. To transfer larger forces, 
cracks along the adhesive surface are needed, in which the slip between concrete and ex-
ternal reinforcement can be reduced. The axial force in the external reinforcement is then 
increased gradually over the several sections between the cracks. Therefore bond failure 
can occur not only at the end of plate or laminate respectively but also on other locations as 
e. g. at concentrated loads or the point where the internal reinforcement starts yielding. 
Thus the bond strength has to be verified over the entire area being stressed by shear forces 
regarding the crack pattern along the adhesive surface, the more so as the location of fail-
ure is not known a priori. 
2.2 New Design Concepts for the Bond Strength of External Rein-
forcement 
Both NEUBAUER [8] and NIEDERMEIER [9] developed design concepts, which enable to 
prove the bond strength over the entire length of the external reinforcement. Within the 
scope of the own research only the concept of NIEDERMEIER is regarded, because it is 
planned to included it in the technical approvals in Germany. The concept is described 
below in few words. A detailed description of the concepts can be found in [8] and [9]. 
At first the crack pattern of the member has to be determined in the ultimate limit state. 
Subsequently the stresses in the external reinforcement σL must be calculated in every 
crack as well as the differences of stresses ∆σL,eff for each section of external reinforce-
ment lying between two cracks. Afterwards the differences of stresses ∆σL,tol, that can be 
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transferred by the bond strength between two cracks is calculated by means of the formulas 
given in [9]. Amongst others ∆σL,tol is a function of the lower one of the stresses σL in the 
bordering cracks. At last the differences of stresses ∆σL,eff and ∆σL,tol have to be compared. 
Because the location of the maximum utilization of the bond strength is unknown a priori, 
this comparison is necessary over the entire length of the external reinforcement (i. e. for 
every section lying between two cracks and at the end of the reinforcement), what is exem-
plified in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1 every triangle is standing for the difference of stresses of one 
section. That proof concept of the bond strength is rather extensive. As every section be-
tween two cracks has to be investigated and the number of cracks depends on the load, 
there have to be regarded several limit state functions, whose number is depending on the 
loading. 
 
Fig. 1:  Proving of the bond strength according to NIEDERMEIER [9] 
In Fig. 1 the differences of stresses ∆σL,eff and ∆σL,tol are displayed as a function of σL. It is 
also possible to chart the totals stresses σL,eff and σL,tol over the length of the member. That 
type of chart is shown in Fig. 2 for the left half a one-span beam (length l = 4.40 m) and for 
two levels of loading. Fig. 2 clearly shows, that the bond strength depends on the bond 
action. Furthermore it can be seen, that for qi = 2.0 * q0 the failure of the bond occurs at the 
point x ≈ 0.85 m, where the lines of σL,eff and σL,tol have an intersection. Thus the location 
of bond failure coincides neither with the end of the lamella nor with the maximum of the 
bending moment nor with concentrated loads and could not be detected a priori. 
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Fig. 2:   Tolerable and existing stresses in the external reinforcement of the left half of an 
one-span beam for two levels of loading 
2.2.1 Conclusions 
The mentioned characteristics of the bond between concrete and external reinforcement 
result in some particularities which have to be considered at the calibration of the partial 
safety factors: 
• The bond strength is a function of the loading. 
• The location where bond failure occurs as well as the relevant limit state function 
are not known a priori. 
• The number of limit state functions is variable for one regarded member depending 
on the load. 
• Setting up the limit state function is rather difficult and may be impossible as the 
regarded new proof concepts consists of several extensive steps. 
• In some cases a concrete member holds a sufficient residual load bearing capacity 
after bond failure of the external reinforcement. So bond failure not necessarily re-
sults in failure of the member. 
• As the up-to-date valid technical approvals in Germany comprise insufficient proof 
concepts for the bond strength, they cannot be used for the calibration of the partial 
safety factors for the new proof concept. 
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3 Reliability-based Calibration of Partial Safety Factors  
3.1 Scope and Object 
The aim of the reliability analysis is calibrating the safety concept for the proof of the bond 
strength so that the proof concept can be included into the German technical approvals. 
Because these approvals are applied together with the German design codes for structural 
concrete (e. g. DIN 1045-1 [2]) and the other accessory codes, the characteristic values of 
loads and material properties (except for the FRP) as well as the partial safety factors are 
given. Thus only the partial safety factors of the bond strength must be determined. The 
required safety level is prescribed by DIN 1055-100 [4] to β = 4.7 for a period of 50 years 
and β = 3.8 for one year respectively.  
3.2 Kinds of Safety Factors 
According to the partial factor method the characteristic values of the material strengths 
are to reduce by partial safety factors to determine the resistance of a structure. Applying 
this on the proof of the bond strength the concrete compressive and tensile strength, the 
yield stress of the internal reinforcement and the ultimate stress of the external reinforce-
ment are to reduce. As mentioned above ∆σL,tol is also a function of the stresses σL. Subse-
quently reducing the material strengths leads to the ratio of characteristic and design value 
of bond strength γb,eff = Rk / Rd being a function of the stresses σL too. This is exemplified 
in Fig. 3 for the partial safety factor for concrete compressive strength γc = 1.50. It is evi-
dent, that this approach leads to a lower reduction of the bond strength for small stresses 
(σL → 0) (i. e. close to the end of the external reinforcement) than for large stresses. Alter-
natively within this study it is investigated, whether it is feasible to reduce only the trans-
ferable differences of stress ∆σL,tol.  
Whereas choosing which basic variables are to reduce by partial safety factors, governs the 
constancy of the safety level for different types of structures, load cases etc. the size of the 
partial safety factors governs which safety level is reached. Concerning this it is of impor-
tance that bond failure does not necessarily lead to failure of the member. For this reason 
in the up-to-date valid German technical approvals (e. g. [1]) the tolerable stresses of the 
external reinforcement must be reduced for high grades of strengthening ηb (i. e. the ration 
of moment capacity after and before strengthening). Hence in the present study a variation 
of the safety factors depending on ηb is considered too. 
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Fig. 3:  Effect of stresses in the external reinforcement on the ratio γb,eff = Rk / Rd for 
γb,eff = 1.50 
3.3 Chosen Reliability Method  
The characteristics of the regarded proof concept are of importance for the choice of the 
reliability method. Using the first- and second-order reliability method (FORM and 
SORM), which is desirable because of the little numerical effort, is abandoned here be-
cause of the problems connected with setting up the limit state function as well as the vari-
able and unknown number of limit state functions as mentioned above. 
Here the determination of the failure probabilities is carried out using optimized Monte-
Carlo methods. This is comparatively easy because all possible kinds of bond failure are 
considered and the location of failure is detected automatically. It is easy to identify and – 
if desired – to sort out the cases of members having a sufficient residual load bearing ca-
pacity after bond failure.  
To keep the numerical effort small, and because scarce information about the possible lo-
cation of the design point or point of maximum likelihood (PML) respectively is available, 
Adaptive Importance Sampling (AIS) is used with normal distributions as importance 
sampling functions. The search of the expected value of the importance sampling function 
is conducted by means of a simple algorithm. After each iteration the vector, that provides 
the largest density and the minimal value for the limit state functions, is chosen as an im-
proved expected value. 
To reduce the number of basic variables before starting the reliability analysis a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted, by means of which the most important variables are identified. For 
this purpose the load bearing capacity is calculated using the mean values for all of the 
variables. In the next step each variable is increased or decreased (so that the bond strength 
is reduced or the stresses are enlarged) by twice the standard deviation. All variables af-
fecting the proof of the bond strength more than the average are regarded as important. 
Using this method reduces the number of basic variables approximately to the half (s. e. g. 
KLEINSCHMITT [7]). 
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3.4 Stochastic Model 
The stochastic model is based on the specifications of the PROBABILISTIC MODEL CODE [6], 
VROUWENVELDER AND SIEMES [13], RACKWITZ [10], SPAETHE [11] and STRAUSS [12]. A 
sample of the selected models is given in Tab. 1. The modeling of the concrete strength, 
live loads and the model uncertainties are briefly described below. 
 
Tab. 1:  Stochastic model and characteristic values of basic variables 
Variable Coefficient of  
Variation 
Distribution Type Quantiles used in 
design 
Permanent loads 10 % N 50 % 
Variable loads:    
- Office 37 % G 97,8 % 
- Residence 28 % G 97,5 % 
- Hotel guest room 16 % G 97,5 % 
- Merchant / retail 45 % G 98,0 % 
- Industrial (light) 77 % G 99,2 % 
- Snow 25 % G 98,0 % 
Strengths:    
Concrete compression strength ≈ 8 ÷ 18 % 1) LN ≈ 2 ÷ 20 % 1) 
Concrete tension strength 8 % 2)  LN 50 % 2) 
Reinforcement Steel  5 % N 2 % 
FRP-Reinforcement  5 % LN 5 % 
Model uncertainty:    
Lamellas - DET - 
Fabrics 12 % LN 10 % 
Distribution Types: N: Normal, LN: Lognormal, G: Gumbel, DET: deterministic 
1) 
2) 
Derived by updating the parameters given in [6] with test data 
Derived from test results 
 
3.4.1 Concrete Compressive and Tensile Strength 
While in the design of structures which still have to be built, the properties of the structure 
(e. g. the concrete compressive strength) are unknown and only target values are deter-
mined as the result of the structural analysis, in the case of structural strengthening the re-
garded member already exists. Thus its properties can be measured at the structure, and if 
this is done are having usually a smaller uncertainty. The determination of all relevant 
characteristics of the structure is very expensive and therefore unusual. However according 
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to the German technical approvals [1], the compressive strength and the tensile strength of 
the concrete must always be ascertained which is considered in the stochastic model.  
For the concrete compressive strength both prior and additional information is used for the 
stochastic model. It is refrained from using only the test data because it is often gained by 
means of a concrete test hammer, which is leading to a little bit more uncertain results than 
other test methods. The prior information is taken from the POBABILISTIC MODEL CODE [6] 
for a given concrete strength class, and it is updated with the test results. Because no test 
results are available for the reliability analysis, plausible assumptions are made. The mean 
of the sample of test results is chosen so that the concrete still belongs to the given con-
crete strength class. According to SPAETHE [11] the coefficient of variation for tests of the 
compression strength is in the range of Cvx = 0.005 ÷ 0.08 with a mean value of Cvx ≈ 0.04. 
Because of the larger uncertainty of results from the concrete test hammer, the upper value 
is used here. Within the reliability analysis for each concrete strength class only one set of 
distribution parameters is determined, which is derived using a representative (i. e. mean) 
assumption for the test data. 
Deriving the concrete tensile strength form the compressive strength leads to results sub-
jected to a rather large scattering. Therefore only the measured values are used for the sto-
chastic model. The coefficient of variation is assumed to Cvx = 0.08 again. This value is 
confirmed by test results, which were collected from a construction company during struc-
tural strengthenings. 
3.4.2 Live Loads  
As concrete members are usually strengthened while the self weight of the structure and in 
many cases also a part of the additional dead load are acting on it, the additional external 
reinforcement mainly is stressed by the live loads. Hence a closer look on those loads 
seems to be appropriate and it is refrained from regarding only one type of live load with 
one coefficient of variation and one characteristic value. 
Instead of that the stochastic models from the PROBABILISTIC MODEL CODE [6] are used 
were different kinds of live loads depending on the type of use are distinguished. Accord-
ing to [6] live loads are divided into two components, which are sustained loads with a 
fairly large relative duration and intermittent loads, which are acting only for a short time 
and changing very often. Using their parameters given in [6] for the different types of load-
ing and as a function of the size of the considered area, the sustained and the intermittent 
loads are simulated and combined over the hole life-time of a structure (here 50 years) by 
means of an algorithm from GLOWIENKA AND HAUSMANN [5]. Subsequently the maximum 
value in that period is determined and the whole procedure is repeated for several times 
(say 1000) leading to a representative sample of extreme values, which can be described 
quite well by a Gumbel distribution. The parameters of these distributions are printed in 
Tab. 1 for some types of use were only the decisive size of area is regarded. From Tab. 1 it 
is evident that primarily the coefficient of variation, which is lying within in a range from 
16 % to 77 %, is fairly various for the different types of use. Furthermore the characteristic 
values given in DIN 1055-3 [3], concerning the imposed loads, are corresponding to dif-
ferent quantiles of the Gumbel distributions.  
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These results assert the necessity to distinguish between the different types of loads within 
in the reliability analysis and furthermore indicate to do so in the design codes by defining 
different partial safety factors. However all safety factors (except for the bond strength) are 
given by the design codes and in these codes only one factor for all types of live loads is 
defined. Therefore it is expected, that the reliability levels of several regarded members are 
scattering if they are subjected to different kinds of live loads, the more so as the external 
reinforcement is predominantly stressed by the live loads. 
3.4.3 Model Uncertainties  
The model uncertainties of the regarded design concept were determined by comparing the 
results of conducted experiments (i. e. the observed ultimate load) with the ultimate loads 
calculated using the proof concept. About 40 of the several experiments, which are docu-
mented in the literature, were selected, from which one half were strengthened with FRP 
strips and the other half with fabrics. Further documented experiments were not used, since 
either the documentation was incomplete or the test specimens did not fail by debonding of 
the external reinforcement. The ratios of experimental and calculated ultimate Load ξ = 
Fu,exp / Fu,calc for the regarded Tests are shown in Fig. 4. It is evident that the values of ξ are 
quite different for strips and fabrics. 
 
Fig. 4: Ratio of experimental and calculated ultimate Load ξ = Fu,exp / Fu,calc for several 
Tests on strengthened beams 
Regarding FRP fabrics there is found a quite good agreement of test results and results of 
the calculation. All obtained values of ξ are within a range of about 1.07 to 1.46 and the 
controlling boundaries of the confidence interval (with a confidence of 95%) are µξ = 1.18 
and σξ = 0.14 (i. e. the coefficient of variation is Cvx = 0.12). These are reasonable values 
compared to the model uncertainties for other model types, which can be found in the lit-
erature. For example in the PROBABILISTIC MODEL CODE [6] or in VROUWENVELDER AND 
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SIEMES [13], the range of the coefficient of variation for concrete resistance models is 
Cvξ = 0.10 ÷ 0.30. According to [6] and [13] a lognormal distribution is chosen for ξ. In the 
reliability analysis ξ is regarded as a further basic variable, that is multiplied with the cal-
culated values of σL,tol.  
On the other hand for FRP strips or lamellas respectively the model uncertainties are con-
siderably larger (µξ = 2.0, σξ = 0.98 and Cvx = 0.49). As in all cases the bond strength was 
clearly underestimated by the regarded proof concept, it is assumed that the results of the 
proof concept are always conservative. Therefore in the reliability analysis the model un-
certainties are neglected for lamellas, and it is presumed that the proof concept matches the 
bond strengths exactly. Otherwise, because it is multiplied with σL,tol, ξ would have – be-
sides the live loads – by far the largest sensitivity and maybe dominate the results of the 
reliability analysis. Considering these results it has to be asked, if the regarded proof con-
cept is still applicable for strengthenings with lamellas, even though it is mechanically rea-
sonable, or if further research and an improvement of the concept are necessary at first, 
before incorporating it into the technical approvals. 
3.5 Example Structures for the Reliability Analysis  
The reliability analysis will be conducted for a sample of several fictitious members, cov-
ering the range of application admitted by the German technical approvals. The sample 
comprises slabs, rectangular beams and T-beams as one- and two-span systems. The varied 
parameters are beside some others the grade of strengthening, the reinforcement ratio and 
the type of loading (ratio of permanent loads to live load, type of live load). 
Slabs are regarded mainly, because strengthening of beams requires an additional external 
reinforcement for shear in most cases. As this external reinforcement for shear encloses the 
longitudinal external reinforcement and is increasing its bond strength, and as this effect 
still cannot be described sufficiently, only beams with a low grade of strengthening and no 
external reinforcement for shear are regarded. 
4 Summary and Outlook 
New proof concept for the bond strength of external reinforcement glued on the surface of 
concrete members shall be incorporated into the German technical approvals for structural 
strengthenings. For this purpose suitable safety factors for the proof concept are deter-
mined by means of a reliability analysis. Because the choice for the reliability method is 
restricted by the characteristics of strengthened members as well as of the regarded design 
concept, the probabilities of failure are determined by means of Adaptive Importance 
Sampling. The stochastic modeling is done regarding the variable loads and the concrete 
strengths in particular. The latter were modeled by using additional information, which is 
obtained through test results. The determined model uncertainties differ for the two kinds 
of FRP used (fabrics and lamellas) and thus two stochastic models are chosen for them. 
First results of the reliability analysis will soon be available.  
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Summary: Since probabilistic calculations to assess the reliability of structural 
elements and buildings are gaining a higher importance, the estimation of sta-
tistical parameters of material properties plays a major role. Whereas for steel 
and concrete structures the required information based on extensive data of test 
results is existent, there is a lack for masonry structures. This is valid especially 
for modern masonry. In this paper the main statistical parameters for the as-
sessment of the reliability of big sized masonry are provided. 
1 Introduction 
Within the scope of the harmonisation of the European design codes the partial safety con-
cept is recommended also for masonry structures. Thus the question of the required value 
of the partial safety factors has to be discussed. The comparison of the international ma-
sonry codes (see Table 1) shows, that especially the safety factors on the resistance for 
unreinforced masonry are contradictory. Possibly the provided safety factors were cali-
brated on basis of experience and traditions of the different countries. Up to now only 
some reliability studies on masonry have been conducted (GALAMBOS et. al [1], HOLICKY 
& MARKOVA [2], SCHUEREMANNS [3]). The reason for this can be found in the lack of re-
quired statistical data especially for industrially produced masonry. Due to the great 
amount of different unit-brick combinations with different properties of modern masonry 
the estimation of the statistical parameters is difficult, too.  
In the following sections some required statistical parameter for the assessment of the reli-
ability of masonry, made of big sized units (in the following called big sized masonry) will 
be given. The focus will be set on axial loading. The main parameter for the assessment of 
the reliability of masonry structures is its compressive strength. Other important material 
parameters as the modulus of elasticity are correlated with the compressive strength and 
may be defined on this basis. Hence the compressive strength needs to be analysed care-
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fully. For the assessment of masonry walls subjected to out of plane shear the statistical 
properties of the friction coefficient and the initial shear strength have to be estimated. Be-
side the influence of the material parameters on the reliability of masonry structures, uncer-
tainties due to the model used to calculate the load capacity play a major role and will be 
analysed, too.  
Table 1:  Summary of safety factors for the ultimate limit state design of unreinforced masonry in 
different countries 
Masonry Action1) 
Country 
γM 
permanent 
γG 
variable 
γQ 
Germany 1.50 1.35 1.502) 
Austria 2.20 1.35 1.50 
Switzerland 2.00 1.30 1.502) 
U.K. 2.50÷3.505) 1.20÷1.402) 1.40÷1.602)4) 
Netherlands 1.80 1.20÷1.352) 1.502) 
Sweden 1.50÷2.763)5) 1.00÷1.15 1.302) 
Australia 1.67÷2.226) 1.20÷1.352) 1.502) 
USA 1.25÷2.56) 1.20 1.30÷1.602)4) 
Canada 1.67 1.4÷1.25 1.502) 
1) Unfavourable effect 
2) Depending on the load combination 
3) Depending on the structural class an kind of building stones 
4) Depending on the effect 
5) Depending on the quality of building stones and the building inspection 
6) Depending on the analysed design situation (e.g. shear, axial, bending) 
2 Specification of Big Sized Masonry 
Big sized masonry is made of big sized units in combination with thin layer mortar and is 
common in Germany, as it safes on construction time and so reduces the cost of the struc-
ture. In the following big sized units are defined as stones with a height of 248mm and 
more, while the length of the stones reaches 998mm in special cases. The most common 
materials for this kind of masonry are porous concrete and calcium silicate unit. In the case 
of calcium silicate unit more or less solid stones are used for big sized masonry.  
The units provide a plane surface and geometrical deviations from the nominal size are 
negligible. The units are stone walled in stretcher course with the aid of small chain hoists 
if the weight of the units exceeds 25kg. The compressive strength and the weight of units 
made of porous concrete are significantly smaller in comparison to calcium silicate units. 
In the following the most important statistical parameters for the determination of the reli-
ability of big sized masonry made of porous concrete and calcium silicates units will be 
analysed.  
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3 Compressive Strength 
3.1 Definition of the Calculation Model 
The compressive strength of masonry is affected by the compressive strength of the units 
and the mortar used. Direct measurements of the compressive strength of masonry are ex-
pensive and thus reduced to minimum. However, the properties of units and mortar are 
subjected to quality control, so that the statistical parameters of the basic materials can be 
obtained on basis of extensive data. These reasons make clear that a calculation model 
should be defined which uses all sources of information for the estimation of the compres-
sive strength of masonry. The model according to equation (1), was proposed by MANN [4] 
and provides a good adjustment with experimental investigations. It is also used in Euro-
code 6 for the calculation of the compressive strength of masonry: 
c
mo
b
bm ffaf ⋅⋅=   (1)
Where: fm is the compressive strength of masonry 
fb is the compressive strength of the unit (brick) 
fmo is the compressive strength of the mortar 
a, b, c are factors which characterise the kind of masonry 
 
The factors a, b and c may be obtained using a regression analysis based on experimental 
investigations. It should be mentioned that for b+c ≠ 1 equation (1) is restricted to a special 
dimension. For the estimation of the required statistical parameter of the compressive 
strength of masonry the model uncertainties due to the transformation of experimental data 
to a mathematical model have to be considered. Thus model uncertainties M must to be 
added to equation (1). 
c
mo
b
bm ffaMf ⋅⋅⋅=   (2)
Where: M is a variable with a mean value of 1.0 which considers 
model uncertainties  
In the probabilistic model a, b and c can be regarded as deterministic parameters, since the 
uncertainties due to the definition of these factors will be included in the model uncertainty 
M. Besides the model uncertainty the compressive strength of the bricks and the mortar 
will be treated as random variables. Prior values for the factors a, b and c can be found at 
SCHUBERT [5]. However it should be mentioned, that the values provided by SCHUBERT [5] 
are valid for a slenderness of the masonry specimens the defined as height-to-thickness 
ratio of 10, whereas in Eurocode 6 these factors are related to a (theoretical) slenderness of 
0.  
For thin layer mortar, the influence on the compressive strength of masonry is negligible 
and thus the factor c can be set to zero (see SCHUBERT [5]), so that equation (2) becomes: 
b
bm faMf ⋅⋅=  for masonry with thin mortar layers  (3)
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3.2 Parameter Estimation 
The required parameters a and b in equation (3) for big sized masonry are calculated on 
basis of a regression analysis of experimental investigations, where the compressive 
strength of the units and the masonry were analysed. Note that all variables in equation (3) 
are treated as deterministic values within this stage of the analysis. Also the parameter M 
remains constant with value of 1.0.  
Since the height of the units has a significant influence on the compressive strength a ref-
erence value for the slenderness has to be defined. The specimens used for the following 
calculation had a slenderness λ defined as height-to-thickness ratio of 3 up to 10. The com-
pressive strengths provided by the tests were converted into a slenderness of zero using an 
approach of MANN [4] so that a standardised basis for the parameter estimation was pro-
vided. On these basis the parameter a and b are estimated to determine the mean value of 
fm in such a way that the squared mean error is minimized. 
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis. These parameters may be used to calculate the 
mean value of the compressive strength of big sized masonry. The parameter a also con-
siders also the slenderness on which the compressive strength of masonry is related to.  
Table 2:  Parameters for the calculation of the compressive strength  
Parameter Masonry 
a b 
Calcium silicate unit 0.23 1.31 
Porous concrete 0.96 0.88 
3.3 Determination of the Model Uncertainties 
Since no calculation model exactly fits to experimental results model uncertainties have to 
be regarded in a probabilistic calculation. In Fig. 1 the adjustment of the model to the data 
using the parameters according to Table 2 is shown. The statistical properties of the model 
uncertainties M are determined by the comparison of the compressive strength provided by 
the model and experimental data. Due to the fact that the model uncertainties are consid-
ered multiplicative in equation (3), the following relationship was used to calculate the 
mean value and the coefficient of variation of the model uncertainties: 
elmod,m
erimentexp,m
f
f
m =   (4)
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Fig. 1: Compressive strength of masonry against compressive strength of brick 
Considering that these values come from a limited amount of data the confidence provided 
by the estimation may be obtained. Table 3 shows the results.  
Table 3:  Parameters for the model uncertainties of the compressive strength of masonry 
Parameter Model uncertainty M  
Model uncertainty M consider-
ing the amount of data1) Masonry 
a b mM σM VM mM2) σM3) VM 
Calcium sili-
cate unit 
0.23 1.31 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.97 0.13 0.13 
Porous con-
crete 
0.96 0.88 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.98 0.11 0.11 
1) α = 95 % (confidence) 
2) Lower limit 
3) Upper limit 
3.4 Resulting Statistical Properties  
Due to the fact that the compressive strength of the units and the model uncertainties are 
random variables the compressive strength of masonry is random variable, too. Since a 
log-normal distribution is assumed for the units and the model uncertainty the resulting 
mean value and the coefficient of variation of the compressive strength of masonry may be 
calculated by equation (5) and (6): 
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On the basis of investigations in the context of quality control the required statistical prop-
erties of the bricks are obtained. For calcium silicate units the coefficient of variation of the 
compressive strength is about 8% whereas for porous concrete it is about 9%. Using all 
information the statistical properties of the compressive strength of masonry can be calcu-
lated. The results are summarized in Table 4. According to [1], [2], [3], [6] the compres-
sive strength of masonry is (approximately) assumed to be lognormal.  
Table 4:  Statistical Parameters of the compressive strength of masonry 
Parameter Mean value Coefficient of Variation 
Masonry 
a b fb1) M fm1) fb M fm 
Class2) 
22.9 0.97 13.5 16 
29.5 0.97 18.8 20 Calcium  
silicate unit 
0.23 1.33 
38.9 0.97 27.0 
0.07 0.13 0.16 
28 
2.9 0.98 2.4 2 
5.3 0.98 4.1 4 Porous  
concrete 
0.96 0.88 
7.5 0.98 5.5 
0.09 0.12 0.14 
6 
1) [N/mm²] 
2) Characteristic compressive strength of the brick (common values) 
In comparison to the variations of other types of masonry, big sized masonry provides a 
smaller coefficient of variation, as Table 5 shows. These values are considered for various 
materials of the units (e.g clay, calcium silicate unit, porous concrete etc.) and thus repre-
sent a mean value for the compressive strength of the masonry.  
Table 5:  Parameters for the calculation of the compressive strength  
Author V Basic variable  
GALAMBOS et al. [1] 0.18 Resistance 
HOLICKY & MARKOVA [2] 0.20 Compressive strength 
SCHUEREMANS1) [3] 0.19 Compressive strength 
KIRTSCHIG & KASTEN [6] 0.17 Compressive strength 
TSCHÖTSCHEL [7] 0.25 Compressive strength 
1) For historical masonry made of bricks (clay) 
Using the estimated parameter according to Table 4 the characteristic values for the com-
pressive strength can be calculated. These are usually defined as 5%-quantile of the distri-
bution of the dependent parameter. Fig. 2 shows the results in comparison to the 
characteristic values according to Eurocode 6. While for porous concrete a good confor-
mance is provided, there are significant variations between the values according to Euro-
code 6 and the results on the basis of experimental investigations for calcium silicate units. 
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 Fig. 2: Compressive strength of masonry against compressive strength of unit and charac-
teristic values according to EC 6 and the model according to equation (3) 
4 Statistical Parameters for the Shear Resistance 
For the calculation of the shear resistance of masonry walls subjected to out of plane shear 
models based on the shear theory by Mohr-Culoumb are common, in which the shear resis-
tance is dependent on friction and cohesion. For in plane shear the following model, which 
is based on Eurocode 6 is recommended: 
E0vc
c
E
0vcR Nfltlt
NfltV ⋅+⋅⋅=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅⋅+⋅⋅= µµ   (7)
Where: t is the thickness of the wall  
fv0 is the initial shear strength under zero compression 
µ is the coefficient of friction 
NE, ME is the axial force and bending moment on the  
section under consideration 
lc is the length of the compressed part of the wall lc = 3/2⋅(l-2⋅ME/NE) ≤ l 
l is the length of the wall 
For a probabilistic calculation the statistical properties of the initial shear strength and the 
coefficient of friction have to be determined. However a lack of data values is existent in 
this case. Especially in the case of the friction coefficient no direct measurements for big 
sized masonry are available. Because of this the statistical properties of the coefficient of 
friction will be approximated according to SCHUEREMANS [3] in this case. Values for the 
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required parameters are summarized in Table 6. However these values should be consid-
ered as prior parameter in a probabilistic calculation, as the data base for the estimation is 
poor.  
Table 6:  Parameters for the calculation of the shear resistance (in plane shear)  
Variable masonry mean V Source  
Calcium silicate unit 0.8 0.19 SCHUEREMANS [3] 
coefficient of friction µ Porous concrete 0.8 0.19 SCHUEREMANS [3] 
Calcium silicate unit 1.27 0.37 SCHUBERT [5] initial shear strength1) fv0 Porous concrete 1.00 0.15 SCHUBERT [5] 
1) Under zero compression 
5 Model Uncertainties for the Carrying Capacity of  
Unreinforced Masonry Walls 
For a probabilistic assessment of structures uncertainties due to the calculation models 
used have to be considered. The statistical parameters of the model uncertainties are influ-
enced by the accuracy of the chosen resistance model and by the amount of information 
available on the properties of the analysed masonry. The resulting model uncertainties can 
be estimated by comparison with the results of experimental tests. In this approach it is 
approximately assumed that the tests provide the exact load carrying capacity. However in 
many cases experimental investigations are rare, because of to the cost associated with the 
tests. 
For the maximum load carrying capacity of slender masonry walls subjected to axial load, 
the model according to Eurocode 6 will be analysed in this paper, which is characterised by 
equation (8) and (9): 
mR ftbN ⋅⋅⋅=Φ   (8)
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
2
uexp
t
e21
2
IΦ  where 
t
e17,173,0
063,0
E
f
t
h
u
I
0
mef
⋅−
−⋅
=   (9)
Where: b is the thickness of the wall  
t is the width of the wall 
eI is the eccentricity of the axial load eI = ME/NE 
hef effective height of the wall hef = ρ⋅hs 
E0 is the modulus of elasticity of masonry 
To estimate the modulus of elasticity only a few tests with contradictory results are avail-
able. For calcium silicate unit no tests using big sized masonry units have been done at all. 
For this reason the parameter fm/E0 is chosen in such a way that the mean value of the 
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model uncertainty becomes 1.0 to provide an unbiased model. For porous concrete and 
calcium silicate unit an amount of 18 tests of masonry walls under representative boundary 
conditions were available to calculate the model uncertainties due to the model according 
to equation (8) and (9). As the results in Table 7 show the model uncertainties of calcium 
silicate units have a higher coefficient of variation compared to porous concrete.  
Unfortunately no experimental investigations on walls subjected to in plane shear are avail-
able. Hence the statistical properties of the coefficient of friction will approximately be 
chosen as for concrete structures basing on the recommendations of the JCSS Probabilistic 
Model Code [8]. Table 7 summarizes the statistical parameters of the model uncertainty for 
the calculation of big sized masonry.  
Table 7:  Parameters for model uncertainties due to the calculation model  
Model uncertainties 
Model Masonry 
mean V 
Calcium silicate unit1) 1.0 0.17 Load carrying capacity of ma-
sonry subjected to axial load Porous concrete2) 1.0 0.15 
Calcium silicate unit 1.0 0.10 Shear resistance3)  
Porous concrete 1.0 0.10 
1) fm/E0 = 1/900 
2) fm/E0 = 1/525 
3) Based on the JCSS Probabistic Modelcode [8] for concrete structures 
6 Conclusion 
This paper provides statistical parameters for a probabilistic assessment of masonry struc-
tures made of big sized units, focusing on axial loading. Beside the required material pa-
rameters, model uncertainties have to be regarded in a probabilistic calculation and are 
quantified in this paper, too. The estimated values are based on experimental tests of ma-
sonry walls and where test results are missing on basis of expert opinions and literature 
research. The determined parameters can be used as prior parameters when additional tests 
become available. In comparison to other kinds of masonry, the statistical parameters of 
big sized masonry provide a smaller scatter.  
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Reliability Analysis of the Fire Protection Lining 
in the High Speed Train Tunnel 'Groene Hart' 
Alfons Krom & Sten de Wit 
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TNO Built Environment and Geosciences 
 
Abstract: Sprayed fire protection linings in bored, high speed train tunnels are 
a new field of application. Questions were raised on the failure probability of 
the lining during the service life of the Groene Hart tunnel. The fire protection 
lining is reinforced with a wire mesh fixed to the tunnel lining. A systematic 
failure analysis has been carried out to identify possibly causes and growth 
mechanisms of delaminations of the protection lining. The research shows how 
the reliability of a new system can be analysed. The analysis uses standard 
reliability methods, and a combination of analytical and numerical modelling, 
small and full-size experiments and expert judgments. The conclusion is that 
sprayed fire protection linings can be applied in the high speed train tunnel 
Groene Hart for short service periods. For long service periods an additional 
inspection regime has to be established. 
1 Introduction 
Fire protection linings are applied in tunnels to protect the concrete against fire. The aim of 
the fire protection lining is to reduce the risks during a fire: to protect the tunnel against 
collapse so that people in the tunnel can leave the tunnel, and to have time to rescue 
casualties. Naturally the fire protection lining should not increase the risk during normal 
use of the tunnel. 
The Groene Hart Tunnel in The Netherlands is a 7 km long high speed railway tunnel with 
an inner diameter of about 13 m, see Fig. 1. A partition wall separates the two tracks. High 
speed trains will pass the tunnel at speeds of more than 300 km/h. Inside the tunnel 
200,000 m2 fire resistant plaster with a wire mesh reinforcement was applied within a very 
short period of time. More information is given by Van de Linde et al. [1]. 
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the high speed train tunnel (left) and a photo of the tunnel lining 
without the fire protection lining (right). Note that the partition wall is not 
protected by the fire protection lining. 
The fire protection lining should not significantly contribute to the probability of failure 
accepted for a structure complying with the Dutch Building Decree during a reference 
period of 100 years. The requirements for safety class nr. 3 (primary structure) are 
applicable, i.e. the reliability index βt = 3.6, corresponding to a probability of failure of 
approximately 10-4 in the reference period of 100 year. 
It is assumed that the fire protection lining fails when a part of the lining is released from 
the tunnel lining. This part must be large enough to cause any potential serious damage, 
e.g. penetration of the front window of a train. 
This paper gives an overview of the reliability analysis of the fire protection lining. It 
includes a description of the fire protection lining, the failure analysis, the modelling of the 
structural behaviour of the lining and the reliability calculations. 
2 System description 
The fire resistant layer consists of a reinforced plaster (Fendolite MII). The average 
thickness is 42 mm. This thickness is large enough to withstand the HSL fire test (1000 °C 
for 1 hour). The reinforcement is a wire mesh of stainless steel quality AISI 316, consisting 
of wires of diameter of 1.5 mm and a mesh of 50 mm in both directions. The wire mesh is 
anchored to the concrete lining using stainless steel anchors. The anchors are fixed to the 
wire mesh with specially bend washers, see Fig. 2. The fixation with the anchors also acts 
as a backup system of the fire protection lining to the concrete lining, which starts to 
function in the event that the normal bond between the two lining has failed. 
Spacings in the segments (see Fig. 1) of the tunnel lining, used during the construction, are 
covered with a bonded plate. There are around 150.000 spacing in the tunnel. 
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Fig. 2: Detail of the fire protection lining (left) and anchored wire mesh fixed to concrete 
lining before spraying (right) 
3 Failure analysis 
Failure is defined as the situation in which the fire protection lining is not connected to the 
concrete lining neither by bond nor by the backup system (wire mesh). In this situation the 
risk is considered as realistic that in the end parts of the lining fall down. 
Note that failure is not defined as the situation in which parts of fire protection lining fall 
down but as the situation in which parts of the lining are not connected to the tunnel. In 
this way some additional safety may be built in the analysis. The reason for this approach 
is that statements can be made on the cracking of the protection lining and the failure of the 
wire mesh on the basis of modelling. Statements on the release of parts from a cracked 
delaminated fire protection is very difficult. 
When parts of the fire protection lining are released from the lining, the bond between the 
linings was not good. A part of the lining which is still intact but has no bond with the 
lining is called a delamination, see Fig. 3. Delaminations may be present from the 
beginning due to application errors. Delaminations may also grow in time due to degrading 
actions. There are several causes for the initial lack of bond. For example the surface of the 
tunnel lining was not clean before the plaster was applied. Because of the large area 
involved, delaminations cannot be ruled out. 
 
Fig. 3: Illustration of a delamination of the fire protection lining and the position of the 
cracking. Note that the anchored wire mesh is not shown. 
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High speed trains can develop large pressures cycles. As a consequence, delaminations are 
subjected to fatigue. Firstly the lining at the delamination can break due to this fatigue 
loading and parts of the protection lining can fall down. Secondly the delamination can 
grow and once its size is too large to withstand the pressure variation, the lining also 
breaks and parts of the lining fall down. In both cases we are dealing with a highly 
unwanted situation. 
The sequences of events, which may lead to failure of the fire protection lining are 
presented in an event tree, shown in Fig. 4. The tree starts with the situation that a 
delamination is present. The first branch deals with the detection of the delamination. If the 
delamination is detected it is assumed that some repair or monitor procedure is taken to 
prevent failure. The second branch deals with the cracking of a part of the delamination. 
An illustration of the cracking of the delamination is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 4: Sequence of events leading to failure and non failure situations of delaminations 
(layer). 
Failure of a delamination may occur in three different scenarios. The first scenario is that 
cracking occurs in a unstable way: the delamination cracks due to one single train passage. 
If the backup system also fails, this will lead to failure (1A). There is no failure when the 
backup is ok or the cracked delamination is detected and repaired. The second scenario is 
that cracking occurs in a stable way due to repeated train passages (fatigue). Again, if the 
backup system also fails, this will lead to failure (2A). There is no failure when the backup 
is ok or the cracked delamination is detected and repaired. The third scenario is that no 
cracking of the delamination occurs. If the backup system is ok, then no failure occurs. If 
the backup is not ok then unstable or stable cracking occurs, leading to failure 1B and 2B, 
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respectively. No failure occurs when the failure of the backup is detected and repaired and 
when no delamination cracking occurs. 
The backup system may fail several in several ways. For example the anchor may be 
pulled out of the tunnel lining. On the basis of experiments, the relevant failure mechanism 
is fatigue of the wires around the anchors. 
The difference between failure modes A and B is the sequence of events. In case of failure 
modes A, first the delamination fails, followed by failure of the backup system. In case of 
modes B it is the other way round. Here failure mode B is assumed to be dominant. This 
assumption is supported by experiments, see the next section. Presumably this is a 
conservative approach because if the delamination cracks first, the load on the 
delamination decreases due to the direct pressure adjustment behind the delamination. 
4 Analytical and Numerical Modelling 
4.1 Mechanical load on the delamination 
Due to the high speed of the trains, high pressure differences will occur in the tunnel. 
During the passage of a train at a certain position in the tunnel, the pressure on the lining 
first increases and then decreases. From small-scale experiments it is concluded that a 
pressure drop of about 3 kPa over 0.01 s exists within the pressure fluctuation. It is 
assumed that in case of a delamination the pressure drop is so fast that the pressure in the 
delamination cannot adjust to the pressure in the tunnel. Therefore a pressure difference 
exists at the delamination. As a consequence the volume of the delamination will increase, 
the pressure in the delamination will decrease, and the delamination will be stressed: it will 
bulged out. The pressure difference over the delamination can be estimated by taking the 
universal gas law and assuming the delamination as circular plate clamped at the edge, see 
Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Illustration of a circular delamination with radius R, initial volume V0 and 
height h. The volume increase ∆V, due to ∆p2 the pressure drop in the tunnel, is 
indicated by the shaded area. p0 = initial pressure in the tunnel and in the 
delamination, ∆p1 = pressure decrease at the delamination. 
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It can be derived that the pressure difference over the delamination ∆pf is: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∆++∆−+−∆+−=∆−∆=∆ 20202002012f pk
V4)
k
Vpp(
k
Vpp
2
1ppp  (1) 
with k the compliance of the delamination (1/k = the stiffness) 
the other symbols are given in Fig. 5. 
In case of a circular delamination with radius R, initial volume V0 and height h, V0/k is 
given by: 
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ν−=  (2) 
with E the elastic modulus of the lining 
ν Poisson's ratio of the lining 
d the thickness of the lining 
ρ the density of the lining 
As the height of the delamination will be very small, the ratio V0/k will also be small. 
Consequently also the pressure difference will be small. However, the volume of the 
delamination depends on the weight of delamination and the number of spacings behind by 
the delamination. These spacings were used for the handling of the tunnel segments during 
the construction of the tunnel. The volume of the spacings within a segment is spread over 
the surface resulting in a spacing thickness dspacing. When the volume behind the 
delamination is determined by the weight and the number of spacings behind the 
delamination, the ratio V0/k is given by: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +ν−ρν−= 4
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V  (3) 
with g the acceleration of gravity. 
Note that no difference is made in the position along the tunnel lining. The above relation 
is valid for delaminations at the ceiling of the tunnel. For delaminations on the side Eq. 3 is 
conservative. The pressure difference on the delamination as function of the radius of the 
delamination is given in Fig 6. At small radii of the delamination the pressure difference is 
equal to the pressure drop. There is no pressure adjustment because small delaminations 
are relatively stiff. So the pressure behind the delamination will not decrease. As the radius 
increases the pressure difference over the delamination decreases. The stiffness decreases 
and the volume behind the delamination increases. As a consequence the pressure behind 
delamination decreases. 
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Fig. 6 The relative pressure difference over the delamination (=∆pf/∆p2) as a function of 
the radius of the delamination. 
4.2 Stress at the delamination 
The pressure difference over the delamination and its self weight causes stresses in the 
layer. The stresses in the layer can be estimated by considering the delamination as circular 
plate clamped at the edge. The maximum stress in the layer occurs at the edge of the 
delamination, see Fig. 3. Using the thin plate theory, this stress is given by [2]: 
( )gdp
d4
R3
f2
2
layer ρ+∆=σ  (4) 
with ∆pf the pressure difference on the delamination caused by the fast pressure 
drop, see Eq. 1. 
ρgd the weight of the delamination 
In Fig. 7 the stress in the fire protection lining is shown at a delaminated layer in which the 
spacings are averaged over the delamination. As a reference the stress in the layer is shown 
without the pressure adjustment due to the deformation of the layer. 
The radius of the delamination has two effects: the pressure ∆pf decreases and the stress 
increases with increasing radius. The result is that there is a (local) minimum in the stress 
in the layer as a function of the radius. At small radii the pressure difference is equal to the 
pressure drop but the stress in the layer remains low. When the radius increases, the 
pressure difference becomes small compared with the self weight contribution. As a result, 
the stress in the layer becomes large with increasing radius. 
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Fig. 7 Maximum stress in the layer as a function of the radius of the delaminated due to 
a pressure drop of 4 kPa according to Eq. 4. The dashed line indicates the stress 
when the effect of the volume increase is not taken into account (Eq. 4 with ∆pf = 
∆p2 = 4 kPa). The layer thickness is 43 mm. 
4.3 Modelling of the backup system 
When there is a delamination the backup system (anchored wire mesh) is activated. The 
response of the backup system to pressure loads was determined by both small and large 
scale experiments. The backup fixation system was tested in the TNO laboratory using 
large test panels (4 m2) with 18 anchor connections and small test panels (0.25 m2) with 1 
anchor connection. Both static and fatigue tests were carried out, the latter in connection 
with the large number of load cycles to the system caused by fast pressure variations due to 
passing high speed trains (300 km/h) during the service life of the tunnel. 
Fig. 8 shows the wire mesh being pulled out of the layer during the static test on a single 
anchor and a typical load displacement diagram for this test. The decreases in load during 
the test occur when the wire mesh is gradually pulled out of the plaster. The static strength 
was in all cases approximately 3 kN. The static requirement was 12 kN/m2 or, with 8 
anchors per m2, 1.5 kN per anchor. With a value of 3 kN the static requirement is fulfilled. 
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Fig. 8: Static test of the anchor and the layer (l) and the load displacement diagram (r). 
Finite element analyses were carried out to assess the effect of the back-up system. In the 
finite element model the anchors were modelled as non-linear springs, see Fig. 9. The wire 
mesh was not modelled as its effect on the stiffness of the layer was insignificant. The 
spring characteristics were derived from the experiments (see e.g. Fig. 2). By calculating 
the volume (change) as a function of the applied pressure, the compliance k was calculated. 
This compliance was compared with the compliance of the delamination without the 
anchors. This resulted in a correction on the compliance in Eq. 3. The correction depends 
on the radius of the delamination. In order to keep the reliability analysis simple, the 
correction was taken conservatively at pressure drop of 6 kPa.  
The same finite element approach was used to calculate the effect of the backup on the 
stresses in the layer. By comparing the stresses with and without backup, a correction 
factor was derived. 
Another correction was applied because the stiffness was derived using the thin plate 
theory which is correct when the layer thickness is small compared to the size of the 
delamination. Using the same finite element model as used for the anchor effects, a 
correction was derived for the analytical model. The analytical model is used in order to 
keep the reliability calculations simple. 
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Fig. 9 An example of a finite element mesh of delamination with anchors (R = 2 m). The 
figure shows the displacements in x-direction in an exaggerated deformed mesh 
The anchors are visualised by (red) lines running from the position of the anchor 
to the origin. Because of symmetry only one quarter needs to be modelled. 
5 Reliability analysis 
In this section limit state functions are defined for the events presented in Fig. 4. The 
functions are used to calculate the reliability index. For most of the variables given in the 
limit state functions statistical distributions were set up. The reliability index was 
determined using the FORM method. Checks were made using SORM and crude Monte 
Carlo. ProBox [3], a probabilistic toolbox developed within TNO, was used to calculate the 
reliability as function of the radius of a the delamination. 
5.1 Failure of the backup system due to repeated train passages 
On the basis of the full scale experiments, failure due to a single train passage was not 
considered as a relevant failure mechanism. Only failure due to fatigue is considered. 
Failure of the backup is defined as failure of the anchor in the centre of the delamination. 
The experiments support the assumption that once an anchor (wires around the anchor) has 
failed, anchors in the vicinity fail shortly afterwards. The load acting upon the backup 
depends on the pressure difference over the delamination, the size of the delamination, the 
number of anchors behind the delamination, and the anchor stiffness. Using the fore 
mentioned finite element modelling, the ratio CK/p between the force on the (centre) anchor 
and the pressure difference over the layer could be determined. The limit state is given by: 
fp/K pCKZ ∆γ−=  (5) 
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with K is the fatigue resistance of the backup determined by full scale tests. The 
fatigue resistance depends on the reference period considered 
)e1(14.0C
2)R27.1(
p/K
−−=  
γ a variable to taken into account the variation in CK/p  
∆pf is the pressure over the delamination (Eq. 1) 
The reliability index as function of the radius of the delamination is given in Fig. 10. The 
result can be explained by considering the pressure difference in Fig. 7 and the 
function CK/p. 
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Fig. 10 Reliability of the backup as function of the radius of the delamination for three 
reference periods. Failure due to repeated train passages. 
5.2 Failure of a delamination due to a single train passage 
This failure mechanism of the fire protection lining is defined as the stress state by a single 
train passage which exceeds the critical stress. Then the layer will crack by a single 
pressure load. The largest stress will occur at the edge of the delamination. The 
delamination will bend outwards. Therefore the critical stress is taken equal to the flexural 
strength of the layer. The limit state is given by: 
( )dgp
d
R
4
3fZ f2
2
c ρ+∆−=  (6) 
with fc the flexural strength of the layer 
∆pf the pressure difference over the layer 
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The reliability index as a function of the radius of the delamination is given in Fig 11. The 
result can be explained by considering Fig. 7. The backup system has a reducing effect on 
the stress. But its effect is only apparent at radii larger than 0.5 m. 
Discarding inspection and maintenance, the following relation is used for probability of 
failure mode 1 given a certain delamination: 
P(mode 1) = P(instable cracking of delamination AND backup fails) 
  = P(instable cracking of delamination | backup fails) x P(backup fails)  
  < P(instable cracking of delamination, no backup) x P(backup fails) (7) 
The first term can be determined from the solid line in Fig. 11. This corresponds to the 
situation that no backup is present. This is a conservative approach because the backup is 
not present from the beginning which is not the case in reality. The second term can be 
determined from Fig. 10. The result of Eq. 7 is given in Fig. 12. 
For radii up to 2 m the reliability index is above the target (=3.6) independent of the 
reference period. For larger radii (> 2.5 m) the reliability becomes below the target value. 
So these delamination have to be found by an inspection program.  
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Fig. 11 The reliability index as a function of the radius of delamination, single train 
passage (unstable cracking). The dashed line is shown for illustration only and not 
used to calculate the reliability. 
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Fig. 12 Reliability index of failure as a result of instable cracking of the delamination and 
fatigue of the backup for three reference periods.  
5.3 Failure of a delamination due to due to repeated train passages 
This failure mechanism of the fire protection lining is defined as the stress state exceeding 
the fatigue strength due to repeated train passages. Then the layer will crack by repeated 
pressure loads in a stable way. The limit state is the same as for failure mode 1 except there 
are two modifications: a correction for fatigue on the flexural strength and without the 
constant load, i.e. the weight of the layer. The limit state is given by: 
f2
2
cfatigue pd
R
4
3fCZ ∆−=  (8) 
with Cfatigue a correction factor due fatigue on the flexural strength. This factor 
depends on the time period considered 
∆pf the pressure difference over the layer (Eq. 1). 
The reliability index as a function of the radius of the delamination is given in Fig. 13. 
Comparing with the situation of a single train passage, the reliability is lower up to 1.5 m. 
This is caused by correction for fatigue. At radii larger than 1.5 m, the index remains 
constant because the load, the pressure difference, becomes constant. Note that for the 
single train passage the load increases as the radius increases due to the weight of layer. 
The backup system has a reducing effect on the stress. But its effect is only apparent at 
radii larger than 0.5 m. 
The same approach as with failure mechanism 1 is used to calculate the probability of 
failure mode 2. Discarding inspection and maintenance, the following relation is used for 
probability of mode 2 given a certain delamination: 
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P(mode 2) = P(stable cracking of delamination AND backup fails) 
  = P(stable cracking of delamination | backup fails) x P(backup fails) 
  < P(stable cracking of delamination, no backup) x P(backup fails) (9) 
The first term can be determined from the solid line in Fig. 13. This corresponds to the 
situation that no backup is present. The second term can be determined from Fig. 10. The 
result of Eq. 9 is given in Fig. 14. 
Between R = 0.3 m and 0.85 m the target reliability is not met for a reference period of 100 
year. The reliability index is clearly below the value of 3.6. For a reference period of 10 
year the target reliability is obtained, and considering the various conservative assumptions 
this may also be assumed for a period of 30 year. 
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Fig. 13 The reliability as a function of the radius of delamination, repeated train passages 
(stable cracking). The dashed line is shown for illustration only and not used to 
calculate the reliability. 
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Fig. 14 Reliability of the lining as a result of stable cracking of the delamination and 
fatigue of the backup for three reference periods. 
6 Conclusions 
The reliability of the sprayed fire protection lining in the high speed tunnel Groene Hart 
has been analysed. The analysis shows how the reliability of a new system can be assessed 
on the basis of probabilistics, standard reliability methods, a combination of analytical and 
numerical modelling, small and full-size experiments and expert judgments. The 
conclusion is that the sprayed fire protection linings can be applied in the high speed train 
tunnel for short service periods (10-30 year). For longer service periods an additional 
inspection regime has to be established. 
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Life cycle assessment of structures 
based on reliability analysis 
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Institute for Building Materials, Concrete Construction and Fire Protection 
Technical University of Braunschweig 
Abstract: A modern lifetime oriented design of structures includes inspection 
and monitoring strategies. Structural health monitoring guarantees that the load 
bearing capacity, the serviceability and the durability of the structure remain 
ensured and that the costs of rehabilitation are limited. In the collaborative re-
search centre 477 (CRC 477) at Braunschweig University of Technology 
methods for the optimisation of structural health monitoring are developed. In 
project field A1 the possibilities of reliability-based structural health monitor-
ing are investigated. The methodology bases on a combination of recognized 
procedures of system and reliability theory. In reliability analysis using the 
First/Second-Order-Reliability-Method (FORM/SORM) the critical weak 
points and failure paths of the structure are identified. The optimisation is 
achieved when the structural health monitoring measures are concentrated on 
these weak-points and failure paths. This is utilized in the knowledge-based 
computer program PROBILAS (PRObabilistic Building Inspection and Life 
ASsessment). The program was designed to assist engineers to plan structural 
health monitoring measures for civil engineering structures. In this paper the 
assessment process is explained using a bridge as an example.  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The lifetime oriented design of structures includes maintenance strategies. Structural health 
monitoring is essential to evaluate these strategies in such a way that the bearing capacity, 
serviceability and the durability remain ensured and the costs of rehabilitation are limited. 
The aim of structural health monitoring is the continuous monitoring and assessment of the 
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actual state of the structure. The outcome of this is the base for the optimisation of further 
measures.  
In the Collaborative Research Centre 477 (CRC 477) “Life cycle assessment of structures 
via innovative monitoring” funded by the German Research Council (DFG) at the Braun-
schweig University of Technology, methods for the optimisation of SHM are investigated 
(see http://www.sfb477.tu-braunschweig.de). In project field A1 of the CRC 477 a frame-
work for reliability-based system assessment based on data from SHM is developed. Its 
main objective is the optimisation of SHM measures with the help of probabilistic meth-
ods. The methodology is able to identify relevant parameters, to weigh the critical areas 
and to determine the actual safety level of a structure.  
1.2 Life cycle assessment 
Nowadays, the design and management of structures is becoming more and more perform-
ance orientated. Modern building management systems (BMS) are starting to combine sys-
tem assessment with regular inspections and monitoring. The proportion of probabilistic 
models within BMS is increasing steadily (e.g. FABER [1]). In the USA, probabilistic mod-
els for life cycle considerations are primarily developed and tested for bridge networks 
(e.g. FRANGOPOL et al. [2]), but it is only a question of time until these technologies are 
applied to complex buildings as well.  
In contrast to Germany, bridges in the USA are often constructed in well-proven and uni-
form configurations. Therefore, the variation of structural elements, types of deterioration 
and development of deteriorations is significantly smaller than in Germany. Additionally, 
the large amount of similar bridge structures provides a sufficient statistic basis to deter-
mine the leading influences on typical deteriorations (e.g. deterioration due to chloride 
ingress). In this case it is possible to draw conclusions from the totality of all bridges onto 
single bridges in a network (Top-down principle). In Germany, this is not possible due to a 
large variety of types of constructed bridges. Here, conclusions can only be drawn from a 
single structure to the totality of structures (Bottom-up principle). According to the condi-
tions in Germany, the developed frame-work concentrates on the individual assessment of 
structures based on results from SHM. 
2 Reliability-based life cycle assessment 
2.1 Framework 
The framework for reliability-based life cycle assessment bases on methods of system and 
reliability theory. The main idea is that, after a thorough anamnesis of a structure, typical 
weak points and failure paths are identified. The gained knowledge about the structural 
system is used to formulate a probabilistic model for the whole system. This model con-
sists of limit-state equations for components of the system, information about the random 
variables and other uncertain parameters and a logical model, which describes the in-
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teractions between the components. This model is evaluated in a reliability analysis with 
FORM/SORM. 
With the help of the results of this analysis, further decisions concerning an inspection and 
monitoring plan can be made, e.g. it is possible to identify the most significant parameters 
of a model. Additionally the weak points of the structure can be weighted. The knowledge 
gained can be used to derive a cost optimised monitoring plan for a continuous monitoring 
process. 
2.2 System reliability analysis 
The analysis of the structure starts with the identification of the different sources of risk for 
the structure. This information has to be translated into components and subsystems. The 
relations between the components are described using logical trees, which combine causes, 
intermediate events and their consequences. Two types of logical trees are used for further 
analysis.  
The event tree shows all consequences of an occurring event and is used to identify all re-
levant failure paths of the structure. The fault tree regards all possible causal sequences of 
component and sub-system failures that lead to a system failure. The root element of the 
fault tree is called “Top Event” and represents e.g. an overall system failure. The logical 
dependence between the subsequent failures of components is described with the help of 
logical conjunctions.  
There are two basic types of conjunctions between the elements of the fault tree: the serial 
system (disjunction), which fails if one of its elements fails and the parallel system (con-
junction), which fails if all of its elements fail. Real systems, in most cases, can be repre-
sented by a combination of these two types. 
Monitoring
Assessment and 
Monitoring Plan
Assessment
of data
Probabilistic Model First
Reliability
Analysis Calibration
Plan
Calibration
Modification of 
Probabilistic
Model
Reliability Analysis
(Actual State + 
Prognosis)
Assessment
and Monitoring
Model Calibration
(Limit-state functions, Fault tree, 
Stochastic model )
End of
Usability
Fig. 1. Structural evaluation process of the framework 
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For all components in a fault tree an ultimate limit state has to be defined. A limit state is 
described by quantities that represent the resistance of a structure (e.g. material strength) 
and by quantities, which represent the actions imposed on the structure (e.g. live load). 
Then the limit state equation can be described in the form:  
G = R - S  (1) 
The component fails, when the resistance quantity (R) is smaller than the action quantity 
(S). Both quantities are functions of parameters, which are stochastic and/or uncertain and 
are generally described by probability distributions. The parameters of the distributions can 
either be estimated from measurements or be found in the literature, e.g. (JCSS [3]). If the 
random variations of an input parameter are small, the parameter can be assumed as deter-
ministic.  
For the reliability analysis the first or second order reliability method (FORM/SORM) 
(DITLEVSEN et al. [4]) is utilised. In these calculations a probability of failure (pf), a safety 
index b (pf=Φ(- β)) and sensitivity values (α-values) for each parameter can be determined. 
The weak points (“hot spots”) of the structure can be identified with the help of the system 
reliability analysis. Based on the calculated values, the failure path with the highest prob-
ability of occurrence can be found. Especially the parameters of the limit-state equations 
within this failure path should be investigated further.  
The first reliability analysis of the actual state of the system is carried out with values for 
the parameters of the structure according to the prescriptions in the structural design. In 
reality, these values may not be identical to the real values of the parameters in the struc-
ture. An example is the compression strength of concrete, which is usually higher than the 
value assumed in the design calculation. Therefore, the probabilistic model of the structure 
has to be calibrated prior to the further probabilistic assessment of the structure. The cali-
bration can be limited to the important and time-independent parameters identified in the 
reliability analysis. Usually, random samples from the regular quality control can be used 
for this purpose. With statistic tests the random samples are tested for conformity with the 
values assumed in the design process. Afterwards, prior information about the parameter 
and the random sample are used to compute new stochastic information about the parame-
ter using Bayesian procedures.  
Beside the reliability of the actual state of the structure, a prognosis calculation will be 
carried out. The difference is that in his case, the reliability index is calculated in a time-
step procedure. For each time-step, the time-dependent alteration functions are evaluated 
for the mean and/or the standard deviation of each considered parameter, before the reli-
ability analysis is started. This results in a time-dependant curve of the safety index.  
2.3 Monitoring and inspection 
Based on the calculation results, a monitoring plan can be determined. It contains informa-
tion about the parameters which should be monitored, as well as monitoring, inspection 
and probabilistic assessment intervals. The monitoring plan mainly depends on the capa-
bilities of sensors.  
Schnetgöke, Klinzmann & Hosser: Life cycle assessment of structures based on reliability analysis 
5 
The monitoring interval is unique for each sensor and is dependent on the phenomenon to 
be monitored and its significance. For very slow processes, e.g. chloride ingress, a suitable 
monitoring interval can be once or twice a year. When the deformation of a deteriorated 
bridge is monitored, this is surely insufficient. In these cases the interval must be extended 
to several times a day.  
The monitoring interval is usually not identical to assessment and inspection intervals. The 
assessment interval describes the time between two probabilistic assessments of the struc-
ture based on the monitored data. The inspection interval describes the time between regu-
lar inspections of the structure to identify new deteriorations or errors of the structure. Due 
to slow degradation processes, it is not necessary to conduct a probabilistic assessment or 
an inspection of the structure every time when new data is available. The ideal time inter-
vals for assessment and inspection can be defined adaptively in conjunction with the re-
sults from the prognosis calculations. In addition, new data is investigated for negative 
trends in the behavior of the structure. If negative behavior of the structure is detected, an 
extraordinary inspection should be carried out. If the outcome of this inspection indicates 
that the probabilistic model has to be modified, a complete probabilistic re-assessment of 
the structure has to take place, too. If the prognosis calculations indicate no significant 
change in the reliability, an assessment and inspection interval of 2 to 3 years is sufficient. 
This interval would be smaller, if the actual safety level of the structure is near to the pre-
scribed target reliability. 
3 Life cycle assessment of a bridge 
3.1 Bridge structure 
The function of a building regarding the bearing capacity and serviceability has to be guar-
anteed over the intended lifetime without substantial loss of the usage characteristics. The 
detection of safety-relevant deviations from planned properties of the structure requires an 
optimised structural health monitoring process.  
For illustration purposes a bridge example is used. The main focus in this article lies on the 
ultimate limit states for the flexure and fatigue failure of the bridge structure. The structure 
is a multi-span plate-girder bridge over two fields with two girders and a span width of 32 
m for each field (Fig 1, 2). The bridge is pre-stressed with post-tensioning tendons. The 
tendons have a cross-sectional area of 180 cm² per girder with normative yield strength of 
1570 MN/m² and a normative ultimate strength of 1770 MN/m². A concrete strength class 
C 35 according to EN 1992 [5] was chosen in the design. 
32.00 32.00
Fig. 2. Bridge structure, elevation 
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3.2 Probabilistic model 
The risk-orientated assessment starts with a survey of possible weak points. First informa-
tion about weak points of structures can be acquired by damage analyses. These analyses 
are the basis for the determination of failure scenarios. Further information about possible 
weak points and failure scenarios can be derived from the structural design process. In this 
example, the weak point analysis is based on the structural design.  
The structural design for the bridge structure shows a high action effect in the cross section 
at midspan and at the support. At these so called “failure points” the structure can fail due 
to the exceeding of the flexure capacity or the fatigue capacity respectively. Further inves-
tigations will be concentrated on these failure modes. The different failure modes are 
summarised in the fault tree as serial system (Fig. 4). A system effect like load redistribu-
tion is neglected. The failure of more then one component for the collapse of the system is 
considered as system effect. Prior analyses of this type of a bridge showed a so-called “zip-
effect” (SCHNETGÖKE et al. [6]).That means that after the failure of the first component the 
redistributed load effect on the second component jumps up extensively. Therefore the 
reliability of the second component decreases significantly, which results in a small influ-
ence on the system reliability.  
Fig. 3. Bridge structure, cross section 
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Fatigue Failure 
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Fatigue Failure 
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Fig. 4. Fault tree 
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For all components in the fault tree the limit state functions have to be defined. The first 
component illustrated in this chapter is the flexure failure. The flexure capacity for the 
bridge section can be calculated using the equilibrium of internal forces. The associated 
equation for the flexure capacity can be described as follows: 
)2
1
c
ys
ysysR fb
fA
fAdfAM ⋅
⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅=  (2) 
The resisting moment according to equation (2) will be compared with the acting moment 
due to dead load and live load. The dead load results from the concrete weight of the con-
struction and the additional load (e.g. surfacing, parapet). The load effect of the live load 
due to the traffic is carried out with a Monte Carlo simulation. A vehicle classification as 
well as the stochastic model of the vehicle weight, axle weight, axle spacing, vehicle 
length, vehicle spacing etc. is required for the simulation. In this investigation the neces-
sary input is based on the data in MERZENICH et al. [7]. A typical twin peaked bimodal dis-
tribution of the weight for a semi-trailer truck is shown in Fig. 5. This form of distribution 
is typical for trucks. The first mode contains the partially loaded trucks, whereas the sec-
ond involves the fully loaded trucks. The moment-time curve is derived from the traffic 
flow simulation and the influence line for the bending moment.  
In the next step the distribution for the bending moment will be described with an extreme-
value distribution type I (Gumbel) (Fig. 6).  
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Fig. 5. distribution of the weight for a semitrailer truck 
Fig. 6. Time series and distribution of the bending moment 
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Beside the flexure capacity also the limit state for fatigue failure of the tendons has to be 
analysed. The describing model for fatigue failure is based on the PALMGREN-MINER hy-
pothesis. This hypothesis describes the damage of the material due to alternating loads of 
the construction. The damage accumulates until a critical value is reached. In the theory a 
fracture occurs with the exceeding of this value. The damage progress of the tendon is de-
scribed by the dimensionless damage factor D: 
∑ ∆∆= i iiN
nD
)(
)(
σ
σ  (3) 
In the equation n(∆σi) stands for the number of load cycles with the stress difference ∆σi. 
N(∆σi) is the maximum number of alternations for the stress difference ∆σi. This maxi-
mum number can be read off directly from the S-N curve. Per definition the fatigue failure 
occurs when the dimensionless damage factor D reaches a value of 1. Based on the Palm-
green-Miner hypothesis, the limit state equation for the fatigue failure can be defined to be: 
Z = DR – DS  (4) 
In the context of the first building assessment the number of 0.5·106 trucks is assumed to 
be the annual volume of traffic. Further the distribution of the stress differences ∆σi is nee-
ded. The stress-time curve results with the relationship between the bending moment and 
the stress in the tendon. In the next step the relevant information for the fatigue failure like 
stress differences ∆σi and associated frequency will be calculated from this curve. There-
fore the so-called counting methods, e.g. the rainflow hysteresis counting method (CLOR-
MANN et al. [8]), are used. The maximum number of alternations can be read of the S-N 
curve with the stress differences determined in this way. 
The probabilistic approach to fatigue failure is based on the stochastic model for the S-N 
curve. An appropriate relationship between the number of stress cycles and the stress dif-
ferences can be found in MAES et al. [9]: 
NgN θσσ +∆=∆ )()(log  (5) 
where g(∆σ) is a deterministic function of the stress range and θN a zero mean normal ran-
dom variable. The traditional function g(∆σ) is the linear respectively bilinear relationship 
between log N and log ∆σ. The resulting relationship is: 
)log()(log)( σσσ ∆⋅−=∆=∆ mcNg m  (6) 
where m is an exponent, which ranges typically from 3 to 5 and cm is a constant. Often the 
S-N curve is made bilinear to account for the absence of fatigue failure when the stress 
range ∆σ becomes very small.  
The PALMGREN-MINER hypothesis is an empirical description of the complex mechanical 
fatigue behaviour procedures and comparatively simple to handle. Therefore the dimen-
sionless damage factor D will be considered as random variable to keep the shortcoming of 
the mechanical model (SPAETHE [10]) in mind.  
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3.3 Reliability analysis and life cycle assessment 
The result of the reliability analysis for the actual state is shown in Fig. 7. The figure 
shows the reliability index β for every component and for the system. The components 
which are significant for the system reliability become obvious based on these results. The 
strength of the concrete and the pre-stressing steel and the live load show a prevalent influ-
ence on the reliability due to the high sensitivity factors α for these parameters.  
A further reliability analysis is the prognosis calculation to estimate the development of the 
reliability of the structure in the future. Therefore a possible degradation and/or a change in 
the load configuration of the structure are assumed. The rising amount of traffic of high-
way bridges and the related higher loading of bridges can be taken as an example. Follow-
ing the bottom-up principle, the degradation of the structure is modelled using time-
Fig. 7. Result of the reliability analysis (actual state) 
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dependant alteration functions for the parameter affected. Due to the small change of the 
material strength during the time and the high sensitivity value α for the live load in the 
prognosis calculation an increase of the live load by 2 % of the initial value a year will be 
assumed. This results in a time-dependent reliability index β shown in fig. 8.  
The monitoring plan can now be determined with this curve. On the one hand there is the 
regular inspection every 3 respectively every 6 years, on the other hand a measurement of 
the traffic load will be suggested after ten years at the latest. The next step will be the reas-
sessment of the structure based on measured data and the update of the monitoring plan. 
Within the first 10 years there is a sufficient safety margin between the prognosis and the 
target reliability according to structural codes (e. g. β1year = 4.7 according to EN 1990 [11]).  
If the inspections show new weak points, a modification of the probabilistic model follows. 
A new reliability analysis including a new prognosis calculation leads to a modification of 
monitoring plan if necessary. 
The durability of the concrete can be important for the structural behaviour besides to an 
increase of the live load. The analysis of past damages shows the environmental influence 
on the structure, e.g. steel corrosion due to chloride attack. In the future, the probabilistic 
model of a bridge structure will have to consider this deterioration if necessary. Based on 
the monitoring of concrete durability, first pieces of information about deviations from the 
designed properties can be received. An approach to include a corrosive degradation of the 
reinforcement in the reliability analysis is shown in SCHNETGÖKE et al. [12]. The methods 
developed in the Collaborative Research Centre 477 which enable the monitoring of the 
concrete durability are described in e.g. (SCHMIDT-DÖHL et al. [13]). 
4 Conclusion 
This article shows the application of the methods of system and reliability theory to the life 
cycle assessment of civil engineering structures. On this basis the inspection, monitoring 
and safety assessment of structures can be optimised. The whole procedure is summarised 
in the explained framework. 
The procedure is illustrated with a bridge structure. After the set up of the probabilistic 
model for the structure in form of a fault tree, the modelling of the limit states for the com-
ponents is shown. With the result of the reliability analysis for the actual state and the 
prognosis consequences for the further structural health monitoring process became appar-
ent.  
Further research will focus on the modelling of different types of structures and extended 
usage of the results from monitoring in the assessment process of structures. The integra-
tion of the methodology of the framework into the computer code PROBILAS (PRObabil-
istic Building Inspection and Life ASsessment) is one additional research topic of project 
field A1 of CRC 477. 
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based on reliability analysis 
Ralf Schnetgöke, Christoph Klinzmann, Dietmar Hosser 
Institute for Building Materials, Concrete Construction and Fire Protection 
Technical University of Braunschweig 
Abstract: A modern lifetime oriented design of structures includes inspection 
and monitoring strategies. Structural health monitoring guarantees that the load 
bearing capacity, the serviceability and the durability of the structure remain 
ensured and that the costs of rehabilitation are limited. In the collaborative re-
search centre 477 (CRC 477) at Braunschweig University of Technology 
methods for the optimisation of structural health monitoring are developed. In 
project field A1 the possibilities of reliability-based structural health monitor-
ing are investigated. The methodology bases on a combination of recognized 
procedures of system and reliability theory. In reliability analysis using the 
First/Second-Order-Reliability-Method (FORM/SORM) the critical weak 
points and failure paths of the structure are identified. The optimisation is 
achieved when the structural health monitoring measures are concentrated on 
these weak-points and failure paths. This is utilized in the knowledge-based 
computer program PROBILAS (PRObabilistic Building Inspection and Life 
ASsessment). The program was designed to assist engineers to plan structural 
health monitoring measures for civil engineering structures. In this paper the 
assessment process is explained using a bridge as an example.  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The lifetime oriented design of structures includes maintenance strategies. Structural health 
monitoring is essential to evaluate these strategies in such a way that the bearing capacity, 
serviceability and the durability remain ensured and the costs of rehabilitation are limited. 
The aim of structural health monitoring is the continuous monitoring and assessment of the 
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actual state of the structure. The outcome of this is the base for the optimisation of further 
measures.  
In the Collaborative Research Centre 477 (CRC 477) “Life cycle assessment of structures 
via innovative monitoring” funded by the German Research Council (DFG) at the Braun-
schweig University of Technology, methods for the optimisation of SHM are investigated 
(see http://www.sfb477.tu-braunschweig.de). In project field A1 of the CRC 477 a frame-
work for reliability-based system assessment based on data from SHM is developed. Its 
main objective is the optimisation of SHM measures with the help of probabilistic meth-
ods. The methodology is able to identify relevant parameters, to weigh the critical areas 
and to determine the actual safety level of a structure.  
1.2 Life cycle assessment 
Nowadays, the design and management of structures is becoming more and more perform-
ance orientated. Modern building management systems (BMS) are starting to combine sys-
tem assessment with regular inspections and monitoring. The proportion of probabilistic 
models within BMS is increasing steadily (e.g. FABER [1]). In the USA, probabilistic mod-
els for life cycle considerations are primarily developed and tested for bridge networks 
(e.g. FRANGOPOL et al. [2]), but it is only a question of time until these technologies are 
applied to complex buildings as well.  
In contrast to Germany, bridges in the USA are often constructed in well-proven and uni-
form configurations. Therefore, the variation of structural elements, types of deterioration 
and development of deteriorations is significantly smaller than in Germany. Additionally, 
the large amount of similar bridge structures provides a sufficient statistic basis to deter-
mine the leading influences on typical deteriorations (e.g. deterioration due to chloride 
ingress). In this case it is possible to draw conclusions from the totality of all bridges onto 
single bridges in a network (Top-down principle). In Germany, this is not possible due to a 
large variety of types of constructed bridges. Here, conclusions can only be drawn from a 
single structure to the totality of structures (Bottom-up principle). According to the condi-
tions in Germany, the developed frame-work concentrates on the individual assessment of 
structures based on results from SHM. 
2 Reliability-based life cycle assessment 
2.1 Framework 
The framework for reliability-based life cycle assessment bases on methods of system and 
reliability theory. The main idea is that, after a thorough anamnesis of a structure, typical 
weak points and failure paths are identified. The gained knowledge about the structural 
system is used to formulate a probabilistic model for the whole system. This model con-
sists of limit-state equations for components of the system, information about the random 
variables and other uncertain parameters and a logical model, which describes the in-
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teractions between the components. This model is evaluated in a reliability analysis with 
FORM/SORM. 
With the help of the results of this analysis, further decisions concerning an inspection and 
monitoring plan can be made, e.g. it is possible to identify the most significant parameters 
of a model. Additionally the weak points of the structure can be weighted. The knowledge 
gained can be used to derive a cost optimised monitoring plan for a continuous monitoring 
process. 
2.2 System reliability analysis 
The analysis of the structure starts with the identification of the different sources of risk for 
the structure. This information has to be translated into components and subsystems. The 
relations between the components are described using logical trees, which combine causes, 
intermediate events and their consequences. Two types of logical trees are used for further 
analysis.  
The event tree shows all consequences of an occurring event and is used to identify all re-
levant failure paths of the structure. The fault tree regards all possible causal sequences of 
component and sub-system failures that lead to a system failure. The root element of the 
fault tree is called “Top Event” and represents e.g. an overall system failure. The logical 
dependence between the subsequent failures of components is described with the help of 
logical conjunctions.  
There are two basic types of conjunctions between the elements of the fault tree: the serial 
system (disjunction), which fails if one of its elements fails and the parallel system (con-
junction), which fails if all of its elements fail. Real systems, in most cases, can be repre-
sented by a combination of these two types. 
Monitoring
Assessment and 
Monitoring Plan
Assessment
of data
Probabilistic Model First
Reliability
Analysis Calibration
Plan
Calibration
Modification of 
Probabilistic
Model
Reliability Analysis
(Actual State + 
Prognosis)
Assessment
and Monitoring
Model Calibration
(Limit-state functions, Fault tree, 
Stochastic model )
End of
Usability
Fig. 1. Structural evaluation process of the framework 
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For all components in a fault tree an ultimate limit state has to be defined. A limit state is 
described by quantities that represent the resistance of a structure (e.g. material strength) 
and by quantities, which represent the actions imposed on the structure (e.g. live load). 
Then the limit state equation can be described in the form:  
G = R - S  (1) 
The component fails, when the resistance quantity (R) is smaller than the action quantity 
(S). Both quantities are functions of parameters, which are stochastic and/or uncertain and 
are generally described by probability distributions. The parameters of the distributions can 
either be estimated from measurements or be found in the literature, e.g. (JCSS [3]). If the 
random variations of an input parameter are small, the parameter can be assumed as deter-
ministic.  
For the reliability analysis the first or second order reliability method (FORM/SORM) 
(DITLEVSEN et al. [4]) is utilised. In these calculations a probability of failure (pf), a safety 
index b (pf=Φ(- β)) and sensitivity values (α-values) for each parameter can be determined. 
The weak points (“hot spots”) of the structure can be identified with the help of the system 
reliability analysis. Based on the calculated values, the failure path with the highest prob-
ability of occurrence can be found. Especially the parameters of the limit-state equations 
within this failure path should be investigated further.  
The first reliability analysis of the actual state of the system is carried out with values for 
the parameters of the structure according to the prescriptions in the structural design. In 
reality, these values may not be identical to the real values of the parameters in the struc-
ture. An example is the compression strength of concrete, which is usually higher than the 
value assumed in the design calculation. Therefore, the probabilistic model of the structure 
has to be calibrated prior to the further probabilistic assessment of the structure. The cali-
bration can be limited to the important and time-independent parameters identified in the 
reliability analysis. Usually, random samples from the regular quality control can be used 
for this purpose. With statistic tests the random samples are tested for conformity with the 
values assumed in the design process. Afterwards, prior information about the parameter 
and the random sample are used to compute new stochastic information about the parame-
ter using Bayesian procedures.  
Beside the reliability of the actual state of the structure, a prognosis calculation will be 
carried out. The difference is that in his case, the reliability index is calculated in a time-
step procedure. For each time-step, the time-dependent alteration functions are evaluated 
for the mean and/or the standard deviation of each considered parameter, before the reli-
ability analysis is started. This results in a time-dependant curve of the safety index.  
2.3 Monitoring and inspection 
Based on the calculation results, a monitoring plan can be determined. It contains informa-
tion about the parameters which should be monitored, as well as monitoring, inspection 
and probabilistic assessment intervals. The monitoring plan mainly depends on the capa-
bilities of sensors.  
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The monitoring interval is unique for each sensor and is dependent on the phenomenon to 
be monitored and its significance. For very slow processes, e.g. chloride ingress, a suitable 
monitoring interval can be once or twice a year. When the deformation of a deteriorated 
bridge is monitored, this is surely insufficient. In these cases the interval must be extended 
to several times a day.  
The monitoring interval is usually not identical to assessment and inspection intervals. The 
assessment interval describes the time between two probabilistic assessments of the struc-
ture based on the monitored data. The inspection interval describes the time between regu-
lar inspections of the structure to identify new deteriorations or errors of the structure. Due 
to slow degradation processes, it is not necessary to conduct a probabilistic assessment or 
an inspection of the structure every time when new data is available. The ideal time inter-
vals for assessment and inspection can be defined adaptively in conjunction with the re-
sults from the prognosis calculations. In addition, new data is investigated for negative 
trends in the behavior of the structure. If negative behavior of the structure is detected, an 
extraordinary inspection should be carried out. If the outcome of this inspection indicates 
that the probabilistic model has to be modified, a complete probabilistic re-assessment of 
the structure has to take place, too. If the prognosis calculations indicate no significant 
change in the reliability, an assessment and inspection interval of 2 to 3 years is sufficient. 
This interval would be smaller, if the actual safety level of the structure is near to the pre-
scribed target reliability. 
3 Life cycle assessment of a bridge 
3.1 Bridge structure 
The function of a building regarding the bearing capacity and serviceability has to be guar-
anteed over the intended lifetime without substantial loss of the usage characteristics. The 
detection of safety-relevant deviations from planned properties of the structure requires an 
optimised structural health monitoring process.  
For illustration purposes a bridge example is used. The main focus in this article lies on the 
ultimate limit states for the flexure and fatigue failure of the bridge structure. The structure 
is a multi-span plate-girder bridge over two fields with two girders and a span width of 32 
m for each field (Fig 1, 2). The bridge is pre-stressed with post-tensioning tendons. The 
tendons have a cross-sectional area of 180 cm² per girder with normative yield strength of 
1570 MN/m² and a normative ultimate strength of 1770 MN/m². A concrete strength class 
C 35 according to EN 1992 [5] was chosen in the design. 
32.00 32.00
Fig. 2. Bridge structure, elevation 
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3.2 Probabilistic model 
The risk-orientated assessment starts with a survey of possible weak points. First informa-
tion about weak points of structures can be acquired by damage analyses. These analyses 
are the basis for the determination of failure scenarios. Further information about possible 
weak points and failure scenarios can be derived from the structural design process. In this 
example, the weak point analysis is based on the structural design.  
The structural design for the bridge structure shows a high action effect in the cross section 
at midspan and at the support. At these so called “failure points” the structure can fail due 
to the exceeding of the flexure capacity or the fatigue capacity respectively. Further inves-
tigations will be concentrated on these failure modes. The different failure modes are 
summarised in the fault tree as serial system (Fig. 4). A system effect like load redistribu-
tion is neglected. The failure of more then one component for the collapse of the system is 
considered as system effect. Prior analyses of this type of a bridge showed a so-called “zip-
effect” (SCHNETGÖKE et al. [6]).That means that after the failure of the first component the 
redistributed load effect on the second component jumps up extensively. Therefore the 
reliability of the second component decreases significantly, which results in a small influ-
ence on the system reliability.  
Fig. 3. Bridge structure, cross section 
System 
Failure
Flexure Failure 
Midspan 2
Flexure Failure 
Midspan 1
Flexure Failure 
Support
Fatigue Failure 
Midspan 2
Fatigue Failure 
Midspan 1
Fatigue Failure 
Support
Fig. 4. Fault tree 
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For all components in the fault tree the limit state functions have to be defined. The first 
component illustrated in this chapter is the flexure failure. The flexure capacity for the 
bridge section can be calculated using the equilibrium of internal forces. The associated 
equation for the flexure capacity can be described as follows: 
)2
1
c
ys
ysysR fb
fA
fAdfAM ⋅
⋅⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅=  (2) 
The resisting moment according to equation (2) will be compared with the acting moment 
due to dead load and live load. The dead load results from the concrete weight of the con-
struction and the additional load (e.g. surfacing, parapet). The load effect of the live load 
due to the traffic is carried out with a Monte Carlo simulation. A vehicle classification as 
well as the stochastic model of the vehicle weight, axle weight, axle spacing, vehicle 
length, vehicle spacing etc. is required for the simulation. In this investigation the neces-
sary input is based on the data in MERZENICH et al. [7]. A typical twin peaked bimodal dis-
tribution of the weight for a semi-trailer truck is shown in Fig. 5. This form of distribution 
is typical for trucks. The first mode contains the partially loaded trucks, whereas the sec-
ond involves the fully loaded trucks. The moment-time curve is derived from the traffic 
flow simulation and the influence line for the bending moment.  
In the next step the distribution for the bending moment will be described with an extreme-
value distribution type I (Gumbel) (Fig. 6).  
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Fig. 5. distribution of the weight for a semitrailer truck 
Fig. 6. Time series and distribution of the bending moment 
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Beside the flexure capacity also the limit state for fatigue failure of the tendons has to be 
analysed. The describing model for fatigue failure is based on the PALMGREN-MINER hy-
pothesis. This hypothesis describes the damage of the material due to alternating loads of 
the construction. The damage accumulates until a critical value is reached. In the theory a 
fracture occurs with the exceeding of this value. The damage progress of the tendon is de-
scribed by the dimensionless damage factor D: 
∑ ∆∆= i iiN
nD
)(
)(
σ
σ  (3) 
In the equation n(∆σi) stands for the number of load cycles with the stress difference ∆σi. 
N(∆σi) is the maximum number of alternations for the stress difference ∆σi. This maxi-
mum number can be read off directly from the S-N curve. Per definition the fatigue failure 
occurs when the dimensionless damage factor D reaches a value of 1. Based on the Palm-
green-Miner hypothesis, the limit state equation for the fatigue failure can be defined to be: 
Z = DR – DS  (4) 
In the context of the first building assessment the number of 0.5·106 trucks is assumed to 
be the annual volume of traffic. Further the distribution of the stress differences ∆σi is nee-
ded. The stress-time curve results with the relationship between the bending moment and 
the stress in the tendon. In the next step the relevant information for the fatigue failure like 
stress differences ∆σi and associated frequency will be calculated from this curve. There-
fore the so-called counting methods, e.g. the rainflow hysteresis counting method (CLOR-
MANN et al. [8]), are used. The maximum number of alternations can be read of the S-N 
curve with the stress differences determined in this way. 
The probabilistic approach to fatigue failure is based on the stochastic model for the S-N 
curve. An appropriate relationship between the number of stress cycles and the stress dif-
ferences can be found in MAES et al. [9]: 
NgN θσσ +∆=∆ )()(log  (5) 
where g(∆σ) is a deterministic function of the stress range and θN a zero mean normal ran-
dom variable. The traditional function g(∆σ) is the linear respectively bilinear relationship 
between log N and log ∆σ. The resulting relationship is: 
)log()(log)( σσσ ∆⋅−=∆=∆ mcNg m  (6) 
where m is an exponent, which ranges typically from 3 to 5 and cm is a constant. Often the 
S-N curve is made bilinear to account for the absence of fatigue failure when the stress 
range ∆σ becomes very small.  
The PALMGREN-MINER hypothesis is an empirical description of the complex mechanical 
fatigue behaviour procedures and comparatively simple to handle. Therefore the dimen-
sionless damage factor D will be considered as random variable to keep the shortcoming of 
the mechanical model (SPAETHE [10]) in mind.  
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3.3 Reliability analysis and life cycle assessment 
The result of the reliability analysis for the actual state is shown in Fig. 7. The figure 
shows the reliability index β for every component and for the system. The components 
which are significant for the system reliability become obvious based on these results. The 
strength of the concrete and the pre-stressing steel and the live load show a prevalent influ-
ence on the reliability due to the high sensitivity factors α for these parameters.  
A further reliability analysis is the prognosis calculation to estimate the development of the 
reliability of the structure in the future. Therefore a possible degradation and/or a change in 
the load configuration of the structure are assumed. The rising amount of traffic of high-
way bridges and the related higher loading of bridges can be taken as an example. Follow-
ing the bottom-up principle, the degradation of the structure is modelled using time-
Fig. 7. Result of the reliability analysis (actual state) 
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dependant alteration functions for the parameter affected. Due to the small change of the 
material strength during the time and the high sensitivity value α for the live load in the 
prognosis calculation an increase of the live load by 2 % of the initial value a year will be 
assumed. This results in a time-dependent reliability index β shown in fig. 8.  
The monitoring plan can now be determined with this curve. On the one hand there is the 
regular inspection every 3 respectively every 6 years, on the other hand a measurement of 
the traffic load will be suggested after ten years at the latest. The next step will be the reas-
sessment of the structure based on measured data and the update of the monitoring plan. 
Within the first 10 years there is a sufficient safety margin between the prognosis and the 
target reliability according to structural codes (e. g. β1year = 4.7 according to EN 1990 [11]).  
If the inspections show new weak points, a modification of the probabilistic model follows. 
A new reliability analysis including a new prognosis calculation leads to a modification of 
monitoring plan if necessary. 
The durability of the concrete can be important for the structural behaviour besides to an 
increase of the live load. The analysis of past damages shows the environmental influence 
on the structure, e.g. steel corrosion due to chloride attack. In the future, the probabilistic 
model of a bridge structure will have to consider this deterioration if necessary. Based on 
the monitoring of concrete durability, first pieces of information about deviations from the 
designed properties can be received. An approach to include a corrosive degradation of the 
reinforcement in the reliability analysis is shown in SCHNETGÖKE et al. [12]. The methods 
developed in the Collaborative Research Centre 477 which enable the monitoring of the 
concrete durability are described in e.g. (SCHMIDT-DÖHL et al. [13]). 
4 Conclusion 
This article shows the application of the methods of system and reliability theory to the life 
cycle assessment of civil engineering structures. On this basis the inspection, monitoring 
and safety assessment of structures can be optimised. The whole procedure is summarised 
in the explained framework. 
The procedure is illustrated with a bridge structure. After the set up of the probabilistic 
model for the structure in form of a fault tree, the modelling of the limit states for the com-
ponents is shown. With the result of the reliability analysis for the actual state and the 
prognosis consequences for the further structural health monitoring process became appar-
ent.  
Further research will focus on the modelling of different types of structures and extended 
usage of the results from monitoring in the assessment process of structures. The integra-
tion of the methodology of the framework into the computer code PROBILAS (PRObabil-
istic Building Inspection and Life ASsessment) is one additional research topic of project 
field A1 of CRC 477. 
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Abstract: In recent years, risk management procedures expanded into the as-
sessment of natural hazards in the European Alps. The risk assessment meth-
odology requires information on both, the natural process and the affected 
damage potential. While determining hazard potential and the related probabil-
ity of occurrence of defined design events is quite sophisticated, little attention 
has been given to the possible range of input parameters needed for modeling. 
Furthermore, the affected damage potential has only been evaluated roughly so 
far, in particular concerning temporal dynamics and vulnerability. Conse-
quently, uncertainties emerging from risk modeling techniques have only been 
addressed recently. In this study, those uncertainties are discussed with respect 
to the input parameters needed for the risk assessment procedure. Long-term as 
well as short-term shifts in the values at risk are presented for different study 
areas and on different scales. A conceptual framework for the consideration of 
those changes in risk analyses for natural hazards is developed. 
1 Introduction 
The term natural hazard implies the occurrence of a natural condition or phenomenon 
which threats disastrous to anthropogenic spheres of interest in a defined space and time1. 
Natural hazards pose a threat to settlements and infrastructure in European mountain areas, 
 
 
1 Notwithstanding from this definition, some authors characterise the ‘natural process’ as ‘hazard’, and the 
‘natural hazard’ as ‘disaster’, and argue that hazards are natural, but in general, disasters are not, and that 
disasters should not be seen as inevitable outcome of a hazard’s impact (for a relatively early attempt, see 
O’KEEFE et al., 1976). They stress on the conditions of people which make it possible for a hazard to become 
a disaster (e.g., CANNON, 1993). This includes the extent and types of people’s vulnerability, in combination 
with the technical issue of how society deals (or does not deal) with the hazard in terms of mitigation and 
preparedness. 
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particularly due to the relative scarceness of areas suitable for land development; e.g., in 
Austria, only about 20 % of the whole area is suitable for development activities (BEV, 
2006). Thus, since the outgoing 19th century, technical mitigation measures have been im-
plemented to avoid damage to assets and people. Since the late 1970s, those measures have 
progressively more been supplemented by non-technical mitigation, such as land-use re-
strictions and preparedness activities in periods of increased jeopardy (e.g., evacuation). 
In recent years, the method of risk management, originally derived from technical sciences, 
has become a common tool to deal with natural hazards in Alpine countries (e.g., 
KIENHOLZ, 1977; KIENHOLZ et al., 1991; HOLLENSTEIN, 1997; HEINIMANN, 1998; BORTER, 
1999; FUCHS et al., 2001). Within the risk management framework (e.g., KIENHOLZ et al., 
2004), risk is defined as a function of probability of occurrence of a natural process and the 
corresponding extent of damage (VARNES 1984), see Equation (1). 
),,,( ,,, SiOjSiOjOjSiji pvApfR =                  (1) 
where Ri, j risk, dependent on scenario i and object j 
pSi probability of scenario i 
AOj  value of object j 
vOj, Si  vulnerability of object j, dependent on scenario i 
pOj, Si probability of exposure of object j to scenario i 
The traditionally technical approach of risk assessment, resulting from the application of 
Equation (1), is subject to inherent uncertainties resulting from the fact that the natural 
system can only partly be described by stochastic or deterministic models. Those uncer-
tainties have effects on the result of risk assessment, in particular regarding the extent of 
the area affected by the hazard process, and consequently on the predicted damage height. 
This paper provides an overview of such uncertainties with respect to snow avalanche risk 
based on case studies carried out in Davos, Switzerland (FUCHS et al., 2004). Snow ava-
lanches have caused high damage in mountain areas within the last century (e.g., EDI, 
1951; SLF, 2000; JÓHANNESSON and ARNALDS, 2001; JAMIESON and STETHEM, 2002; 
FUCHS and BRÜNDL, 2005), and had been subject to comprehensive research even earlier 
during the period of the penultimate turn of the century (e.g., COAZ, 1888; HEIM, 1885; 
PENCK, 1912). 
2 Probability of occurrence of snow avalanches 
Within the risk management procedure, reliable and precise modelling is a key tool consid-
ering the area potentially affected by avalanches. A variety of models have been derived to 
calculate snow avalanche motion and/or run-out distance in the past. Early attempts in 
physical modelling of avalanche phenomenon (PERLA et al., 1980; VOELLMY, 1955) based 
on “sliding block” descriptions had been further developed towards “continuum” models 
(e.g., BARTELT et al., 1999; NETTUNO, 1996) in recent years. Apart from such deterministic 
approaches for avalanche motion, empirical procedures for run-out calculation have been 
developed as well (LIED and BAKKEHØI, 1980; MCCLUNG and LIED, 1987; LIED et al., 
1995). Although the use of empirical models is more immediate and involves a relatively 
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low degree of subjectivity in the choice of input parameters, the information they can pro-
vide is more limited than that obtained from dynamic approaches (BARBOLINI et al., 2002). 
With reference to avalanche risk assessment, empirical models can give no information 
concerning impact pressures and thus potential damage. Furthermore, the return period of 
an avalanche event is not considered because the models had been developed for one spe-
cific frequency class (typically “extreme” events). Conversely, dynamical models allow for 
a wide range of information on the avalanche event (velocity, impact pressure, shape of the 
deposit). Moreover, the deterministic nature of such an approach guarantees the reproduc-
tion of a specific avalanche event, once certain initial and boundary conditions and model 
parameters have been fixed (BARBOLINI et al., 2002). This opens the possibility of simulat-
ing events with different return periods, and therefore to deal with avalanche risk assess-
ment, correlating the frequency of the avalanche with its potential degree of damage. 
However, the substantial degree of uncertainty in the definition of either initial conditions 
(release area and release depth) and model parameters (friction coefficients) represent one 
of the main weakness still connected with the use of dynamical models in practical applica-
tions. Thus, because land-use planning decisions rely on the calculated avalanche run-out 
distances, these modelling uncertainties could have large effects on the risk assessment 
procedure. 
Within the present study, a case study related to the long-term development of risk has 
been carried out in Davos, Switzerland (FUCHS et al., 2005). Methodologically, the areas 
affected by avalanches were deduced using the incident cadastre of former events, the le-
gally valid hazard maps, and the avalanche models AVAL1-D. AVAL-1D is a one-
dimensional avalanche dynamics program that predicts run-out distances, flow velocities 
and impact pressure of both flowing and powder snow avalanches. Calibrated depth-
average continuum models are used to track the motion of the avalanches from initiation to 
run-out. AVAL-1D consists of two computational modules for dense flow avalanches and 
powder snow avalanches. These modules solve the governing equations of mass, energy 
and momentum balance using a finite difference scheme (CHRISTEN et al., 2002). The 
dense flow simulation model employs a “Voellmy-fluid” flow law. This law assumes that 
the shear strains in the flow body are small and that the flow resistance, given by a dry-
Coulomb type friction (µ) and a velocity squared friction (ξ), is concentrated at the base of 
the avalanche. The magnitude of these two friction parameters is based on extensive model 
calibration (BARTELT et al., 1999) as well as observed field events. The powder snow 
simulation follows Norem’s description of powder flow avalanche formation and structure 
(NOREM, 1995). The model consists of a suspension layer and a saltation layer, mass and 
momentum exchange between those two layers being determined by particle settling, tur-
bulent diffusion against the concentration gradient, and aerodynamic shear forces 
(CHRISTEN et al., 2002). The net erosion or deposition rate is a function of the kinetic en-
ergy of the impacting forces. More details about the model and its validation are described 
in ISSLER (1998) and FÖRSTER (2000). 
During the sets of calculation, the run out zones of 30-year and 300-year avalanche scenar-
ios were determined for the community of Davos. In doing so, the release conditions un-
certainties resulting from the combination of input parameters were considered following a 
procedure outlined in BARBOLINI et al. (2002). Thus, based upon a 95 % confidence inter-
val, the run out length of the 30-year events varied ± 20 m and the run out length of the 
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300-year events varied ± 30 m, which resulted in significant effects on the affected values 
at risk. 
3 Values at risk 
For those avalanche scenarios, the values at risk were obtained analysing the zoning plan 
with respect to location and perimeter of every building. Additional information, such as 
building type, year of construction and replacement value2, as well as the number of resi-
dents was provided by the official authorities and the mandatory building insurer, and was 
joint using a GIS. The number of endangered tourists was derived using the number of 
beds within endangered hotels and guest houses and the respective degree of utilisation.  
A general shift in damage potential resulted from the development of the study area from a 
traditionally agricultural society towards a tourism centre within the 20th century. This de-
velopment could be evaluated since the year 1950, using decadal study periods, and pro-
vided a general idea about the development of assets in endangered areas. This approach 
mainly focused on the development of values in areas endangered by avalanches, such as 
the number and value of buildings, or the number of persons inhabiting those buildings. 
A second development of damage potential, particularly focusing on mobile values and 
intangible assets, is based on a seasonal and diurnal assessment of variations in damage 
potential. This approach had also been applied related to the number of tourists staying 
temporally at a specific endangered location.  
3.1 Long-term development of values at risk 
Regarding the long-term development in numbers and values of endangered buildings, a 
significant increase could be proven for the period between 1950 and 2000 (FUCHS et al., 
2004, 2005). The total number of buildings has almost tripled, from 161 in 1950 to 462 in 
2000 (Fig. 1). This increase was due to the shift from 51 to 256 in the category of residen-
tial buildings, while in the other categories the number of buildings was approximately 
unchanging. A significant increase in number dated back in the 1960s and 1970s before the 
legally binding hazard map came into force. The total value of buildings increased by a 
factor of almost four. In 1950, the total sum of buildings was € 240 million and in 2000, 
the total sum was € 930 million. In 1950, the proportion of residential buildings was less 
than 15 %, compared to the total amount of endangered buildings. Until 2000, this ratio 
changed to almost 50 %. Regarding the category of hotels and guest houses as well as the 
 
 
2 Regarding the discussion of market values versus reconstruction costs, see FUCHS and MCALPIN (2005) and 
FUCHS et al. (2006a): The first choice for revealing the societal preferences toward buildings would be the 
market price. However, since it is the philosophy of mandatory building insurers like in Switzerland to un-
derwrite the risk due to the replacement value to be able to compensate for an eventual total loss and to en-
able a replacement of the damaged building at any time, it does make sense to use the replacement value 
within this study, neglecting any risk-dependent change in the demand within the real estate market. Fur-
thermore, this value serves as a basis for the expressed preferences of the societal accepted value of protec-
tion against natural hazards. 
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category of special risks, nearly no increase in value could be observed. However, those 
categories showed a higher average value per building than residential buildings. The 
number of endangered permanent residential population increased slightly. In 1950, a 
population of 1,098 persons was exposed to avalanche hazards, until 2000 this value in-
creased to 1,137 persons. This is a relatively moderate increase of 3.6 %, compared to the 
increase in tangible assets. If the classification into different building functions is carried 
out, this increase turned out to be larger. In residential buildings, 673 persons were con-
cerned in 1950 and 1,116 in 2000, which is an increase of two thirds.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Development of values at risk in Davos, Switzerland related to the respective ava-
lanche-prone areas, subdivided in decades and building categories. In the left bar 
plot, information on the number of affected buildings is given, while on the right 
bar plot the respective reconstruction value is presented. 
3.2 Short-term development of values at risk  
Parallel to the long-term increases described in the previous section, remarkable short-term 
variations of persons at risk are detectable in mountain areas. Those variations could be 
determined on seasonal, weekly and hourly resolution, and are exemplarily presented using 
results from a case study carried out in Galtür, Austria (KEILER et al., 2005). This work 
complemented the studies in Davos with respect to rapid changes in avalanche risk, and 
had shown considerable similarities between mountain communities featuring different 
historical roots. 
Between 1950 and 2000, the total number of endangered persons fluctuated by a factor of 
almost six, however, strong variations could be observed during the winter season as well 
as in daytime (Fig. 2). The seasonal fluctuation was characterised by a strongly increasing 
number of tourists at Christmas time and the Easter travel season. The end of the winter 
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season was highlighted by a sharp decrease in the number of persons to nearly the amount 
of the permanent population. Considering the diurnal fluctuation, the weekly structure 
could be easily followed. From the beginning of the winter season on, these patterns were 
overlapped by general movements of the tourists during daytime. The number of persons 
varied by a factor of 1.4 between minimum and maximum in the off-season, and by a fac-
tor of 3.4 in the period of the main season. These changes could occur extremely rapid 
within one or two hours. 
 
Fig. 2: Monthly, weekly, and diurnal fluctuations of the number of exposed persons in the 
study area of Galtür, Austria (KEILER et al., 2005, with permission). 
3.3 Multi-temporal development of values at risk  
As presented in the previous sections, the development of values at risk due to socioeco-
nomic transformation in the European Alps varies remarkably on different temporal levels. 
Long-term changes and short-term fluctuations have to be considered when evaluating risk 
resulting from natural hazards. 
Long-term changes in values at risk could be considered as basic disposition. To reduce the 
risk resulting from this basic disposition, permanent constructive mitigation measures 
could be constructed and land-use regulations implemented. As a consequence, the basic 
risk could be reduced due to a spatial reduction of the process area. As pointed out in 
(FUCHS et al., 2004) for the study area of Davos, the risk due to snow avalanches decreased 
fundamentally since the 1950s, even if the values at risk increased in the municipality. This 
development could be mainly attributed to the construction of permanent mitigation meas-
ures, and is strongly related to immobile values. Similar results were obtained for the study 
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area Galtür (KEILER et al., 2006). However, extraordinary losses could be estimated if rare 
events with severe effects occur, since the delimitation of the respective process areas is 
based on defined design events. This problem emerged during the avalanche winter 1999 
in Switzerland (SLF, 2000) and Austria.  
Short-term fluctuations in damage potential supplement this continuing development of 
damage potential within a specific range. Thus, they have to be considered as variable dis-
position. To mitigate those fluctuations, temporal measures could be applied, such as 
evacuations or temporary road closures. 
Long-term as well as short-term variations in damage potential should be implemented into 
risk management approaches. In Fig. 3, the significance for a consideration of variable as 
well as basic damage potential is presented. As shown in example a) the event will not hit 
any values at risk, and thus, the level of risk reduction is sufficient. In example b), due to 
high amounts of variable values at risk, damage will occur. As a result, temporal mitigation 
strategies could reduce the variable damage potential until a critical level. In example c), 
basic and variable values at risk are affected by a process. Thus, temporal measures are no 
more sufficient enough for an effective risk reduction. These examples clearly indicate the 
strong need for an incorporation of dynamic assessments of damage potential in commu-
nity risk management strategies. 
Furthermore, since the socioeconomic development differs within Alpine regions, studies 
on the long-term behaviour of values at risk contribute to the ongoing discussion of passive 
and active developing regions and suburbanisation (FUCHS and BRÜNDL, 2005). However, 
if a potentially dangerous natural event will occur, it depends on the actual amount of val-
ues at risk (basic and variable disposition) within the process area whether or not damage 
will be triggered. 
 
Fig. 3: Schematic description of the concept of basic (long-term) and variable (short-term) 
damage potential and the relation to triggering events. 
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4 Vulnerability 
The term vulnerability is used in hazard and risk management in a large number of ways. 
Without controversy, vulnerability is related to the consequences of a natural hazard. 
Those consequences are generally measured in terms of damage or losses, either on a met-
ric scale (e.g., as monetary unit), or on a non-numerical scale based on social values or 
perceptions and evaluations. This is not necessarily a matter of ambiguity or semantic drift, 
but disciplinary focus. Essentially, these different uses have invisible, implied adjectives 
preceding them, hence structural engineering vulnerability, lifeline infrastructural vulner-
ability, communications system vulnerability, macro-economic vulnerability, regional eco-
nomic vulnerability, commercial vulnerability (including insurance exposure), and social 
vulnerability (WISNER et al., 2004). Consequently, two diverse perspectives on the concept 
of vulnerability exist; (1) the perspective from social science and (2) the perspective from 
natural science. 
From social sciences’ perspective, there are no unique definitions of vulnerability 
(CUTTER, 1996). Approaches not only differ between several degrees of voluntariness 
when dealing with natural hazards, but also consider individual as well as social influ-
ences, filtered by certain conditions that determine an individual’s perception of risk. De-
pending on various guiding elements such as probability of occurrence, extent of damage, 
perception, uncertainty, ubiquity, persistence, reversibility, time delay, and mobilisation 
potential (GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, 1998), vulnerability is sub-
ject to considerable changes. 
From a natural science perspective, vulnerability is usually considered as a function of a 
given intensity of a process, and is defined as the expected degree of loss for an element at 
risk as a consequence of a certain event (VARNES, 1984; FELL, 1994). The vulnerability 
value ranges generally between 0 (no damage) to 1 (complete destruction). Its assessment 
involves in many cases the evaluation of several different parameters and factors such as 
building materials and techniques, state of conservation, presence of protection structures, 
presence of warning systems and so on (FELL, 1994; FELL and HARTFORD, 1997). On the 
process side, parameters such as the process intensity have to be analysed, usually by map-
ping the geomorphologic disposition and previous events, and/or modelling (defined de-
sign) events. However, with respect to avalanches, it has recently been claimed that 
standardised approaches to evaluate the impacts to buildings are still missing 
(HOLLENSTEIN et al., 2002). 
BARBOLINI et al. (2004) proposed an empirical vulnerability relation for alpine buildings 
based on the studies of JÓNASSON et al. (1999) and KEYLOCK and BARBOLINI (2001). 
Knowing the degree of damage and the deduced specific loss of the buildings, the vulner-
ability function was analysed for five impact pressure ranges (BARBOLINI et al., 2004). 
However, heterogeneous construction methods of buildings in alpine countries as well as 
socio-economic changes have not been sufficiently addressed in the study of BARBOLINI et 
al. (2004), an issue that is very important in the vulnerability analysis, particularly for a 
temporal approach of avalanche risk assessment. 
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To partially close this gap, KEILER et al. (2006) applied an empirical approach outlined in 
WILHELM (1997) to determine vulnerability functions for different construction types of 
buildings (building categories) related to avalanche pressure (Fig. 4). The susceptibility of 
loss to the building categories is partly based on the analyses of destroyed buildings during 
the avalanche winter 1954 in Vorarlberg, Austria, by VOELLMY (1955). WILHELM (1997), 
and accordingly BORTER (1999) differentiate between four vulnerability thresholds (see 
Fig. 4): 
• The general damage level (pu) corresponds to an avalanche pressure of 2–3 kPa and 
causes mentionable damage (estimated at 3 %), such as destroyed windows and 
doors. 
• The specific damage level (pui) is the consequence of an avalanche impact pressure 
that inflicts damage on the building structure. Thus, each building category has a 
different specific damage level due to its different construction type. 
• The destruction level (poi) describes the avalanche pressure that can produce maxi-
mum loss within each building category. 
• The detach limit (pai) of each building category describes a damage threshold below 
the destruction level, but demolition and reconstruction of the buildings is neces-
sary. Therefore, maximum loss is postulated for a degree of susceptibility to loss of 
50 % and more because additional costs arise for the demolition and reconstruction 
that can add up to the maximum loss. 
However, since the construction type of buildings has typically to be identified by field 
studies, this procedure is very time-consuming and thus costly. Furthermore, the effects of 
avalanches in the run-out area is not yet completely known3, consequently, modelled im-
pact pressures can only be a rough estimate of the real system behaviour. There were ex-
amples where an avalanche destroyed a building situated perpendicular to the avalanche 
axis (e.g., in the hamlet of Valzur, Paznaun, Austria, in February 1999), but there were 
cases where such a building was able to stop such an avalanche completely (e.g., in the 
village of Airolo, Ticino, Switzerland, February 1951). To conclude, the vulnerability 
component of risk analysis is still poorly specified, mainly due to a lack of intensive ex-
perimental or observational data. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Future research concerning the behaviour of avalanches in the run-out areas is needed, in particular related 
to the structure of buildings. Buildings can have similar effects on avalanches as avalanche retarding mounds. 
Thus, due to a shift in the building pattern within the accumulation area, buildings oriented towards the val-
ley bottom tend to result in smaller risk than buildings that are located closer towards the transit area. Inde-
pendent from the related political implications and the associated impacts on land-use planning, further 
studies on this effect should be carried out due to the probable reduction of the run-out areas and, as a conse-
quence, the resulting risk. 
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Fig. 4: Degree of possible loss as a function of avalanche impact pressure and vulnerability 
of buildings, the latter varies due to the material used for construction (building 
categories). Building categories: 1 = lightweight construction, 2 = mixed construc-
tion, 3 = massive construction, 4 = concrete (reinforced) construction, 5 = rein-
forced construction. Limiting values: pu = damage level, pui = specific damage 
level, pai = detach limit, poi = destruction level, p = avalanche pressure [kPa] (modi-
fied according to WILHELM, 1997:72). 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Natural hazard risk management is subject to a range of uncertainties which have to be 
taken into account. Regarding the probability of occurrence pSi, uncertainties resulting 
from avalanche modelling have to be considered. In addition to some basic limitations that 
occur when using models, the major uncertainties result from the use of the input parame-
ters. As outlined in BARBOLINI et al. (2002), data related to the fracture depth and the po-
tential extent of the release area is concerned, in addition to the length and angle of the 
accumulation area in consequence of topographic conditions. As a result, the range result-
ing from these uncertainties within the avalanche run-out areas was calculated regarding 
the variations outlined in section 2. This procedure caused a wide range of results which 
traced back to the high concentration of assets in the study area (see Fig. 5); and repre-
sented the typical problems when dealing with design events in the area of risk analyses 
resulting from alpine natural hazards. 
In the year 1950, 83 buildings with a total replacement value of approximately € 107.6 
million had been located inside the run-out areas affected by the 30-year avalanche scenar-
ios. In the year 2000, 33 buildings with a replacement value of € 19.3 million were situated 
inside the areas affected by a 30-year avalanche, which is nearly 40 % in number and 18 % 
in value of the 1950s calculation. The endangered residential population amounted to 591 
persons living in the areas of a 30-year avalanche run-out zone in 1950. In 2000, in conse-
quence of the construction of permanent mitigation measures, 87 residents remained ex-
posed, which is an 85 % reduction. However, the range of these results was considerable: 
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Inside the areas of a 30-year avalanche event, the number of buildings scattered almost 
25 % in number and value for the scenario 1950 and 50 % for the scenario 2000. Concern-
ing residential population, the values ranged from ± 20 % for the scenario 1950 to a re-
markable factor of around 450 % for the scenario 2000. Compared to the results of the 
300-year avalanche scenarios, those values were relatively small. 
Even if the number of buildings affected by the 300-year scenarios has decreased from 161 
to 125, the upper limit decreased only from 178 to 174. Thus it could be deduced that when 
interpreting the scenarios adversarial (accumulation length of the avalanche +30 m), no 
fundamental shift in the risk occurred in spite of the construction of mitigation measures. 
Concerning the values of endangered buildings it becomes apparent that the upper limit of 
the scenario2000 (€ 162.2 million) is near to the lower limit of the scenario1950 (€ 172.3 mil-
lion), which is far below the development of the precise scenario. Using the results of the 
exact scenario, nearly a bisection of the endangered building values is detectable, from 
€ 239.4 million to € 121.7 million. The average number of persons (residential population), 
which was 2.4 per dwelling, might be an upper limit in the category of vacation homes in 
the area under investigation. However, more exact data related to vacation homes are miss-
ing in the official statistics. Comparing scenario1950 to scenario2000, the number of endan-
gered persons increased from 1,098 to 1,137 persons. Considering the minimum values 
(accumulation length of the 300-year scenario – 30 m), this value decreased from 832 to 
636 persons. Considering the maximum values (accumulation length of the 300-year sce-
nario + 30 m), nearly a doubling is detectable from 1,156 to 1,971 persons. Particularly in 
the category of endangered persons it becomes evident that the range of the scenarios is 
higher than the difference between the scenario under consideration of mitigation measures 
and the scenario without mitigation measures. 
As shown in the previous section, short-term fluctuations in damage potential might lead to 
a temporal increase in risk, resulting from a modified recreational behaviour within the 
society. Until now, there is a particular lack in information related to short-term fluctua-
tions of values at risk. In contrast to the immobile damage potential (buildings and infra-
structure, etc.), persons and mobile values can either leave or be removed out of hazard-
prone areas in case of dangerous situations. For developing efficient and effective evacua-
tion and emergency plans, information on numbers of persons and mobile values as well as 
their location and movements in the area is needed. In consequence, permanent mitigation 
structures could be complemented by temporal measures to achieve an efficient and effec-
tive risk reduction. 
If uncertainties in the vulnerability of objects would have been included within this study, 
the ranges would have been considerably higher. However, until now, there is no reliable 
methodology to account for such values within the risk management procedure. Thus, ex-
pressions regarding the range of uncertainty in natural hazard risk management will rather 
increase than decrease in the future. Possible improvements could be achieved applying the 
promising approach by GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB4, however, large uncertainties will 
 
 
4 GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB, Integrating Bayesian networks into a GIS for avalanche risk assessment, this 
issue; and GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB, Spatially explicit avalanche risk assessment linking Bayesian net-
works to a GIS, Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, forthcoming. 
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remain in a sustainable dealing with natural hazards in mountain areas. Until now, the spa-
tial planning authorities need to have a precise boundary to draw the outline of endangered 
areas not or only to a certain extent appropriate for land development. Consequently, a 
dichotomy arises between the (scientifically) accurate and precise delimitation of areas 
endangered by natural hazards including confidence intervals, and the practical require-
ments emerging from the implementation of legal requirements (FUCHS et al., 2006b). 
 
 
Fig. 5: Scenario1950 and scenario2000 related to a 30-year and a 300-year avalanche event 
and presentation of the associated uncertainties following the suggestions outlined 
in BARBOLINI et al. (2002). Modified from FUCHS et al. (2005, with permission). 
Information on the temporal variability of values at risk both from a long-term as well as 
from a short-term point of view provide in combination with process knowledge provides 
the basis for dynamic risk visualisation. Such information may help to recognise high-risk 
situations more easily and enables a situation-oriented and risk-based decision-making 
(e.g., ZISCHG et al., 2004; SCHWAB et al., 2005; ZISCHG et al., 2005). Apart from the dam-
age potential, risk analyses are based on the concept of recurrence intervals of hazard proc-
esses. If due to ‘global change’-processes those defined design events have to be exceeded, 
the remarkable increase of values at risk would result in a significant shift in monetary 
losses (and presumably fatalities). First results on risk associated with torrent hazards sug-
gest an increase in the probabilities of the design events in the Alpine region, however, 
these results still need some additional analyses to be verified, and are subject to ongoing 
research.  
To conclude, risk analyses concerning natural hazards should be carried out with respect to 
a dynamic change of input parameters, particularly with respect to exposed values at risk. 
This is essential for efficient disaster risk reduction and contributes to the concept of resil-
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ience as part of proactive adaptation. Regarding snow avalanches in the European Alps, the 
most important input parameter is the temporal variability of damage potential, since the 
natural avalanche activity did not vary substantially during the past decades (LATERNSER 
and SCHNEEBELI, 2002). Thus, future research is needed to quantify the impact of modifi-
cations in damage potential on (1) the result of risk analyses, (2) the assessment of risk in 
the cycle of integrated risk management, (3) the adjustment of coping strategies, and (4) 
the perception of risk by all parties involved, including policy makers. 
The latter is the most crucial issue in Europe, since until now, dealing with natural hazards 
is based on mono-disciplinary approaches. In Austria, the forest law of 1975 restricts all 
hazards planning to forestry engineers (REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH, 1976, 2004), in France, 
experts responsible for these issues are predominantly geologists (STÖTTER et al., 1999), 
while in Italy, the requirement for those specialists is a PhD in agriculture or a master’s 
degree in forestry or geology (AUTONOME PROVINZ TRENTINO-SÜDTIROL, 1998). However, 
since risk resulting from natural hazards is a subject matter affecting life and economy 
within the whole society, multiple stakeholders’ interests have to be considered when miti-
gation measures and coping strategies are developed and decisions are made. Thus, there is 
a particular need to involve (1) economists with respect to an efficient and effective use of 
public expenditures, (2) social scientists with respect to both, society’s risk perception and 
an enhanced risk communication, (3) geographers and land-use planners as well as (4) all 
other disciplines representing any other party involved. 
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Abstract: Considering the significant monetary losses associated with avalanche 
disasters, it is crucial that decisions made in regard to hazard mitigation are based on 
a consistent assessment of the risks. This in turn necessitates a proper assessment of 
the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the avalanche frequencies and intensi-
ties, the possible avalanche extent, as well as the estimations of the damage potential. 
In this study, we link a BAYES’ian network to a Geographic Information System for 
avalanche risk assessment. We identify the major sources of uncertainty and show 
the potential of BAYES’ian inference techniques to improve the avalanche model us-
ing observed data. The probabilistic model, which consistently incorporates available 
information, can serve as a basis for spatial risk assessment. It is implemented here in 
a test area in the Swiss Alps. 
1 Introduction 
Economical damages from natural hazards are on the rise (MunicheRe, 2006). In moun-
tainous areas such as the Swiss Alps, costs associated with damages due to snow ava-
lanches and floods have grown exponentially in the last decade. In order to deal with these 
expenditures, decision makers are recognizing the need for a risk-based strategy, which 
explicitly addresses the involved uncertainties together with the consequences of such 
events (PLANAT, 2004). This type of strategy requires, on one hand, a probabilistic ava-
lanche hazard model, which includes all available information on the physical processes 
and the observations of past events, on the other hand, a risk assessment procedure, which 
combines the available observational information and expert opinions.  
Probabilistic approaches to avalanche hazard are not new (HARBITZ et al., 2001; 
BARBOLINI et al., 2002, 2003; ANCEY, 2004, 2005). These studies use observations to ei-
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ther estimate release probability and/or the parameters of the dynamic avalanche models. 
ANCEY (2005) applies BAYES’ian inference, but only to investigate the dependency of the 
friction parameters in the dynamic avalanche model on the avalanche volume.  To our 
knowledge, BAYES’ian inference has never been used to update both uncertainties in the 
release and the flow process based on avalanche observations.  
In order to facilitate the explicit modeling of uncertainties in risk assessment procedures, 
several authors (e.g. FRIIS-HANSER, 2000; FABER et al., 2002) suggest the use of 
BAYES’ian Networks (BN). There are only few reported applications of BN in the field of 
natural hazards (e.g. AMENDOLA et al., 2000; ANTONUCCI et al., 2003; HINCKS et al., 2004; 
BAYRAKTARLI et al., 2005; STRAUB, 2005). All these studies, however, do not estimate risk 
in a spatially explicit manner, which is essential for land-use planning. Geographic Infor-
mation Systems (GIS) have the capacity to incorporate the complexities of spatial dimen-
sion within such analyses. A large number of GIS applications for natural hazards have 
been developed (e.g., WADGE et al., 1993; CARRARA and GUZZETTI 1995, CHEN et al., 
2003; BELL and GLADE, 2004). However, until now, in spite of the recognized uncertain-
ties in spatial models and data, we are only aware of one previous attempt at considering 
the output of GIS in probabilistic terms (STASSOPOULOU et al.,1998). 
It is thus the aim of this study to (1) develop a probabilistic avalanche hazard model (2) to 
integrate this probabilistic hazard model into a BN linked to a GIS (3) to show, how 
BAYES’ian inference modify the risk assessment results. We illustrate the approach by as-
sessing the risk of avalanches in a run-out zone located in the municipality of Davos (Swit-
zerland). This paper links the findings of two previous studies (STRAUB and GRÊT-
REGAMEY, 2006; GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB, 2006).  
2 Method 
2.1 BAYES’ian probabilistic avalanche hazard model 
We apply a state-of-the-art two-dimensional dynamic simulation model, the AVAL-2D, 
used in Switzerland for avalanche prediction and hazard zoning (GRUBER, 1999; 
MAGGIONI and GRUBER, 2003). The avalanche process can be divided into the release 
process and the dynamic avalanche flow. Both parts are associated with uncertainties, 
which must explicitly be addressed. 
In the AVAL-2D, the avalanche release process is represented by the annual maximum 
detached snow volume, described by the area Ar and the snow depth H of the detached 
snow mass. We focus on five release scenarios (r10, r30, r100, and r300) with different return 
periods (R); typical values of the return periods are 10 years, 30 years, 100 years, and 300 
years. Representative values for the size of the release areas and the snow depths under 
these release scenarios are based on calibration of the model at different sites (U. GRUBER, 
pers. communication 11/2005, SLF). We introduce a sixth scenario, r1, with an annual ex-
ceedance frequency equal to 1, which is assumed to correspond to no avalanche, as ava-
lanches that occur every year will not lead to damages in the built environment. In order to 
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include both the uncertainty related to the type of release scenario and its probability of 
occurrence, we determine different alternative exceedance probability curves for each re-
turn period (ΘR). The probability of r1 is represented by a separate random variable Φ, as 
the probability of occurrence of the nil-scenario is dependent on the definition of a relevant 
avalanche. The annual probability of any release scenario r, conditional on ϕ  and Rθ , is 
written as ( ),p RR rθ ϕ  and following the total probability theorem, the unconditional annual 
probability is: 
   ( ) ( ) ( ),,p p p ,RR
R
R RRr rθ ϕ θ ϕΘ Φ
Φ Θ
=∑∑   
where ( ),p ,R Rθ ϕΘ Φ  is the joint probability of R RθΘ =  and ϕΦ = . 
The AVAL-2D calculates flow resistance at the base of the avalanche using two parame-
ters: the dry-Coulomb type friction (µ) and a velocity squared friction (ξ). In this study, the 
parameter µ is modeled probabilistically, while the parameter ξ is modeled as a determinis-
tic parameter, with different values for slope angles, topographical classifications, and sur-
faces. As the parameter µ depends on different topographical classifications, we identify 
nine different parameter scenarios for θµ1… θµ9, corresponding to a set of values for µ. 
In summary, the input parameters to the AVAL-2D are a set of four random variables 
{ }, , ,R R µ= Θ Φ ΘΘ . The dynamic avalanche model itself can be interpreted as a determi-
nistic function fAval, which, for given values of Θ , gives the annual maximum pressure P 
for any spatial coordinate u on a 5m x 5m raster as: 
( ) ( ), f ,AVALP ε= +u θ u θ (u)  
Because the model is only a simplified representation of reality and because some of 
the deterministic input parameters of the model are actually uncertain, we consider 
the additive error term ε in the formulation for P. 
2.2 Spatially explicit risk assessment using BAYES’ian Networks 
We organize the risk assessment procedure including the probabilistic avalanche model in 
the form of a BN as suggested by STRAUB (2005). BN are directed acyclic graph, where 
the nodes correspond to the random variables and the arcs represent the dependency struc-
ture of the problem, see PEARL (1988) and JENSEN (2001) for a comprehensive summary. 
Figure 1 shows the a-priori probabilistic avalanche risk assessment model represented by a 
BN. A detailed description of the data and sources of the variables used in the BN are pro-
vided in GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB (2006).  
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Fig. 1: BAYES’ian network of avalanche risk assessment with the a-priori probabilistic ava-
lanche model. 
 
In order to estimate the risk on a cell basis, we integrate the BN created in the Hugin envi-
ronment into ArcGIS 9.3 (ESRI, 2000). The input nodes of the BN are initialized with val-
ues provided by spatially explicit datasets such as location and type of buildings. A digital 
elevation model provides information used in the AVAL-2D to calculate values used as 
evidence for the conditional probability tables of the “friction parameter” and the “pres-
sure” nodes. The main output of the BN is thus the annual risk for each cell expressed in 
monetary terms, which includes not only costs of damaged building, but also costs associ-
ated with damaged contents, infrastructure, and societal losses. 
2.3 Updating the avalanche model with BAYES’ian inference 
BAYES’ theorem allows for updating a prior probabilistic model with observations of the 
process under consideration. Finding the conditional distribution of a subset of the vari-
ables, conditional on know values for some other subset (the evidence) is the goal of infer-
ence. Here, we update the prior probabilistic model of the set of variables Θ, represented 
through the joint probability mass function of Θ, with observations related to the extent of 
past avalanches (q). The observations of avalanches are considered one-dimensionally 
along the avalanche path and were obtained from the winter reports 1950 to 2003 (unpub-
lished data, SLF Davos, Switzerland). A threshold is introduced on the observations of the 
run-out distance. Observations, which are considered to correspond to a return period 
lower than 10 years are introduced in the analysis only through the information that the 
run-out distance was lower than the threshold. This threshold was chosen in the example as 
1300m, which is lower than the lowest calculated run-out distance for the r10 scenario. 
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STRAUB and GRÊT-REGAMEY (2006) perform a sensitivity study to check the appropriate-
ness of this choice.  
The choice of the prior probability mass functions for the set of variables Θµ, ΘR, and Φ, 
and the impact of this choice on the updating procedure is discussed in details in STRAUB 
and GRÊT-REGAMEY (2006). 
In the posterior model, the updated variables RΘ , Φ  and R  may be collapsed into the sin-
gle variable R . The posterior model is then fully described by the two parameters µΘ  and 
R .As derived in details in STRAUB and GRÊT-REGAMEY (2006). The posterior joint prob-
ability mass function is calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,p , p p , ,R R
R
RR Rr rµ µµ µθ ϕθ θ θ ϕΘ Θ Θ ΦΘ Φ=∑∑q q  
When neglecting the error term (which is a reasonable assumption for engineering applica-
tions) and based on the posterior model of the parameters, we can apply the following BN 
in the risk assessment procedure, simplified to three nodes (Fig. 2). For more details on the 
probabilistic avalanche model, the reader is referred to STRAUB and GRÊT-REGAMEY 
(2006). 
 
P
Θµ R
 
 
Fig. 2: BAYES’ian network representing the posterior avalanche model. 
3 Results 
The probabilistic risk assessment model is applied to a run-out zone, the “Frauentobel”, 
located in the municipality of Davos, Switzerland.   
In a first step, we update the prior probabilistic model of the set of variables Θ. Fig. 3 
shows the posterior marginal probability mass function of the parameter scenario Θµ. To 
illustrate the fact that Θµ is dependent on the release scenario R, we also show the posterior 
probability mass function conditional on r10 and r100. Higher values of the friction parame-
ter are more likely for smaller release scenarios, respectively lower snow volumes, which 
is in accordance with general experience (ANCEY, 2005). 
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Fig. 3: Posterior probability mass function of Θµ .  
In a second step, we introduce the new values for the friction parameters in the posterior 
avalanche model. Figure 4 shows the annual probability that an avalanche occurs, as 
evaluated with the prior model (a) and the posterior model (b). The updated model predicts 
a larger amount of shorter avalanches, whereas the presented probabilistic model predicts 
fewer but larger avalanche.  
 
Fig. 4: Annual probability that an avalanche occurs, as evaluated with the prior model (a) 
and the posterior model (b) model. The annual probabilities range from 2.5*10-9 
(brown) to 0.15 (blue). 
In a third step, we calculate annual risks using the original avalanche model and the im-
proved probabilistic model. Annual risks calculated using the updated avalanche model in 
the “Frauentobel” (4970 CHF/year) exceed the annual risk calculated using the original 
model (3850 CHF/year) by 22 % considering the five avalanche release scenarios. Total 
annual risks are lowest under a 30-year release scenario. This suggests that frequent but 
smaller avalanches do not reach highly populated areas. 
a b 
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Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to identify the variables having the greatest influ-
ence on the risk. We use the SHANNON’s mutual information indicator. Details about its 
calculation are provided in GRÊT-REGAMEY and STRAUB (2006). The variables “house con-
struction”, followed by “people’s presence in buildings”, and “pressure” are identified as 
having the largest impact on the uncertainty in the total risk. BAYES’ian credible intervals 
allow representing these uncertainties in a spatially explicit manner (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Fig. 5: BAYES’ian credible intervals map. The white bars represent the expected cost value 
at each location [log CHF]; the black bars are the upper bound values of the credi-
ble interval. The grey area represents the avalanche extent under a 300-year sce-
nario. 
 
The maximum credible interval calculated from the uncertainty distributions in the BN is 
large (2680 CHF/year) compared to the maximal expected annual cost of 800 CHF. Risk 
values located at the border of the avalanche run-out zones have large confidence intervals, 
pointing to the large uncertainties in the estimation of the risks at these locations, and 
showing that a more reliable calculation of the avalanche pressures are crucial for reducing 
the uncertainty in the risk assessment. 
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4 Discussion 
In this study, we show the potential of embedding a BN into a GIS for natural hazard risk 
assessment. The approach unifies human expertise and quantitative knowledge in a coher-
ent framework, which overcomes a major limitation of previous approaches. By updating 
the avalanche model with observations, we show that the risk estimates can increase by 
approximately 20% in the considered run-out zone. Furthermore, the integration of the 
probabilistic approach into a GIS allows quantifying and visualizing uncertainties in a spa-
tially explicit manner, which is a basis to provide credible information to planners.  
A distinct feature of the presented probabilistic avalanche model is that it allows calibrat-
ing the model parameters to observations, not deterministically as done in previous studies, 
but using BAYES’ian inference, which ensures the consistent use of all available informa-
tion, and facilitates learning the processes in a regional context. In the future, for example, 
the approach could be used to investigate the dependency of the friction parameters on the 
snow release volume. 
The proposed framework offers many other possibilities for further development. In its 
present version, the model is run for each cell individually, and thus the spatial and tempo-
ral dependency structure of the risk is not evaluated. These dependencies can be included 
in the framework by combining individual BN in the model into one single model. This 
will allow using the information obtained from similar sites for the determination of the 
prior probability distributions of the parameters, which can be of particular relevance at 
sites where little information on past events is available.  
Furthermore, many important characteristics of an integral risk management strategy, as 
presented e.g. in FABER and STEWART (2003), are not covered in this paper. Such aspects 
include the identification of mitigation actions or the determination of risk acceptance cri-
teria. Yet it is believed that the presented framework for risk assessment supports a struc-
tured approach to all tasks involved in the management of natural hazards, and could be 
extended to provide a tool for optimal risk-based decision making. 
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Abstract: Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) performed within the Peri-
odic Safety Reviews are utilised thereafter in the regulatory procedures related 
to specific issues to be dealt with and to be decided upon as well as regular 
plant changes applied for by the utilities. In this paper the status of PSAs avail-
able, the objectives of performing additional probabilistic analyses as well as 
probabilistic investigations actually conducted in different cases of application 
are described. Significant results and insights obtained which are able to sup-
port the safety assessment and the decision making process in the regulatory 
procedures are addressed. Further, basic facts of a concept developed to per-
form an integrated safety assessment within the usual Regulatory Plant Change 
Procedure (RPCP) will be outlined.  
1 Background 
The licensing and supervision procedures referring to Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in 
Germany are essentially based on deterministic principles and criteria laid down in the 
corresponding regulatory framework. Probabilistic analyses and investigations have firstly 
been conducted in the context of the so-called Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR; lately, only 
called Safety Review (SR)) regularly to be carried out. 
After the conclusion of the 1st round of the PSRs, Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) 
for all NPPs in Baden-Württemberg have been available which have also been reviewed. It 
was felt meaningful to utilise these PSAs afterwards also to assess specific issues to be 
dealt with in the usual regulatory procedures as well as to up-date and expand the existing 
PSAs with respect to recommendations given with the conclusion of the 1st PSR. 
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Thus, in various cases probabilistic investigations have been conducted in the past years in 
order to be able to address the safety relevance of issues to be decided upon.  
Further, the utilities applied for regular plant changes by supplementing the usually re-
quested deterministic reasoning with a probabilistic analysis, i. e. investigating the impact 
of the change to the safety level of the plant explicitly.  
2 Status of PSAs available  
The analysed plant reference states of the PSAs conducted in the framework of the 1st 
round of the PSRs range from 1994 to 1997, partly including plant modifications already 
planned at the time, but realised afterwards. The scope of a PSA in the framework of this 
1st PSR corresponded to the GERMAN PSR GUIDELINE [1], i. e. a level 1 PSA without the 
analysis of low power and shutdown plant states (LPSS), Accident Management (AM) 
measures, internal fires or external events. Meanwhile, these topics have been addressed by 
the utility – also due to recommendations given by the reviewing body (TÜV) with the 
final statement of the 1st PSR – but not completely been reviewed.  
It has to be stressed that the PSR GUIDELINE [1] has recently been considerably up-dated 
and supplemented [2]. Thereby, also other recommendations given by the reviewer with 
the objective of a continuation and up-dating of the existing PSAs will be tackled – like an 
extension of the existing Human Reliability Assessments (HRAs) and the additional prob-
abilistic analysis of LPSS.  
In the meantime, the 2nd round of the Safety Review (SR) has been started according to the 
fixed schedule since the amendment of the Atomic Law. Recently, we started with the re-
viewing process of the PSA of one of the NPPs concerned, which represents a considerable 
expansion regarding the scope in comparison to the PSAs submitted and finally reviewed 
during the 1st PSR. 
That means, the eventually reviewed PSAs available up-to now for the NPPs do reflect a 
conservative result with respect to the quantification of the safety level (plant hazard states, 
because AM measures are not credited); on the other hand, the scope of the PSAs con-
ducted is not comprehensive with respect to risk contributions. Moreover, the current plant 
states do no longer correspond to these existing reviewed PSAs, for not every plant 
changes realised after the performance of the PSAs are reflected in the plant modelling. 
3 Objectives  
Main objective of additional probabilistic analyses is to obtain different, safety relevant 
insights that can support the safety assessment and decision making process in the regula-
tory procedures. In particular, the regulatory body is interested in acquiring as much rele-
vant insights as possible for the safety assessment to be conducted and the decisions to be 
taken. Moreover, it is possible to quantify safety benefits, to assess the balance of the 
Spitzer: Utilisation of Probabilistic Investigations to Support Safety Assessment and Risk Management 
 
3 
safety concept and to be able to concentrate on safety relevant issues, i. e. to prioritise ac-
tions to be taken. All in all, such an approach provides an additional instrument to support 
the necessary safety assessment and the decision making process for the regulatory body 
(UM) as well as for the utility.  
The utilities have the same objective in performing additional probabilistic analyses, i. e. 
gathering as much safety relevant insights and results as possible. In addition, their goal 
can be related more to the concentration on really safety relevant issues, i. e. to prioritise 
their activities and efforts against the background of cost – benefit considerations. 
However, the regulatory procedures are deterministic for the time being, and a structured 
and systematic implementation of supplementing probabilistic investigations – in particular 
concerning regular plant changes – is primarily voluntary, and thus subject to arguments 
and convincing. 
Therefore, TÜV had already in the end of the 90th developed a concept, see SPITZER et al. 
[3], on how to conduct an integrated safety assessment by utilising PSAs with respect to 
regular plant changes to provide a discussion basis within the regulatory procedures and to 
develop a common understanding at the parties involved.  
Some time later, TÜV developed an expanded concept, see SPITZER et al. [4], on request of 
UM related to the documentation to be provided by the utility in case of the performance of 
additional probabilistic analyses within the usual Regulatory Plant Change Procedure 
(RPCP) as well as the formal processing of a future supplemented probabilistic assessment, 
in particular addressing the issue of when such additional assessments should be per-
formed. 
Hereafter, recent activities being carried out are described in some detail, i. e. examples 
related to the present practice of supplementing probabilistic investigations to support 
safety assessment and risk management in the decision making processes will be given. 
Further, basic facts of the concept developed, i. e. the formal processing of a future sup-
plemented probabilistic assessment within the usual RPCP and the topics in terms of con-
tent will be described to some extent, for details see SPITZER et al [4].  
4 Probabilistic Investigations  
The areas where supplementing probabilistic investigations outside the by now mandatory 
SR have in practice been conducted can roughly be identified firstly as principal issues the 
regulators wanted to be investigated in order to benefit from the different approach with 
respect to possibly different safety relevant insights for the NPPs under consideration.  
Further, additional probabilistic analyses have been carried out regarding necessary as-
sessments which had a very specific reason. 
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Last but not least, usual plant modifications resp. changes planned have been supplemented 
by the utilities with probabilistic analyses with the objective to investigate the impact of 
the modification to the safety level of the plant.  
4.1 Principal Issues 
Recommendations given with the conclusion of the 1st PSR e. g. referred to the probabilis-
tic analysis of LPSS, internal fire events as well as AM measures.  
These topics, that had not been subject of the investigations within the 1st PSR, were felt to 
be very important to assess the respective contributions to the plant risk, and to possibly 
identify safety relevant plant improvements and optimisations. 
A major initiative in this context for example referred to the performance and subsequent 
review of probabilistic analyses for the LPSS for the NPPs in Baden-Württemberg. Main 
emphasis of the review work performance for these LPSS analyses referred to the 
• documentation and plant reference state 
• evaluation of the plant operating states (POS) according to the operational experi-
ence, outage scheduling, available system technique and containment state 
• determination of potential initiating events to be considered and the identification 
of relevant events to be analysed explicitly 
• evaluation of all parameters needed 
• Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) and Human Factors (HF) analyses 
• definition and categorisation of final states of event tree analyses.  
For the performance of LPSS probabilistic analyses (by the way also for the analysis of 
AM measures), the HRA resp. the HF analysis can no longer be considered only to a lim-
ited extend, they have a major relevance, see SPITZER [5]. The reason for it is that in con-
trast to the Full Power Operating State (FPOS) the control of malfunctions has basically to 
be carried out manually. Besides, in most plants the operating procedures – event and 
symptom oriented as well as AM measures – have been developed, designed and imple-
mented for the FPOS (including an extensive training), and therefore do not inevitably 
match with the requirements and demand of the LPSS; the latter also applies to the so far 
used HRA approach which had initially been developed for FPOS circumstances – evi-
dently for historical reasons. 
Another issue that requires much more attention in the LPSS refers to the analysis of the 
consequences of human erroneous behaviour related to pre-accident human actions which 
have to be addressed adequately for these LPSS probabilistic analyses, see SPITZER [5].  
The most important HF relevant issues that have been identified during the review of the 
LPSS analyses and consequently need to be addressed refer to a larger scope for making a 
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decision, relatively large time windows, the communication between members of several 
teams in different places in the plant and knowledge based behaviour; further, there are 
higher demands for administrative and organisational coordination and communication, 
physical restrictions due to the environment (like radiation, high temperature, steam) as 
well as a potential for the so-called Errors of Commission (EoC). 
The most important insights from the review of the LPSS probabilistic analyses subse-
quently concerned the necessity to 
• ensure an available system technique in the different POS 
• develop strategies for the control of incidents, malfunctions and accidents during 
the LPSS in corresponding operating procedures 
• preferably utilise an advanced HRA resp. HF methodology, see SPITZER [5], instead 
of the mostly used conventional approach THERP [6]. 
Based on these results and insights, a comprehensive project has been initiated regarding 
the further development of operating procedures for the LPSS for all NPPs in Baden-
Württemberg. Thus, consistent symptom oriented procedures related to LPSS have been 
developed and submitted for review. These procedures are based on action guiding 
schemes for all POS, including the adaptation of safety goals to follow-up and control un-
der the circumstances of LPSS. 
The regulatory body has been very satisfied about the identification of the safety relevant 
plant improvements and optimisations obtained related to the LPSS; this can also be stated 
for other principal issues being subject of probabilistic analyses and subsequent review, 
e. g. internal fire events and AM measures. 
4.2 Assessments with Specific Reason 
In case of some unexpected occurrences in the plant operation or requests resulting from 
certain technical constraints, probabilistic analyses and investigations had eventually to be 
performed in the regulatory procedures in order to be able to really assess the safety rele-
vance of the issue to be decided upon. 
Different cases of application have successfully been conducted in the regulatory proce-
dures depending on the occurrences and on request; in this paper, selected representative 
case studies will be outlined – also with respect to plant modifications planned and ad-
dressed in the next chapter. 
A corresponding example referred to the realisation of a certain plant change, namely the 
reconstruction of two redundant electrical trains planned and scheduled for two consecu-
tive outages of the corresponding NPP. 
The reconstruction work in one of the electrical trains has been carried out in the first out-
age after the approval of the regulatory body. The implementation of the changes in the 
second electrical train has been scheduled for the subsequent outage. 
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Thereafter, the following circumstances turned out: due to the limited space in the affected 
electronic equipment rooms, the usual inspections and maintenance tasks would have to be 
carried out temporally after the implementation of the plant changes related to the electri-
cal train affected, i. e. the reconstruction work. This consecutive work performance would 
have resulted in a significantly longer outage period. 
The utility therefore requested to disconnect the affected electrical train two months before 
the 2nd outage to carry out the reconstruction work. They substantiated this request by 
probabilistic investigations and corresponding assessments.  
TÜV then conducted quite expanded analyses in order to assess the safety relevance of this 
request. In the course of this, the time dependent unavailability related to system functions, 
event sequences and initiating events has been analysed with regard to the impact of dis-
connecting the affected electrical train during the FPOS two months before the scheduled 
outage.  
Thereby, the evidence could be demonstrated that the reconstruction already carried out 
during the precedent outage resulted in such a safety relevant improvement, that the dis-
connecting of the other electrical train two months before the subsequent outage implied 
only a very minor relative risk increase in comparison to not disconnecting.  
On basis of the integral view provided by the probabilistic investigations and assessments 
taking into account the risk development in the course of time, the utilities´ request could 
be supported and approved by the regulatory body. 
In another case, during the periodic testing a slightly increased leakage had been identified 
at the mechanical shaft seal of a component cooling pump which is part of safety system of 
the respective NPP.  
The utility requested to replace the component cooling pump instantaneously during FPOS 
by disconnecting the corresponding train – though the reliable operation on demand of the 
component cooling pump was still assumed, also in consideration of the finding during the 
test procedure. The reviewer affirmed the functional capability of the component cooling 
pump given the very minor leakage identified during the testing. Nevertheless, it could not 
be excluded that the deterioration mechanism at the mechanical shaft seal would progress. 
This would then result in an increased failure probability of the component cooling pump 
up to the total loss on demand.  
In order to support the decision to be taken by the regulatory body, the following two strat-
egies related to the time period up to the next periodic testing have probabilistically been 
investigated and assessed: 
• instantaneous replacement of the component cooling pump with a defined discon-
necting of the corresponding train 
• no replacement of the component cooling pump resulting in a likely increase of the 
failure rates up to the total loss on request. 
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TÜV performed detailed sensitivity and uncertainty analyses for the two strategies to be 
decided upon by also considering possible variations in the disconnecting time period and 
the potential increase in the failure probability of the component cooling pump. 
As result of the probabilistic analyses, the two strategies showed practically no difference 
with respect to the impact on the safety level of the plant - assuming a limited disconnect-
ing time period which could be expected and a certain increase in the failure rates which 
has been estimated. 
The utilities´ request to replace the component cooling pump instantaneously during FPOS 
could be approved by the regulatory body – but on basis of substantial results and safety 
relevant insights provided. 
4.3 Plant Modifications Planned 
For the regular plant modifications planned and applied for by the utilities within the 
RPCP, the a. m. expanded concept of an integrated safety assessment has been developed. 
This concept aims at a systematic and structured procedure on when and how such plant 
modifications should be supplemented by probabilistic analyses.  
As this concept is not yet formally implemented in the RPCP, plant modifications have 
been applied for in a case-by-case approach. Due to the lack of binding guidelines agreed 
up-to-now in Baden-Württemberg for the performance of supplemented probabilistic as-
sessments within the RPCP, in most cases TÜV had to conduct a quite expanded analysis 
on the basis of the reviewers´ PSA in order to assess the impact of the change on the safety 
level of the plant thus being able to assess the safety relevance of the modification. The 
review and subsequent assessment essentially followed the concept developed and ex-
plained in this paper afterwards on how to conduct such an integrated safety assessment.  
In quite a number of cases replacements and/or changes in the maintenance respectively 
surveillance test intervals in various electrical systems have been applied for and supple-
mented by the utilities with probabilistic assessments with the objective to investigate the 
impact of the modification to the safety level of the plant. A representative example will be 
outlined hereafter.  
One of the applied plant changes in the framework of the RPCP referred to the prolonga-
tion of the surveillance test interval (doubling) of digital protective relay. The impact of 
this plant change has been assessed by the utility in a quite global manner therefore TÜV 
had to conduct more detailed probabilistic investigations. 
First of all, the possible impact of the proposed change, i. e. the prolongation of the surveil-
lance test interval of the digital protective relay concerned had to be evaluated. The poten-
tial impact could only be assed indirectly with respect to the respective assigned technical 
component to be protected by the protective relay. One of the consequences evaluated in 
case of a possible degradation in the function of the digital protective relay could for ex-
ample result in an erroneous turning-off of the assigned technical component.  
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After the identification of all assigned technical components affected by the prolongation 
of the surveillance test interval of the digital protective relay concerned, sensitivity analy-
ses have been performed addressing the potential indirect impact on the technical compo-
nents´ failure behaviour. The probabilistic analyses have been carried out successively for 
the initiating events, event sequences as well as system functions affected.  
The probabilistic analyses related to the potential erroneous turning-off of the assigned 
technical components revealed a non-negligible safety relevance of the modification for a 
certain system function. This system function however has been dominated by the opera-
tional failure behaviour of a pump basically resulting from a rather short observation pe-
riod. Consequently, the potential indirect impact of the prolongation of the surveillance test 
interval of the digital protective relay modelled in this case represented a gross overestima-
tion.  
Nevertheless, it has been recommended to follow-up and to evaluate the failure modes of 
the technical components affected in particular with respect to possible contributions of the 
digital protective relay in order to address this insight obtained.  
On basis of the overall probabilistic investigations and assessments, the applied prolonga-
tion of the surveillance test interval of digital protective relay could be approved, but the 
a. m. recommendations as well as some further aspects addressed by the reviewer have to 
be observed.  
Though the approach for these case by case reviews and integrated safety assessments has 
not fully been satisfying (the plant reference state has not been up-dated in the framework 
of the RPCP), additional insights could always be achieved – in contrast to a purely deter-
ministic approach – in order to support the necessary decision making process. 
5 Integrated Safety Assessment 
In order to perform an integrated safety assessment – that means the performance of de-
terministic and supplemented probabilistic assessments within the usual RPCP – in a more 
structured way, a consistent concept has been proposed addressing the prerequisites, the 
formal processing, the documentation to be provided and the topics in terms of content. 
Hereafter, basic facts of this concept developed will be outlined, for details see SPITZER et 
al [4]. 
5.1 Prerequisites 
Prerequisite for the performance of an integrated safety assessment including additional 
probabilistic analyses is a plant specific PSA which has been reviewed in detail.  
Further, the existing PSAs should be up-dated and reviewed referring to the plant reference 
state, including the realisations of the recommendations given with the final statement in 
the previous PSR.  
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Moreover, very detailed and specified procedures should be agreed on in order to carry out 
this up-dating consistently and efficiently. Besides, changes reflected in the PSA model 
should remain there, also in such cases which initially have no risk impact.  
5.2 Formal Processing 
The formal processing of a future supplemented probabilistic assessment within the RPCP 
has been proposed as a step by step procedure: only plant changes applied for, where a risk 
impact is generally expected and consequences on the existing PSAs are identified, should 
be subject of an immediate supplemented probabilistic assessment; the remaining plant 
changes are probabilistically assessed later in a summarised form (see figure 1).  
 
 
Plant Changes
 [A, B, C]
 
 
 
No  [ ]β 
Yes [ ]β, γ 
Yes [ ] γ 
No [ ]α 
 
 
Fig. 1: Formal processing of a supplemented probabilistic assessment within the Regu-
latory Plant Change Procedure (RPCP) 
5.3 Documentation 
The documentation to be provided and submitted for γ plant changes, i. e. in case of the 
performance of additional probabilistic analyses, should be comprised of the following 
parts: 
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A definition of the plant change with a detailed description of the current and planned 
status including the prevailing impacts 
B performance of deterministic evaluations as well as probabilistic assessments 
C development of monitoring strategies for the plant change 
D application of the plant change according to the formal RPCP. 
The utilities´ documentation should aim at the evidence that the following principles are 
met: 
I The proposed plant change is consistent with the current regulations and safety 
concept (defence-in-depth philosophy). 
II Including the plant change, there are still sufficient safety margins. 
III Including the plant change, the safety level of the plant is maintained. 
IV The impact of the plant change is monitored by corresponding strategies. 
The submittal of such a γ plant change applied for would then be subject of a concrete re-
view in the framework of the formal RPCP with the objective of an integrated safety as-
sessment before the regulators´ approval and the utilities´ implementation.  
5.4 Assessment in Terms of Content 
For the demonstration of the adherence of a proposed plant change to the principles listed 
above, the following issues should be addressed in the submittal and have to be reviewed 
specifically: 
All safety impacts of a proposed plant change are evaluated and assessed in an integrated 
manner. An e. g. minor risk increase due to a slight increase in some evaluated frequencies 
of plant hazard states can be compensated by the qualitative description of the safety rele-
vant benefit of the change.  
The scope and quality of the evaluations and analyses conducted are suitable to justify the 
plant change and to support a risk-informed assessment and decision making; they are ba-
sed on the current plant state and reflect the existing operating experience. 
Appropriate consideration is given to the associated uncertainties in the analyses and the 
interpretation of the insights obtained. Significant uncertainties should be monitored and a 
feedback as well as possibly needed corrective actions should be anticipated. 
Basis of the probabilistic assessment are the currently available and reviewed frequencies 
of plant hazard states; thereby, a categorisation of the hazard states should be carried out, 
particularly with respect to the potential of a large early release.  
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A proposed plant change has eventually to be analysed and assessed in accordance with the 
usual deterministic principles and criteria; additionally, probabilistic analyses and assess-
ments have to be performed.  
The probabilistic assessment is carried out on basis of the analyses performed and the ro-
bustness of the insights and results obtained, particularly considering the uncertainties in 
data, models and assumptions. In this context, a possible further impact of the plant change 
on not explicitly reflected subject areas has to be addressed and assessed appropriately.  
The deterministic evaluations and probabilistic assessments have to be brought together 
aiming at demonstrating the evidence that the plant change is consistent with the current 
regulations and safety concept, that there are still sufficient safety margins and the safety 
level of the plant is maintained, and that the impact of the plant change is monitored by 
corresponding strategies.  
6 Conclusions 
After the conclusion of the 1st PSR, PSAs for all NPPs in Baden-Württemberg have been 
available which have also been reviewed. It was felt meaningful to utilise these PSAs af-
terwards also to assess specific issues to be dealt with in the usual regulatory procedures as 
well as to up-date and expand the existing PSAs with respect to recommendations given.  
Thus, in various cases probabilistic investigations have been conducted in the past years in 
order to be able to address the safety relevance of issues. Further, the utilities applied for 
regular plant changes by supplementing the usually requested deterministic reasoning with 
a probabilistic analysis, i. e. investigating the impact of the change on the safety level of 
the plant explicitly. 
Additional probabilistic investigations are performed in order to support decisions to be 
taken in the regulatory procedures. As the legal basis is still mainly deterministic, such a 
performance – in particular concerning regular plant changes – is voluntary. 
Nevertheless, regulators, utilities and reviewers appreciate the explicit usefulness and be-
nefit, i.e. the safety relevant insights exceeding a purely deterministic consideration.  
The areas where supplementing probabilistic investigations have been conducted refer to 
principal issues the regulators wanted to be investigated, issues regarding necessary as-
sessments which had a specific reason as well as plant changes planned within the RPCP 
aiming at an integrated safety assessment.  
A major initiative in this context for example referred to the performance and review of 
probabilistic analyses for the LPSS for the NPPs in Baden-Württemberg resulting in sig-
nificant results and insights consequently leading to major safety relevant plant improve-
ments and optimisations.  
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Further cases of application – also related to assessments which had a specific reason as 
well as regular plant changes – always resulted in supplementing significant results and 
insights being able to support the necessary safety assessment and the decision making 
process in the regulatory procedures. In order to perform an integrated safety assessment 
within the usual RPCP in a less case-by-case approach, i. e. in a more structured way, a 
consistent concept has been proposed addressing the prerequisites, the formal processing, 
the documentation to be provided and the topics in terms of content.  
The performance of additional probabilistic analyses in regulatory procedures related to 
specific issues to be dealt with and to be decided upon as well as regular plant changes in a 
step by step way of proceeding within the RPCP is regarded to be feasible, appropriate and 
beneficial for all parties involved. 
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(2) SKB – Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB; Oskarshamn; Sweden 
Abstract. In order to handle long living radioactive waste Sweden is planning 
to build a deep repository that requires no monitoring by future generations. 
The spent nuclear fuel will be encapsulated in copper canisters consisting of a 
graphite cast iron insert shielded by an outer 30-50 mm thick copper cylinder 
for corrosion and radiation protection. The cast iron insert provides the neces-
sary strength and shielding of radiation. The critical part of the encapsulation 
of spent fuel is the sealing of the canister which is done by welding the copper 
lid to the cylindrical part of the canister. Two welding techniques have been 
developed in parallel at the canister lab in Oskarshamn, Electron Beam Weld-
ing (EBW) and Friction Stir Welding (FSW). Mid 2005 SKB decided that 
FSW is the preferred sealing technique.A subpart of the final risk assessment 
for the deep repository is to determine the risk of premature canister leak 
caused by discontinuities in the insert, in the sealing weld or elsewhere in the 
copper shielding. Therefore the quality of the production processes and the re-
liability of the NDT system must be satisfactorily determined and combined to 
derive assumptions regarding the frequency of undetected production disconti-
nuities in relation to the acceptance criteria for the ensemble of canisters. The 
reliability of the NDT systems can be derived from POD curves which are in-
vestigated for X-ray and ultrasonic techniques applied by SKB. The POD 
evaluation was carried out by BAM in a joint project for SKB and is evaluated 
within the common “â versus a” approach according to the MIL1823 and some 
extensions due to the more complex flaw situations in the canisters compared 
to the original aerospace applications. 
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1 The Swedish Deposit Project 
Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management 
Co) is responsible for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden. 
In order to handle the long living radioactive waste (spent nuclear fuel) SKB is planning to 
build a deep repository that requires no monitoring by future generations. The spent nu-
clear fuel will be encapsulated in copper canisters consisting of a graphite cast iron insert. 
The KBS-3 system is based on a multi barrier system where the canister is the primary 
barrier. The cast iron insert gives the canister the necessary strength and the outer shell that 
gives corrosion protection is made of oxygen free copper. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB (SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Man-
agement Co) is responsible for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden. 
 
 
Fig. 2: The canisters will then be deposited in the bedrock, embedded in bentonite clay, at 
a depth of 500 meters.  
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SKB’s efforts are based on a stepwise program for the implementation of deep geological 
disposal of spent fuel including concurrent activities in the areas of deep repository- and 
encapsulation technology. Major milestones in the program are application for construction 
and building of an encapsulation plant in 2006 and a deep repository in 2008. According to 
the program initial operation for the system will start in 2017. The most critical part of the 
encapsulation process is the sealing of the canister, which is done by welding the copper 
lid to the cylindrical part of the copper shell. The canisters will then be deposited in the 
bedrock, embedded in bentonite clay, at a depth of 500 meters. 
 
       
Fig. 3: Outfit of the Copper Canister 
 
The safety and reliability of the whole systems i.e. the well sealed deposit of the radioac-
tive material under all possible influencing scenarios will be guaranteed by modern means 
of risk assessment and management. 
2 Welding and risk assessment 
The welding techniques studied are electron beam welding (EBW) and friction stir welding 
(FSW). Both techniques are developed in parallel at the SKB Canister Laboratory (see Fig. 
1) in Oskarshamn (Sweden) [1]. According to the different metallurgical welding processes 
they reveal a quite different variety of discontinuity’s to be detected by NDT techniques 
and different material micro-structure. 
A subpart of the final risk assessment of the deep repository construction is to determine 
the risk of premature canister leak caused by discontinuities in the sealing weld. The dis-
continuities occurring during the production welding process create a diminishing of the 
wall thickness. The possible additional reduction of the wall thickness by ground water 
corrosion makes a minimum rest wall thickness of 15 mm copper necessary. A conse-
quence for the applied NDT methods is to detect all critical discontinuities which would 
reduce the wall thickness to an amount near or below the 15 mm with a validated high reli-
ability the value of which needs to be known for the further risk assessment. 
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a: Principle of the electron beam welding b: Principle of the friction stir welding 
Fig. 4: Principe of the Electron beam welding and Stir friction welding 
 
  
Fig. 5: The weld with possible discontinuity configurations 
 
The NDT techniques applied and adapted by SKB are high energy (9 MeV) X-ray-
technique and mechanized ultrasonic phased array technique (2…5 MHz) according to the 
material structure [1]. Since the materials structures and connected possible discontinuity 
scenarios created by the welding techniques are different the development of NDT tech-
niques and reliability measurement has also been tailored to the particular welding methods 
– e.g. higher frequencies for UT were possible for FSW. Mid 2005 SKB decided that FSW 
is the preferred sealing technique. 
The BAM was providing its expertise in optimizing non-destructive testing to a certain 
extent and the corresponding reliability assessment to the project during 2004-2005. The 
applied non-destructive testing methods are in a first step checked and optimized concern-
ing the physical parameters and set up according to the latest European and American 
standards. For the detailed optimization of the radiographic technique the BAM “X-ray” 
simulation tool [2] is applied to various parameter options thus saving lots of expensive 
experiments. BAM UT-simulation was used to understand the UT-signal response from 
special discontinuities types better as input for the POD. [3] 
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a: Radiographic testing b: Mechanized ultrasonic testing with phased array 
technique 
Fig. 6: Non-destructive testing methods used in the project. 
3 Reliability Assessment using POD 
Steered by the plan of experiments for the welding procedure optimization and verifica-
tion, the POD (Probability of Detection) for the discontinuities is determined using a sys-
tematic statistical methodology. The POD method, where the detection probability is 
determined as a function of discontinuity size, was originally developed for the US military 
aerospace sector [4] for 1-dimensional signals. For the more complex 3-dimensional dis-
continuity situation in the canister welds and 2-dimensional data fields the method needs to 
be developed further. From the POD curve and its lower confidence bound the discontinu-
ity size is derived that will be detected with sufficient reliability and compared to the de-
mand for integrity. This procedure includes a series of experiments with the SKB X-ray 
and ultrasonic methods foreseen for the production. 
These results have to be compared to true discontinuity configurations in the welds. To 
determine these “true discontinuity configurations” the welds have to be tested destruc-
tively or tested with a more comprehensive non-destructive reference method. To save the 
parts and the effort for the destruction, the BAM selected a high energy computed tomo-
graphy (HECT, or CT) method as reference completed by focussed ultrasonic transmission 
measurement. Finally all reference measurements were verified or corrected by destructive 
tests. Fig. 7 shows all the results for a wormhole in weld No. FSW 5 at 136° position. In 
figure part a) a JLH is seen in addition (green colour). 
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(a) SKB UT-scan (JLH+wormhole) 
 
(b) SKB-RT scan (wormhole) 
 
(c) CT of wormholes 
 
(d) Wormhole cross section FSW5-136 
Fig. 7: Example: Weld FSW5 Section 136° 
 
The basic principle of the signal response analysis or “â versus a” evaluation is shown in 
Fig. 8. A discontinuity of size a (crack depth in Fig. 8) is causing a signal of height â. The 
statistical distribution of the signals in dependence of the discontinuity size yields a certain 
POD curve which is described in more exact terms in the following section. 
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For automated thresholding systems a forecast of the POD 
is possible from the statistics of the response signals
a
â
a â POD
defect size signal magnitude probability of 
detection 
experiments or 
modelling
calculations with
log-normal-distribution
(or other statistical model)
response
typical POD
POD
a
100 %
log a
log â
linear or more general relationship
 
Fig. 8: Quantify the risk: „â versus a“ 
 
3.1 â versus a analysis 
3.1.1 General description [2] 
Consider a quantitative NDT system. As a result of the investigation of a discontinuity 
having size a, it generates a signal â. If the signal exceeds a certain decision threshold âdec, 
the system registers a flaw detection. As the NDT system is influenced by uncontrolled 
factors, discontinuities of the same size can cause signals of different strength. For this 
reason the strength of the signal â to the discontinuity of size a is considered as a random 
value and associated with a probability density ga(â). The relation between a and â can be 
expressed as follows: 
                     δµ += )(ˆ aa  (1) 
Here µ(a) equals the mean value of ga(â) and δ is the random error whose distribution de-
termines the probability density ga(â). 
In practice, it is often assumed that δ is distributed normally with zero mean and constant 
(independent of a) variance. ga(â) is then the normal density function with mean µ(a) and 
variance equal to that of δ. 
The probability of detection (POD) as function of the size of the discontinuity is: 
                     adagaaaPa
a a
ˆ )ˆ(])(ˆ[ )ˆPOD(
decˆ
dec ∫+∞=>=  (2) 
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Fig. 9 illustrates this formula. The probability of detection is represented as hatched part of 
the area under the bell curve. 
 
Discontinuity size, a
Si
gn
al
,â
Decision threshold, âdec
a1
POD(a1)
a2
POD(a2)
ga1(â)
ga2(â)
 
Fig. 9: Probability of detection 
 
3.1.2 Calculation of the POD 
Source data are a and â – arrays of length n that contain sizes of the discontinuities and 
response magnitudes, respectively, and the decision threshold âdec. Note that the theory for 
dealing with censored data has been developed (see [5]) but is not used here, because the 
data sets available to us do no contain censored data. The censored data are the signals that 
cannot be registered by the system because they are either under the recording threshold or 
above the saturation threshold. 
3.1.3 Calculation of the POD function parameters 
The following formula is commonly used to model the relation between a and â: 
δββ +⋅+= aa lnˆln 10  (3) 
Here δ is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance 2δσ . 
Under the assumptions of the model, the POD function has the following form: 
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⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ=>=>= σ
µaaaPaaPa ln)]ˆln()ˆ[ln( ]ˆ[ )POD( decdec  (4) 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function, and 
1
1
0decˆln
β
σσ
β
βµ
δ=
−= a
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
The parameters β0, β1 and σδ describe the linear dependency of â on a and have the follow-
ing meaning: 
β0 Intercept 
β1 Slope 
σδ Standard deviation of the residuals 
Their values are estimated from the arrays a and â using the method of maximum likeli-
hood. 
3.1.4 The 95% lower confidence POD 
The 95% lower confidence bound is given by the following formula: 
( )hza −Φ= ˆ)(POD95  (7) 
where σ
µ−= az lnˆ  and the variable h reflects the sample size and the scatter of the source 
data. The calculation of h is thoroughly described in [5]. 
This general formalism has now to be applied to the discontinuity detection problem within 
the scope of welding optimization and risk assessment. 
3.2 POD - The Original Task (full programs) 
The original task (together with the welding optimization) is to make sure that only one of 
1000 canisters might contain a critical discontinuity situation where in total more or equal 
35 mm of the Cu-wall is missing. 
From the naturally real existing POD as a function of all possible influencing parameters 
we have to extract the POD as function of the flaw radial dimension by a dedicated „Plan 
of Experiments“ and reasonable mean value operations (see Formula 1). The full program 
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is only feasible with a number of additional experiments. But in order to learn where we 
are with our current NDT technique and where to optimize, we need a POD assessment of 
the state of the art using an “Adapted POD Assessment”. 
)(POD),...,(POD radial1 agaaf n =→=  (8) 
Formula 1: Extraction of the POD as a function of the radial size. 
3.3 „Adapted POD Assessment“  
Volumetric flaws and area-like (non-volumetric) flaws will be treated separately – for EB 
as well as for FSW 
• Volumetric flaws RT 
• area like flaws UT 
The physically reasonable „â versus a“ PODs are applied to the parameter configurations 
shown on 13. 
 
Fig. 10: Input parameters to the POD 
 
We determine the a90/95 magnitudes i.e. the size a of the flaw for which the lower 95% con-
fidence bound crosses the 90% POD level i.e. it is guaranteed that flaws with a size of 
a90/95 will be detected with 90% probability where only 5% might fall outside this confi-
dence limit in case the experiment is repeated. We work with the assumption – given by 
the manufacturing experts – that only one of 100 canisters might have a critical flaw. Then 
the above argumentation yields: Only each of 1000 canisters might have a leakage. 
3.4 Integrity Requirement 
The flaw radial size has to be limited so that a remaining wall thickness of 15 mm is guar-
anteed against ground water corrosion. The maximum allowed flaw size in the radial direc-
tion is 35 mm. Together with the above POD an additional flaw geometry statistics has to 
provide for the four groups 
• FSW volumetric area-like 
• EB volumetric area-like 
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separately, no flaws of ar ≥ 35 mm will be present. No flaw of radial size ar ≥ 35 mm can 
be among the flaw assembly below a90/95, that means no a ≤ a90/95 should have at the same 
time an ar ≥ 35 mm. This would yield a reasonable justification of the system to meet the 
above integrity requirement, as long as the existing flaw configurations are representative 
for the welds. Look for the “correlation” in the scatter diagrams: 
• penetrated flaw length by X-ray ÅÆ  radial dimension 
• area perpendicular to UT beam ÅÆ  radial dimension 
3.5 Results 
In the following diagrams we illustrate the results for several examples of flaws for EBW 
and FSW detected by X–rays (RT) and ultrasound (UT).  
3.5.1 Results for Electron Beam Welding (EBW) 
Fig. 11 shows the basic “â versus a” logarithmic diagram for the radiographic maximum 
contrast as a function the discontinuity size penetrated by the X-rays. The dependence is 
quite linear but shows a considerable scatter. The original values are shown in the diagram 
on the upper side. The lower diagram shows the values without outliers. This version is 
more reasonable because the discontinuities behind the outliers were created with perturba-
tions to the welding process far outside the normal parameter window.  
The corresponding probability of detection and its lower confidence bound (Fig. 12) yield 
an a90/95 value of about 2 mm for the penetrated size (2.3 with outliers and 1.9 without). 
Now we have to make sure the corresponding radial dimension will not exceed the critical 
size for all penetrated sizes below a90/95. 
Fig. 13 shows the discontinuity size statistics, where the penetrated sizes are plotted 
against the radial dimensions for all observed volumetric discontinuities for the EBW. The 
critical region is the red hatched area, where discontinuities with critical radial dimensions 
above the critical size would occur belonging to sizes a below a90/95. As seen in Fig. 13, the 
real discontinuity configurations are far away from this. The radial discontinuity dimension 
ar belonging to a90/95 is about 3.6 mm. For an exact determination of the corresponding 
radial dimension a complete geometrical model for the discontinuities shape would be nec-
essary. The data points were too few for this. That is why we turned to an empirical as-
sessment: The value ar is taken as the maximum radial size between the discontinuities 
with the area/penetrated length less than a90/95 plus 1 mm. The 1 mm is for the uncertainty 
in the radial dimension from destructive testing/reference methods. 
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Fig. 11: L025 RT scatter diagram 
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Fig. 12: L025 RT POD 
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Fig. 13: L025 RT critical region 
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The Fig. 14 to Fig. 16 show the same types of diagrams (as presented in Fig. 11 to Fig. 13 
for RT) for the UT- investigation of area like discontinuities for EBW. The â is the ultra-
sonic echo height and a is the reflecting area of the discontinuity. The scatter of signals is 
wider and the a90/95 is larger. When the area is plotted in a logarithmic scale the “â versus 
a” looks quite linear even when the bigger flaws of the right hand side are taken into ac-
count which are not so typical for the EBW process. As seen in Fig. 16, again all observed 
discontinuities are far away from the critical region. 
These results should be taken as a rough confirmation that the SKB NDT system is able to 
detect the volumetric discontinuities with X-ray technique and the area like discontinuities 
with UT phased array technique with high probability already far below all critical values. 
Since for EBW no destructive tests have been carried out the a90/95 might change a couple 
of millimetres due to the uncertainty of the true values determined via reference methods. 
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Fig. 14: L025 UT scatter diagram 
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Fig. 15: L025 UT POD 
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Fig. 16: L025 UT critical region 
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3.5.2 Results for Friction Stir Welding (FSW) 
Below the “Adapted POD Results” for the wormholes for RT- and UT-inspection are pre-
sented with the following pattern: First we present the “â versus a” scatter diagrams where 
the â’s in terms of maximum radiographic contrast and the maximum echo height, respec-
tively are plotted in dependence of the “a” in terms of penetrated length and area perpen-
dicular to the sound beam. For these signal sizes the actual thresholds are applied yielding 
the mean POD curves and the 95% confidence bound and the a90/95 as key parameter. As 
discussed above the additional scatter diagram showing the statistics of the “a” dimension 
in dependence of the radial dimension reveals for all cases that the “critical” region with 
critical radial dimensions belonging to “a”-values below a90/95 are far away from the actu-
ally occurring configurations.  
RT wormhole 
 
Fig. 17: Volumetric Discontinuity 
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Fig. 18: FSW5 RT scatter diagram  
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Fig. 18 shows the “â versus a” scatter diagram in terms of maximum radiographic contrast 
versus the by the X-rays penetrated length. A linear behaviour can be seen but with consid-
erable scatter which might be due to the zig-zag shape (see Fig. 17) causing uncertainties 
in the determination of the penetrated length.  
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Fig. 19: FSW5 RT POD  
 
The resulting POD curve and the 95% confidence bound in Fig. 19 indicate an a90/95 of 
2.6 mm for the penetrated length. The corresponding radial dimension of the discontinui-
ties “to detect for sure” is 4 mm as indicated in Fig. 20. 
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Fig. 20: Critical region based on radiographic inspection of volumetric discontinuities with 
the threshold 250 levels. 
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Fig. 21: FSW5 UT scatter diagram 
 
The same set of wormhole discontinuities as investigated above were inspected by ultra-
sound with “a” as area perpendicular to the sound beam and â as maximum echo ampli-
tude. The reference value for the area was taken from results from destructive tests (cubes). 
The scatter diagram in Fig. 21 indicates the already known fact that these discontinuities 
are not ideal reflectors of ultrasound and that the echo amplitude is affected by a number of 
other factors than the discontinuity size as listed in [6] for UT. The corresponding POD 
curve in Fig. 22 and the “critical region”- Fig. 23 reveals for a90/95 12.5 mm² and a corre-
sponding detectable radial dimension of 6.3 mm. The crosses in Fig. 23 represent results 
from destructive testing. 
Both methods are capable to detect the wormholes far below the required critical size but 
show even a potential to detect smaller discontinuities in studying the detection processes 
in more detail. 
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Fig. 22: POD curve based on ultrasonic inspection of volumetric discontinuities (threshold 
15%). 
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Fig. 23: Critical region based on ultrasonic inspection of volumetric discontinuities (thresh-
old 15%). 
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JLH 
 
Fig. 24: Cross section of a JLH (Joint Line Hooking) 
 
Fig. 24 shows a typical cross section of a JLH (Joint Line Hooking) discontinuity. It is 
clear that this shape not easily matching the empirical POD approach. The investigation 
was refined step by step: The first approach in investigating the JLH discontinuities was to 
apply the POD method in an empirical way. For this approach, the maximum echo ampli-
tude was used as â as before. First, a totally empirical “â versus a” scatter (Fig. 25) dia-
gram and POD (Fig. 26) were created. These included all the values of the SKB 
experiments which yields the a90/95 equal to the detectable radial dimension of 4.0. In the 
next step, outliers (too small and too big values compared to a "normal" amplitude versus 
size behaviour), were excluded. This resulted in detectable radial dimension is 3.2 mm due 
to the decreased scatter. 
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Fig. 25: Scatter diagram of the amplitude vs. radial size for the JLH-type discontinuities 
(log. axes). 
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Figure 26: POD curve for the JLH–type discontinuities (with outliers). 
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Figure 27: Scatter diagram of the amplitude vs. radial size for the JLH–type discontinuities 
(log. axes, without outliers). 
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Fig. 28: POD curve for the JLH–type discontinuities (outliers excluded). 
 
We looked deeper into the JLH geometry and echo heights and recognized that the "hook" 
part is in almost all cases indicated by the 0° or -10° sound beam and the straight part, the 
inclined plane or rectangle by the 10° and 20° sound beam. Consequently we should con-
sider the forming of the POD separately for hook and rectangle with the corresponding 
angle of the sound beam. Because the number of data points becomes too small after sepa-
ration we did not carry out this procedure yet. It might be considered as a future investiga-
tion to look deeper to the forming of the POD for the two parts of the JLH and the different 
angles separately in combining experimental and modelling insight after all the influencing 
factors has been listed carefully. It will depend on the importance of the JLH in the future 
welding process. 
3.6 Consideration of the total reliability 
The POD’s considered so far reveal the basic or intrinsic capability of the NDT methods 
and do not yet take into account the final industrial application factors and the human fac-
tor. The situation for general NDT systems – as outlined in the formula (2) - is described in 
detail in [7] and [8] and will be applied to the canister welds on a later stage of the project. 
It is planned to set up the NDT–system as automatic as possible to minimize the human 
factors or to apply double evaluation. 
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Fig. 29: Modular approach: the reliability formula 
4 Conclusions 
A Probability of Detection evaluation for the SKB-NDT processes has been successfully 
established to make sure the applied NDT techniques are able to reveal the occurring dis-
continuities, which might be overseen by NDT as an input for the final risk assessment. A 
generalization of the existing prescription for the signal response POD from the MIL 1823 
standard was necessary because the EBW and FSW welds of 50 mm thick Cu-canister-
welds are more complex than thin aerospace structures.  
The physical reasonable a90/95 values as discontinuity sizes, which are detected for sure 
need to be set in correspondence to the corresponding radial dimensions of discontinuities 
to provide the expected wall thickness reduction, which is of importance for the integrity 
requirement. For EBW these values are below 4 mm for volumetric flaws detected by radi-
ography and are not larger than 7 mm for area like flaws detected by UT. Subject of con-
sideration for FSW was the detectability of volumetric like wormholes and area like “Joint 
line hooking” with the SKB radiographic and ultrasonic methods. At the current state of 
the art all observed a90/95 values are for the wormholes for radiographs not larger than 
3 mm and for UT not larger than 13 mm2. The corresponding radial dimension are at 
maximum 4 mm for RT and 6 mm for UT in case the flaw configurations investigated here 
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represent the full possible scale which might occur in the welds under production condi-
tions.  
The empirical detectable radial dimension with UT for the “joint line hooking” is 4 mm.  
As result of this SKB-BAM project optimized testing techniques will be provided which 
are validated for the production process and which will guarantee the required rest wall 
thickness with sufficient reliability. The NDT reliability investigation is continued now for 
the iron cast insert and the copper shield. The joint SKB-BAM project is a contribution for 
the long term European public safety. 
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Statistical design of experiments applied to tests of metal 
detectors used for mine detection  
Mate Gaal, Christina Müller 
Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und –prüfung (BAM), Berlin  
Summary: This paper discusses the statistical design of experiments for test-
ing and evaluation of metal detectors used in humanitarian landmine clearance. 
Design of experiment is the process of planning the experiment so that appro-
priate data will be collected, enabling objective conclusions. In 2003 and 2005 
field tests were performed on the latest models of four metal detector manufac-
turers. The results of these tests are discussed in this paper. The tests were exe-
cuted according to the standard for testing and evaluation of metal detectors 
CWA 14747:2003 with the purpose of optimisation and more detailed specifi-
cation of the testing procedures.  
Many factors influence the reliability of a detection system, which consists of 
the physical and technical properties of the detector, the conditions of applica-
tion and the human operator. In demining, the most important influences are 
the detector, the mine type, the mine depth, the soil magnetic properties and the 
operator. Statistical design of experiments enables an unbiased estimate of the 
difference between detectors, at the same time minimising the experimental er-
ror, thus reducing the necessary number of repetitions. Only a scientifically 
planned experiment can separate the influences of all influencing factors, with 
the aim to select the most appropriate device for certain conditions of applica-
tion.  
A full factorial design was applied to the maximum detection height measure-
ments and a fractional factorial design to the blind tests, also called reliability 
tests. The performance indicators of the blind tests are the probability of detec-
tion (POD) and the false alarm rate (FAR). The statistical design of experi-
ments is applicable also in tests of the equipment used in non-destructive 
testing. 
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1 Test and evaluation of metal detectors 
Most efforts of the research and development community working on problems related to 
humanitarian demining were directed at improving landmine detection. Many scientists 
hoped to find a “silver bullet” solution among technologies not used before in the field. 
However, all developments in that direction have failed to meet field needs. The metal de-
tector is still the main detection tool in humanitarian demining, and it will probably con-
tinue to be for many more years  [1]. At the same time, we are witnessing substantial 
progress in testing and evaluation of demining equipment. A standard for testing and 
evaluation of metal detectors has been proposed in 2003. The CEN Workshop Agreement 
CWA 14747:2003 specifies standardised procedures for measuring the influences of many 
factors to the performance of metal detectors  [2]. The purpose of testing is to find the most 
suitable detector for a given set of conditions.  
Many tests described in the CWA 14747:2003 are based on maximum detection height 
measurements. The maximum detection height is the distance between the search head of 
the metal detector and the top of the target at which the detector starts to give clear signals 
in an experiment in which the position of the target is known to the operator. This quantity 
provides the information about the depths at which the mines in a minefield can still be 
detected.  
The blind in-field tests called detection reliability tests are the tests receiving the highest 
attention by detector end users, since they are performed in conditions as close as possible 
to the real minefield conditions. The operators are not familiar with the positions of the 
targets. They mark the assumed positions of the targets and the positions of their indica-
tions are compared with the actual target positions. If an indication falls inside a pre-
scribed circle called halo, the indication is counted as a true positive. If it falls outside, it is 
counted as a false positive indication. The halo radius, according to CWA 14747:2003, is 
“the half of the maximum horizontal extent of the metal components in the target plus 100 
mm”.  
The two values to be estimated by the results of a detection reliability test are the probabil-
ity of detection (POD) and the false alarm rate (FAR). The estimated probability of detec-
tion for a particular choice of targets, operators or detectors is the number of detected 
targets (true positives) divided by the total number of targets. The estimated false alarm 
rate is the number of false alarms (false positives) on a certain area divided by the size of 
that area. If we assume a binomial distribution for the number of detections, we can find 
95% confidence limits for the probability of detection. Similarly, if we assume Poisson 
distribution for the false alarms, we can construct 95% confidence limits for the false alarm 
rate  [3]. A ROC diagram is a diagram with the POD on the ordinate and the FAR on the 
abscissa, and it is a modification of a ROC diagram used in non-destructive testing, where 
the probability of detection is plotted against the probability of false alarms  [5] , [6],  [7].  
The other kind of diagram is the POD curve, presenting the dependence of the POD on a 
parameter, in our case the depth of the target. The POD curves and the corresponding re-
gression model are described in detail in the final report of the metal detector trial per-
formed in Benkovac, Croatia, 2005  [8].  
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The detection reliability tests owe their name to the concept of reliability, which is defined 
(CWA 14747:2003) as “the degree to which the metal detector is capable of achieving its 
purpose, which is to have maximum capability for giving true alarm indications without 
producing false alarm indications”. Detection reliability tests are the only tests that include 
the evaluation of the ability of metal detectors to deal with false alarms. In the context of 
testing, the detection of metal clutter is not considered as false alarm, since metal detectors 
are designed to detect metal. The main source of false alarms is the soils with frequency 
dependent magnetic susceptibility, causing alarms without presence of a metal fragment. 
Most metal detectors today have some ground compensating abilities, which means that 
they can decrease their sensitivity to soils with much smaller decrease of sensitivity to 
metal.  
There are many factors influencing the performance of metal detectors. They are all de-
scribed in a concept called “reliability formula”, first applied in non-destructive testing  [5], 
 [6]. The total reliability (R) of a detection system is described by three factors: intrinsic 
capability (IC) describing the physics and the basic technical capabilities of the device, and 
representing an upper limit of R; factors of application (AP) such as specific environmental 
conditions in the field generally diminishing R and finally the human factor (HF), which 
also lowers R. The mutual interaction of these factors is usually very complex.  
An important advantage of the detection reliability tests is that they include most of the 
factors influencing the performance of metal detectors. In the maximum detection height 
measurements the influence of the operator (or the “human factor” from the reliability 
model) is much smaller, but it is not entirely excluded. The operator sets up the metal de-
tector, performs the ground compensation, operates the device and decides whether the 
audio signal is a detection or noise. 
2 Design of experiment, basic principles 
The statistical design of experiments  [3] , [4] (sometimes called experimental design) is the 
process of planning the experiment considering all influencing factors so that appropriate 
data will be collected, enabling objective conclusions. A scientific approach to planning an 
experiment results in unambiguous results, which are as little affected by experimental 
error as possible. The use of experimental design in industry can result in products with 
better performance, reliability, lower production costs or shorter development time.  
In a designed experiment we make a difference between the predictor variables and the 
response variables describing a process. The predictor variables included in the experiment 
by controlling their values are called factors and the specific values that these factors can 
take in an experiment are called factor levels, or simply levels.  
The basic principles of experimental design are replication, randomisation and blocking. 
Replication is the repetition of the experiment. It allows the experimenter to estimate the 
experimental error. Randomisation is crucial for each design of experiment. Both the allo-
cation of the experimental material and the order of execution of measurements are deter-
mined randomly. As a result, errors are usually values of independently distributed random 
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variables. Another important consequence of randomisation can be “averaging out” the 
effects of extraneous factors that might be present. A block is a portion of the experimental 
material that is more homogeneous than the entire set of material. Comparisons can be 
made within each block. This way the variability between blocks does not affect the ex-
perimental error.  
3 Metal detector trial, Benkovac, Croatia, May 2005 
3.1 Overview 
BAM (German Federal Institute for Materials Research) has organised and performed a 
series of four metal detector trials  [7] [8]. The last of these trials was performed in Ben-
kovac, Croatia in May 2005. That trial was conducted at the test site of the Croatian Mine 
Action Centre – Centre for Testing, Development and Training (HCR-CTRO) in Ben-
kovac, Croatia. It was conducted according to the procedures prescribed in CWA 
14747:2003, CEN Workshop Agreement on testing and evaluation of metal detectors for 
humanitarian demining  [2], with the aim to verify the proposed testing procedures. Maxi-
mum detection height measurements and detection reliability tests were performed.  
The metal detector models tested in the trials were products of the following companies, 
listed alphabetically: CEIA, Ebinger, Foerster and Vallon. It has been agreed with the 
manufacturers to keep the detector models anonymous, so that the models are labelled U, 
X, Y and Z. The detectors operated on different principles: some were time domain, some 
frequency domain ones; some used a single coil, some a “double-D” coil; some were static 
mode detectors, and some dynamic mode ones. All detectors had the possibility of ground 
compensation.  
Two soil types were present in the trials in May 2005. There were four lanes with dimen-
sions 1 m × 29 m, lanes 1 and 2 containing a highly magnetic soil from the surroundings of 
the town Obrovac, and lanes 3 and 4 containing a magnetically rather neutral soil from the 
area around the town Sisak.  
Two mine types modified to be safe were used as targets: PMA-2 and PMA-1A. The 
PMA-2 is a minimum metal mine, the hardest to detect in south-eastern Europe. A surro-
gate of PMA-2 labelled PMA-S was used too, but only for the maximum detection height 
measurements. Each lane contained five mines PMA-2 buried just below the surface, five 
buried to 5 cm depth and five to 10 cm depth, measured to the top of the mine. The PMA-
1A mines were buried similarly, but to depths 5, 10 and 15 cm.  
The operators were experienced deminers of CROMAC (Croatian Mine Action Centre). 
They went through a one-day training for each detector model. Each of them performed 
one or two runs (i.e. one or two passes through a lane) per day.  
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3.2 Maximum detection height measurements, design of experiment 
In earlier investigations it has been conjectured that repeated maximum detection height 
measurements give very similar results. The experiment described in this article had been 
designed to check this conjecture of the stability of metal detectors.  
The maximum detection height measurements were performed with a full factorial design, 
meaning that all combinations of factor levels were present in the experiment. The investi-
gated factors were: detector model, operator, target-soil combination. Two series of maxi-
mum detection height measurements were performed: one during the detection reliability 
test and the other afterwards. They both contain the same measurements; they were just 
performed in a different order.  
The goals of this test were: 
1. To assess the variability of the maximum detection height measurements.  
2. To compare the detecting capabilities of four metal detectors in two soil types sepa-
rately. 
3. To compare the surrogate of the PMA-2 with the real mine, using the in-air meas-
urements. 
4. If the surrogate faithfully represents the real mine, to use it for comparing the two 
soils used in the experiment. 
The first series of measurements was performed according to the design of the reliability 
test (see section 3.3). This series is described in more detail in the trial final report  [8]. The 
measurements of the second series were performed according to the design presented in 
Table 1. PMA-S is a surrogate of the PMA-2. This is a full factorial design, meaning that 
all combinations of factor levels are present. The in-air measurements on the PMA-2 and 
the PMA-S were performed one after the other, in a random order. The execution order of 
starts was arranged to avoid bias, i.e. a systematic influence of unknown factors related to 
time (for example, gradual increase of the deminers’ concentration or fatigue). If there was 
such an influence, it was “distributed” to all detector models equally. The operators set up 
the detector before each start and performed the ground compensation before the in-soil 
measurement. The targets were buried to depths up to 15 cm in steps of 1 cm and their po-
sitions were visibly marked.  
3.3 Detection reliability tests, design of experiment 
The four factors investigated in this test are detector model, operator, lane (related to the 
soil type), and start. A factorial design including all factor level combinations would be the 
optimum choice to achieve an unbiased estimate of the detectors in each soil type sepa-
rately. However, such a test would require a lot of time. This is why a fractional factorial 
design had been proposed: each detector is tested with each level of each factor, but not 
with all the possible combinations of factor levels. This design is based on a Graeco-Latin 
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square and it is shown in Table 2. In the first week two operators (A, B) tested two detec-
tors (alpha, beta) and the other two operators the other two detectors. In the second week 
they switched (A and B tested gamma and delta). Such a design, compared with an ordi-
nary Graeco-Latin square, allowed the operators to concentrate on two in stead of four de-
tector models in a week.  
Tab. 1. Design of the maximum detection height measurements. The variable “start” indi-
cates the order of execution. Numbers 1, 2, 3 indicate the random order of execu-
tion of the measurements within a start. The in-air measurements were executed 
before the in-soil measurements, but within the same start. 
 
   in-air 
in soil of 
lanes 1, 2 
in soil of 
lanes 3, 4 
start operator detector PMA-1A PMA-2 PMA-S PMA-2 PMA-S 
1 C beta 1 2 3 1 2 
2 D alpha 1 3 2 2 1 
3 A delta 1 2 3 2 1 
4 B gamma 3 2 1 1 2 
5 A alpha 1 3 2 1 2 
6 B beta 1 3 2 1 2 
7 C gamma 1 2 3 1 2 
8 D delta 1 3 2 1 2 
9 A gamma 3 2 1 2 1 
10 B delta 3 1 2 1 2 
11 C alpha 3 2 1 2 1 
12 D beta 1 3 2 2 1 
13 C delta 3 2 1 2 1 
14 D gamma 1 2 3 1 2 
15 A beta 1 2 3 1 2 
16 B alpha 3 2 1 1 2 
 
Tab. 2. Design of the detection reliability test. The design is based on a Graeco-Latin 
square, letters A, B, C, D representing the operators, and alpha, beta, gamma, delta 
the detectors. 
Week 1   Start 
18-20 May   1 2 3 4 
 1 A alpha C delta B beta D gamma 
 2 C gamma A beta D delta B alpha 
 3 B beta D gamma A alpha C delta 
 
La
ne
 
4 D delta B alpha C gamma A beta 
           
Week 2   Start 
25-27 May   1 2 3 4 
 1 C alpha A delta D beta B gamma 
 2 A gamma C beta B delta D alpha 
 3 D beta B gamma C alpha A delta 
 
La
ne
 
4 B delta D alpha A gamma C beta 
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4 Results of the Benkovac trial, May 2005, compared with 
the results of earlier trials 
4.1 Results of the maximum detection height measurements 
This section discusses some results of both series of maximum detection height measure-
ments.  
One of our goals was to compare the metal detectors in a specific soil. Assuming that the 
maximum detection heights for a specific detector-target-soil combination are independ-
ently normally distributed, we can perform some statistical tests to examine the differences 
between the detectors. Before doing that, it is usually helpful to present the results in a 
simple diagram. Fig. 1 contains the results of both measurement series. The indicated error 
bars are the sample standard deviations. The results of a t-test with a significance level α = 
0.05 for the soil from lanes 1 and 2 show a significant difference between all detectors ex-
cept between detectors U and X and between Y and Z. In the soil from lanes 3 and 4 the 
only significant differences are between X and Y and between X and Z.  
Let us compare the PMA-2 with its surrogate, PMA-S. The in-air measurements were ana-
lysed as paired measurements. This means that the difference between the measurements 
on these two targets within the same start (see Table 1) is analysed as a normally distrib-
uted variable. The result indicates that the maximum detection height of the real mine is 
(9.4±6.6) mm larger than that of the surrogate, where (9.4 ± 6.6) mm marks the 95% confi-
dence limits. This result indicates that in some cases the PMA-S can be used as a surrogate 
of the PMA-2, since it is just a bit more difficult to detect. However, the difference is not 
small enough to allow the comparison of the results in two soils as if the two targets were 
identical.  
Many metal detector trials performed before 2005 included some maximum detection 
height measurements, but almost all of them were performed without repetitions. How-
ever, already a quick view on the diagram in Fig. 1 reveals that the variance of the maxi-
mum detection height measurements cannot be neglected, thus pointing to the conclusion 
that repetitions are necessary. Further investigations have shown that the variability of the 
measurements is caused by the differences between the operators (deminers), by the setup 
of the devices, and by the remaining sources of the variability, which are the instability of 
the hardware between two setups, the changing subjectivity of the operators, and the uncer-
tainty of the measurements of the distance between the search head and the target.  
4.2 Results of the detection reliability tests 
This section presents some of the results of the detection reliability tests performed in 
Benkovac in Croatia, in May 2005.  
The following three diagrams are ROC diagrams are based on the complete data set, i.e. all 
levels of all factors: both mine types, both soil types, all four detectors and all four opera- 
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Fig. 1. Results of the maximum detection height measurements. The error bars indicate the 
estimated standard deviations.  
tors. The first diagram, Fig. 2, shows the differences between the four detector models 
tested in the trials. The diagram on Fig. 3 clearly shows that all operators performed simi-
larly: no significant differences were detected between the deminers’ results. This is a con-
sequence of the choice of skilled deminers, an adequate training, and the applied working 
procedures, which were close to the actual working conditions. The same was observed 
throughout the whole analysis, for any choice of targets or soils. The importance of opera-
tors involved in the trials has proven in all trials of demining equipment, but also in tests of 
NDT (non-destructive testing) detection systems [5], [6]. It has been shown that the human 
factor (skill of the operators and the testing procedure) can significantly influence the test 
results. A comparison with earlier tests in Benkovac and Oberjettenberg [7], [8] reveals a 
notable improvement of the test results, mostly due to human factor improvements. This 
can be seen in Fig. 4 and Fig. 6. Fig. 4 is a ROC diagram comparing the results of the 
BENKOVAC 2003 and 2005 trials. Only the factor levels common to both trials are included 
in the analysis.  
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Fig. 2. Overall results, comparison of detector models. The size of the crosses indicates 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Fig. 3. Overall results, comparison of operators A, B, C and D. The size of the crosses in-
dicates 95% confidence intervals.  
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Benkovac 2003 and 2005 trials, ROC diagram. Only the factor lev-
els common for the two trials are selected: PMA-2 at depths 0, 5 and 10 cm in 
Obrovac soil and Sisak soil, detectors Z and U. The size of the crosses indicates 
95% confidence limits.  
The next diagram (Fig. 5) presents the estimated POD curve (POD versus depth) with the 
corresponding confidence bounds for the selected case of PMA-2 in the soil from Obrovac 
area. The mine PMA-2 has the smallest metal content in the region of South-Eastern 
Europe. The soil from Obrovac is very difficult for metal detectors due to its magnetic 
properties, causing many false alarms, so that ground compensation is necessary. We can 
see from the diagram that detector Y, which has the highest total POD, can reliably detect 
the PMA-2 in the soil from Obrovac only if it is buried shallowly. Fortunately, the vast 
majority of mines is buried very near the surface.  
 
Fig. 5. POD curve, the results of detector Y in lanes 1 and 2 on the target PMA-2. The dot-
ted curves indicate 95% confidence bounds.  
Let us compare this result with the maximum detection height measurements with the same 
choice of detector, soil and target. The largest value being detected is (9.6 ± 0.6) cm. The 
best estimate of the maximum detection height is that value increased by 0.5 cm, because 
the targets were buried to depths in steps of 1 cm. Thus we have the estimated maximum 
detection height: (10.1 ± 0.6) cm. We see from Fig. 5 that many mines at that depth and 
even at smaller depths than (10.1 – 0.6) cm = 9.5 cm were not detected in the reliability 
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test. The main reason is that the operators did not know the positions of the targets during 
the reliability test. However, the human factor is not the only cause of this effect. There are 
some other sources of variation involved with blind trials. The depths of the targets can not 
be controlled so well as during the maximum detection height measurements. Each target 
is placed on another location, and the local properties of soil can vary. All these influences 
introduce higher unavoidable errors, both for the POD and for the target depths. This is 
why the POD curves obtained from a reliability trial will not fall with depth that abruptly 
as expected from the maximum detection height measurements. The analysis of the other 
detectors leads to the same conclusions.  
Fig. 6 is a comparison of the POD curves of the Benkovac 2003 and 2005 results. Again 
we see, as in Fig. 4, a notable improvement of the test results. An important consequence 
of the improvements of the human factor treatment is the increase of the POD for smaller 
depths. This is mostly a consequence of better pinpointing, i.e. localisation of the target.  
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Fig. 6. Comparison of Benkovac 2003 and 2005 trials, ROC diagram. Only the factor lev-
els common for the two trials are selected: PMA-2 at depths 0, 5 and 10 cm in 
Obrovac soil and Sisak soil, detectors Z and U.  
5 Conclusions  
Statistical design of experiment enables unbiased conclusions and minimises the experi-
mental error, thus enabling shorter trials with lower expenses. Conclusions are unbiased 
when it is possible to separate the influences of different factors, for example, the influence 
of the detector model from the influence of the operator. Design of experiments is the only 
way to deal with complex experimental problems like metal detector tests.  
Maximum detection height measurements are easier to perform than the more time con-
suming detection reliability tests. However, detection reliability tests include a large part of 
the human factor influences, and so come closer to actual conditions in demining. Besides, 
the false alarm rate can be estimated only in reliability tests. The maximum detection 
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height measurements should be performed with several operators and with repetitions, 
since they have a variance that has to be taken into account.  
A comparison of the Benkovac 2005 and 2003 trials shows a notable improvement of the 
test results. That improvement is a consequence of a reduced time pressure on the opera-
tors, improved training and the application of some elements of the local demining prac-
tise.  
ROC diagrams, POD curves and results of maximum detection height measurements are 
planned to be included in annual catalogues of demining detection equipment. 
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Measurement uncertainty and risk analysis – examples 
from civil engineering products 
Wilfried Hinrichs 
Materialprüfanstalt für das Bauwesen Braunschweig (Germany) 
 
Abstract: Measurement uncertainty may have a significant impact on deci-
sions on a product’s compliance with a specification. At the moment, in prac-
tice, this problem is usually treated on a qualitative or half-quantitative basis. 
This contribution presents quantitative models on how to link statements on 
measurement uncertainty and risk analysis and how this information can be 
used in compliance assessment. The application of the models is demonstrated 
in three examples. An important result of the investigation is that the probabil-
ity of wrong decisions is considerably high both in classification and in state-
ments on compliance of civil engineering products. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 General 
In principle, new constructions meet requirements both of the owners and/or the users 
when four preconditions are met: 
• The static system is correct. 
• All reasonable loads have been taken into account. 
• The construction materials have been carefully chosen. 
• The realisation of the building was quality-driven. 
As usability and safety are key issues in construction the probability of severe deviations 
from these requirements is usually very small, i.e. in a range of p = 10-4 … 10-5 . With addi-
tional effort it is quite easy to reach even p = 10-10. In practice, substantial mistakes in 
planning mainly arise from the dimensioning for bearing loads and from calculation with 
wrong units. This is not the subject of this contribution but it focuses on specifications for 
construction products and their compliance with the appropriate limit values on the back-
ground of the third and the fourth bullet above. The emphasis lies on market aspects, i.e. 
the question whether the materials and the constructions are in accordance with a contract. 
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A statement of non-compliance does not necessarily mean that the technical usability is 
questionable but it may have substantial financial consequences for the supplier. 
1.2 Measurement uncertainty 
Every measurement results is associated with an uncertainty which may be relevant in two 
quite different areas: 
• One source of an uncertainty problem is an incomplete validation1 of a test procedure. 
As a validation of test procedures is a prerogative in standardization which includes the 
measurement uncertainty undefined risks should not emerge from normative docu-
ments. However, this is not always the case as reported below. 
• The other area is the process of compliance assessment itself which is the fulfilment of 
specified requirements. When assessing the compliance of a given product on the basis 
of a test result a decision may have to include the uncertainty associated with the test 
result. This is rarely done in practice. 
1.3 Risk analysis 
Due to measurement uncertainty there is always a certain probability that a decision about 
the acceptance or rejection of a product is wrong. It is possible to quantitatively address the 
probability using risk analysis procedures if quantitative data for the measurement uncer-
tainty are available. A feasible approach is outlined in an international discussion paper 
which links risk analysis with measurement uncertainty and conformance testing [1]. 
The instruments for estimating probabilities for wrong decisions in compliance assessment 
are same whether the choice of the underlying tolerances was safety-driven and functional-
ity-driven but the consequences are quite different. On the one hand a wrong decision may 
decrease the safety level unacceptably [2] or it may increase it to an inadequate extent. On 
the other hand construction products with wrong dimensions may cause direct reactions 
such as a rejection from the construction site. 
1.4 Risk assessment 
Quantitative details on the risk of making wrong decisions in compliance assessment 
which encompass measurement uncertainty are mostly lacking. In the areas investigated 
neither the test nor the product standards provide any help. This situation is by no means 
exceptional. In principle, assessment bodies are aware of the problem but it is often hardly 
possible to address it. Both clients and other parties involved do not want to be confronted 
with (avoidable) problems and a certification body would usually not have all necessary 
information to professionally include the results of a risk analysis in its decision. 
Therefore in practice, measurement uncertainty is no issue in decisions on compliance. 
This situation is far from being satisfactory. Strictly speaking, in compliance assessment a 
 
 
1 Validation is the confirmation that the particular requirements for a specific use are fulfilled. 
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test result as such is not important: Relevant is the statement whether or not the product 
meets specified requirements. But as all decisions are wrong to a certain degree users of 
certificates should get information on the reliability of a decision. That could be done by a 
quantitative statement on the probability to what extent a decision may be right or wrong. 
2 Models 
This contribution reports about the evaluation of different models for risk analysis in com-
pliance assessment which are presented as examples from different fields of civil engineer-
ing. Theoretically speaking, the background is how the result of the validation of a test 
procedure may influence the result of a compliance assessment. The basic question is 
therefore simply: To what extend does the measurement uncertainty of an applied test 
procedure influence the probability of making a wrong decision? 
2.1 Model for measurement uncertainty 
There are two basic sources of uncertainty in materials testing: the intrinsic properties of 
the substance as regards its internal homogeneity, texture etc and extrinsic phenomena like 
sampling and test procedures, environmental conditions etc. In the last years the interna-
tional laboratory community has put much effort into the investigation of the extrinsic 
source, i.e. in measurement uncertainty. That has been triggered especially by the harmoni-
zation of requirements in quality management such as ISO/IEC 17025 [3]. The process is 
far from being at an end as the implementation of concepts and procedures are difficult and 
are also prone to incomparability. But in this course both the knowledge about specific 
aspects of uncertainty is broadening and the amount of reliable data on measurement un-
certainty is increasing. 
In many branches of civil engineering data on measurement uncertainty are rare as explicit 
information. But there are various sources of implicit data that may be used so that it is in 
many cases generally possible to arrive at quantitative data. The basic ideas of the interna-
tional discussion in measurement uncertainty are accessible through different sources of 
uncertainty data [4] which are usually described by their evaluation procedure: 
• The modelling (or mathematical) approach 
• The single laboratory validation approach 
• The interlaboratory validation approach 
• The proficiency testing approach 
The wide spectrum of such concepts to get quantitative uncertainty data opens the gate to 
an analysis of the risks that reflect on the measuring and/or testing procedure. However, 
the reliability of such data is often not sufficiently known. It is therefore of major impor-
tance to check what information these data really contain. That means for practical applica-
tions that an answer to the question is needed on how realistic the uncertainty data for the 
purpose of their use are. 
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2.2 Model for risk analysis 
For risk analysis purposes a distinction between usability and the compliance of a product 
is irrelevant. This aspect must be addressed in the risk assessment, i.e. in the evaluation of 
the results. A decision on the usability of a product is a deeply technical question whereas 
statements on compliance are aiming at whether or not a product is fit for putting it on the 
market. Its technical aspect is more hidden: The putting-on-the-market is a commercial 
activity but it usually also means that the product is fit for putting it in service which is 
again a technical issue. 
One focus of the international discussion in treating measurement uncertainty is its influ-
ence on statements in compliance assessment. JCGM/WG1/SC3 have produced a draft 
document [1] which links measurement uncertainty and conformance testing. The scope of 
this draft Technical Report specifies that it ‘provides guidelines for setting gauging (or 
test) limits in support of accept/reject decisions in … general conformance tests where 
uncertain numerical test results are compared with specified requirements.’ The paper 
provides detailed information on the theoretical background, on conditions, on procedures 
etc. A main figure is PC which is the probability of conformance. Provided a Gaussian dis-
tribution of the test results the formula runs as follows: 
      ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ=
m
mL
m
mU
C u
xT
u
xTP  (1)
with PC        probability of conformance 
        TL         lower tolerance limit 
        TU        upper tolerance limit 
        xm         test result 
        um         measurement uncertainty associated to the test result xm 
 
From a mathematical point of view it is not necessary to differentiate between types of the 
origin of uncertainty data. But as the results of such calculations are not comparable it is 
useful to specify different probabilities and to concentrate on the basic question of this con-
tribution. Firstly, the probability of making a wrong decision is expressed as the probabil-
ity of non-compliance PNC. Secondly, it is necessary to distinguish some types of 
probabilities of non-compliance, mainly because in practice there are two main testing 
situations: 
• In factory production control test results are produced under very similar circum-
stances, i.e. personnel, instruments, environmental conditions etc. This is a first party 
(producer) business. In interlaboratory validation testing sr is used as the standard de-
viation for the repetition of measurement as defined in ISO 5725-2 [5]. When compar-
ing test results with specifications the term ‘conformance testing’ is used. The 
probability of non-compliance in this case is PNC,conformance. 
• The spread of test results is usually wider when tests are performed by different per-
sons using similar instruments but, of course, applying specified procedures. This is 
specific for a third party (impartial laboratory) business. A useful term for standard de-
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viations under such reproducibility conditions is sR as defined in ISO 5725-2. This is a 
‘conformity testing’ with PNC,conformity as the probability of non-compliance in these 
situations. 
• Figures both for the repetition and reproduction are well understood in the laboratory 
community as they are linked with interlaboratory validation schemes. The situation is 
different with other kinds of uncertainty data because they usually need further expla-
nation. The probability of non-compliance is specified as PNC,model. 
The transformed formula runs as follows: 
 
       ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −Φ+⎟⎟⎠
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with     PNC,x     specific probability of non-compliance 
            TL         lower tolerance limit 
            TU        upper tolerance limit 
            xm         test result 
            ux         measurement uncertainty associated to the test result xm 
 
2.3 Assessment of non-compliance 
When assessing compliance the model input data both of the risk analysis and of the meas-
urement uncertainty must be quantitatively known. A statement on non-compliance en-
compasses the measurement uncertainty approaches used. 
The problem with test results close to specification limits is an old one. The treatment of 
such situation in practice is a formal rather than a mathematical or a technical one. As the 
procedures are internationally quite different, an international discussion in measurement 
on this subject has just started. An example is given in a draft for public comment [6]. 
3 Examples 
Aggregates for concrete and fire protective products are tested before putting them in service. 
The evenness is usually tested immediately after completion of a floor. 
3.1 Risk analysis 
Formula (2) allows to directly calculate the probability of non-compliance PNC. As most 
laboratory people are more familiar with PC, the probability of compliance is presented in 
the diagrams. 
3.1.1 Aggregates for concrete 
EN 12620 [7] specifies aggregates for concrete. It refers to numerous properties. Nearly all 
test procedures specified in the product standard contain information on precision data in 
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informative annexes. Two examples are treated here: the Flakiness index FI and the con-
tent of acid-soluble sulphates MS of an aggregate product (table 1). 
 
Requirement Test procedure Standard deviations 
Flakiness index (FI) EN 933-3 M
DFIFIsr
3)100(001,0 ⋅−⋅⋅=
 
343,0082,0 +⋅= FIsR  
Magnesium sulphate index (MS) EN 1367-2 
)100(188,0
)100(054,0
MSMSs
MSMSs
R
r
−⋅⋅=
−⋅⋅=
 
Table 1: Uncertainty data of test results of aggregates 
The Flakiness index FI represents a geometrical property of an aggregate. It is important 
both for the workability of the material and the necessary amount of cement in concrete. 
The content of magnesium sulphates MS indicates how much of MgSO4 would be intro-
duced in the concrete with the aggregate. The substance is harmful for the durability of 
concrete. 
EN 12620 specifies 5 product categories for FI (FI15, FI20, FI35, FI50 and FI>50) and 4 for 
MS (MS18, MS25, MS35, MS>35). The appropriate category is chosen on the basis of test re-
sults. For CE-marking it has to be formally stated in a declaration of conformity by the 
supplier. This document is therefore an important basis for contracts. The buyer of aggre-
gates will compare the data with his requirements usually specified in an advertised bid-
ding. 
Graphs for the sums of the relative distributions of the probability of compliance PC are 
given in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The small line is for results arrived at under repetition conditions 
(conformance testing), the bold line is based on data from reproduction (conformity test-
ing). More details are given in [8]. 
 
Fig. 1: Classification for the Flakiness-Index of aggregates 
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Fig. 2: Classification for the magnesium sulphate index MS of aggregates 
3.1.2 Fire protective products 
A basic requirement of fire protective products is the reaction to fire. That means that the 
material must not only withstand fire attacks but it shall also not contribute to the devel-
opment of a fire. Technical approval papers call for a non-combustibility test according to 
ISO 1182 [9]. This standard contains quantitative data on the precision of test methods. 
They include the increase of temperature (∆T) and the flaming time (tf) which were pro-
duced in interlaboratory comparisons and in proficiency testing (table 2): 
 
Parameter Standard deviations 
Increase of temperature ∆T 
Ts
Ts
R
r
∆⋅+=
∆⋅+=
26,096,0
10,026,1
 
Flaming time tf 
fR
fr
ts
ts
⋅=
⋅=
32,0
14,0
 
Table 2: Uncertainty data of test results of fire protective products 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the sums of the probability of compliance PC for ∆T and tf. Again 
the small line is for conformance testing, the bold line for conformity testing. 
3.1.3 Industrial floors 
Evenness or flatness of industrial floors is a basic requirement which necessary ‘degree’ 
strongly depends upon the intended use. It is usually acceptable that unfinished upper sur-
faces of floors and concrete bases are more uneven than finished floors or those with more 
stringent requirements. For example, evenness is an important requirement in warehouses 
with high fixed path forklift trucks or in similar storages such as archives. Due to dynamic 
components caused by the movements and impacts of static lean even relatively small 
geometrical deviations in the floor can reduce the usability of the trucks as regards safety 
of operation and collision with other trucks. 
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Fig. 3: Classification for the increase of temperature ∆T of fire protective products 
 
Fig. 4: Classification for the flaming time tf of fire protective products 
DIN 18202 [10] specifies tolerances for evenness in building constructions but it does not 
prescribe a test method or describe how a survey to check compliance with these limits 
should be conducted. Two usual methods in evenness testing of industrial floors are: 
• Test procedure A: V head and straightedge / aiming stake 
• Test procedure B: Grid levelling / area levelling 
To quantify the risk associated with results from these methods the measurement uncer-
tainties have been investigated using the modelling, the interlaboratory and the single labo-
ratory validation approaches. Significant systematic components in the uncertainties were 
found for the test procedure A. The reason is that the V head forms bridges on the surface 
of the concrete. The resulting measured distance is therefore usually smaller than in reality 
but it cannot be larger. Further details will be presented in [11]. 
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Independent of the test method applied a significant source of uncertainty is the floor itself. 
DIN 18202 does not specify how many tests should be conducted. Due to economic rea-
sons their number is always strongly limited, with the effect that the standard deviation of 
the test result is far from being statistically reliable. In general the numbers of test results 
should vary strongly. This all leads to considerable uncertainties mainly because the pre-
sumption of homogenous surfaces is not realistic in practice. Thus the measurement uncer-
tainty depends on various factors. The main influences are the number of measured 
distances per square unit, the test method applied and the measuring conditions as the cali-
bration status of the instrumentation and the skill of the personnel. The specific uncertain-
ties have been calculated for favourable and for unfavourable measurement conditions. 
‘Favourable’ does not mean best measurement capability but good practice. Unfavourable 
conditions are those where the situation is worse than a fair practice would suggest. The 
results are listed in the table 3. They are valid for a straightedge of 4 m length. 
 
Test procedure Measurement uncertainty 
U in mm 
Measurement situation 
3,5 Favourable A: V head and straightedge 
7,0 Unfavourable 
2,0 Favourable B: Grid levelling / area levelling 
4,0 Unfavourable 
Table 3: Uncertainty data of test results in floor testing 
Fig. 5 shows the results of a risk analysis. Given is the probability of a non-conformance 
PNC of a finished floor (upper limit TU = 10 mm) under favourable conditions. The num-
bers locate the limits with PNC = 0,05 or PNC = 0,01 respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Critical values for the compliance assessment in floor testing 
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3.2 Risk assessment 
3.2.1 General example 
A compliance assessment body (CAB) is asked to certify that a certain product meets a 
requirement with an upper tolerance limit TU = 21 units and to make a statement on the risk 
of the certification statement for market use. The appropriate product standard refers to the 
two slightly different test methods A and B. The client presents two test results: the one for 
procedure A is 18,9 units, the other for procedure B 18,2 units. Here are three scenarios to 
what result a risk assessment body could reasonably come: 
• Scenario 1: Both test results are below the upper tolerance limit. The requirement is 
met. The tolerance values encompass all possible measurement uncertainties be-
cause that is not explicitly excluded. Additionally both test methods were applied 
and show a positive result. The reliability of the certification is therefore very high. 
[The implicit probability PNC for the user is close to 0 %.] 
• Scenario 2: The CAB asks both laboratories for the appropriate measurement un-
certainty. The one that has chosen test method A reports that the standard deviation 
is 0,9 units (σ = 1, normal distribution). It has been taken from the laboratory’s in-
ternal documentation based on repeatability studies. The other laboratory informs 
that for test method B the standard deviation is 1,1 units. This figure is mentioned 
in a laboratory’s internal validation document. The CAB calculates a probability of 
non-compliance of 1 % for method A. The CAB assumes that σ = 1 and normal dis-
tribution are correct: PNC ≈ 0,6 %. 
• Scenario 3: The CAB has an own risk management procedure for certification pur-
poses which also addresses the measurement uncertainty. This document states that 
the calculation of compliance should generally be done using appropriate uncer-
tainty data. It says that reproducibility data shall be used for certification purposes. 
The CAB asks the laboratories specifically for these data and gets the information 
that an annex to the test standard specifies reproducibility limits sR which are 2,6 
units for test procedure A and 2,9 units for B. That leads to PNC ≈ 7,4 % for 
method A and PNC ≈ 4,0 % for method B. 
The CABs in the scenarios arrive at quite different results. The task called for some con-
siderations about the risk of the decision. In the first scenario it has been formally handled 
with reference to the specification limit and to general contractional conditions. In the sec-
ond scenario the CAB looked at the measurement uncertainty but used data for in-house 
testing. In the third scenario the CAB was well aware of the client’s task. 
3.2.2 Results of the investigation 
In order to make the results better comparable the figure Rrel is used. It normalizes the 
width of a safe-guard band for compliance assessment and is defined as: 
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U
U
rel T
xTR −=  
 
(3)
with        Rrel       relative width of a safe-guard band 
               TU        upper tolerance limit 
               x           measurement value at a defined PNC 
 
Table 4 shows that in the areas investigated the probabilities for wrong decisions are some-
times highly significant. Based on a risk management as outlined in the third scenario a 
CAB would have to ask the client for acceptable PNC for wrong decisions. 
 
Rrel in %  
Parameter 
 
TU PNC = 5 % PNC = 1 % 
Aggregates for concrete 
Flakiness index FI 30 14 18 
Magnesium sulphate index MS 25 43 55 
Fire protective products 
Increase of temperature ∆T 30 34 42 
Flaming time tf 20 24 41 
Flatness of industrial floors 
V head and straightedge 10 29 41 
Grid levelling / area levelling 10 16 23 
Table 4: Results for PNC = 0,05 or 0,01 respectively 
4 Conclusions 
The probability of wrong decisions in compliance assessment depends upon its specific 
aim (statements on compliance with general specifications or on conformance, conformity 
ci), on the associated measurement uncertainty um if the decision is based on laboratory 
results, on systematic components usys, on measurement conditions mc etc. Hence PNC is 
influenced by various factors: 
( ),...,,, csysmiNC muucfP =  
 
(4)
with        ci          specific aim of assessment 
               um        measurement uncertainty 
               usys           systematic component to the measurement uncertainty 
               mc            measurement conditions 
Some or all of these influences may be significant. The investigation showed that it is quite 
improbable that the measurement uncertainty in general may have a significant and direct 
impact on aspects such as usability or safety. But it may affect, for example, the safety 
level. 
In conformance assessments the measurement uncertainty is usually of minor importance 
as a repetition of measurement is usually less uncertain and systematic components are 
often unimportant. The probability of wrong decisions may especially be important with 
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conformity testing because here usys and mc have to be taken quantitatively into account. 
This has been illustrated in detail in the course of the presentation of the three examples. 
The problem with measurement uncertainty in the certification of construction product 
properties is an old one – and it is well known. The onus to handle the measurement uncer-
tainty lies with the specialised laboratories but it remains in the responsibility of certifica-
tion assessment bodies to cope with the problem. However, in practice, this fact is often 
ignored or at least underestimated. The usual concept to compare test results, i.e. more or 
less random numbers, with specification data is not appropriate from a risk management 
point of view. In an advanced certification process it is possible to assign an appropriate 
probability of the ‘validity’ of the statement. 
Safety relevant products call for additional measures. If laboratories are involved in such 
reliability studies they should use strategies on how to contribute to the input of relevant 
data. This problem is, for example, outlined in the contribution made by SCHNETGÖKE et al 
[12]. Measurement uncertainty data may have two general influences on the reliability as-
sessment of a construction. Firstly, they may affect the precision of the model through its 
calibration. An example is the significant influence of the dispersion of the yield point of 
steel on the reliability of a construction. Secondly, they may contribute to the ‘weak points’ 
when used in the assessment of the measurement values. This should especially be the case 
for systematic errors, at least if used as absolute figures. Data should also be available, for 
example, in the course of the selection of appropriate sensors. 
In some cases further influences on compliance statements which are only touched in this 
contribution are the sampling, the identification and number of measurement spots, sys-
tematic components etc. From this point of view the task of compliance assessment bodies 
can be strongly supported by laboratories that are well aware of measurement uncertainty 
and its possible influences on the use of measurement results. In difficult situation that 
could include services such as testing under more precise conditions, the quantification of 
systematic components etc. 
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Rzeszow University of Technology 
1 Introduction 
The aim of the analysis of risk connected with water supply system (WSS) operating is to 
create a basis of substantial critical information necessary in decision making process, 
process optimisation, system operating and control and while the protective actions pre-
venting occurrence of unfavourable consequences of events are undertaken.  
Lately BAYES’ formula has become the basis to develop the theory and algorithms of the 
probabilistic deduction. BAYES’ analysis is used to describe the reason of the situation in 
which the occurrence of the given event depends on the occurrence of the other event as 
well as the situation in which necessary knowledge is uncertain or incomplete.  
Let Ω means a space of all the events. Events X and Y will be called independent if the 
occurrence of one of them has no impact on the occurrence of the other one. P(X) means 
the likelihood that event X occurs. The likelihood that event X occurs assuming that event 
Y took place is marked as P(X|Y) and is called the conditional likelihood. The notation X+Y 
means the sum and X⋅Y the product of events X and Y.  
P(X⋅Y) = P(X/Y) ⋅P(Y) = P(Y/X) ⋅P(X)       (1) 
P(X + Y) = P(X) + P(Y) – P(X ⋅Y)        (2) 
If events X and Y are independent, then: 
P(X ⋅Y) = P(X) ⋅P(Y) 
There is the given event Y and there are such mutually exclusive events X1, X2, ...,Xn  that  
Ω=∑
=
n
i
iX
1
 and Y can take place only together with one of the events Xi, i=1,…n. Then the 
total (complete) likelihood is defined by the formula [4]:  
∑
=
⋅=
n
i
ii XPXYPYP
1
)()/()(         (3) 
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2 Uncertainty in WSS operation 
Uncertainty concerning WSS operational reliability analysis can relate to: 
• fragmentary information (eg. concerning the actual network technical condition), 
• inaccurate, imprecise information (eg. concerning failure localisation, ground con-
ditions ), 
• difficulties in right consequences prediction,  
• uncertainty connected with expert’s knowledge. 
The most basic and the most effective form of knowledge about the so called uncertain 
environment is the conditional independence, which is described by BAYES’ formula. 
BAYES’ theory introduces the so called BAYES’ian likelihood, which means that the likeli-
hood of event changes together with a new premise. It can be useful when we evaluate the 
likelihood that the given undesirable event occurs on the base of the causal likelihood of 
that event.  
BAYES’ theorem is the following: (T. BAYES 1763 ) [5]. 
If  X1, X2, …Xn are such events that Xi∩Xj =∅ for i≠j, i, j =1,…n, Ω=
=
∪n
i
iX
1
, P(Bi)>0 for 
i=1,2,…n and P(Y) > 0, then : 
)(
)()/()/(
YP
XPXYPYXP ⋅=          (4) 
2.1 An example of BAYES’ian deduction 
Water leakage can be located by means of a digital correlator. It was assumed that the like-
lihood of the event with the positive result of examination (the device indicates water leak-
age) and when the leakage exists in reality is 0.97 and the likelihood of the event with the 
negative result of examination (the device did not indicate water leakage) and the pre-
sumed leakage does not exist in reality is 0.98. Moreover, it was found that within a year 
the failures occur in 10 % of water-pipe network kilometre segments. 
The following notations have been made: 
P(+) - the likelihood of the event that the device will indicate leakage (the positive result of examination), 
P(¬) - the likelihood of the event that  the device will not indicate leakage (the negative result of examina-
tion), 
P(+failure) - the likelihood that the failure in water- pipe network occurs, 
P(¬failure) - the likelihood that the failure in water- pipe network will not occur, 
P(+/+failure) – the conditional likelihood of the event;  the positive result of examination and in reality the 
failure in water-pipe network took place, 
P(+/¬failure) - the conditional likelihood of the event;  the positive result of examination but in reality the 
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failure in water-pipe network did not take place, 
P(¬/+failure - the conditional likelihood of the event;  the negative result of examination but in reality the 
failure in water-pipe network took place, 
P(¬/¬failure) - the conditional likelihood of the event;  the negative result of examination and in reality the 
failure in water-pipe network did not take place. 
The particular likelihood values are the following: 
P(+failure) = 0,1  P(¬failure ) = 0,9 
P(+/+failure) = 0,97  P(¬/ + failure ) = 0,03 
P(+/¬failure ) = 0,02  P(¬/¬failure ) = 0,98 
Next the partial likelihood has been calculated according to the formula for the complete 
likelihood (3): 
P(+/+failure) ⋅ P(+failure) = 0,97 ⋅0,1 = 0,097 
P(+/¬failure) ⋅P(¬failure) = 0,02 ⋅ 0,9 = 0,018 
The complete likelihood of the event that the device will indicate leakage is: 
P= 0,097 + 0,018 = 0,115 
Finally the conditional likelihood has been calculated according to the formula (4): 
P(+failure /+) - the conditional likelihood of the event that the failure in water-pipe net-
work took place and the result of examination is positive, 
P(¬failure/+) - the conditional likelihood of the event that the failure in water-pipe network 
did not take place in spite of the positive result of reading.  
( ) ( ) 8435,0
115,0
1,097,0)/(/ =⋅=+⋅++=++
P
failurePfailurePfailureP  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1565,0
115,0
9,002,0// =⋅=¬⋅¬+=+¬
P
failurePfailurePfailureP . 
Calculated likelihood a posteriori shows that the positive device reading concerning the 
possibility of the failure in water-pipe network (water leakage reading) comes true in real-
ity with the likelihood ∼ 0,84 and does not come true with the likelihood ∼0,16. 
3 BAYES’ian network basis 
Let us consider a configuration of random events mutually connected by cause and effect 
relation. The occurrence of event X (cause) has some influence on the occurrence of event 
Y (effect). However, this influence is not “certain” and can be defined only by means of the 
likelihood. Such configuration of events and their mutual relations can be modelled by 
means of the directed graph D. Every event is interpreted as the graph node which is iden-
tified with the point on the plane. Relations between events are represented by edges. If the 
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occurrence of event X has an influence on the occurrence of event Y (Y depends on X) then 
in the graph model there is an edge (X, Y) going from X into Y direction is marked by an 
arrow). The node X will be called the parent of node Y. π(X) means the set of all nodes X 
parents [1, 2]. 
 
Fig. 1: The example of BAYES’ian network 
For the graph D in fig.1 we have π (X1) = {X2, X3}, π (X5) = {X6}. Events X5, X6 are the 
dependent events, and X3 depends on X4, X5, that means on their parents. Additionally we 
assume the independence of every node of the nodes which are not its parents. In our ex-
ample X1 is independent of X4, X5, X6.  
To simplify the notation every event Xi will be identified with the corresponding random 
variable with the same name. In our considerations all the random variables corresponding 
to events are bivalent.  
The dependence between nodes (events) is expressed by means of the conditional likeli-
hood. For the node X whose parents are in the set π(X) these dependences are represented 
by the conditional likelihood tables CLT. In CLT for the variable X must be defined the 
likelihood values P(X|π (X)) for all possible combinations of variable values from the set 
π(X). The table for node without parents contains the likelihood that random variable X 
will take its particular values.  
Formally the definition of BAYES’ian network (BN) can be written as follows: 
BAYES’ian network B(D,CLT) is a pair (D, CLT), where D is an acyclic directed graph on 
whose nodes the function CLT has been defined, which assigns the conditional likelihood 
tables CLT to each node X. The table CLT for node X contains P(X|π (X)) [1, 2].  
If the net has n nodes: X1,...,Xn  then the joint probability distribution of all random vari-
ables can be shown as the formula  
))(/(),...(
1
1 i
n
n
in XXPXXP π∏
=
= :       (5) 
For the network in fig. 1 this formula can be unfolded as: 
P(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5)= P(X1/ X2, X3) ⋅ P(X2)⋅P(X3/ X4, X5) ⋅P(X4) ⋅P(X5/ X6) ⋅P(X6) 
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To determine the joint probability distribution without using BN it is necessary to know all 
values P(X1,...,Xn) for all possible combinations of variable values X1,...,Xn which means 2n 
values to be memorised. Using BAYES network it is enough to know the conditional likeli-
hood for each node at the given values of its direct ancestors (parents) that means:  
∑
=
=
n
i
iXLN
1
)(2 π          (6) 
where )( iXπ  means a number of elements in set π(Xi). 
For the example presented in fig.2 the likelihood number is: 
LN = 22+20+22+20+21+20=13. To calculate the joint probability distribution by the conven-
tional method it would be necessary to determine 26= 64 likelihood values.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Bayesian network diagram for the event - the contaminated water occurs in water-
pipe network 
4 Possibility of BAYES’ian network application in WSS risk 
analysis 
Let us assume the following notation of the particular events: 
X1 – secondary water contamination in water-pipe network, 
X2 – failure in water-pipe network, 
X3 – contaminated water in the water treatment plant outlet, 
X4 – incidental contamination in water intake, 
X5 – water treatment process failed, 
X6 – wear-out failure occurred (water-pipe network is over 50 years old ). 
X7 – stress failure occurred (sudden changes of ground temperature), 
X8 - water-pipe network failure caused  by external factors (eg. mechanical damage). 
The configuration of cause and effect relation for the events defined above is shown as 
BAYES’ian network in fig.2. 
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We assume the independence of events Xi of all )( ij XX π∉ (not parents). 
The number of necessary likelihood is LN = 23 + 2·22 +5·20 = 21 according to the formula 
(6). For the particular network nodes the appropriate tables of the conditional likelihood 
have been made assuming the following notions: +X – means that the event takes place, ¬X 
– means that the event does not take place, X – means that the event takes place or does not 
take place. 
The particular likelihood values are: 
Node,, X1”     Node,,X2” 
X3 X2 P(X1/ X3, X2)  X6 X7 X8 P(X2/ X6, X7, X8) 
+ + 0,05  + + + 0,15 
+ ¬ 0,50 **  + + ¬ 0, 40 
¬ + 0,50 *  + ¬ + 0,50 
¬ ¬ 0,90  ¬ + + 0,60 
    + ¬ ¬ 0,70 * 
    ¬ + ¬ 0,65 
    ¬ ¬ + 0,55 
    ¬ ¬ ¬ 0,95 ** 
 
Node,, X3”     Node,, X4”, ,, X5” 
X4 X5 P(X3/ X4, X5)  X4 P(X4) X5 P(X5) 
+ + 0,05 **  + 0,25 ** + 0,35** 
+ ¬ 0,50  ¬ 0,75 * ¬ 0,65 * 
¬ + 0,50      
¬ ¬ 0,95 *      
 
Node,, X6”, ,, X7”, ,, X8” 
X6 P(X6) X7 P(X7) X8 P(X8) 
+ 0,3 * + 0,2 + 0,4 
¬ 0,7 ** ¬       0,8 *,** ¬ 0,6 *,** 
 
*)  - values in CLT for the example c 
**) - values in CLT for the example d 
 
The joint probability distribution for the example presented in fig.2 is: 
P(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8) = P(X1/ X2, X3) ⋅ P(X2/X6,X7,X8)⋅P(X3/ X4, X5) ⋅P(X4) ⋅P(X5) 
⋅P(X6)  ⋅ P(X7) ⋅P(X8)     
           (7) 
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4.1 Example c 
One must determine the likelihood of water contamination in water-pipe network (event 
+X1) if: 
• failure in water-pipe network occurred (event +X2), 
• wear-out failure occurred (event +X6), 
• stress failure did not occur (event ¬X7), 
• failure contributed by external factors did not occur (failure¬X8), 
• contaminated water in the water treatment plant outlet did not occur (failure¬X3), 
• contamination in water intake did not occur (failure¬X4), 
• water treatment process did not fail (failure ¬X5). 
Assuming that the events are not dependent on their primogenitors and only on their par-
ents we obtain the joint probability distribution: 
P(+X1, +X2, +X6, ¬X7, ¬X8, ¬X3, ¬X4, ¬X5) = 0,5⋅0,7⋅0,3⋅0,8⋅0,6⋅0,95⋅0,75⋅0,65 = 0,023 
4.2 Example d 
One must determine the likelihood of water contamination in water-pipe network (event 
+X1) if: 
• failure in water-pipe network did not occur (event ¬X2 ), 
• wear-out failure did not occur (event ¬X6), 
• stress failure did not occur (event ¬X7), 
• failure contributed  by external factors did not occur (failure¬X8), 
• contaminated water in the water treatment plant outlet occurred (failure +X3),  
• contamination in water intake occurred (failure +X4), 
• water treatment process failed (failure +X5). 
Assuming that the events are not dependent on their primogenitors and only on their par-
ents we obtain the joint probability distribution: 
P(+X1, ¬X2, ¬X6, ¬X7, ¬X8, +X3, +X4, +X5) = 0,5⋅0,95⋅0,7⋅0,8⋅0,6⋅0,05⋅0,25⋅0,35 = 0,0007 
4.3 Example e 
There is the failure in water-pipe network contributed y the external factors (event +X8). 
What is the likelihood of the secondary water contamination in water- pipe network (event 
+X1) if we do not have any information about the other events. Deduction that we use is 
called the cause-and-effect deduction. We determine the likelihood of the consequence 
when we know the cause. P(+X1|+X8) must be calculated. 
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P(+X1| + X8) =
)XP(
)X,XP(
8
81
+
++ = ∑
∑
++
++
7,6,5,4,3,2,1
87654321
7,6,5,4,3,2
87654321
),,,,,,,(
),,,,,,,(
XXXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXXXP
XXXXXXXXP
 
Taking into account the formula (7) we obtain:  
P(+X1| + X8)= 
)XP(
)X,XP(
8
81
+
++  = 
∑
∑
+
++
+
++
7654321 8765
45435438762321
765432 8765
45435438762321
,X,X,X,X,XX,X
,X,X,X,X,XX
) X) P() P(X)P(XP(X
) ) P(X, X/ X)P(X, X/ X)P(XX,,X/X) P(X, X/ XXP(
)    X) P() P(X)P(X P(X
)) P(X, X/ X)P(X, X/ X)P(XX,,X/X) P(X, X/ XXP(
 
= 0,48 
4.4 Example f 
There is the secondary failure in water- pipe network (event +X1). Calculate the likelihood 
that the cause of it was the damage in water-pipe network contributed by the external fac-
tors (event +X8). P(+X8|+X1)must be calculated. Deduction that we use now is called the 
diagnostic deduction. Using the same deduction as in the example 3 we obtain: 
P(+X8| + X1)= 
∑
∑
+
++
+
++
7654321 8765
45435438762321
765432 8765
45435438762321
,X,X,X,X,XX,X
,X,X,X,X,XX
) X) P() P(X)P(XP(X
) ) P(X, X/ X)P(X, X/ X)P(XX,,X/X) P(X, X/ XXP(
)    X) P() P(X)P(X P(X
)) P(X, X/ X)P(X, X/ X)P(XX,,X/X) P(X, X/ XXP(
 
=0,4 
5 Conclusion 
• WSS is a complex technological system and its reliable operation conditions water con-
sumer’s safety. 
• To determine the likelihood of different undesirable events scenarios in WSS and to 
cause and effect analysis of these events we can use Bayesian networks. 
• The advantages of using Bayesian network are, among others, the following: a lower 
number of necessary likelihood values, instead of 2n we need only (for the example 
presented in fig.3: 21 instead of 256), we can choose any direction of deduction, net-
work is easy to be modified and expanded. 
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• The right Bayesian network construction requires the base of historical date in order to 
assess the conditional likelihood and the knowledge of the experts in the given field [3]. 
• Bayesian networks can be a very good tool to analyse risk connected with water supply 
system operating, they can be used to calculate different scenarios of causes and conse-
quences of undesirable events which, however, often requires to build the expanded 
networks and to use computer software for calculations (eg.3 and 4). 
• The methods and procedures concerning the cause and effect analysis of the undesir-
able events in WSS that have been known and used up to the present can be completed 
by Bayesian networks. 
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Restricted water area optimization 
with risk consideration 
Lucjan Gucma 
Maritime University of Szczecin, Poland 
Abstract: The paper presents method of waterway width optimization with risk 
as the optimization criterion and limitation. The data possessed from real time 
ship simulations conducted in first stage of researches are processed and 
accident intensity in several ship passages are calculated. In further step the 
cost optimization model based on risk of accident is used to find optimal 
solution of waterway modernization. 
1 Navigational risk 
Navigational risk R is expressed as potential losses during the waterway operation. The 
navigational accidents on restricted water areas usually do not involve human fatalities nor 
injuries so economical expression of consequences is used. The main factors of risk are 
probability of accident Pa and accident consequences C: 
CPR a ⋅=   (1)
The most important aspects in navigational risk assessment are concerned with: 
− accident probability is changing during the ship passage; 
− necessity to consider many manoeuvring ships; 
− different conditions during ship passages; 
− long time of waterway operation. 
Some of above aspects have been considered in presented optimization model. 
1.1 Probability of accident and cumulative accident intensity 
Real time simulations are conducted with use of computer model of ship and environment 
in simulated meteorological conditions (Fig. 1). These researches are rather expensive and 
time consuming so they should to be reduced to the minimum that guarantee statistical 
significance to achieved results. Human navigators are used as ships operators. The naviga- 
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Fig. 1: Typical real time PC-based ship maneuvering simulator 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Graphical explanation of safety water area definition and probability of collision 
with the embankments assessment. 
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tor influence is therefore propagated through presented model and described by means of 
estimated statistical distributions. 
Let us consider that the ships of breadth B move along the waterway trying to keep as close 
as possible to the centre of the waterway described by the curve line y=0. The distances of 
the most extreme points of the waterway are considered as random variables and denoted 
as fr(y) and fl(y) (Fig.1). To allow further calculations the waterway is divided into discrete 
sections with length ∆x. 
Based on empirical distributions of ship positions achieved in simulations (Fig. 2) the sim-
plified formula for probability of accident due to safe waterway exit can be evaluated in 
every itch waterway section as follows: 
∫
+∞
=
ri
riari  )(
d
dyyfP   (2)
where: fri(y) = density function of ship extreme positions; dri = distance from the waterway 
centre to its border. 
The above formula does not consider the phenomenon that on narrow waterways it is not 
possible to exit the waterway on the left side of the waterway while considering the prob-
ability on the right side of the waterway. Thus the truncated distribution at the point of 
dtli=(dli-B) should be considered as more appropriate. This distribution is created with use 
distribution fr(y) in point dli by normalizing for y < dli: 
⎩⎨
⎧
≤
>⋅=
tli
tliri
tri 0
)(
)(
dyfor
dyforyfk
yf   (3)
where: k − normalizing constant )(/1 tliR dFk = . 
Then probability of accident on right side of itch section of the waterway can be expressed 
as: 
∫
+∞
=
ri
triari  )(
d
dyyfP   (4)
The probability of accident changes during the passage of ships due to conditions and 
proximity to the waterway borders is the function of x: 
)(ari xfP =   (5)
The function f(x) is usually determined as empirical by means of simulation and presented 
method. 
The probability on the right and left side are should be treated as independent so to the 
final calculations the maximum value should be considered if or when consequence as-
sessment is available the one with maximum risk: 
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);max( arialiai PPp =   (6)
The time of ship passage through the section is random and depends of ships speed distri-
bution v(x) and can be express as: 
iii / vxt ∆=   (7)
With assumption that accidents occurrence could be described be the Poisson process [2], 
the accident intensity of single ship in given section λi could be calculated as: 
ii
aiai 1)1(
tenpp ⋅−−=≥= λ   (8)
thus intensity of accident in given section estimated as: 
iai /)1ln( tpi −−=λ   (9)
It was assumed that ship speed is constant and accident intensity were constant in single 
section The intensity calculated in [accident/km] units can be evaluated as: 
iiaii /)1ln( xtp ∆−−=λ   (10)
where: it  – mean time of given section passing. 
The whole passage of the ship can be treated as nonhomogeneous Poisson processes 
(NHPP) with probability function: 
!
)()(
)(
n n
etxNp
txn ⋅−⋅⋅=
λλ   (11)
where: λ(x) − intensity function, 
and the probability of n-event occurrence in itch section can be defined as: 
!
)(
)(
i
)(
i
n n
etx
nNp
t
x
x
n
x
∫
∆
−
∆
⋅⋅
==
∫
λ
λ
 
 (12)
cumulative intensity function can be expressed as: 
∫=Λ i
0
 )()(
x
dxxx λ   (13)
and estimated by: 
)/()()(ˆ 1ii
1
ii −
=
−=Λ ∑ xxxx m
i
λ   (14)
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1.2 Accident consequences – cost of typical navigational accident  
Usually during the investigation of ship grounding accident on restricted waters it is not 
necessary to take into consideration the possibility of human fatalities nor injures. The cost 
of accident Ca could be divided into following costs: 
CpcCosCraCrCa +++=   (15)
 
where: 
Cr – cost of ships repair, 
Cra – cost of rescue action, 
Cos – cost of potential oil spill, 
Cpc – cost of port closure. 
2 Optimization model 
The optimization model with risk consideration is relatively simple and can be expressed 
as follows: 
twith
min
RR
CaCMCT
≤
→+= ∑∑   (16)
where: 
CT – total cost, 
CM – modernization costs, 
Ca – accident costs, 
R – risk, 
Rt – tolerable risk. 
The cost of modernization can be evaluated by the cost of dredging material that should 
removed from the waterway and protection works that should be done on the waterway 
embankments. The cost is nearly linear and depends mostly of desired width (Fig. 7, 8, 9). 
3 The case study – cost optimization of the waterway 
As an example the 5 km long part of Szczecin – Świnoujście waterway have been chosen. 
The total length of the waterway is more than 40 km. Analyzed 5 km long part of the fair-
way consist of two bands and one straight line (Fig. 3).  
The analysis has been conducted due to modernization projects of bringing into service on 
this waterway much bigger ships (Length = 250 m, Breadth = 38.5 m, Draught = 10.5m) 
than ones presently used (Length = 210m, Breadth = 31 m, Draught = 9.15 m).  
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The real time simulation models of ships have been applied for researches. Due to fact that 
at the moment there is no reliable mathematical model of human navigator available the 
real navigators have been used for these researches (captains, pilots). 
After executing series of simulation trials with number guaranteed the former set up level 
of confidence the shape of distribution of maximum ship's point’s distances from the centre 
of the fairway have been determined (Fig. 1, 2). There have been also estimated parameters 
of these distributions. As it was proven in former researches [2], [3] normal distribution 
usually well estimates process of ship passage through the waterway, even on the curved 
parts of it. Two such distributions were analyzed (starboard and port side of the waterway) 
for each section of the waterway. The length of the section was set to avoid loosing impor-
tant information about ship movement. 
Estimated mean (m) and variance (σ) of normal distribution was used for the navigation 
reliability (Pn) calculation (Fig. 3). The following formula was used: 
Pa(d) = P(X ≥ dmax)  (17)
where: 
dmax − distance from the centre of the fairway to the fairway bank, 
X −  normal distribution with parameters X: N(m,σ). 
The above probability of collision with bank was calculated twice one for starboard and 
one for port side of the fairway. 
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Fig. 3: The layout of investigated waterway 
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The probability of accident Pa in single passage of ship is presented on Fig. 4. As it could 
be expected the probability of accident is highly dependent of waterway part and increases 
on curved sections. 
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Fig. 4: Probability of accident in ships single passage 
The presented model of accident intensity cumulating is used for determination of accident 
intensity in single passage (Fig. 5). In the next step several passages were taken into con-
sideration. 
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Fig. 5: Cumulative number of accident in single passage of ship through the waterway 
The waterway modernization is based on increasing of its width. The widening of water-
way increases the safety and decrease the number of expected accidents. This could be 
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observed on the Fig. 6 where one year is considered. In presented researches average traf-
fic intensity is assumed as 200 movements of given ships per year. 
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Fig. 6: Decreasing of yearly accident intensity in 200 maneuvers of given ships with wa-
terway widening up to 50 meters  
The total cost of accidents CAn throughout the waterway lifetime n=20 years could be de-
fined as a product of accident cumulative intensity and mean cost of single accident: 
CAn = Λn·Ca  (18)
where: 
CAn − cost of accidents throughout the lifetime of the waterway, 
Λn − cumulative intensity of accidents, 
n − expected lifetime of the waterway (n = 20 years), 
Ca − mean cost of single accident. 
The mean cost of accident is very important in these researches and was calculated for 
typical ship. The mean estimated cost of serious ship accident is assumed as C1 = 600.000 €. 
The oil spill cost was not considered. Following assumption has been taken in calculations: 
− number of tugs taking part in rescue action: 3 tugs, 
− mean time of rescue action.: 1 day, 
− trip to nearest shipyard: 0,5 day, 
− discharging of ship: 4 days, 
− repair on dry dock: 2 days, 
− total of oil spilled:0 tons. 
The results of optimization are presented on Fig. 7. One could observe that there is no nec-
essary of waterway widening with assumed mean cost of accidents. The most important 
problem in these researches is relatively high uncertainty to the cost of accident. It depends 
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of many factors like kind of ship, bottom characteristic ships kinetic energy and finally 
cargo on board. 
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Fig. 7: Cost-Benefit Analysis for mean accident cost 
On the Fig. 8 and 9 the cost of single accident has been increased by the factor of 10 and 
20 up to 6 million € and 12 million € respectively. In these cases the optimal increase of 
waterway width should be around 10 and 15 meters respectively. 
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Fig. 8: Cost-Benefit Analysis for the accident cost increased by the factor of 10 
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Fig. 9: Cost-Benefit Analysis for the accident cost increased by the factor of 20 
4 Conclusions 
The paper presents the optimal waterway modernization method with consideration of 
navigational risk. The presented case study and sensitivity analysis revealed that cost de-
termination is most important in optimization process. It should be stressed that from the 
other side that the cost of navigational accident is highly undetermined and serious meth-
ods of uncertainty evaluations should be applied. 
The Cost-Benefit Analysis is powerful technique and with combination of acceptable risk 
could be used in helping of decision making process during optimization of waterway 
width. 
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Estimating Convolution Density Function by Monte-
Carlo-Simulation-Method 
Lech Kasyk 
Institute of Mathematics in Maritime University, Szczecin 
Abstract: The paper presents a few problems from the area of Marine Traffic 
Engineering and a few theoretical problems with the sum of continuous ran-
dom variables. In order to describe the probability distribution of density func-
tion of the summed random variables, function convolution was applied. The 
formulae of particular convolutions were derived, and the distributions were 
estimated by means of Monte Carlo simulation method. 
1 Introduction 
Marine Traffic Engineering is preoccupied with numerous problems of probabilistic nature 
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In the problems solved, known probability distributions are frequently used, 
as well as various methods to make the matched theoretical distribution differ as little as 
possible from real data. The application of density function convolutions of random vari-
ables also serves this purpose; it describes the probability distribution of sums of random 
variables [9]. The density function of the convolution is defined as the boundary density of 
two-dimensional random variable. For this purpose variable Z=(U, V) is created, where 
U=X+Y and V = Y. Random variable U=X+Y has a boundary distribution of two-
dimensional variable Z. Assuming variables X and Y to be independent, random variable Z 
is described by density function [9]: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2,g u v f u v f v= − ⋅   (1)
where  
f1 probability density function of variable X 
f2 probability density function of variable Y 
 
The density of single variable U is obtained as boundary distribution, integrating density 
g(u,v) in relation to variable v, in limits proper for particular distributions. 
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2 Convolution of exponential with normal distribution 
The process of reporting by fairway vessels, when they report individually and independ-
ently of each other, is a Poisson process [2, 7]. If T1 denotes the time of waiting for the 
successive vessel at point P1, and T2 denotes the time of passing section P1P2, then the time 
T = T1 + T2 denotes the time of waiting for the successive vessel to report at point P2. Time 
T1 is a random variable with exponential distribution [6, 7, 8]; therefore, the probability 
distribution density of variable T is the boundary density of function: 
( ) ( )
( )2
221 for , 2
0                                  for other ,
v m
u ve e u v v Rg u v
u v
λ σλ σ π
−−− −⎧⎪ ⋅ ≥ ∧ ∈= ⎨⎪⎩  
 (2) 
where  
λ exponential distribution parameter of random variable T1 
m expected value of random variable T2 
2σ  variance of random variable T2 
The density of random variable T is equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
1
2
1 1 Erf
2 2
v mu
u v
m u
g u e e dv
m ue
λ σ
λ λσ
λ σ π
λσλ σ
−−− −
−∞
− +
= ⋅ =
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− += ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
∫
 
 (3) 
where Erf (x) denotes the function of error used in Mathematica program in probabilistic 
problems; [1]: 
( ) 2
0
2Erf
x
tx e dtπ
−= ∫
. 
A graph of function g(u) is presented in Fig. 1. The shape of the graph depends on particu-
lar parameters of the summed variables. The figure below was prepared for λ = 2, m = 15, 
σ = 5. 
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Fig.1. Graph of density function of the sum of random variables with exponential and nor-
mal distributions 
By use of the Monte Carlo method 1000 values of random variable T1 with uniform distri-
bution were determined by way of simulation and 1000 values of variable T2 with normal 
distribution. Next they were summed and a distribution of variable T = T1 + T2 was ob-
tained. A histogram of this variable is presented in Fig. 2. 
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Fig.2. A histogram of sum distribution of simulated random variables with exponential and 
normal distributions 
Among distributions matched, variable T is best described by Inverse Gauss distribution 
with parameters 731 and 13263517. The conformity of these distributions is high, as the 
2χ  coefficient is equal to 23.24 at critical value 41.33 (on confidence level 0.95). 
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3 Convolution of two normal distributions 
If B1 denotes an error of a vessel’s position determination in a given direction, resulting 
from measurement accuracy, and B2 an error resulting from the method assumed, then the 
random variable B = B1 + B2 can be assumed as the total error of the vessel’s position de-
termination in a given direction.  
In the case of both B1 and B2 errors being random variables with normal distributions, the 
two-dimensional density function has the following shape: 
 
( )
( ) ( )2 21 2
2 2
1 22 2
1 2
1,
2
u v m v m
g u v e σ σπσ σ
− − −− −= ⋅   (4)
where 1m        expected value of random variable B1 
2
1σ        variance of random variable B1 
2m        expected value of random variable B2 
2
2σ        variance of random variable B2 
 
 
After integrating this function in relation to v, within the range of ( ),−∞ ∞ , the density of 
random variable B is equal to  
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
2
1 2
2 2
1 22
2 2
1 2
1
2
u m m
g u e σ σπ σ σ
− −− += ⋅
+
  (5)
 
This is the density of normal distribution with mean 1 2m m+  and with variance 2 21 2σ σ+ . 
Using the Monte Carlo method 1000 values of random variable B1 with normal distribution 
N(70;2) were determined by way of simulation as well as 1000 values of random valuable 
B2 with normal distribution N(14;5). Next, they were summed and the distribution of vari-
able B = B1 + B2 was obtained. This distribution was compared with normal distribution 
described by density function (5). The conformity of these distributions is high, as the chi2 
coefficient is equal to 15.17 at critical value 41.33, on confidence level of 0.95.  
4 Convolution of normal distribution with uniform distri-
bution 
In the case of B1 being a random variable with normal distribution, and B2 a random vari-
able with uniform distribution, the two-dimensional density function has the following 
shape: 
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( ) ( )
2
221 1,
2
v m
g u v e
b a
σ
πσ
−−= ⋅ ⋅−   (6)
where b, a  limits of uniform  distribution 
,m σ  parameters of normal distribution. 
 
After integrating this function in relation to v, within the limits of ( ),u b u a− − , the density 
of random variable B is equal to: 
 
( ) ( )
1 Erf Erf
2 2 2
b m u a m ug u
b a σ σ
⎛ ⎞+ − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
  (7)
 
Fig. 3 presents the graph of g(u) function for the following parameters: a = 4, b = 10,  
m = 5, σ = 0.5. 
 
10 12 14 16
u
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
gHuL
 
 
Fig.3. Graph of density function of random variables sum with uniform and normal distri-
bution 
Using the Monte Carlo method, 1000 values of variable B1 with uniform distribution 
U(4;10) were determined by way of simulation, as well as 1000 values of variable B2 with 
normal distribution N(5;0.5). Next they were summed, and the distribution of variable B = 
B1 + B2 was obtained. A histogram of this variable is presented in Fig. 4. 
4th International Probabilistic Symposium, 12th-13th October 2006 
6 
 Distribution for B=B1+B2
Mean = 11,99992
X <=14,78
95%
X <=9,19
5%
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0,18
0,2
7 10 13 16
 
 
 
Fig.4. A histogram of sum distribution of simulated random variables with uniform and 
normal distributions 
Among distributions matched, variable B is best described by Beta distribution with pa-
rameters (2.48; 2.32; 7.63; 16.12). The conformity of these distributions is very low, as the 
chi2 coefficient is equal to 60.53 at critical value 41.33 (on confidence level 0.95). 
5 Convolution of three normal distributions 
The ferry’s movement on a ferry crossing can be divided into 3 phases. The first is “gather-
ing speed”, i.e. the time from leaving the initial berth to reaching full crossing speed. The 
second phase is the ferry’s movement at full speed. The third phase is “braking”, i.e. the 
time from starting to brake to the mooring at final harbour. The times of covering particu-
lar stages of the crossing are random variables with normal distributions [3, 8]. Hence, the 
total time of covering the crossing is equal to T = T1 + T2 + T3. 
Formula (5) presents the density function of the convolution of two normal distributions. 
By repeating the operation of this distribution’s convolution with normal distribution, the 
density function of the convolution of three normal distributions was obtained: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
2
1 2 3
2 2 2
1 2 32
2 2 2
1 2 3
1
2
u m m m
g u e σ σ σπ σ σ σ
− − −− + += ⋅
+ +
  (8) 
where ,i im σ  parameters of normal distribution of variable Ti   
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Function g(u) is equal to the density of normal distribution with mean 1 2 3m m m+ +  and 
variance 2 2 21 2 3σ σ σ+ + . 
Using the Monte Carlo method 1000 values of variable T1 with normal distribution were 
determined, 1000 values of variable T2 with normal distribution and 1000 values of vari-
able T3 with normal distribution. Next they were summed and the distribution of variable T 
= T1 + T2 + T3 was obtained. This distribution was compared with normal distribution de-
scribed by density function (8). The conformity of these distributions is not high, as the 
chi2 coefficient is equal to 38.78 at critical value 41.33 (on confidence level of 0.95). Vari-
able T is better described by Inverse Gauss distribution (chi2 equal to 29.44 at critical value 
41.33, on confidence level of 0.95). 
6 Convolution of two uniform distributions 
A vessel proceeding along a narrow fairway usually attempts to sail along the axis of the 
fairway; yet a lot of phenomena make it practically impossible. The distance of the vessel’s 
gravity centre from the fairway axis is a random variable which can be described by uni-
form distribution [4]. If D1 denotes the distance of the vessel’s gravity centre from the 
fairway axis caused by factor C1, and D2 denotes the distance of the vessel’s gravity centre 
from the fairway axis caused by factor C2, then the summary deviation D = D1 + D2 will 
have a distribution equal to the convolution of uniform distributions. The two-dimensional 
density function, from which the convolution was calculated, has the following form: 
( )
1 1  for 
,
0                  for other ,
v a u v b c v d
g u v b a d c
u v
⎧ ⋅ + ≤ ≤ + ∧ ≤ ≤⎪= − −⎨⎪⎩
  (9) 
where 
            b, a limits of uniform distribution of variable D1 
            d,c limits of uniform distribution of variable D2 
 
If c b d a+ < + , then after integrating this function in relation to v, in the range  ( ),c u a− , 
( ),u b u a− −  and ( ),u b d− , the density of random variable D will amount to: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
  for 
1                   for  
-
  for 
u a c c a u c b
b a d c
g u c b u d a
d c
u d b d a u d b
b a d c
− −⎧ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎪⎪= + ≤ < +⎨⎪ − + +⎪ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎩
  (10) 
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If c b d a+ > + , then after integrating this function in relation to v, in the range ( ),c u a− , 
( ),c d  and ( ),u b d− , the density of random variable D will amount to: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
  for 
1                   for  
-
  for 
u a c c a u d a
b a d c
g u d a u c b
d c
u d b c b u d b
b a d c
− −⎧ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎪⎪= + ≤ < +⎨⎪ − + +⎪ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎩
  (11) 
If c b d a+ = + , then after integrating this function in relation to v, in the range ( ),c u a−  
and ( ),u b d− , the density of random variable D will amount to: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
  for 
  for 
u a c c a u c b
b a d c
g u
u d b c b u d b
b a d c
− −⎧ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎪= ⎨ − + +⎪ + ≤ < +⎪ − ⋅ −⎩
  (12) 
The above function g(u) is the density of triangular distribution. 
Using the Monte Carlo method 1000 values of random variable D1 with uniform distribu-
tion U(3;6) were determined by way of simulation as well as 1000 values of random valu-
able D2 with uniform distribution U(4;10). Next, they were summed and the distribution of 
variable D = D1 + D2 was obtained. This distribution was compared with triangular distri-
bution. The conformity of these distributions is not high, as the chi2 coefficient is equal to 
35.71 at critical value 41.33, on confidence level of 0.95. ). Variable D is better described 
by Beta distribution (chi2 equal to 27.93 at critical value 41.33, on confidence level of 
0.95). 
7 Convolution of two exponential distributions 
The two-dimensional density function, for sum of two exponential random variable, has 
the following form: 
( ) ( )1 2- -1 2 e e  for 0,
0                          for rest ,
u v v u v vg u v
u v
λ λλ λ −⎧ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ∧ ≥⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
  (13) 
where  
1λ  exponential distribution parameter of random variable X 
2λ  exponential distribution parameter of random variable Y . 
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After integrating this function in relation to v, within the limits of ( )0,u , the density of 
random variable U=X+Y is equal to: 
( ) ( )2 11 2
1 2
u ug u e eλ λλ λλ λ
−= ⋅ −−   (14)
Fig. 7 presents the graph of g(u) function for the following parameters: 1 3λ =  and 1 7λ = . 
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Fig.7. Graph of density function of random variables sum with exponential distribution 
Using the Monte Carlo method, 1000 values of variable X with exponential distribution 
E( 1 3λ = ) were determined by way of simulation, as well as 1000 values of variable Y with 
exponential distribution E( 1 7λ = ). Next they were summed, and the distribution of vari-
able U=X+Y was obtained. A histogram of this variable is presented in Fig. 8. 
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Fig.8. A histogram of sum distribution of simulated random variables with exponential 
distributions 
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Among distributions matched, variable U is best described by Gamma distribution with 
parameters (1.71; 5.7). The conformity of these distributions is high, as the chi2 coefficient 
is equal to 17.9 at critical value 41.33 (on confidence level 0.95). 
8 Resumé 
The convolution of particular density functions of random variables makes it possible to 
distribute a given phenomenon over a number of smaller elements, which can be examined 
more easily and profoundly. Knowing the distributions of particular component elements 
of the variable, the distribution of this variable can be determined. What is also interesting 
is the fact that knowing the distribution of the variable and knowing that this distribution is 
a convolution of other distributions, it is possible to search for component elements of this 
variable with known distributions. This process is possible due to matching the distribution 
to the sum of simulated random variables. 
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Risk assessment for LNG carrier maneuvers in a 
restricted sea area 
Maciej Gucma 
Institute of Marine Traffic Engineering, Maritime University Szczecin 
Abstract: Increase of LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) terminals development, 
especially in sea areas where other ports are located, leads to growth of marine 
traffic. This affects safety factors in such area. Article presents method for as-
sessing navigational risk of maneuvering LNG carrier in area where dense traf-
fic and movement restrictions occurs. Methods used in marine traffic engi-
neering discipline are presented. Some conceptions of specific LNG terminals, 
with its particulars related to maneuvering safety factors are showed as well. 
1 Introduction 
Over the last few years, there has been a substantial increase in the worldwide production 
and transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This situation leads to growth of traf-
fic in areas where LNG terminal are located. While many studies have been conducted to 
assess the consequences and risks of potential LNG land based accident, the increasing 
importance of marine LNG imports suggests that, consistent methods and approaches shall 
be identified and implemented to help improve safety. 
One of possible regulations for safety assessment of waterways for LNG has been devel-
oped by United States Coast Guard. The Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) outlined 
in the Navigation Vessel and Inspection Circular (NVIC) No. 05-05: “Guidance on Assess-
ing the Suitability of a Waterway for Liquefied Natural Gas Marine Traffic” is a qualitative 
assessment of a waterway. The WSA is considered crucial to the objective evaluation of 
proposals to build and operate shoreside LNG terminals. The Coast Guard Captain of the 
Port (COTP) reviews and validates the applicant’s assessment, ensuring it adequately ad-
dresses the inherent safety, security, and environmental risks associated with the terminal 
and LNG marine traffic.  
From the European Union point of view there are no common politics related to LNG 
maritime safety measures. Each country has own procedures for implementation and op-
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eration of shore based LNG terminals. In such case it is a desirable to create own risk crite-
rions for maneuvering of LNG tanker carrier in confined waters. Although such criterions 
should be based on well described and accepted models. This work is introduction study in 
maritime safety field for development of LNG system in Polish coast. 
2 LNG Terminal Waterway Suitability Assessments  
The WSA described in NVIC 05-05 is a relatively new process for the LNG industry and 
the Coast Guard in the United States of America. The new process calls for the applicant to 
complete a comprehensive WSA that considers all aspects of safety, security, and the ma-
rine environment. Major factors and risks assessed include [5]: 
• density and character of marine traffic, including detailed analysis of recreational, 
commercial, military and other movements,  
• identification of critical sea infrastructure – for traffic of LNG carrier,   
• key assets along the transit route,  
• consequences resulting from possible LNG spills,  
• demographical situation in proximity of terminal, 
• detailed characterization of LNG facility with, so called ‘Zones of Concern’ giving 
applied to the length of the transit to determine the main areas of concern along the 
waterway. 
• maneuvers required to berth to terminal, and their impact for traffic in vicinity,  
• availability of resources for maintaining security and safety,  
In addition, the process outlined in WSA requires the Coast Guard to conduct a review and 
validation of the applicant's to ensure it presents a realistic and credible analysis of the 
public safety and security implications for introducing LNG marine traffic into the port and 
evaluates the measures intended to responsibly manage identified risks [5].  
Risk Assessments in Means of WSA determines both safety and security aspects. After the 
port environment and transit route have been characterized, the WSA should analyze the 
risks that arise from the introduction to LNG operations into the port. The goal of this sec-
tion of the WSA is to discern and understand the individual risks, in terms of probabilities, 
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences, so that appropriate risk management strategies 
can be developed in the next section. The WSA should go into as much detail as possible 
[5]. Key assumptions should be identified and a sensitivity analysis performed. 
User of terminal may use any assessment methodology deemed appropriate. However, it is 
recommended that the applicant use a methodology that meets generally accepted risk-
based decision-making industry standards and that the assessment is as objective and 
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transparent as possible. The Risk Assessment portion of the WSA looks at the conditions 
that could result in a release of LNG. The events that could trigger a release may be acci-
dental (collisions, groundings, spills, etc.) or intentional (terrorist act, sabotage, etc) [5]. 
The accidental releases should be considered in a safety assessment that looks at the prob-
ability and consequences of various incidents. For the unique case of intentional releases a 
security assessment is performed. 
3 MTE tools for assessment of risk factors 
The Marine Traffic Engineering as a regular science was initiated due to the increasing 
number of vessel accidents, due to the higher intensity of vessels traffic. Such circum-
stances are of special interest in confined water regions. Along with the increased number, 
size and speed of ships, there was no corresponding change in the size of waterways, ca-
nals and maneuvering areas. 
A vessel can maneuver safely only in an area where she fulfils at every point the condition 
of required depth. Such an area is called accessible navigational area, which can be pre-
sented in the form of area D of sets of point fulfilling the condition of required depth at 
moment t [3]. 
The vessel performing a given maneuver in an accessible navigational area occupies a cer-
tain area determined by her successive locations in the area.  The parameters of this area 
are random and depend on various factors.  This area, calculated on a definite reliability 
level is called safe maneuvering area. A safe maneuvering area so defined can be pre-
sented in the form of area dijk (set of points) and the basic navigational safety condition 
can be written down as follows [3]:  
 
⎭⎬
⎫
∆+≥∈
⊂
 ),,(),,(),,(   )(),(
)(
tyxtyxTtyxhtyxp
tijk
D
Dd
  (1)
where:     
D(t) – accessible navigational area (meeting the condition of accessible depth at 
moment t, 
dijk – accessible maneuvering area (traffic lane) of the i-th vessel, performing the 
j-th maneuver in k-th navigational conditions, 
h(x, y, t) – the depth of the area at point with coordinates (x, y) at moment t, 
T(x, y, t)  – the draft of the vessel at area point with coordinates (x, y) at moment t, 
∆(x, y, t)  – underkeel clearance at area point with coordinates (x, y) at moment t. 
Sets of points of the accessible navigational area D(t), as also the safe maneuvering area 
dijk can be identified with areas of definite linear parameters (Fig. 1). P represents actual 
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position of vessel in moment t, and P2 represents position in moment t2, and for its moment 
probability of grounding and touching the bottom is visualized. 
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Fig. 1: Sets of accessible navigational area D(t) and safe manoeuvring area djk for LNG 
tanker in virtual port 
 
Navigational safety in restricted areas is a concept which covers all problems bound with 
conducting the vessel from point A to point B, fulfilling the basic navigational safety con-
dition on the confined water. 
Such defined safety can be presented in the form of the function [2]: 
Pi = f (Ai, Si, Ni, Hi, Mi, Ii, Ri)  (2)
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where:     
Ai  – area parameters, 
Si – vessel parameters, 
Ni – position fixing systems parameters, 
Hi – parameters of hydrometeorological conditions, 
Mi – parameters of manoeuvre performed taking into consideration the human 
factor, 
Ii – traffic intensity parameters, 
Ri – traffic control system parameters. 
4 Simulation researches 
Computer based simulations are used for assessment of traffic lane and after analysis an 
actual level of risk at given area and given conditions. Navigational risk is defined as the 
product of probability of failure occurrence and the consequences it can cause. Addition-
ally, the definition of risk was supplemented by relative frequency of performing the ma-
neuver under research. Assuming that failure and its results are independent occurrences, 
navigational risk can be presented in the form of product [3]: 
Rijkxy = Iijkxy · aijkxyP · Sijkxy   (3)
where:     
Iijkxy –   average annual intensity (frequency) of performing the j-th maneuver by
the i-th vessel in k-th navigational conditions in area (xy), 
a
ijkxyP  –   probability of particular failure occurrence when performing the j-th
maneuver by the i-th vessel in k-th navigational conditions in area (xy),
Sijkxy   –   results caused by this failure when performing the j-th maneuver by the 
i-th vessel in k-th navigational conditions in area (xy). 
At the same time it should be noted that the product Iijkxy · aijkxyP  is the probable number of a 
definite failure occurrence in a year that is [3]: 
aijkxy = Iijkxy · aijkxyP    (4)
The estimation of navigational risk consists of: 
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• calculation of the probability of failure occurrence of a certain type when perform-
ing the j-th kind of maneuver in a set area restricted by the i-th kind of vessel in k-
th navigational conditions, 
• estimating failure consequences of a certain type due to performing the j-th kind of 
manoeuvre in a set area restricted by the i-th kind of vessel in k-th navigational 
conditions. 
Based on the definition of navigational risk the condition of safe definition of safe naviga-
tion has been determined [2]: 
Rijkxy ≤ accxyR   (5)
and after transformation: 
Iijkxy · aijkxyP · Sijkxy ≤ accxyR                  (6)
Simulations are performed by expert users – captains on LNG tankers. Simulations envi-
ronment is visualized at navigational chart (Fig. 2) or at 3D models. After completion of 
significant number of runs (usually 20 runs gives statistically significant results) over given 
area in given conditions and in given time, the analysis began. The mean traffic lane is 
evaluated and then risk criterions are checked again for fulfillment of acceptability. 
Simulations results from performed in Marine Traffic Engineering Institute, Maritime Uni-
versity of Szczecin for entering large crude carrier to port Swinoujscie in Poland, are pre-
sented at Fig. 3.  
Along with simulation runs, expert opinions elicitation, will give an answer for probabili-
ties of failures of such events that could not be assed directly as for example: 
• Fatal: 
o Grounding; 
o Collision; 
o Stranding; 
o Loss of stability; 
o Extreme weather during cargo operations; 
o Failure of cargo system in port; 
• Non fatal: 
o Electrical system breakdown;  
o Mechanical system breakdown; 
o Steering system breakdown; 
o Other. 
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Fig. 2: Visualization during simulation runs 
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Fig.3. Traffic lanes during entrance of crude carrier to the inner port of Swinoujscie with 
lengths of:  240 m, 250 m and 260 m. [6] 
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This method gives values accident occurrence values for QRA reports that are desired for 
WSA in USA and for local regulations in UE. For example powered collision of merchant 
vessels with LNG tanker using coastal traffic lanes was estimated at value of 6.1·10-6 for 
given port – studies for Cabrillio LNG port [4]. Other risks were calculated for among 70 
different situations both fatal and non fatal [4].  
5 Conclusions 
Detailed study over localization of LNG terminal should be based on analysis of area and 
facilities in surroundings. Criterions used for risk assessment shall comply with the ac-
cepted methods used in MTE science. 
Qualitative risk assessment method proposed by companies like DNV (Det Norske Veri-
tas), do not give an answers for measurable risk in field of vessel movement, other than 
expert based factors. Such methodology is not effective for LNG carrier traffic safety as-
sessment, due to the fact that potential accident might lead to many casualties. Proposed 
method has following features: 
• Gives detailed risk factors for specific maneuvers, 
• Describes conditions of performed maneuvers, 
• Is directly implemental for new structures (not existing terminals). 
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Zusammenfassung: Unbestimmtheit ist eine inhärente Eigenschaft der Welt. 
Unbestimmtheit kann durch geeignete mathematische Modelle beschrieben 
werden. Derartige Modelle sind z.B. die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Fuzzy-
Modelle, Neuronale Netze, Expertensysteme oder eben die Theorie der Grauen 
Systeme. Im Folgenden wird kurz auf die letztgenannte Theorie eingegangen. 
Anschließend werden zwei Beispiele vorgestellt, bei denen die Grauen Zahlen 
zur Erfassung von Unbestimmtheit verwendet wurden. 
1 Einleitung  
Die vollständige Vorhersage zukünftiger Ereignisse ist nach dem derzeitigen Verständnis 
der Welt unmöglich. Unbestimmtheit ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der bekannten Welt. 
Aber die aktive Rolle des Menschen und die damit verbundenen notwendigen Vorhersagen 
zukünftiger Ereignisse zwingen den Menschen, die Unbestimmtheit zu berücksichtigen. Im 
letzten Jahrhundert haben sich theoretisch-mathematische und empirisch-mathematische 
Modelle zur Extrapolation zukünftiger Ereignisse in nahezu allen Fachgebieten durchge-
setzt und die reinen empirischen Regeln verdrängt. Im Gegensatz zu den reinen empiri-
schen Regeln, die implizit Unbestimmtheit beinhalten, bedürfen die mathematischen 
Modelle einer besonderen Berücksichtigung der Unbestimmtheit. Dazu stehen verschiede-
ne Verfahren bereit, wobei hierbei zu allererst die Statistik und Wahrscheinlichkeitsrech-
nung zu nennen wären. Weitere Verfahren sind die in den 60er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts 
von ZADEH entwickelten Fuzzy-Modelle [20], aber auch Entropie basierte Werte (z.B. 
SHANNON’s Entropie als Maß fehlender Informationen), Degrees of belief (Subjektive 
Wahrscheinlichkeit), Expertensysteme (Delphi-Befragungen), Künstliche Intelligenz, Neu-
ronale Netzwerke, Datamining, Rought Sets, Chaostheorie oder genetische Verfahren. 
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WEN & CHANG [10] verweisen in diesem Zusammenhang darauf, dass mehr als 300 ma-
thematische Verfahren zur Entwicklung von Vorhersagemodellen existieren.  
In den 80er Jahren wurde in China die Theorie der Grauen Zahlen durch DENG eingeführt 
[15]. Seither wurde dieses mathematische Verfahren zur Beschreibung der Unbestimmtheit 
auf vielen Gebieten in China verwendet. So wurden Graue Zahlen für die Abschätzung des 
Aufkommens an Schmutzwasser [4], für Temperaturvorhersagemodelle [5], Transport-
probleme [6], Energieverbrauchsvorhersagen [7], für die Planung von Unterhaltungsmaß-
nahmen [2] oder für Flut- und Murenprognosen [12] verwendet. Auch eine Überführung 
von Fuzzymodellen in Graue Modelle wurde bereits vorgestellt [8]. 
Auf Grund der Tatsache, dass die Veröffentlichungen überwiegend in chinesischer Sprache 
gehalten waren, fand dieses Verfahren nur sehr wenig Beachtung im europäischen Raum. 
Deshalb soll hier im Folgenden eine kurze Einführung in das Thema der Grauen Zahlen 
erfolgen. 
Der Name Graue Zahlen beschreibt den Informationsgehalt, welche eine Zahl besitzt. Im 
Vergleich dazu ist eine Schwarze Zahl eine Zahl, über die keine Informationen vorliegen 
und eine Weiße Zahl ist eine vollständig bekannte Zahl. Eine Zusammenstellung der Ei-
genschaften der Schwarzen, Grauen und Weißen Zahlen findet sich in Tab. 1. 
Tab. 1: Eigenschaften von Zahlen 
Eigenschaft Schwarz Grau Weiß 
Information Unbekannt Unvollständig Vollständig 
Darstellung Dunkel Grau Leuchtend 
Resultat Keine Lösung Mehrere Lösungen Eine Lösung 
Prozess Neu Erfahrungen liegen vor Alt 
Eigenschaften Chaotisch Komplex Ordnung 
Vorstellung Negativ Übergang Positiv 
 
1.1 Begriffe 
Eine Graue Zahl wird mathematisch als ⊗  dargestellt. Innerhalb der Definition Grauer 
Zahlen sind verschiedene Klassen bekannt (GUO & LOVE [1]): 
Graue Zahl mit Untergrenze [ , ]a⊗∈ ∞   
Graue Zahl mit Obergrenze [ , ]a⊗∈ ∞   
Graue Zahl mit Intervall [ , ]a a⊗∈  
Kontinuierliche Graue Zahl [ ]a n a⊗∈ ≤ ≤   
Diskrete Graue Zahl 1 2 3[ ... ]ia n n n n a⊗∈ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤   
Schwarze Zahl [ , ]⊗∈ ∞ ∞  oder 1 2[ , ]⊗∈ ⊗ ⊗  
Weiße Zahl [ , ]a a⊗∈  mit a a=  
Aufhellungsprozess  Prozess zur Ermittlung einer repräsentativen Grauen 
Zahl. Bei Grauen Zahlen, die um einen Wert schwan-
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ken, wählt man hier in der Regel den Mittelwert 
(1 ) 0,5 0.5a b a bα α⊗ = ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅  
Eine Graue Zahl muss jedoch nicht als reiner Zahlenintervall definiert werden, sondern 
kann auch als Funktion abgebildet werden. Beispiele dafür werden in Tab. 2 gezeigt.  
Tab. 2: Verschiedene Formen von Grauen Zahlen nach DENG [15] 
a1
f x ( )
b1 b2 a2
L x ( ) R x ( )
 a1
f x ( )
b1 b2 a2  b1 b2
f x ( )
 
Graue Zahl Graue Zahl mit linearen 
Funktionen  
Zahlenintervall 
Der Kenntnisstand einer Zahl kann über den Grauwert oder die Graustufe der Zahl beur-
teilt werden. Vergleichbar dazu wäre die Standardabweichung oder Varianz einer Zahl in 
der Statistik. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die Graustufe aber einheitenlos. Es gibt verschiedene 
Formen von Graustufen, wie z.B. 
die relative Graustufe einer Zahl: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−++
−⋅=
2
22
1
11
12
120 ,max
2
b
ab
b
ab
bb
bb
g , 
die absolute Graustufe einer Zahl: ( )2211120 5,0 ababbbg −+−⋅+−= , 
die Graustufe einer Intervall-Zahl: 
12
120 2
bb
bb
g +
−⋅= . 
Berechnet man für eine Intervallzahl 8 bis 16 die Graustufe, so erhalt man:  
667,0
816
81620 =+
−⋅=g . 
In Abb. 1 wird die Entwicklung der Graustufe einer Intervallzahl in Abhängigkeit der Ver-
änderung der oberen Schranke gezeigt. 
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Abb. 1: Verlauf der Graustufe für eine Intervallzahl, bei der die untere Schranke mit 1,0 
konstant gehalten wird und die obere Schranke kontinuierlich erhöht wird.  
1.2 Prognose 
Die grundlegende Annahme für die Modellbildung ist das Vorhandensein stetiger und dif-
ferenzierbarer Funktionen zur Beschreibung von Abhängigkeiten. Diese Annahme kann 
auf Grund der begrenzt vorliegenden Daten in der Regel nicht geprüft werden. Die in vie-
len Gebieten auftretenden Probleme bei der Prognose, so z.B. in den Sozialwissenschaften, 
können möglicherweise auf die Korruption dieser Annahme zurückgeführt werden.  
Die Idee bei der Anwendung Grauer Zahlen liegt nun darin, die Differential- und Integral-
rechnung auf diskrete Zahlenreihen anstelle von Funktionen zu erweitern. Die im Folgen-
den dargestellte Herleitung der Prognoseverfahren ist DENG [15] und GUO & LOVE [1] 
entnommen. Es soll eine Zahlenreihe, z.B. Messwerte in der Form  
(0)
(0)
(0) (0)
(0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
...
( )
x
x
X x
x k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
vorliegen.  
Zunächst wird das Integral dieser Zahlenreihe behandelt:  
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1
0 0
( ) ( ) lim ( )
b n
k kx ka
F x f x dx f x
−
∆ → =
= = ∆∑∫
 
Eine integrierte Funktion besitzt weniger Extremstellen, sie verläuft in der Regel gleich-
mäßiger als die ursprüngliche Funktion. Betrachtet man solche Extremwerte als Ausreißer, 
so werden diese Ausreißer durch den Integrationsprozess eliminiert. Die gegebene Zahlen-
reihe )0(X  wird nun integriert, in dem gilt: 
(1) (0)
0
( )
k
i
x x i
=
=∑
 
Die Integration soll als Operator D bezeichnet werden )1()0(: XXD → . Weitere Operatio-
nen sind möglich: 
( ) ( 1)
0
( )
k
r r
i
x x i−
=
=∑
. 
Im nächsten Schritt wird die Ermittlung des Differenzials betrachtet. Dazu wird die Reihe  
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
(1)
(2)
(3)
...
( )
r
r
r r
r
x
x
X x
x k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
herangezogen. Das Differential ergibt sich dann zu: 
( ) ( )
( )
0
( ) ( 1)( ) lim
r r
r
t
d x k x kX k
dt t∆ →
− −= ∆  
Berücksichtigt man die Ermittlung von )(rX , so erkennt man, dass gilt: 
1
( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
k k
r r
r ri i
x i x i
d X k x k
dt
−− −
−= =
−
= =
∑ ∑
 
Damit können Summen bzw. Differenzen der Messreihen als Integrale und Differentiale 
betrachtet werden und sind ineinander überführbar. Die Überführung der Reihen kann nun 
auf Differentialgleichungen angewendet werden. 
Zunächst soll die Differentialgleichung 1. Ordnung: 
dx a x b
dt
+ ⋅ =
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betrachtet werden. Diese Gleichung ist die Grundlage für das so genannte Graue Model 
GM(1,1). Dazu wird zunächst )1(xx =  gewählt und man erhält: 
(1)
(1)dx a x b
dt
+ ⋅ =
 
Da )0(
)1(
x
dt
dx =  gilt, kann man schreiben: 
(0) (1)x a x b+ ⋅ =  
Allerdings stimmen jetzt die Zeitpunkte nicht mehr. Deutlich wird dies allein durch die 
Tatsache, dass )0(x  einen Zahlenwert mehr hat als )1(x . Diese Zeitverschiebung wird kor-
rigiert, in dem man anstelle von )1(x  mit dem Mittelwert zweier benachbarter )1(x  rechnet. 
Das entspricht auch einem Aufhellungsprozess, also der Berücksichtigung zusätzlicher 
Informationen: )1(5.0)(5.0)( )1()1()1( −⋅+⋅= kxkxkz . Der Wert 0.5 ist variable. Im Rah-
men der vorliegenden Untersuchungen wurde ein Verfahren umgesetzt, welches den Wert 
im Sinne des kleinsten Fehlerquadratsumme optimiert, wobei gilt 
(1) (1) (1)( ) ( ) (1/ ) ( 1)z k f x k f x k= ⋅ + ⋅ −  
Die Differentialgleichung wird nun zu: 
(0) (1)x a z b+ ⋅ =  
Mit den Originaldaten und den Umrechnungen der Reihen können nun die noch unbekann-
ten Parameter a und b der Differentialgleichung bestimmt werden. Dazu wird das folgende 
Gleichungssystem aufgestellt. 
(0) (1)
(0) (1)
(0) (1)
(2) (2)
(3) (3)
(4) (4)
...
x a z b
x a z b
x a z b
= − ⋅ +
= − ⋅ +
= − ⋅ +
 
Schreibt man dieses Gleichungssystem in Matrixform, so erhält man die Matrix 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
−
=
1)4(
1)3(
1)2(
)1(
)1(
)1(
z
z
z
B , und den Vektor 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
)4(
)3(
)2(
)0(
)0(
)0(
x
x
x
Y . 
Die Bestimmungsgleichung für die noch unbekannten Parameter ist  
YBBB
b
a
A TT ⋅⋅⋅=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= −1)( . 
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Die gegebene inhomogene Differentialgleichung 1. Ordnung  
dx a x b
dt
+ ⋅ =
 
gehorcht der Form 
dx r x k
dt
= ⋅ +
 
Diese Differentialgleichung kann wie folgt gelöst werden: 
/
/
dx dt r
x k r
=+  
Beide Seiten werden integriert und man erhält: Ctrrkx +⋅=+ )/ln(   
Weiter kann man beide Seiten exponieren: 
/ exp( ) exp( )x k r r t C+ = ± ⋅ ⋅ . 
Isoliert man im nächsten Schritt x, so ergibt sich: 
exp( ) exp( ) kx r t C
r
= ⋅ ⋅ −
 
Jetzt verwendet man wieder die ursprünglichen Bezeichnungen und Vorzeichen: 
exp( ) bx C a t
a
= ⋅ − ⋅ +
 
Die Variable C beschreibt die Startbedingungen: 
(0) (1) bC x
a
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Basierend auf den vorliegenden Datenreihen, kann man gemäß der Formel Daten extrapo-
lieren: 
(1) (0)ˆ ( 1) (1) a kb bx k x e
a a
− ⋅⎛ ⎞+ = − ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
(0) (1) (1)ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1) ( 1) ( )x k x k x k+ = + − . 
Neben dem Grauen Model GM (1,1)-Modell gibt es weitere Modelle, die auf anderen An-
sätzen beruhen, wie z.B. DGDMMI(1,1,1) [21], GDM(2,2,1) [26], GFM(1,1) [26], 
GM(2,2) [23], GM(0,N) [12], UIRGM(1,1) [25] oder DGDM(1,1,1) [22]. 
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■ Beispiel 
Im Folgenden soll die Anwendung an einem sehr einfachen Beispiel gezeigt werden. Dazu 
wird ein exponentieller Wachstumsprozess für eine zu extrapolierende Größe angenom-
men. Die Eingangsgrößen für die Funktion sind in Tabelle 3 angegeben. Der Wert für 2010 
wurde mittels Regression Grauer Zahlen geschätzt. 
Tab. 3: Eigenschaften von Zahlen 
Jahr Messwert 
1995 1,412 
2000 1,050 
2005 0,720 
2010 extrapoliert 0,4933 
 
Die Berechnung wurde mit dem Programm MATLAB durchgeführt. Die Variablen gemäß 
der bisher verwendeten Nomenklatur sind links Die Einzelwerte der Berechnung ergeben 
sich zu: 
X0 =    1.4120    1.0500    0.7200    )0(x  
Y0 =      1995      2000      2005    Zeitachse 
X1 =     1.4120    2.4620    3.1820    )1(x  
Z1 =          0    1.9370    2.8220    )1(z  
B  =    -1.9370    1.0000     Matrix B 
        -2.8220    1.0000 
Y =      1.0500       Matrix Y 
         0.7200 
BT =    -1.9370   -2.8220     Matrix BT 
         1.0000    1.0000 
A =      0.3729       Matrix A 
         1.7723 
alpha =  0.3729       α  
beta =   1.7723       β  
X0SG =    1.4120    1.0500    0.7200    0.4937 )0(xˆ  
1.3 Grauer Relationskoeffizient 
Vergleichbar zum PEARSON’schen Korrelationskoeffizienten in der Statistik existiert in-
nerhalb der Theorie der Grauen Zahlen auch ein Grauer Relationskoeffizient, der den Grad 
der Abhängigkeit zwischen Zahlenreihen beschreiben soll. Dazu müssen zwei Zahlen-
reihen in der Form 
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vorliegen. Es können auch mehrere Zahlenreihenpaare vorliegen. Im ersten Schritt werden 
die Beträge der Differenzen der Zahlenreihen ermittelt:  
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
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−
−
−
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)4()4(
...
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)2()2(
)1()1(
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01
01
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⎟⎟
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⎝
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−
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−
−
−
)4()4(
...
)3()3(
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1
1
1
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ii
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X
 
Der Relationskoeffizient ist definiert als:  
XX
XX
k
ki
kiki
i maxmax
maxmaxminmin
)()( +
+
=
αξ  mit 10 ≤≤ α  
Der Wert α ist abhängig von den Umgebungsbedingungen: 
 
1α =  Umgebungsbedingungen identisch 
0α =  Umgebungsbedingungen unabhängig 
 
Der berechnete Relationskoeffizient kann wie folgt interpretiert werden: 
 
0,9 1ξ< ≤  Vollständige Abhängigkeit 
0,8 0,9ξ< ≤  Gute Übereinstimmung 
0,6 0,8ξ< ≤  Mittlere Übereinstimmung 
0,0 0,6ξ< ≤  Keine Übereinstimmung 
 
Bei Relationskoeffizient zwischen 0,0 und 0,6 besteht also ein signifikanter Unterschied 
zwischen den Zahlenpaaren. 
2 Beispiele 
2.1 Abschätzung von Hochwasserständen 
In den Niederlanden befindet sich 40 % der Landesfläche unterhalb des Meeresspiegels. 
Diese Zahl zeigt die Bedeutung des Hochwasserschutzen in diesem Land. Um Schutzbau-
werke gegen Hochwasser zu errichten ist die Prognose von Hochwasserständen erforder-
lich.  
Für die Abschätzung von sturminduzierten Hochwasser in den Niederlanden gibt es eine 
Vielzahl von Verfahren und Veröffentlichungen. Die Verfahren lassen sich in der Regel in 
zwei Gruppen einteilen: rein stochastische Verfahren oder Mischverfahren, die sowohl 
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deterministische Zusammenhänge als auch stochastische Eingangsparameter berücksichti-
gen können. Beide Verfahrensarten müssen sich einer gewaltige Aufgabe stellen: nämlich 
der beachtlichen Extrapolation von Daten für die Bemessung von Dämmen. In der Regel 
wird ein Hochwasserpegeln mit einer Rückkehrperiode von 10.000 Jahren herangezogen. 
Die längsten Messungen von Hochwasserpegeln liegen bei ca. 130 Jahren. Im vorliegen-
den Fall wurden die Regional Frequency Analysis für Messungen an der niederländischen 
Nordseeküste verwendet, um die Datenmenge durch die Vermengung der Messungen an 
verschiedenen Küstenorten zu erhöhen.  
Anschließend wurde für die Häufigkeit der Hochwasserpegel eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsver-
teilung gewählt. Basierend auf zahlreichen Vorarbeiten, die u.a. eine GUMBEL, Exponenti-
al-, Weibull- oder Logistische Verteilung nennen, wurden eine Exponential- und eine 
Logistische Verteilung gewählt. Für diese Verteilungen wurden die Verteilungsparameter 
basierend auf den Daten nicht mittels Maximum-Likelihood, wie üblich, sondern mittels 
Regressionsverfahren für Graue Zahlen berechnet (GM 1). Es zeigte sich, dass die errech-
neten Werte zum Teil deutlich über den bisher ermittelten Werten lagen (Abb. 2). Weitere 
Angaben zu der Berechnung finden sich bei PROSKE & VAN GELDER [21]. 
 
Abb. 2:  Prognose von Hochwasserpegeln mittel Grauem Exponential Modell (GM 1), 
Grauem Verhulst Modell und der klassischen Exponentialverteilung 
2.2 Identifikation von Schädigungen in Baukonstruktionen 
Die Anwendung des Grauen Relationskoeffizienten soll am Beispiel der Identifikation von 
Schäden an einem Kragarm gezeigt werden. Grundlage für die hier vorgestellte Untersu-
chung waren Vorarbeiten von CHEN, ZHU & CHEN [3]. Untersuchungsgegenstand ist ein 
Kragarm, der verschiedenen Belastungen unterworfen wird. Die dabei auftretenden Ver-
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formungen sollen an zwölf verschiedenen Stellen des Kragarmes erfasst werden. Zunächst 
werden die Messungen am unbeschädigten Originalsystem und anschließend am beschä-
digten System durchgeführt. Ziel der Untersuchung ist die Identifizierung von lokalen 
Schäden am Kragarm. Unter Schäden werden Bereiche mit einer überdurchschnittlichen 
Abnahme der Steifigkeit unter Belastung verstanden. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass die 
Umweltbedingungen identisch sind. Die Untersuchung hier vorgestellte Untersuchung ist 
allein numerischer Art. 
Zunächst werden die Verformungen im unbeschädigten und im beschädigten Zustand er-
mittelt. Anschließend werden die Krümmungen vereinfacht mittels Differenzverfahren 
berechnet. Weiterhin wird die Differenz der Krümmungen ermittelt, wobei die Minimal- 
und Maximalwerte berechnet werden. Damit kann der Graue Relationskoeffizient be-
stimmt werden. In Abhängigkeit von der Vorschädigung zeigt der Relationskoeffizient 
Veränderungen der Steifigkeiten der einzelnen Elemente des Kragarms an. Die drei Last-
stellungen, denen der Kragarm unterworfen wird, sind eine Einzellast am Kragarmende, 
drei Einzellasten verteilt über den Kragarm und sieben Lasten regelmäßig verteilt über den 
Kragarm. Abb. 3 zeigt nun die mittels Grauem Relationskoeffizienten identifizierten Schä-
digungen bei den jeweiligen Laststellungen (Linien) und die tatsächlich vorgegebene Schä-
digung (Graue Balken) 
Das Problem bei dieser Untersuchung liegt nun darin, dass die Schädigungen oft durch 
andere Einflüsse überdeckt werden. Im vorliegenden Fall wurde deshalb ein sehr starkes 
weißes Rauschen über die Messwerte (Variationskoeffizient 30 %) gelegt. Dadurch wird 
die Identifikation der geschädigten Elemente deutlich schwieriger. Abb. 4 zeigt die Ergeb-
nisse. Während bei den Messungen ohne weißes Rauschen die geschädigten Bereiche 
(Messpunkte) eindeutige identifiziert werden können, gelingt dies bei starkem weißem 
Rauschen deutlich schwieriger. Abb. 5 verdeutlicht den Umfang der Störungen in den Da-
ten durch das weiße Rauschen. Trotzdem scheint der Graue Relationskoeffizient die ge-
schädigten Bereiche identifizieren zu können.  
Bei zwei Lastfällen wird die Schädigung an der Stelle 3 identifiziert. Lastfall 1 und Lastfall 
2 weisen auf eine Schädigung am Messpunkt 5, die nicht existiert. Die leichte Schädigung 
in der Nähe der Messstelle 7 scheint bei allen drei Laststellungen erkannt zu werden. Al-
lerdings wird die Schädigung an der Messstelle 8 vermutet. Auch die Schäden an der 
Messstelle 9 werden weiter nach hinten geschoben.  
3 Ergebnisse 
Das Verfahren der Grauen Zahlen ist eine weitere mathematische Möglichkeit der Behand-
lung von Unbestimmtheit. Die Anwendung wurde an zwei einfachen Beispielen gezeigt. 
Die Frage, in welchen Bereichen die Vorteile des Verfahrens der Grauen Zahlen im Ver-
gleich zu andere mathematische Verfahren zur Erfassung von Unbestimmtheit liegen, er-
fordert aus Sicht der Autoren weitere Forschungsarbeit. 
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Abb. 3:  Identifikation von Schädigungen durch den Grauen Relationskoeffizienten bei 
Messungen ohne weißes Rauschen. 
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Abb. 4:  Identifikation von Schädigungen durch den Grauen Relationskoeffizienten bei 
Messungen mit weißem Rauschen 
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Abb. 5: Verformungsbild des Kragarmes mit und ohne weißes Rauschen 
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